The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
War Coverage and Peace Journalism

Friedens- und Demokratiepsychologie

Band 11

herausgegeben von

Wolfgang Frindte & Wilhelm Kempf

Wilhelm Kempf & Dov Shinar (Eds.)

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
War Coverage and Peace Journalism

Contents

Peace journalism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

An introduction

The geopolitical dynamics of recent years suggest that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lost its major position in the global limelight, and that media coverage and public opinion have moved on to new concerns.[1] In the second decade of the 21st century, public attention and media interest in this conflict have yielded to increased awareness of the globalization of terrorist and anti-terrorist activities that include incidents in the USA, Europe, Asia and Africa; the ongoing crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, accompanied by events in Pakistan and Syria, preceding and following the Iraq war; the consolidation of a Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance under the wings of a nuclear-to-be Iran, a supportive Russian attitude, and possible North Korean involvement (see Demnik 2013); "Arab Spring" events and their regional and global repercussions; the changing local, regional and international positions of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf Emirates, and others; the disappearance – through death, defeat or political retirement – of an older generation of leaders (Arafat, Sharon, Hussein, Mubarak, Gaddafi) and some younger cohorts (Barak, Olmert, Ahmadinejad), with no successors of similar stature[2]; and the collapse of the Oslo treaty and of subsequent peacemaking attempts over more than a decade.[3] Thus, it is no wonder that the "news-value rug" of public attention and media interest has been pulled out from under the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as compared with the higher degrees of news-value enjoyed by previous events, such as the 2005 Israeli pull-out from the Gaza Strip, the 2006 Lebanon war, Hamas' establishment of control over Gaza; continual rocket attacks on Israeli towns, and the IDF operations "Iron Cast" and "Pillar of Smoke".

The militant discourse and actions of Hamas and other radical movements in the Gaza area, and their brutal methods vis-à-vis Israel, Israelis, and Palestinian opponents, have become rather predictable, causing them to lose much of their former news-value. Despite the Palestinian Authority's internal weakening, marked

---

1 See http://listverse.com and other lists for a year-by-year account of top news-stories since the beginning of the century. Also, at the time of writing, on September 22, 2013, the media around the world is being flooded with coverage of the Somali terrorist attack in Kenya. Very little coverage, if any, is being devoted to the present round of Palestinian-Israeli talks.

2 Shimon Peres can be considered an exception that proves the rule; Hassan Rohani might be another.

3 For details, see http://news.yahoo.com/timeline-middle-east-peace-talks-resume-215528929.html.

by economic, political, and leadership crises, some international PR efforts and sporadic acts of terrorism have helped the Authority to keep some media presence and a slightly higher level of news value.

In contrast, radical right-wing government policies and right-wing public opinion in Israel have increased, and a severe erosion of the Jewish state's legitimacy has been expressed loudly and clearly by governments and activist movements, including many former traditional supporters. Notwithstanding some demonstrations and statements by an Israeli peace camp, infringements of human rights have become more frequent and largely ignored by the media; the construction of a separation wall and of thousands of settlement housing units was accelerated; anti-Arab legislation, both within and beyond the current Israeli borders, was introduced and enacted in the Knesset; and semi-official Israeli organizations and non-governmental hooligan militias have enjoyed an almost uncurbed freedom to burn Palestinian crops, desecrate Moslem and Christian religious sites, trespass on and vandalize Palestinian property, and physically attack non-Jews in the neighborhoods and streets of East and West Jerusalem, Hebron, and other areas. Such "more of the same" news proved unable to maintain the former high news value of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since 1948.

This state of affairs has encouraged us to take a retrospective look at questions of conflict, war and peace coverage, taking advantage of the fact that the chapter authors in this volume have contributed articles relevant to the entire first decade of this century and beyond, from the years when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was breaking news up to the present. The longitudinal nature of this retrospective look might have productive implications for explaining the loss of interest in the conflict and related issues. Examples include the case studies by Mandelzis (chapter 5), Ross (chapter 8), Baltodano et al. (chapter 9), Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10), and Gaisbauer (chapter 11) on media framing and the representation of issues and leaders. Another example is Shinar's look at the problematic media coverage of the conflict in 2003 (chapter 4), followed and to a large extent confirmed by a worldwide overview ten years later (chapter 1), which reflects other works pointing in the same direction, such as Ben Ami's[4] (1991, 2013); and the account by First & Avraham (chapter 6) and First (chapter 7) on the coverage of Israeli Arabs in 2003 and 2010.

More direct references to peace journalism can be found in Kempf's critical assessment of the German press and its audience (chapter 2) and in the last part of the book, which studies audience reactions to differently framed news stories about the establishment of a Palestinian state (Peleg & Alimi, chapter 12, and Kempf, chapter 13), and the interaction between recipients' individual frames and media frames of news stories about Palestinian suicide attacks and Israeli military operations (Kempf & Thiel, chapter 14, and Thiel & Kempf, chapter 15).

---

4 Professor Shlomo Ben Ami is an Israeli historian, a former ambassador to Spain and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Barak government (2000-2001).

In addition to the intrinsic value of longitudinal analyses, the joint publication of this collection might contribute to refreshing the research agenda on conflict coverage and peace journalism. Analysis of these texts, together with others published in *cco* and elsewhere, given the changing international situations, can be helpful and thought-provoking, posing relevant new questions, even if definitive answers may still not be available. Furthermore, it can encourage not just established scholars to embark on new research projects. A wide range of ideas can hopefully be developed on the basis of this volume for a "bank" of topics for masters and doctoral dissertations that could enrich the current agenda.

The present volume can be useful in studying questions on levels of conflict relevance in the media; in inquiring about the persistence of a war orientation in media culture and performance, and about the extent to which the media have "matured" enough to change this normative orientation in favor of an increased contribution to peacemaking and peacekeeping. It can help us to analyze the impact of the previous questions on thought, research and action in peace journalism; on how much progress has been made or could have been made to enable peace journalism to achieve its goals; and on the reasons for the achievements and failures of peace journalism in the last decade. More focused analyses might deal with:

Conceptual questions on the *psychological* and *cultural* levels. In line with Kempf's study in chapter 2, the former can focus on the mental models according to which the media and their audiences take an interest in and understand the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The cultural level can include attempts to interpret the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the context of broader historical and political frameworks. One such model emphasizes the cultural nature of the conflict, as presented by Shinar in chapter 4. It might serve to help explore changes in media perspectives, a decreasing emphasis on conflict resolution and reconciliation and could help us recognize the difficulties involved in such a Western-inspired dogmatic "problem-solution approach". An additional perspective could focus on conflict management and transformation, even when resolution is impossible or almost impossible. Another alternative could be an approach in which coverage emphasizes the ideologies and actions of emerging religious, ethnic and other cultural groups and coalitions (Ben-Ami 1991, 2013). This approach could serve to update the early post-colonial emphasis on unstable independent states established within artificial geographical, ethnic and religious borders where ancient hatreds and antagonisms prevail. Considering how such trends arise and are treated by peace journalism can stimulate thought-provoking questions, e.g., on how to reduce the current emphasis of peace journalism research and training on inter-state conflicts and to increase the emphasis on intra-state conflicts. This is exemplified by the studies of Lee & Maslog (2005) on the Asian press, Tayeebwa (2012) on Northern Uganda, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) on Rwanda (see also Thompson 2007).

Questions related to changes in media attitudes, norms and dilemmas in relation to war and peace coverage. Contemporary research does not focus on the significant changes in the way the media prefer to understand and frame conflict. The prevalence of older definitions of news-value and the lack of emphasis

on the promotion of peace is suggested in Shinar's contributions (chapters 1 and 4) and in the case studies on framing by Ross (chapter 8), Baltodano et al. (chapter 9), Kempf (chapter 2), Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) and Gaisbauer (chapter 11). Even Al-Jazeera, the "new kid on the screen" since the Iraq war, has apparently been compromising professional reporting standards in order to take political positions. This is shown at the very least by the mass resignation of the network's Egyptian correspondents because of Al-Jazeera's allegedly spreading blatant lies, taking one-sided positions and favoring one of the parties to the conflict in Egypt.[5]

Questions related to media action or the lack thereof, such as**:** To what extent has the increasingly asymmetric nature of war (see Shinar & Bratič 2010) – in which regular armies have found it difficult or impossible to defeat militias and armed movements – become more interesting to the media, in line with the "loss of appetite" that democratic powers and superpowers have developed for taking military action, as illustrated at least in the cases of Syria and Iran? Did the international media adopt the narratives of interested governments during the international unfolding of the Syrian crisis, particularly during President Obama's reflections on defining a relevant point of reference? To what extent if any did the media focus solely on the issue of chemical weapons and prefer to ignore the massacre of tens of thousands of Syrians and the mass exodus of about two million Syrian refugees to neighboring countries?

Questions related to old and new actors in conflicts, including**:**
1. *Leaders:* In the first stages of the post-colonial era the viability of new states largely depended on dictatorial leaders (Ben Ami 1991, 2003). Related questions at present are, for example, whether leaders or at least their portrayal and performance in the media, can promote stability (and perhaps peace)? Can peace initiatives, processes and efforts improve the images of leaders and countries in the media and for their audiences, as suggested by Mandelzis in chapter 5? And can leadership styles – such as Abbas' versus Arafat's (and the Palestinian Authority versus Hamas), Obama's versus Netanyahu's and versus Putin's, Ardogan's versus Assad's, or Rohani's versus Ahmadinejad's – contribute to the news-value of peace efforts?
2. *Minorities* in conflict-ridden areas: In line with the "discovery" of Israeli Arabs and the development of their new level of consciousness, as discussed by First in chapter 7 and, together with Avraham in chapter 6, the emergence of minorities as political movers and shakers in the Middle East deserves attention by the media and their audiences. Relevant questions in this area could include: How do the media portray (if at all) the differences between Sunni and Shia all over the Middle East? Between Syrian rebels and Alawites? Between Palestinians and Bedouins in Jordan? Between Salafists and Copts in Egypt? Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran? Sa'adi, Saff al bahar and Tu-

---

5 See http://www.aawsat.net/2013/07/article55309195; http://gulfnews.com/news/region/egypt/al-jazeera-correspondent-in-cairo-quits-1.1206719; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=na_kGkXw8ok

aregs in Libya? Northern and Southern Yemenite tribes? Majorities and mi-
norities in Lebanon? Can the partition of the Sudan into a traditional Arab-
Moslem state in the North and a new mostly Christian state of Southern Su-
dan serve as a model for what might happen in Middle Eastern countries
whose populations lack a common history and are divided by ongoing ethnic
and tribal rivalries? Has the media coverage of such issues matched their im-
portance?

3.   *Protest movements*, such as the various permutations of the Tahrir Square
     upheavals, and of the Syrian rebels; and the roles of the new internet-based
     social media – Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, etc. – as mobilizing agents; as
     pressure valves for venting public dissent and protest in dictatorial as well as
     in democratic regimes (see references to this issue in chapter 1); and as
     weapons of propaganda and disinformation.

Questions related to discourse and representation in war and peace cov-
erage, ranging from the lack of a media peace discourse (Shinar, chapters 1, 3
and 4) to the role of metaphors in war coverage.
Thus, Shinar (chapter 3) points to the absence of a peace discourse in the media
and the use of substitutes (war discourse, trivialization, ritualization to represent
and frame peace), while Gavriely-Nuri (2008) uses the 2006 Lebanon War to an-
alyze the flexibility and efficacy of exclusion mechanisms to frame political events,
particularly war, in abstract concepts; and the power of using metaphors to neu-
tralize negative images of controversial issues (e.g., war) and transform them into
consensual events. The intensive use of war-normalizing metaphors annihilates
war and frames it as a 'normal' event, an integral part of Israeli daily life, despite
the ca. 3970 rockets fired into Israel and the massive Israeli bombing of Lebanon.
The analysis of media war reporting in the US and Canada, detailed by Baltodano
et al. in chapter 9, shows that this is not merely a local or regional practice, but
that there is a cultural convergence rather than divergence in war reporting prac-
tices in different countries.

Questions on war coverage and peace diplomacy. While the above examples
of media discourses date mostly from the first decade of this century, a number
of cases in the current second decade, such as those of Syria and Iran, and perhaps
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, might raise questions about war-related and peace-
related "media talk" and official "diplotalk". How is diplotalk covered in the media?
To what extent might the media reveal (or conceal) complicity in the unfolding
wars of messages of recent years?

Questions concerning the aims of peace journalism. Even if we agree that
peace journalism comes into existence when editors and reporters become aware
of their contribution to the construction of reality and their responsibility to 'give
peace a chance' (cf. chapter 2), the question still arises: What concept of peace
does peace journalism have, in general, and what kind of concept is suitable in
the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular? Is the goal the end of war?
Is it conflict resolution? Is it reconciliation? Taking into account that cultural con-
flicts are very difficult, perhaps impossible to resolve, Shinar (chapter 4) suggests

that we should understand the peace process as a process of conflict transformation (Lederach, 1998) that transforms destructive conflict behavior into a more constructive course of action. Building upon research in Political Psychology, Kempf (chapter 2) suggests that peace journalism can facilitate this process by counteracting competitive misperceptions (Deutsch 1973) and societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1998) that are constitutive for the media war discourses that fuel conflict. In trying to transform a war discourse into a peace discourse and ultimately into a reconciliation discourse, peace journalism must be careful, however, not to arouse unrealistic and illusory expectations. The performance of the Israeli media before and after the failure of the Oslo process as analyzed by Shinar (chapter 4) and Mandelzis (chapter 5) can serve as a cautionary example for how the premature adoption of an overly optimistic discourse may give rise to disappointment, frustration and, in the end, the revival of war discourse and action. As Mandelzis concludes, "transformations from the habit of war to the norm of peace require a gradual de-construction of stereotypes" and "cannot be achieved by simply adopting a new political discourse and ideology that idealize cooperation".

Questions concerning the strategy of peace journalism. Transforming media discourse should unfold in a gradual process. As long as the societal beliefs that help society members to endure ongoing conflict remain dominant, there is a risk that the conflict parties will rashly dismiss any solution-oriented (or even transformation-oriented) coverage as implausible or even as hostile counter-propaganda. For this reason, Kempf (chapter 2) suggests we restrict peace journalism efforts during the hot phase of a conflict to de-escalation oriented coverage which avoids creating the misperceptions mentioned above, takes a critical distance from belligerents of every stripe and makes the public aware of the high price that violent conflict imposes on participants and bystanders alike. According, to Kempf, during this phase of a conflict the chief aim of peace journalism can only be to find a way out of the fixation on violence and mutual destruction and to deconstruct the conflict parties' antagonistic conceptions of reality. Nevertheless, how far peace journalism can and should go at each stage of a conflict remains an open question (cf. Bläsi 2009).

Questions concerning the transformation of enemy images. Mandelzis (chapter 5) reports that even during the Oslo peace process no news or any background information about Palestinian culture was presented to the Israeli public. During the various conflict events whose coverage was analyzed by First & Avraham (chapter 6) and First (chapter 7), the portrayal of the Arab population in Israel still contributed to the alienation of Arabs from their citizenship as Israelis. Although there were differences between the media and across the years (from 1976 to 2007), and although there has been some change for the better, the distinction between "us" and "them" has persisted in Israel. Demonstrations against discrimination, deprivation, and land expropriation (as claimed by the organizers) were predominantly framed as provocative actions by marginal groups with ties to the enemy (1976). At the onset of the Second Intifada, the Arab citizens of Israel were portrayed as identifying with the Palestinians in the territories, and their

civilian status was emphasized only after some had been shot (2000). The attempts of Israeli Arabs to initiate a discourse on their rights met with fierce opposition (2007).

Examples like these suggest the need to end the relegation of the "other" to the mere status of an enemy. We propose that this could involve a long-term process in which peace journalists would serve as a supportive vanguard.

Questions concerning the scope of peace journalism. Azar & Cohen (1979) warned that if stereotypes and prejudices are merely suppressed, they persist below the surface of social discourse and reemerge when the opportunity presents itself. Drawing on their work, Mandelzis (chapter 5) argues that the deconstruction of stereotypes can only proceed gradually by building a strong civil society. Taking this into account, the question naturally arises of whether the focus of peace journalism on conflict coverage isn't too narrow. We must ask, then, what other topics should be introduced into media discourse in order to anchor the deconstruction of competitive misperceptions and destructive societal beliefs within a civil society discourse? Studies on German press coverage of France after World War II (Jaeger 2009) suggest that the coverage of cultural issues (literature, music, theater, etc.) may be suitable for counteracting and overcoming the dehumanization of (former) enemies. Likewise, Rivenburgh (2009) has identified discursive spaces for peace in media-sport narratives. More research is needed in order to identify further issues that may help to construct a media frame able to broaden the image of the "other" beyond his role in conflict: history, cultural traditions, social problems, etc.

Questions concerning the international media landscape. National media discourses are not independent of the international media environment. Due to their greater distance from conflict events, international media have a range of possibilities for serving as mediators to conciliate opponents, deconstruct their antagonistic (mis)perceptions of reality and/or support beginning peace processes. Due to their greater distance from conflict events, the media not only have great freedom of action in terms of open-minded reporting, overcoming prejudices and reducing enemy images, but also in terms of avoiding overreaction (Kempf 2003). However, as the case studies in chapters 8 to 11 show, various factors might restrict their ability to perform this mediating role. How peace journalism can cope with these factors is still an open question that needs both theoretical consideration and empirical research.

1. One of the factors to be taken into account is *the subordination of conflict to strategic interests*, as identified by Ross (chapter 8) in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 events. At that time, *New York Times* editorials framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to a U.S. Strategic Interests frame that tied the conflict to President Bush's war on terror.

2. Taking into account that Israel is the most important U.S. ally in the Middle East, it can be assumed that U.S. strategic interests also play an indirect role in the *uncritical adoption of* pro-Israeli *war frames*. While quite a number of editorials used a unilateral Israeli Need for Justice frame, a comparable Palestinian Need for Justice frame was found in none of the editorials. Although

both frames were similarly frequent, Ross found a qualitative difference between the Israeli Aggression frame, which tended to justify Israeli violence, and the Palestinian Aggression frame, which portrayed the Palestinians as members of an antiquated, murderous caste, consumed by old hatreds, stoking tensions with peace-loving Israelis, and intent upon driving the Jews into the sea.

3. The strong *tendency to identify* with Israel also weakens the mediating potential of those frames that (at first sight) seem to embody peace journalism principles. There is the Dual Justice frame, which recognizes that both sides have legitimate interests, but represents the need for Palestinian sovereignty and security as less substantial than the corresponding Israeli security interests. There is also the Feuding Neighbors frame, which portrays both sides as committing violence against innocent bystanders and acknowledges a two-sided dynamic of violence that must be broken, but tends to justify Israeli violence as necessary for its self-defense and to place the blame solely on the Palestinian side.

4. *Win-lose logic.* Baltodano et al. (chapter 9) compare U.S. and Canadian coverage of the Palestinian presidential election in January 2005, the Israeli pull-out from Gaza in August 2005, and the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006. They find only occasional and at best inadequate attempts at de-escalation oriented coverage. Narratives in which peace is a possibility appeared only occasionally, and even then the recommended solution was framed as a zero-sum game that requires one of the parties to yield to the other's will. Consensus, compromise and creative cooperation were not presented as realistic options.

5. Comparing the coverage of the Second Intifada and the Gaza War, Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) found that the German quality press tried to take a more objective, detached and balanced stance that involves criticizing both sides. Following a pattern of conventional war reporting and due to a *focus on violence and confrontational behavior*, however, it did not really give peace a chance, but merely put both sides in a bad light.

6. At the same time, the particular way the German press tried to balance coverage during the Gaza War points to a certain ambivalence between solidarity with Israel and empathy with the Palestinian side. Due to the seemingly *excessive use of force by the IDF*, there was a pro-Palestinian shift between the Second Intifada and the Gaza War that was, however, moderated by a counterbalancing pro-Israel trend. Anxious not to turn readers against Israel, the press balanced the increased Israeli violence with a more negative evaluation of Palestinian actions and intentions, less emphasis on Israel's superior military power, a stronger focus on the justification of Israeli actions and the portrayal of Israel as taking a defensive position.

7. This *counterbalancing of a reporting situation unfavorable for Israel* was also found in the study by Gaisbauer (chapter 11), who analyzed the representation of victimization and responsibility during the two conflicts and found a reversal in the victim roles and a convergence in the perpetrator roles from

the Second Intifada to the Gaza War which was counterbalanced by an in-creased focus on Israeli civilian victims, while Palestinian civilian victims re-ceived less attention than during the Second Intifada.

More than any other struggle, the Middle East conflict confronts peace journalism with the problem of how to be critical toward the conflict behavior of all sides with-out inciting hostile and/or – as in the present case – even anti-Semitic attitudes. Whether unequal media treatment of Israelis and Palestinians in the international press is an effective means to curb the temptation to anti-Semitism must be ques-tioned, however. It may instead provoke a backlash and make existing anti-Semitic prejudices and stereotypes salient (cf. chapters 2, 10 and 11).

Questions concerning audience reactions and the effects of peace jour-nalism. Audiences aren't simply passive media receivers, they make their own sense of the news items they read or view. They integrate presented information into their mental models (or individual frames), and this affects both the issues directly touched on by the information presented by the media and issues related to it only via the structure of their mental models. This effect is not uniform, and thus the results of the experiment discussed in chapter 13 indicate that the par-ticipants' *a priori* mental models were more powerful predictors of how they would change their assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than variables such as their political orientation, personal views, relevance attribution and knowledge of the conflict. In contrast to the Israeli study by Peleg & Alimi (chapter 12), a Ger-man replication by Kempf (chapter 13) failed to demonstrate any effects of text framing, however.

To explain these differences, Kempf assumes that mental models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not only a *cognitive* component (positioning to the con-flict: according to a war frame or a peace frame), but also an *affective* component (the emotional ambivalence of both frames: between security and threat). He also concludes that the framing effects observed by Peleg & Alimi were due to the *se-lective activation* of competing mental models that were both available to the Is-raeli participants, who (at the time of the experiment, and regardless of its inadequacies) had lived through a peace process lasting over a dozen years. Not directly affected by the conflict, the German participants can be assumed to be less ambivalent, and many Germans do not even have an *a priori* position on the conflict.

These conclusions are further examined in experiments by Kempf & Thiel (chapter 14) and Thiel & Kempf (chapter 15) which presented German recipients differently framed articles about Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations.

Consistent with prior studies that dealt with other conflict contexts (Bläsi et al. 2005, Jackson 2006, Kempf 2008, Möckel 2009, Schaefer 2006, Sparr 2004, Stun-tebeck 2009), the results of the experiment indicate that the German public gen-erally accepts media *peace* frames as more comprehensible, less biased, more balanced and less partisan than media *war* frames of the same events. As expect-ed, the specific ways participants respond to the frames are not uniform, however,

but instead depend on their positioning to the conflict and on their sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace in the Israeli-Palestinian context (chapter 14). Media frames that were incompatible with participants' *a priori* positioning were rejected as less comprehensible, more biased and less impartial; the stronger the recipients' positions were in favor of one side, the more they regarded reports about this side's committing violence as expressing partisan support for the opponent. At the same time, this sensitivity for the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims (Herman & Chomsky 1988) was closely related to participants' awareness of the ambivalence of war and peace. Recipients who merely recognized the Israeli security dilemma and/or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel were insensitive to the propaganda function of reports about Palestinian violence. While these participants also regarded pro-Israeli media frames as more comprehensible, less biased and less partisan, recipients who recognized both sides' behavior as ambivalent regarded pro-Israeli frames as more biased and less impartial.

Furthermore, the findings on framing effects (chapter 15) demonstrate that both media frames and individual frames (*a priori* mental models) had a direct effect on how participants assigned meaning to the news stories they read. The effects of media frames and individual frames were not linear-additive, however, and particularly the effects of media war frames diminished if they were incongruent with participants' individual frames.

Altogether, the findings in chapter 12 to 15 speak in favor of the peace journalism project. De-escalation oriented peace frames are appreciated by audiences, and while limited by their *a priori* understanding of the conflict, in general they have a moderating effect on how recipients interpret the reported events and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even so, we should not be overly optimistic. The more they positioned themselves in favor of one side, the more recipients tended to regard even media peace frames as partial (cf. chapter 14). A group of participants who had already *a priori* positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame translated the media peace frame of reports about Israeli violence into an escalation oriented pro-Palestinian frame (cf. chapter 15).

Changes in attitudes and behavior do not happen overnight, and the effects of isolated news items are limited. Nonetheless, we can expect that in the long run peace journalism can exert a moderating influence on societal discourses. To find out more about this, long-term studies could be helpful, but they are difficult to make. Moreover, (with the sole exception being chapter 12), the experiments presented in this volume were conducted only with German participants. Thus, there is a need for more studies that evaluate the acceptance by and effects of de-escalation oriented coverage on Israeli and Palestinian audiences.

Questions concerning journalistic ethics and/or the role of journalists. Along with the above questions that call for more theoretical development of and (empirical) basic research on peace journalism concepts, there is an urgent need for rethinking the philosophy of peace journalism. Already, Loyn (2008) and Hanitzsch (2008) have warned against the (mis)understanding of peace journalism as a program of advocacy journalism that oversteps the thin line between journal-

ism and public relations and/or peace propaganda and thus becomes the opposite of good journalism. Since then there have been some worrying new developments within the peace journalism movement. In a most dramatic way, Johan Galtung's alleged anti-Semitic bias[6], as well as Jake Lynch's academic boycott of Israeli scholars[7], demonstrate the dangers of role-diffusion between journalists and would-be peace-makers. As mentioned in chapter 2 of this volume, creating one's own conflict resolution plan and designating an evildoer who is allegedly to blame for its failure can easily promote enemy images and partisanship for those regarded as the victims of the evildoers. If peace journalists fall into this trap, they can easily forget all they have ever learned about how to do their job as quality journalists, and – perhaps worse – about conflict dynamics as well. Sustainable conflict transformation processes cannot be imposed on conflict parties from outside, and all that peace journalists can (and should) do to promote peace is to help to overcome destructive reality constructions that fuel conflict.

The campaign of "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel" can serve as an example of this problem. Even if they regard it as "a non-violent and effective strategy to help end Israeli impunity and move towards the realization of the Palestinians' rights" (as Lynch's supporters claim[8]), it cannot be the task of peace journalists to become entangled in such partisan activities. Their task is to inform the public about them, and to work against oversimplification in the sense of portraying the conflict as a struggle between the "good" (whose rights ought to be respected) and the "evil" (who should be punished) or – to the contrary – as hostility targeted against Jews or Judaism. Their task is to inform the public about issues, such as the controversial discussion of and partial support for the campaign among members of the Israeli peace camp and among Jews in other parts of the world. Their task is to inform about the pro and contra arguments for the campaign and to warn against a blanket identification of all Israelis with the failed policies of the Israeli government, and – on the whole – to provide a forum for a comprehensive discussion of all the issues that need to be considered.

Questions concerning the institutional development of peace journalism. Since its emergence some four decades ago, some issues in the institutional development of peace journalism have remained unclear. The present volume offers a good opportunity to encourage peace journalism supporters, as well as critics and opponents, to clarify such issues. This can facilitate viewing the development of peace journalism in the frame of an essential sociological feature of institutionalization processes, namely that they should be accompanied by clear normative, professional, structural and functional differentiation.

The need to clarify such aspects includes, first, questions of identity, such as asking *what peace journalism should be* in the twenty-first century: an ideology, a professional field, a discipline, or a combination thereof? Is it true that so far peace journalism has been characterized more by an ideological and activist ori-

---

6   See http://www.jpost.com/International/Swiss-group-suspends-anti-Semitic-Norway-scholar
7   See http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4778144.html
8   See http://www.communityrun.org/petitions/support-jake-lynch-s-academic-boycott-of-israel-and-end-usyd-s-collaboration-with-the-technion

entation and by training activities and lecture tours on its behalf, and less by the number and status of researchers in the field, and by media professionals defined by themselves and others as peace journalists? How well have the theoretical and practical frameworks of peace journalism been able to meet 21st century needs? Is peace journalism a branch of peace studies, of social psychology, or of communication and media studies?

Second, what would be the best and the most attractive, productive and honest division-of-labor among peace journalism visionaries, theorists, media professionals, activists, researchers, teachers and trainers, and their target audiences?

Third, and finally, it seems necessary to clarify organizational questions, such as how and where support, criticism or rejection of premises and views can be voiced and presented to a competent and successful peace-journalism community? Have centralized efforts, such as the generous support in the past by the Japanese Toda Institute, offered a viable model? To what extent is a better option a decentralized pattern, such as that of peace journalism centers and institutes distributed worldwide, or the loose and free-for-all framework of IPRA?

Wilhelm Kempf & Dov Shinar

Berlin and Jerusalem, November 2013

Part I

The role of the media

Reflections on media war coverage: Dissonance, dilemmas, and the need for improvement

Dov Shinar

1.   The media like war

Research on conflict coverage reveals a long-standing preference for war in the printed press, radio and television (Shinar 2003 [cf. chapter 4], Wolfsfeld 2004). As early as 1898, just before the Spanish-American War broke out, the *New York Journal* envoy to Cuba, photojournalist Frederic Remington spent a few days in lively Havana. Without sensing any signs of war, he cabled his boss saying, "there will be no war, request to be recalled". The boss, press tycoon William Randolph Hearst, cabled back: "Request denied. Please remain. You furnish the pictures, I'll furnish the war". Regardless of the doubts over its accuracy, this episode illustrates the media preference of war and the pursuit of this interest. In line with Hearst's papers' sensationalist style, later baptized as "yellow journalism", his New York Journal carried out an aggressive campaign, blaming the Spanish for the mysterious sinking of the American battleship Maine in Havana harbor, in addition to allegations of torture and rape of Cubans by Spanish forces. At present, it is widely believed that the explosion on the Maine was due to a fire in one of its coalbunkers. Nevertheless, the coverage of the incident together with a daily torrent of horror stories, served to steer public opinion and to pressure Republican President McKinley into a war he had wished to avoid (Beede 1994, Corbett 2012a, b).

More recent literature displays a similar tendency, including coverage of the first and second World Wars; and conflicts in South East Asia; the Middle East; the Gulf; the Balkans; Chechnya; Afghanistan; Africa and Latin America (Corbett 2012a, b; Pilger 2010, Bläsi 2004, 2009; Knightley 2000).

Two examples are highly illustrative. Before, during, and after the April-July 1994 Rwandan genocide, *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM)[1] became an iconic symbol of media promotion of hatred and violence in that country. Run by Hutu majority government agencies, that popular radio station openly called for the extermination of the Tutsis, enhancing a climate of hostility that encouraged genocidal mass killings. Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) concludes that access to such

---

1   French for "One Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television", deriving from the description of Rwanda as "Land of a Thousand Hills".

broadcasts served to increase organized and civilian violence; that they caused approximately 10% of the participation in genocidal violence; and that some 50,000 deaths can be attributed to the broadcasts. Tayeebwa (2012) corroborates this evidence and adds information on hate media in the 2009 Northern Ugandan crisis.

The ethnic and religious strife in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s provides further evidence of such preferences. Nationalist propaganda disseminated by major media channels sponsored by the Milošević regime in Serbia, has enhanced violent attitudes and behaviors on the part of civilians against rival minorities; and later recollections of such propaganda have served civilians to justify unacceptable behaviors (Shinar & Bratič 2010, Volcic 2006). Likewise, Croatian journalists used global discourses of violence to justify and legitimize war crimes in the coverage of the war in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia (Erjavic & Volcic 2007, Kurspahic 2003).

2. Media attitudes and behaviors

Professional critique and academic research provide information on institutional, organizational, personal and professional aspects of the media preference for violence and war. Schechter (2006) offers a critical analysis of this preference by U.S. media organizations in the Iraq invasion.

Ottosen comments "that it is interesting to see how both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* one year after the War in Iraq started, apologized to the readers for misleading them and then taking responsibility for being a part of the war preparation" (Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 12). On a more general vein, Andersen (2006) argues that the history of the struggle between war and its representation has changed the way wars are fought, and the way stories of war are told: information management has developed together with new media technologies; computer-based technologies have transformed the weapons of war; and media images have turned war into entertainment.

The media tendency to incite and ignite rather than to appease is another dimension of this scene, as documented in research and professional writings. The former includes works by Kull et al. (2003-04), Shinar (2003) (cf. chapter 4), Wolfsfeld (2004), Volcic (2006), and others. The latter is illustrated by reports such as Pekusic's for the Belgrade *Southeast European Times* (January 10, 2012), entitled: "Media war crimes under investigation in Serbia: The Belgrade prosecutor's office says trials are forthcoming for the journalists who are responsible for inciting 1990s war crimes in the former Yugoslavia". *SETimes* states at the same date that according to the prosecution, media propaganda in the former Yugoslavia was a prelude to the ensuing armed conflict. Bläsi (2006, 2009) analyses institutional and professional constraints that affect journalists in conflict coverage, such as media structures, conflict situations on-site, individual journalists' personal features, political climate, lobbies, and audiences in different stages of conflicts. Based on interviews with German journalists who covered conflicts in the Gulf War, the Balkans, Chechnya, Rwanda, Liberia, Indonesia, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, and

Iraq, he argues that it might be easier to improve the coverage quality of the violent stage through investing efforts toward more accurate reporting of the "pre-violence phase". Further research is required to supply more evidence to support this proposition.

Finally, current research displays several types and degrees of media involvement in conflict:

1. *pro-active involvement*, such as Hearst's, and *Radio Mille Collines'*;
2. *"passive compliance"* with governmental authorities, such as in the My Lai massacre in 1968, reported from Vietnam by freelance Seymour Hersh, but not by the mainstream media, even though some journalists and media executives knew about this and similar atrocities (Corbett 2012a, b; Pilger 2010);
3. *cooperation* with government agencies, as revealed in the correlations found by Kull and his associates (2003-2004) between audiences' misperceptions about the war in Iraq support for the war, and individuals' primary source of news. Viewers of US government-supportive *Fox News*, for example, displayed more misperceptions and support for the war;
4. *embedding*, i.e. contractual relations of journalists and media outlets with governments and armed forces' agencies that provide journalists with access to and relative personal protection in war events, in return for their vaguely defined "fair" coverage (Ignatius 2010, Goodman & Cummings 2003).

3.   Why is that so?

Professional environments, political contexts, and economic constraints provide some explanations of media attitudes and behaviors in conflict and war coverage.

3.1 Professional environments

Professionally, conflict coverage has been highly rated in the mainstream media culture because of its nature as a source of prestige and of its openness to discourse that enhances the news-value of war. Both factors encourage journalists to represent realities in vivid colors and clear-cut polarities, primordial sentiments and the thrill of the unexpected. They allow reporters and editors to prefer the emotional over the rational and to emphasize glory and heroism, thus satisfying classic news value requirements: live coverage immediacy, dramatic action, simplification of events, personal stories and victory or defeat results (Corbett 2012a, b); Shinar 2011, Nohrstedt 2009). Thus Wolfsfeld (2004, 15) states that conventional news values are so grounded in conflict to the extent that "when peace appears to be taking hold in a particular area, it is time for journalists to leave". Such conventional news values include a sacrosanct set of norms that dictates the use of frames such as immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism. Since journalists cannot afford to be in the "business of waiting" (p. 16), the immediacy frame

captures events and specific actions rather than processes and long-term policies. The drama frame demands violence, crisis, conflict, extremism, dangers, internal discord, major breakthroughs rather than "calm, lack of crisis, cooperation, moderation, opportunities, internal consensus and incremental progress". The simplicity frame favors "opinions, images, major personalities, two-sided conflicts; while ideology, texts, institutions, multi-sided conflicts are less newsworthy. Under the ethnocentrism frame news is "our beliefs, our suffering, their brutality", and what is not news is "their beliefs, their suffering, our brutality" (ibid).

Such coverage has been criticized for de-sensitizing the audience to the gory details of war, for blending news with views, and for ignoring facts and contexts. This is how media war coverage becomes a form of entertainment rather than a quest for information (Buntig 2004, InfoRefuge 2003). One excellent illustration is the comment made by an American correspondent one night during a US air raid over Baghdad, about the thrill caused by the "fireworks" that lit up the sky[2]. Moreover, the evolving public status of media organizations and journalists in war coverage has benefited from the fact that they have become direct actors in international relations: they exchange information with policymakers and field actors, they provide channels for dialogue between belligerent leaders; and they often ignore the distinction between the roles of reporter and actor. The resulting media culture has thus tended to emphasize fighting parties, manifest violence and sportslike "us" versus "them" attitudes; and visible events and results, winners and losers, rather than longer and complex processes. In addition, it has made it easier for governmental agencies, such as the military, to manipulate the media (Shinar 2011, Nohrstedt 2009).

However, cases of rebellion against manipulation, and of less biased reporting should not be ignored. Thus, frustrated by Pentagon manipulation of the media during the Gulf War, *CBS*'s Bob Simon and his three-man crew began making unauthorized forays from the press center in Dhahran to the front. Regardless of the fact that in their last trip they were taken war prisoners by Iraqi troops, and spent forty days in a Bagdad jail (Simon, 1992), this episode reflects professional attempts to resist pressures imposed on journalists. On another line, Rosen (2010) and Hammock (2010) recognize the merits of a contextual journalism new trend in some of the traditional and newer media, and quote illustrations for this trend. Another example is the worldwide award winning documentary "Precious Life", produced by Israeli TV correspondent Shlomi Eldar in 2010, in which he reports on the efforts to have a Palestinian baby taken out of Gaza during the Cast Lead operation in the Winter of 2008-9, in order to give him lifesaving treatment in an Israeli hospital. The film manages to escape the propaganda war, and to show dilemmas, radical positions, and a human approach that is often missing in war reporting (www.preciouslifemovie.com).

The question remains, however, whether such few instances are not the exception that proves the rule.

---

2   Shown in Schechter's video and script that accompanies his book (2006).

3.2 Political contexts and controls

Not surprisingly and not exclusively, media political contexts are active both in to-
talitarian regimes, and in democratic open societies. While it is true that the media
are controlled by coercion and censorship in the former, less obvious manipulative
practices have been making progress in the latter (Shah, 2005). Thus, in 2005,
the White House admitted to producing videos designed to look like news reports
from legitimate independent journalists, and then feeding those reports to media
outlets ready to air on the evening news. In April 2008, the *New York Times* re-
vealed a secret US Department of Defense program launched in 2002 that involved
using retired military officers to implant Pentagon talking points in the media. They
were presented as "independent analysts", while the fact that they were briefed
beforehand by the Pentagon was concealed. Also, in line with developments in the
media world, it was revealed early in 2012 that the US government had contracted
with a private firm to develop software that create fake social media accounts so
as to steer public opinion and promote propaganda on popular websites (Corbett
2012a, b). Pilger (2012) & Knightley (2000a) express similar criticism for the United
Kingdom media political context.

3.3 Economic constraints

Insofar as media economy is concerned, radical and moderate critics perceive the
media preference of violence and war as highly correlated with the influence of
the profit-making, rating-hungry, scoop-hunting basic media structures, particu-
larly but not exclusively the private ones (Mc Chesney 2000; Herman & Chomsky,
1988). Nohrstedt (2009) points out the economic breakthrough given by wars to
media organizations, such as the Gulf War to *CNN* and the Iraq War to *Al-Jazeera*.
Such claims are illustrations of a media economic imperative that works together
with the technological and the professional ones. A second important aspect is the
increasing economic facet of war coverage as entertainment. Raymond Federman
(1997) wrote a sarcastic "letter to a friend" about the Gulf War being the best TV
show of the year, and Jean Baudrillard (2001a) made an ironic claim that the war
did not happen, but was just a media production. More specifically, Billig's (1995)
notion of banal nationalism might have inspired Bunting (2004) to indirectly refer
to the economic imperative in terms of the barbarism and banality involved in the
interruption of news items that show images of death and suffering with tasteless
out-of-context advertisements for consumer goods. On the other hand, a rather
paradoxical result of the economic imperative appears in studies that link market
pressures with the shrinking coverage of war (Ricchiardi 2008).

Such professional environments, political contexts and controls, and economic
constraints together with the pressures and prejudices of journalists, editors, and
producers on the ground provide the context for dissonance and dilemmas in war
coverage. While war coverage is a classic case of convergence and coincidence of
the institutional and personal normative levels, dissonance refers mostly (but not

exclusively) to institutional and organizational issues, and dilemmas refer mostly (but not exclusively) to professional and individual aspects.

4. Dissonance

The preference of conflict is a central feature in the institutional DNA of the media. This implies high and multiple correlation levels of media psychology, culture, economy, and technology on one hand, with violence and war on the other. Such correlations can encourage the emergence of institutional and personal dissonance, such as:

a) Between *patriotic/ethnic and professional allegiances*: Evans (n.d.) and Zandberg & Neiger (2005) documented a preference of the former, mostly in the early stages of war[3]. This confirms findings of other studies that in the coverage of conflict, particularly when referring to their own countries, journalists are caught between nation and profession, and their belonging to the national community overpowers their membership in the professional one. This leads journalists to relate to an institutionalized sphere of consensus (Hallin 1986), in which they feel free to stop trying to be balanced in favor of a generalized we and take for granted shared organizational values and assumptions (Schudson 2002).

b) Between the former *agenda-setting monopoly* held by the traditional media and the competition raised by the emergence of new media: The printed press, radio and particularly television have traditionally had exclusive control of setting the agenda in society, sometimes on behalf of governments and corporations, and particularly in war coverage. The emergence of new online and social media has reduced this monopoly considerably, as people are increasingly abandoning their former main source of news – newspapers, radio and television – in favor of online channels and as online journalists and bloggers are emerging as a threatening competition. This has been changing the ways in which the public agenda is being set. It is still unclear whether and how online channels affect the media preference for war and violence and to what extent governmental and opposition efforts to use the web will succeed. However, the flourishing decentralized and de-institutionalized new media and the decline of the traditional media monopoly have been worrying the traditional media system (Corbett 2012a, b; Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 30).

c) Between *technological advancement and ethical standards*: The emergence of newer technological developments in the media can pose serious challenges to journalistic ethical standards. Jean Paul Marthoz quotes: "The world is ... reduced to a village; all men are compelled to think ... on imperfect information and with too little time for reflection", and adds, "this sentence is not about the CNN effect but about the telegraph effect; it was pronounced in 1889" (Carpentier & Terzis

---

3   But not only in the early stages of war, as shown by the firing of venerated professionals Peter Arnett and Phil Donahew by their U.S. media employers during the Iraq campaign (see below in the section on *direct pressures and constraints*).

2005, 29). Based on data from their study of the Romanian revolution and the Gulf War coverage, Shinar & Stoiciu (1992, 253) reflect that "technological changes have been so rapid and overwhelming ... that journalists and researchers have been busy chasing them with little time left for understanding the demands they make on the profession". Indeed, the *CNN*-style "rolling news", immediate satellite links, and the on-the-spot 24/7 availability of broadcast materials have made it very tempting to use them before assessing their veracity, significance, and impact. The professional race with their peers in the field and with their own editors has often led journalists to file or broadcast their reports without cross checking the information, out of fear that they will lag behind (Corbett 2012a, b; Nohrstedt 2009, Shinar & Stoiciu 1992). Terzis writes about this dilemma in the Greek and Turkish media: "When my competitor gets the story, how can I miss the story? I know it's one-sided and I know it might not be true and I don't have the time to check the sources" (Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 27). In this sense, it is important to recall the institutional facet of media ethics, presented in Tehranian's comment (2002, 58) that "the locus of most media ethics has hitherto been the individual journalist. But the individual journalist operates in the context of institutional, national, and international regimes ... media ethics must be negotiated not only professionally but also institutionally, nationally, and internationally ... ethics without commensurate institutional frameworks and sanctions often translate into pious wishes".

d) Between *longer and shorter spans of memory*: The media have little or no memory, argues Philip Knightley (2000a). This is plausible, at least based on his critique of the Kosovo NATO campaign coverage. In a rather unusual stance, he suggests that war reporters have short working lives and there is little tradition, motivation or means for passing on their knowledge and experience. The military, on the other hand, plan media strategy with as much attention as military strategy. The Pentagon and Ministries of Defense have manuals updated after every war, which serve to guide the way they will manage the media – as does every other major military power. These military manuals follow basic principles – appear open, transparent and eager to help; never go in for summary repression or direct control; nullify rather than conceal undesirable news; control emphasis rather than facts; balance bad news with good; and lie directly only when certain that the lie will not be found out during the course of the war. In this sense too, one can wonder what implications will be introduced in this area by the increased access to historical materials provided by newer technologies.

5. Dilemmas

A considerable number of professional and individual normative dilemmas surface, based on the earlier discussion. The following presentation of some such dilemmas aims at providing a basis for thought and research rather than being an exhaustive list of problems, reactions, support, suggestions for improvements, criticism and disagreement are bound to enrich this basis. The dilemmas listed here refer to the

adequacy of coverage techniques; to the selectivity of narratives and contexts; to self-manipulation; and to the narrowing of focus and discourse.

5.1 Adequacy of coverage techniques

Dilemmas in this context refer to how to maintain a reasonable critical distance necessary for adequate reporting vis-à-vis the dependence on official sources; the attraction to negative coverage and access and safety problems.

The *dependence of media organizations and journalists on official sources* is a recurring theme in the academic and professional literature on war coverage. The allegation that mainstream media treat information supplied by official sources as fact rather than as just one perspective provides one example. Such dependence leads the mainstream media to fail in presenting context and depth. In reporting the Iraq war, popular mainstream news channels, such as *The New York Times*, *CNN*, and *Associated Press* presented news stories that practically conveyed only the government's message, with little coverage of alternative views and sources that have often challenged official sources (Lancaster 2008). Likewise, Terzis reports on Greek and Turkish journalists' experience that "international affairs reporting depends heavily on the official sources ... dependency on the ministries of defense and foreign affairs is much greater than for example the environmental correspondent, because he can depend on personal experiences and eyewitnesses" (Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 27).

Negative coverage, such as personalizing, negative othering, demonizing or dehumanizing poses another professional dilemma vis-à-vis the professional normative demand for impartiality. Shinar and Stoiciu's accounts about such techniques in the Romanian revolution and the Gulf War (1992), and reports on the genocidal role of *Radio Mille Collines* in Rwanda illustrate this type of coverage (Yanagizawa-Drott 2012, Tayeebwa 2012). They are supported by more recent reports, such as the declaration of Serbian Chief War Crimes Prosecutor that "most local media during Milošević's regime were part of the war machine" whose propaganda goals were "completely to de-humanize opponents in the armed conflict, often threatening their right to life" (Pekusic 2012). And propaganda expert Nancy Snow explains why in the Gulf War, a majority of Americans linked Saddam Hussein to 9/11 because they "were repeatedly told by the President ... that Saddam's evil alone was enough to be linked to 9/11 and that given time, he would have used his weapons against us" (Gutierrez 2004).

Access to and safety in combat zones, are deadly characteristics of war coverage. About one hundred journalists and supporting staff died during two and a half years after the beginning of the Iraq invasion. A similar number of media workers and journalists died in the Yugoslav wars of the1990s. These figures certainly outweigh the sixty-three journalists killed during the Vietnam War, which lasted for twenty years. They illustrate the dilemma in the definition of journalists as witnesses on behalf of the public or legitimate targets (Andersen 2006). This dilemma

has been frequently used and abused by official authorities to deny or curb access of journalists to combat areas (Schechter 2006).

5.2 Selectivity of narratives and contexts

Like many types of journalism, war reporting cannot present every detail of events and processes, but purposeful or negligent deceptive coverage should certainly worry those concerned with the adequacy of war coverage. At times, such short-comings blur the distance between journalism and propaganda, creating dilemmas of incompleteness; inaccuracy; surrender to the seductions of convenience, and ethical shortcomings.

Incompleteness: The lack of access to events, and the consequent lack of full or at least reasonable witnessing explain obvious limits in the provision of details in war coverage. Safety demands are another explanation, based on the need to prevent supplying important information to the enemy. Thus the strict control imposed by US and South Korean authorities on visiting tourists and journalists to the DMZ; or the harsh limitations imposed by Israeli authorities on reporting landing sites of missiles and rockets in the Gulf War, the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2009 Cast Iron and the 2012 Pillar of Defense operations in Gaza[4]. Additional sources of incompleteness include:

- massive information flows together with limited print space and airtime have made it more difficult for journalists to deal in detail with processes and complex topics, and for citizens to make sense of them;
- limited knowledge about the contexts and culture of conflicts and lack of motivation to learn about them has lead reporting to reductionism and simplicity, and has emphasized what is close and what is believed to be known to media users;
- "voluntary and forced cooperation of media institutions and journalists with political and military establishments has made independent journalism less and less feasible and less acceptable ... This ... is increased by ... the commercialization of news (that) leads to subservience to ... official communication policies" (Marthoz, in Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 30f.);
- the lower news value assigned to certain regions and topics have made it difficult for the media to cover complexity. The case of Darfur (and Africa in general) is an example of geography-based lower news value: the crisis started in March 2003, peaked between September and December 2003, and the first big broadcast came in March 2004 (Carpentier & Terzis 2005). Environmental damage caused by war is an example of thematic lower news value. The environment is a major victim of current war reporting. It is practically absent from the coverage, and in the few instances in which it is covered, it usually

---

4   This is the official title of the operation (in Hebrew it is called "Pillar of Cloud"), referring to the belief, recorded in the Bible, that during the Israelites' exodus from Egypt, God took the form of a pillar of cloud during the day and a pillar of fire at night, in order to light their way and to frighten the Egyptian army (Exodus 14:19-20; 14:24; 13:21-22; Numbers 14:14).

appears in less relevant pages and scheduling. This results from the traditional lower news value of environmental coverage in general, from the facts that the topic is complex, and that it demands previous knowledge by journalists and audiences of at least some historical, economic, and cultural backgrounds, and some perspective of its long-term consequences (Shinar 2008).

Inaccuracy: Some incompleteness might be acceptable, given the problems discussed above. Inaccuracy is less acceptable, for both practical and ethical reasons, referring to media organizations' and individual journalists' responses to direct pressures and constraints; seductions of convenience; and ethical shortcomings. The major dilemma in this case is how to provide appropriate coverage under such circumstances.

Depending on levels of democracy, *direct pressures and constraints* range from institutional and organizational directives and from professional and individual peer pressure. Terzis offers some evidence from Greek-Turkish crises reporting: "Greek and Turkish journalists ... feel like soldiers of the national army ... journalists would be fired in Greece and in Turkey ... if they go against the perceived national interest ... legislation exists in Turkey that if as a journalist you speak against the 'national interest', you can be imprisoned. In Greece, you will be fired ... and you will not be able to find a job afterwards ... journalist unions ... (to) protect journalists, are not there ... you want ... not be isolated from the main sources ... you socialize with them ... you don't want to be 'the bad guy' in the group' ... huge peer pressure especially in times of crises ... not to voice other opinions" (Carpentier & Terzis 2005, 25-28).

Greek and Turkish journalists are not alone in this matter. Questioning the US government and Pentagon agenda has resulted in an abrupt end to more than one media personality's career. In 2003, NBC fired Peter Arnett, after he criticized the US policy on the war in Iraq. *MSNBC* fired Phil Donahue in the months leading up to U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although his show was top-rated, he was fired in response to his anti-war opinions and guests. A leaked network report called him "a difficult public face for *NBC* in a time of war ... anti-war, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration's motives ... (and providing) "a home for the liberal anti-war agenda at the same time that our competitors are waving the flag at every opportunity" (Harris 2012). Dan Rather, the iconic *CBS* news anchor for 24 years, told interviewer John Pilger (2010) that in reporting the war in Iraq, "there was a fear in every newsroom in America ... of losing your job ... of being stuck with some label, unpatriotic or otherwise ... that war has made 'stenographers out of us'" This is a view now shared by a number of senior journalists interviewed in the US.

Surrender to the seductions of convenience refers to the levels of inaccuracy accepted by media organizations and journalists to help cope with complexity and financial constraints. The former refers to difficulties imposed by complex items and contexts; the latter to benefits provided to media organizations and professionals. Barstow & Stein (2005) note that together with a continuous demand for news that usually increases in war times, news channels budgets and staff are

shrinking. In the United States alone, some 90 percent of TV newsrooms rely on video news releases, and ready-to-run segments, provided by official agencies and contracted PR firms. This allows many outlets to expand their news coverage without additional costs. It also allows for the dissemination of inaccurate news with less checks and harder traceability, as segments flow through a vast network of distributors and redistributors. Nohrstedt (2009) implies some similarities in the inaccuracy of reports on the Iraq invasion and the coverage of the NATO bombings in Kosovo.

Ethical shortcomings refer to direct breaches of ethical codes, in addition to such aspects in incomplete and inaccurate reporting. It includes the inventing of stories; and techniques of media management, such as the aforementioned practice of releasing and using prepackaged and fake PR segments; paying journalists to promote certain issues or contracting PR firms to feed stories to the press. Inventing stories refer to strategies that increase the attractiveness of the news. Thus, although war atrocities are not uncommon, Evans (n.d.) notes that " the Germans did not ... toss Belgian babies in the air and catch them on bayonets, nor boil down German corpses for glycerin for munitions ... the French did not routinely ... gouge out the eyes of captured German soldiers, or chop off their fingers for the rings on them". These were stories invented by a British correspondent to satisfy his office for attractive news. Iraqi soldiers invading Kuwait in the Gulf War did not toss premature babies out of incubators, as *The Sunday Telegraph* in London, and then the *Los Angeles Times*, reported, quoting Reuters. The story was an invention of the Citizens for a Free Kuwait lobby in Washington (Knightley 2000a). In addition, news of the "massacre of 41 Serbian children" in an elementary school, near Vukovar, published in November 1991, proved very soon to be a fabrication (Pekusic 2012).

Paying journalists and experts to promote certain issues, without acknowledging this or without the media mentioning the sources, is an ethical issue dealt with caution, even in blogs and internet sites. Nevertheless, blogger Justin Raimondo (of www.antiwar.com) talks openly about "a cadre of bought-and-paid-for columnists, publicists, and perhaps even a few 'bloggers'". In a more personal vein, he attacks senior journalists Armstrong Williams and Maggie Gallagher[5] on grounds that these pundits' messages sound like Pentagon press releases. Harris (2012) reports that not long after the Iraq war began in 2003, *CNN* chief news executive Eason Jordan revealed that he had secured the Pentagon's approval for a list of military analysts, mostly retired generals, to provide on-air commentary. PR firms are contracted to sell a war, and to maximize media coverage of particular issues through the careful use of media management techniques, such as "driving the agenda" and "milking the story". This includes, for example, leaking jigsaw pieces of information to different outlets, leading them to piece the story together and

---

5   Armstrong Williams is an American conservative political commentator, and host of a daily radio show and a nationally syndicated TV program. Maggie Gallagher, writer, commentator, columnist for Universal Press Syndicate, and has published five books. Both are known as media pundits, i.e. independent experts.

to drive it up the news agenda (Gutierrez, 2004). One such example is the Washington PR firm The Rendon Group (TRG), a public relations and propaganda firm that as its website[6] states, "for nearly three decades has been providing innovative global strategic communications solutions ... assisting leading commercial, government and military organizations ... active in 78 countries"[7]. Founder John Rendon described himself as "an information warrior, and a perception manager", which in the language of Pentagon planners means "actions to convey and (or) deny selected information and indicators ... to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning" (Rampton & Stauber 2003). Many media outlets are willing partners. Kull et al. (2003-2004) found that the frequency of Americans' misperceptions on the war in Iraq varies significantly depending on their exposure to different news sources. Their analysis of polls conducted in the summer of 2003 found that 48% incorrectly believed that evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda have been found, 22% that weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, and 25% that world public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq. Overall 60% had at least one of these three misperceptions. The following table presents a breakdown of respondents' percentages that had one or more of the three misperceptions listed above, according to their major source of news.

Misperceptions	FOX	CBS	ABC	NBC	CNN	Print	NPR/PBS
None	20%	30%	39%	45%	45%	53%	77%
1 or more	80%	70%	61%	55%	55%	47%	23%

The table presents a clear connection between all commercial TV networks, notably Fox, CBS, and ABC, with misperceptions about the war.

5.3 Self-manipulation

Some academics and professionals hold on to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) media manipulation pioneering model, regardless of the changes taking place in reporting war and in other aspects of international relations. Harris (2012) accepts the model as is, including the filtering agents that determine the news people receive from the media: owners; sources; financial interests; ideology, and flak, namely corporate or government front groups that spin on particular stories or advocate their own point of view or deceptively plant false stories through fake advocacy organizations. Likewise, Shah (2006) & Corbett (2012a, b) believe that in war coverage the media are totally manipulated by official sources and public relations firms that disseminate propaganda as news. Even without pointing out the need to update some details Herman's and Chomsky's model to the post-Cold War era, one must accept the argument that governments and private interests always use one or more of such agents. One can also admit that the press, radio and TV

---

6   http://www.rendon.com
7   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rendon_Group – cite_note-prwatch2001-1#cite_note-prwatch2001-1

do disseminate false and distorted information, probably consciously in some cases. However, media organizations and professionals are not babes in the woods. It is difficult to believe that they are always innocent victims of one-sided manipulation by omnipotent conspiracies. In most cases, they play active and willing roles in the process. In other words, the discussion is not really about evil pressures working on innocent media, particularly in war reporting. The dilemma faced by the media is the extent to which they can afford to go along with well known external pressures, and to what extent they can afford to disregard ethical codes and the public interest (and thus lose at least some credibility) in return for economic and other benefits. This is the media self-manipulation dilemma. Tagged in the early 1990s in an analysis of the Romanian revolution and the Gulf War coverage, it showed how desk editors in America and Europe framed reports from the field to fit their own expectations, and their willing acceptance of governmental, military, political or corporate views as facts (Shinar & Stoiciu 1992). Following Hearst's heritage, and resembling some features of war coverage at present, this pattern finds expression not necessarily in factual materials but in the use of pre-conceived frames, such as:

- *The conspiracy frame* that ranges from Ceausescu and his Securitate's behavior against the Romanian people to similar framings of Saddam, Gadaffi, Mubarak, Assad and others in more recent years.
- *The monster frame* produced by the demonization of leaders, such as Ceacescu, Saddam Hussein, Iranian leaders, and personalities ousted in the Arab Spring. Satanic images promoted by the highest official sources and willfully accepted by the media, range from brutality and torture, to clumsiness and cowardly behavior. Images of crime and punishment, good and evil, freedom and oppression make up the backbone of the legitimacy sought for war.
- *The spontaneous reaction frame* refers to the alleged snowball nature of events, which fits the breaking news style. Again, such framing in the coverage of Romania and the Gulf War, parallels the framing of events in former Yugoslavia, Tahrir Square and in other Arab Spring symbolic sites;
- *The national unity frame* promoted in the Western media coverage of early crises, and often abandoned as the climate becomes chaotic and anarchic (as in Romania, Tunisia, Lybia, Egypt, Syria, etc.).
- *The international community frame,* cherished at the political, economic, and psychological levels by governments, and by the media. Sympathetic portrayals of US-led coalitions have detracted public attention from unpopular facts. Examples include war against former allies (Saddam Hussein; the Taliban; regimes ousted in the Arab Spring); links with and support of undemocratic and oppressive regimes (Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia); poor training and inadequate command of military allies; and economic and political interests that motivated members of coalitions and media organizations to participate in US-led efforts.

Also this professional pattern implies, firstly, that in war coverage, particularly in areas far away from media centers, distinctions exist between field-reporters and

headquarters' desk editors. With or without sufficient factual materials, Western desk editors very often prefer less reliable information that fits their pre-disposi- tions, psycho-symbolic expectations and external pressures rather than reports filed by their own field staff. Self-manipulation is evident in that they tend to con- struct realities that do not deviate from the hegemonic consensus.

Second, in war coverage perhaps more than in other areas, the very trademarks of prestigious media help to legitimize propaganda. Regardless of the message, the sheer prestige of organizations such as *The New York Times*, *CNN*, or *BBC* plays a legitimizing role for selective and segmented information, and this is increasingly effective for governmental media management.

Third, in war coverage, media users get some details rather than full pictures, and are told 'what they mean' rather than what they are. In many cases, this displays the media willing compliance with the official line that promotes rituals of heroism and patriotism, condemnation of disloyal actions and legitimate criticism; reliance on authority; morality and rationality; stereotyping, and others.

Finally, research findings (Knightley 2000b), reveal that both official propaganda and the media prepare users for war in skilful ways, increasing the likeliness that they do not want the truthful and balanced reporting once expected from war cor- respondents. As a result, governments might find further justification for exerting open and covert tighter control of war correspondents and media organizations.

The dilemma is whether ethical considerations and service to the public interest can reduce the media tendency to accept such control in return for commercial and political benefits.

5.4 Focus and range of discourse

The dilemmas of coverage techniques, narratives and contexts, and self-manipu- lation display some built-in focus and discourse problems. The present section adds two dilemmas specifically related to the media openness to discursive pat- terns that enhance the news value of war. They include narrowing the focus and range of discourse, and wording.

Narrowing the focus and range of discourse refers to presenting and discussing issues within a limited range of ideas, opinions, and facts. This approach allows for making judgments on details of given events, processes or issues while curbing broader and deeper substantive frameworks and boundaries of discourse. Indeed, directing focus, deflecting the range of discourse into permitted parameters of de- bate, and using preemptive assumptions[8], appear like democratic debate and dis- cussion, but do not allow for proper deliberation, and encourage the loss of focus (Shah 2005, Eno 2003, Parenti 2001). Following the earlier discussion, media use of biased experts, helps to determine such parameters and assumptions, thus re-

---

8   Media acceptance as given of the very positions that need to be critically examined (Parenti 2001).

inforcing the limits imposed by governmental and military authorities on the range of the debate. Such limits are often systemic, although they might also occur accidentally, and sometimes result from journalists' plain ignorance, lack of attention, or professional constraints, such as space and time limitations. The major dilemma in this sense has to do with the extent to which journalists and media organizations can accept such narrowing.

Wording: Classifications on this matter, such as Delwiche's (n.d.) and Parenti's (2001)[9] clearly point out some of the important dilemmas referring to the use of language in war coverage. They include questions on the extent to which war coverage should use:

Word Games, such as name-calling and labeling people, groups, and institutions in positive or negative terms; glittering generalities; euphemisms, blander meanings, connotations and simple, repetitive and emotional words;

False Connections, such as symbols and imagery of institutions in order to strengthen or weaken acceptance; testimonials; citing individuals and sources not qualified to make the claims made;

Special Appeals, such as plain folks; leaders appealing to ordinary citizens by doing ordinary things; using band wagon effects and the "everyone else is doing it" argument; heightening, exploiting or arousing people's fears to get support for one side, and opposition and hatred for others; and

Logical fallacies, such as bad logic or unwarranted extrapolation. These factors affect ethical standards and provoke dilemmas of coverage adequacy; framing selectivity of narratives and contexts; difficulty to detect fabrications/lies, manipulation and self-manipulation; and narrow ranges of discourse and focus.

6. Nine implications for the improvement of war coverage

This closing section offers implications from the preceding diagnostic sections on the media preference of war and violence, their attitudes and behaviors; their professional, political and economic contexts; and on media dissonant dimensions and dilemmas in war coverage.

The first implication calls for reconsidering and encouraging the updating of media war coverage both conceptually (regarding aspects such as news-value, objectivity, ethics, and the like), and professionally (regarding techniques, use of technology, discourse, legitimacy of varied views and narratives). This could be done in joint symposia, conferences, and training efforts (see below) with the participation of journalists, officials and researchers experienced in war coverage, such as gath-

---

9   Parenti's classification (2001) includes suppression by omission, "attack and destroy the target", labeling, pre-emptive assumptions, face-value transmission, slighting of content, false balancing, follow-up avoidance, and framing. For detailed categories, see his www.propagandacritic,com website.

erings sponsored by a variety of media-and-peace-related institutes and founda-tions, relevant NGOs, academic institutes, and professional associations. This might be a slow process, with unknown results. The chances of success might have increased since the social media have joined the traditional press, radio, and tele-vision. Such new media and networks, particularly facebook, you-tube, and twitter – seem to be better equipped for early warning, airing events in real time, revealing intentions, exposing, mobilizing, and compensating for the limitations of the tra-ditional media. Their use during clashes and crises[10] could be encouraged.

In this context, questions on the extent to which this implication differs from peace journalism principles are natural. A concise response is that efforts to achieve this goal are increasingly becoming better equipped with evidence based on research and practice from the field, and with experimental applications, thus improving the arsenal of arguments offered by the rather ideological work conducted by Galtung and his disciples. Moreover, while the peace journalism guidelines advocated by Galtung and others can be accepted in principle, the methods offered by the orig-inal peace journalism model have not produced a significant genre in journalism since their advent some forty years ago. The low acceptance rates of these meth-ods and their limited effectiveness have been recognized and criticized on the grounds of their radical ideology; their weak theoretical and empirical bases; their sectarian, closed club structure; and their missionary efforts at professional re-ed-ucation (Shinar 2011, Hanitzsch 2004a, b).

An additional argument calls for challenging the increasing number of journalists and researchers critical of Galtung's model to suggest new experimental trends and adapt the model to the 21st century. Good leads in this direction include Julian Assange's wikileaks and other models based on new technologies, the developing contextual journalism trend (Hammock 2010), revealed shortcomings in current conflict, peacemaking and peacekeeping coverage.

The second implication calls for recognizing the shortcomings of local and inter-national media, not only in totalitarian but also in democratic environments. In the former, the ability of traditional local media to influence, expose or mobilize is lim-ited, although not entirely blocked, as documented in the historical Iranian revo-lution and Palestinian national awakening (Shinar 1983, 1987) and in the ongoing Arab Spring. This emphasizes the importance of international and social media. Also media control in totalitarian regimes is easy to identify, for its usually blatant and crude methods. In democratic societies, they are harder to grasp. Thus, it is important to identify media control practices in democratic societies, particularly in the coverage of more recent wars and conflicts. In addition, this implication is an opportunity for recognizing that the concept of media literacy needs to depart from its traditional focus on the traditional printed press, radio and TV, on quite older and to some degree irrelevant expectations from journalism, and on rigid Western-based definitions of democracy. An updates effort could be made to study

---

10   See, for example John Pilger's (2010) combined use of text and video segments run in you-tube.

and experiment with technological, economic and normative changes in the journalistic profession, with particular reference to war coverage.

The third implication calls for encouraging gradual and cumulative reporting rather than immediate and explosion-like coverage, emphasizing

- predictive and interpretive reporting based on unbiased expertise, experience, and openness to a wide range of official and critical assessments;
- constant attention to possible and emerging eruptions of war and violence;
- early warnings, accompanied by immediate reactions, and consistent follow-up;
- awareness of the advantages offered by the new media for such roles: while the traditional media instill a sense of controlled, closed networks, the newer media enhance the activation of networks open for all.

The fourth implication calls for adopting, developing, and demanding thick coverage, in the spirit of anthropologist Clifford Geertz's thick description, a tool to rescue thoughts, meanings, actions, feelings, deeper motives, and details about the surroundings of people or phenomena. Thick coverage is process-oriented rather than event-centered; demands context, background knowledge and understanding; resolves as much as possible professional contradictions and dilemmas that affect the coverage; and does not narrow focus and discourse. It stands in contrast with parachute journalism that refers to reporters who drop into a country for a relatively short period, file a story or handful of dispatches, and then leave. This is an unflattering term, based on the sense that an outside journalist, usually a well known media celebrity, who stays in a country or town for just a short time is unlikely to have a sufficient feel for the area's political and cultural landscape. Lack of knowledge and tight deadlines often result in inaccurate or distorted reports, especially during breaking news. Unlike reporting by expert foreign correspondents active in the locale for a longer time, critics contend that parachute journalists misrepresents facts, display ignorance of contextual issues, lack proper contacts; are not able to conduct independent investigation; and often use the only information immediately available from other news organizations or from official or bureaucratic sources, which might be propaganda agencies.

Even though this might be difficult to implement fully and immediately, one could recommend to start working this strategy in terms of developing and experimenting with working definitions (i.e. change news value concept, increase respect for audiences, experiment with new media), and introducing the concept in the professional agenda.

As mentioned above, providing "thick training" to media students and young journalists could be a positive step in this direction. It could be based on teachers imparting and students acquiring knowledge and skills on the roles, techniques, and organizations of traditional and new media, on their current shortcomings, and on ways to improve their performance in war coverage. Scholarly and professional works as well as projects run by international organizations, such as Search for

Common Ground and other NGOs, UN agencies, universities, and relevant institutions could take part in such active media literacy efforts.

The fifth implication calls for the adoption, by established media, of constant and consistent routinization, legitimization, and cooperation with civic, fringe, blog, and even outcast journalism, such as represented by Michael Moore, Danny Schechter, Julian Assange, John Pilger and others.

The sixth implication calls for assisting journalists in Western and other countries to resolve dilemmas of media rhetoric, particularly those related to focus and range of discourse, and to wording. It also calls for efforts to develop a media peace discourse (Shinar 2004) as an improvement of classic peace journalism. Academic research and emphasis on training older and younger journalists in this respect could serve to update the marked focus on training by Galtung's disciples.

The seventh implication follows lessons from the reporting of 21st century conflicts and calls for redirecting Galtung's ideological concentration on professional reeducation to promoting ongoing field monitoring and empirical research that might help uncover incitement and hate-media as well as to document ethical infringements in Western and other countries. This could serve to legitimize and encourage the remarkable ongoing progress of empirical research on war coverage and peace journalism in Third World countries, as showed by Lee and Maslog on Asian media (2005), Tayeebwa (2012) in Africa, and others.

The two final implications refer mostly but not exclusively to the post-war establishment of media structures, regulatory frameworks, and the production of adequate post-war contents. Accordingly, *the eighth implication* follows the premise that the use of media as weapons of war can lead to the development of new post-war media structures. Many NGOs and grassroots activist communities have become increasingly influential in both conflict and post-war times through creating their own coverage, as illustrated by their prominent presence on websites, by their use of professionally designed publications, and by the development of their own audio and video broadcasts. Examples from Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Israel-Palestine show the importance of such media structures. Following pressures of international powers, post war Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a laboratory of peace-oriented media regulation, resulting in an increased post-war ratio per capita of radio and television stations in Bosnia. Major media projects emerged, aiming to promote adequate media structures, such as new television and radio networks, and new frequencies and licenses that transformed the former ethnic broadcasters into a Public Broadcasting System. In Kosovo, the media responded to the conflict much in the same fashion, following the international community initiative to set up a national television and radio system, and strict regulation of hate broadcasting (Shinar & Bratič 2010). These examples might lead the way to additional initiatives.

Finally, *the ninth implication* calls for the production and dissemination of postwar adequate formats and contents. Examples include the Israeli-Palestinian jointly operated *All for Peace Radio* that has been successfully producing and broad-

casting joint-produced news and programs in Arabic and Hebrew. In former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the *Common Ground News Service* has been providing information produced by local and international experts, on and to conflicting parties, such as syndicated articles, analysis, and op-ed pieces. In order to counter the organization of the media along ethnic lines, Common Ground initiated joint reporting teams and ensured that each joint-written article be published identically in the different papers. The organization initiated the production and broadcasting of radio and television programs intended to build consensus on contentious issues, such as television series looking at the lives and concerns of ordinary people, with particular attention to successful efforts to rebuild post-war economy and society (Melone et al. 2002).

2

Peace journalism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the German press and the German public[1]

Wilhelm Kempf

1.   Definitions of peace journalism

> There's a war between the ones who say there is a war
> and the ones who say there isn't.
> (Leonard Cohen, There is a War)

Media contribute to the social construction of reality, on one hand, by introducing specific topics into public discourse (agenda setting; McCombs & Shaw 1972) and, on another, by presenting these topics (framing; Goffman 1974) in such a way "as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993).

Similarly, Jake Lynch & Annabel McGoldrick (2005, 5) provided a compact formula for what peace journalism (PJ) is about when they defined it as follows:

"Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict."

As a formula for the aims of PJ, this definition is quite comprehensible. As a working definition, however, it lacks precision and can easily be (mis)understood as a program of advocacy journalism that requires active contributions by reporters to peaceful conflict resolution (Loyn 2008) and entails overstepping the thin line between journalism and public relations (Hanitzsch 2008).

As a consequence, (if not war) at least antagonism has broken out between those who support the PJ concept and those who do not. Many journalists, such as David Loyn, fear that PJ could compromise their integrity and their role as neutral disseminators of information, and they feel they are under attack when "the advocates of Peace Journalism … lump everyone else together … as 'War Journalists'" (Loyn 2008, 61).

When Annabel McGoldrick (2008) launched her attack on journalistic objectivity, the situation worsened. Critics of PJ refused to give up the quality norms of journalism and accused PJ of being the opposite of good journalism (Loyn 2008).

Understanding myself as one of the pioneers of PJ, I must admit that they are not completely wrong: If PJ understands itself as an advocacy journalism that disregards journalistic quality norms, it is in danger of not only deteriorating into the opposite of good journalism, but also of jeopardizing its own goals and becoming a journalism of attachment.

Partisanship in the name of peace, creating one's own conflict resolution plan and designating an evildoer who is allegedly to blame for not adopting this plan – these can easily promote enemy images and partisanship for those regarded as the victims of the evildoers. Accordingly, it was no surprise when one of the most popular advocates of PJ posted a couple of anti-Israeli blogs during the Gaza War.

2. The need for peace journalism

> All we are saying is give peace a chance.
> (John Lennon, Give Peace a Chance)

In order to avoid these dangers, I propose that we modify Lynch & McGoldrick's definition as follows:

Peace journalism is when editors and reporters are aware of their contribution to the construction of reality and of their responsibility to "give peace a chance."

Even if we adopt this definition, however, the critics of PJ may still cling to the view that PJ is at best meaningless (Loyn 2008), or perhaps just old wine in new bottles (Hanitzsch 2008), and they may still deny the need for PJ, "since most of the legal framework, and the codes of conduct for journalists, written by trade unions and responsible employers, provide a sufficient framework which prescribes what journalists can do and what they cannot do" (Loyn 2008).

Regarding this point, however, they are definitely wrong. The codes of conduct for journalists are definitely *not* sufficient to guarantee high quality journalism that is neutral, objective and unbiased.

1. As countless media content analyses have demonstrated, the mainstream of war reporting has an escalation-prone bias, and so-called quality journalism does not live up to its own norms.
2. Even though most journalists try to do a good job, they often fail and end up doing biased reporting and – in the worst case – a sort of conflict coverage which looks like war propaganda plain and simple.

Journalists don't just report facts, they also give them meaning. And even if they try to report truthfully, they can only write what they personally believe to be true.

However, journalists are members of society, and they often share the same beliefs as other members of their society.

Particularly in long-lasting intractable conflict, however, these societal beliefs include, among others, beliefs about the justness of one's cause, one's victim role, the delegitimizing of the enemy and the defense of personal and national security through a policy of strength. According to Bar-Tal (1996), it can be assumed that these societal beliefs can be found in any society engaged in intractable conflict, especially in those that successfully cope with it. They are necessary for enduring intractable conflict, and any nation at war, therefore, tries to create and maintain these beliefs by means of propaganda.

Nonetheless, they are not just an ideology imposed on society from outside or by its political leaders, nor are they just the result of misleading propaganda. They arise from a long history of experiences with concrete conflicts at a high level of escalation, and they are constituted as a generalized interpretation of these conflicts. Once these beliefs have emerged in a society, they provide a framework (war frame) that literally interprets every interaction with the opponent as another event in the great historical drama of the struggle between "good" and "evil".

In order to give peace a chance, journalists need to distance themselves from these beliefs and replace them with a different interpretative frame (peace frame) that acknowledges the justification (of at least some) of the interests of the other side, recognizes mutual victim roles, ends the delegitimizing of the opponent and strives to achieve personal and national security through a peaceful solution (Kempf 2011a).

3.   How Germans frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

> He's the Universal Soldier and he really is to blame,
> his orders come from far away no more,
> they come from here and there and you and me.
> (Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)

The escalation dynamics of conflicts are decisively influenced by whether a conflict is interpreted as a competitive or as a cooperative process. Competitive conflicts have a tendency to expand and escalate and go together with typical misperceptions (Deutsch 1973) that become motors of conflict escalation and – in the long-run (Kempf 2003) – solidify into the above-named societal beliefs.

The members of a society directly affected by a conflict are not the only ones who develop such beliefs. Outsiders trying to make sense of a conflict in which they are not themselves engaged will also interpret it either in the sense of a peace frame (win-win model) or of a war frame (win-lose model). How a person positions himself toward a conflict – which side he takes, e.g., in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – thus depends essentially on the mental model he forms of the conflict.

Particularly in Germany, the way people position themselves toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is quite ambivalent, however. The World War II lesson of "never again fascism, never again war" implies a tendency to adopt the Peace Frame (never again war). But, it is ambivalent with regard to human rights. "Never again fascism" can be interpreted in two ways:

1. as support for the *victims of National Socialism*, which implies a tendency toward unconditional solidarity with Israeli policy and a weakening of the peace frame. This can go so far that it turns into a war frame: (never again fascism, *therefore* war), as was the case (in part) in 1990/91 Gulf War discourse (Kempf 1994), or
2. as support for *human rights worldwide*, which implies rejecting at least some aspects of Israeli policy and includes solidarity with the Israeli peace movement and at least a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side. Although this tends to strengthen the peace frame, it also poses the danger of adopting the war frame and siding with the Palestinians.

The results of a recent survey (Kempf 2011a) demonstrate that this danger is quite real. One of the aims of the survey was to reconstruct the mental models according to which people in Germany interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Starting from the conception that mental models have not only a cognitive, but also an affective aspect, we designed three separate scales for participants' "concern about the conflict," their perception of the "ambivalence of war and peace" for both Israelis and Palestinians, and their "positioning with regard to the conflict." As a first step, we identified typical response patterns for each of the three scales, and in a second step, we then inferred the participants' mental models by identifying the meta-patterns in which they combine concern, ambivalence and positioning.

Concern: The results of the survey showed that the more they are concerned, the better the participants consider their knowledge of the conflict to be. The more participants feel affected by the conflict, the fewer there are who do not feel attached to one side or the other, the more there are who have visited Israel and/or the Palestinian territories, the more there are who have had personal contact with Israelis and/or Palestinians, and the more there are who have Israeli and/or Palestinian friends, relatives or acquaintances.

Ambivalence: With increasing concern, participants' sensitivity for the ambivalence of war and peace changes from empathy for Israel's security dilemma via uncertainty about whether peace can offer Israel security, to recognizing the ambivalence of peace for both parties, to regarding the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel, to naive pacifism: "peace is good, war is evil", and finally to uncertainty as to whether war is really very bad for the Palestinians.

Positioning: At the same time, the dominant position participants take to the conflict shifts from no position at all via an ambivalent peace frame with sympathy for Israel to an ambivalent peace frame with sympathy for the Palestinians, to a polarization between a pro-Israeli war frame, pro-Palestinian peace frame and a pro-Palestinian war frame.

From this point on, the participants' positions switch to the Palestinian side: The (mainly) naive pacifists interpret the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian peace frame on the edge of a war frame, and the participants who are most concerned about the conflict and – at the same time – do not fear that Palestinian violence is an obstacle to the establishment of a Palestinian state interpret the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian war frame.

Comparing the results of our representative study with those of a (non-representative) pilot study, we also found that there was a dramatic shift in the way participants position themselves to the conflict. From one year after the Gaza War (November 2009 – February 2010), when the data for the pilot study were collected, to the months after the Israeli navy's seizure of the Free Gaza ship (June 2010 – November 2010), when the data for the survey were collected, the share of participants who interpreted the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian peace frame decreased dramatically, and instead there arose a group of participants who interpreted the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian war frame. In our pilot study, we did not find any such group.

4.   How to do peace journalism

> And brothers can't you see,
> this is not the way we put the end to war.
> (Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)

If journalists are to give peace a chance, they need some easy-to-follow guidelines for how to do this, and for many journalists and peace researchers, Galtung's (1998, 2002) famous table which contrasts PJ with conventional war journalism seems to offer such a guideline. As a guideline, however, it has some crucial shortcomings:

1.   It creates a simple dualism between PJ, on the one hand, and War Journalism, on the other.
2.   It only describes the outcome of the two approaches.
3.   It does not tell us *how* to reach our goal.

Both the antagonism between those who subscribe to PJ and those who do not, and the tendency to understand PJ as a variant of advocacy journalism that deliberately disregards the norms of quality journalism are simply logical consequences of these shortcomings.

PJ should be employed, but it is not helpful to expect journalists to distance themselves from the dominant beliefs of their society. Societal beliefs are part of a society's ethos, and they are also part of the psychological infrastructure that enables societal members to hold up under the stress of war (Bar-Tal 1996). They construct society members' views of conflict in a way that seemingly proves the truth of the stereotypes and prejudices that foster these views (Kempf 2003), and the only way

to break out of this vicious circle is to learn to accept the facts before they are interpreted (Martin-Baró 1991).

Only if a society does this can conflicts that persist after a peace treaty or that arise during peace processes be understood in a way that gradually overcomes prejudices and transforms a war culture into a more constructive social contract between former enemies.

- The first rule for journalists who aim to facilitate such a process of social learning, therefore, is to *mistrust the superficially plausible*.
- And the second rule is to *ask the right questions*.

A peace or reconciliation discourse is *not* a discourse *about* peace or reconciliation, and especially not a discourse that harmonizes contradictions or suppresses conflicts. It is a matter of *how* to deal with conflict. Correspondingly, the best way to characterize the various discourse forms in which journalists may engage is in terms of the questions they focus on.

- In *war discourse*, it is a matter of "Who is guilty?" and "How can they be stopped?"
- *Peace discourse* asks, "What is the problem?" and "How can it be solved?"
- And when a *reconciliation discourse* is appropriate, the focus is on questions such as "Who is the other?" and "How can we meet each other with mutual respect?"

The choice of a suitable discourse form is essential for the developmental dynamics of peace processes, and – as Lea Mandelzis (2007) has shown in the case of the Oslo Process – mistakes in choosing a discourse form can easily create overly optimistic expectations. Their disappointment can spread ill-feeling in the population and ultimately has the consequence that the discourse turns into a renewed war discourse.

For this very reason, it would be inappropriate to engage in a reconciliation discourse during the 'hot' phase of a conflict. If journalists manage to maintain a critical distance from belligerents of every stripe and make the public aware of the high price violent conflict imposes on *all* participants, they have already accomplished a lot. Proposals for solutions are a delicate matter at this stage of a conflict, however, and there is a risk that societal members will rashly dismiss coverage as implausible or as hostile counter-propaganda. Therefore, in this phase the chief aim can only be to find a way out of the fixation on violence and mutual destruction and to alert the public to an external viewpoint that can deconstruct the conflict parties' antagonistic conceptions of reality.

Once this is accomplished and the parties no longer automatically perceive every voice for moderation as hostile, PJ may enter into a constructive process and focus coverage on the question of how to start peace processes and how to build peace.

5.   How the German quality press frames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

> And he knows he shouldn't kill,
> and he knows he always will.
> (Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)

In every escalating conflict, there comes a point when the parties start to seek allies and to divide the world into those who are "for us" and those who are "against us". PJ doesn't have any easy solutions for such situations. Quality journalism cannot refrain from reporting issues that are unfavorable to one party or the other and, in the light of increasing sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the German public, it is not surprising that German media are often accused of providing one-sided reportage on the Middle East conflict and displaying narrow partisanship for the Palestinian position (cf. Anti-Defamation League 2002b, Jäger & Jäger 2003, Wistrich 2004, Krämer 2010).

Criticism like this should not be taken lightly. In order to decide whether there is a growing pro-Palestinian bias in the German media, we compared the coverage of the second Intifada and the Gaza War in the big five German national quality papers which cover the entire political spectrum and are generally regarded as representative for the German media landscape (cf. Wilke 1999): *Die Welt* (DW), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR) and *Die Tageszeitung* (taz).

The results of our study (cf. chapter 10) demonstrated that media coverage of both conflicts was much more complex and differentiated than assumed by critics, and during the Gaza War the German quality press likewise did its best to avoid taking the Palestinian side.

The press tried hard to satisfy the quality norms of journalism and to report in an objective and detached manner. In many regards, it maintained a uniform distance from both conflict parties, it was quite critical of both sides' policies, and it tried to make clear the pluralism of both societies.

Nonetheless, the coverage of the two wars did not really live up to PJ as defined above, and the results of our study showed the negative impact of the news selection mechanisms that Galtung blamed for the escalation-prone bias of conventional war journalism as early as 1998.

1.   Due to the news factor "social, cultural, historical proximity", more was reported on the Israelis than on the Palestinians. Only with regard to victims (and due to the actual number of victims) did the German papers report less about Israel than about the Palestinians.
2.   Due to the news factor "negativism", German coverage was dominated by negative news. It focused on the employment of force, the victims of violence, as well as on the conflict parties' confrontational and threatening behavior and thus put not only the Palestinians, but also Israel in a bad light.

In this context, Israeli actions were more often criticized than those of the Palestinians. Israel's strength and confidence of victory, competitive logic, its confrontational behavior and threats to it were more often reported than on the Palestinian side. This makes Israel appear extremely powerful and uncompromising and could possibly favor a "David versus Goliath" image that encourages solidarity with the Palestinians.

Trying to provide balanced reportage, however, the German media neutralized this negative effect by displaying a measure of understanding for Israeli policies, so that on balance Israel came off looking better than the Palestinians.

1. Israel was more frequently portrayed in a defensive position than were the Palestinians, and the threat to Israel was more often thematized.
2. Israeli actions were more often justified, Israel's rights were more often acknowledged, and not only Israel's cooperative behavior, but also its readiness for cooperation were thematized more often.

Due to the different nature of the two wars, during the Gaza War the reportage situation tended to shift in favor of the Palestinians, however.

1. There were more frequent reports on threats to the Palestinians and on Palestinian victims than during the second Intifada, and the calculation and comparison of victim statistics was more frequent.
2. Cooperative behavior, offers of cooperation and threatening behavior were less often thematized for both sides, and the focus of the reportage shifted to Israeli use of force, on the one side, and confrontational Palestinian (political) measures, on the other.
3. While the focus on Palestinian use of force declined during the Gaza War in favor of a competitive logic and confrontational behavior, during the Gaza War Israeli use of force was focused on about twice as often as during the second Intifada. Thereby an impression was given of an increasing asymmetry between Israel's (excessive) use of force and the Palestinian's (mere) political confrontation.

Thus, the media image of Israeli actions during the Gaza War was more negative than during the second Intifada, and that of Palestinian actions, in contrast, not quite as negative as previously. This partial leveling of the differences between the representations of the two parties' actions was, however, probably due more to the facts and the specific characteristics of the two wars than to bias in favor of the Palestinians.

Quite to the contrary, differences in German reportage on the two wars indicate a clear tendency to tone down a reporting situation unfavorable to Israel.

1. Also, during the Gaza War, Israel's behavior was still less negatively represented than that of the Palestinians.
2. Israel's seemingly excessive use of force was balanced with reportage that justified Israeli actions, increasingly represented Israel as taking a defensive position and less often thematized Israel's superior military power.

3. To be sure, the frequency of justifications of *both* conflict parties' actions decreased during the Gaza War, but the judgment of Israeli intentions and actions did not change in comparison with the second Intifada and also remained largely positive during the Gaza War.
4. Instead, reportage on events that could turn readers against Israel was counteracted by a negative shift in the evaluation of Palestinian intentions and actions.
5. Thereby the imbalance between the two parties increased in favor of Israel. Whereas during the second Intifada Israeli behavior was justified somewhat more than twice as often, during the Gaza War this rose to four-and-a-half times as often.

This asymmetry between increased portrayal of Israeli use of force, on the one side, and increased justification of Israeli actions, on the other, is also mirrored in the punctuation of the conflict and the representation of its victims.

1. Thus, during the Gaza War reportage on victims and numbers of victims admittedly shifted in favor of the Palestinians, but this was counteracted in that Israel (relative to the Palestinians) was increasingly represented in a defensive position, and Israel's superior military force was (relatively) less often thematized.
2. Although the amount of coverage devoted to the two sides was not as dramatically unequal as during the second Intifada, during the Gaza War the threat to Israel was still represented more than twice as frequently as that to the Palestinians.
3. And although both parties were less often represented in a defensive position during the Gaza War, the ratio between the two parties shifted in favor of Israel. While Israel was represented twice as often in a defensive position during the second Intifada, this rose to more than three times as often during the Gaza War.

Summarizing these results, we can state that the coverage of the German quality press did not meet the standards of PJ.

1. While the press aimed at objective, detached and balanced coverage, it tended to follow the pattern of conventional war reporting (cf. focus on violence and confrontational behavior), which did not really give peace a chance but merely put both sides in a bad light.
2. Moreover, the particular way the press tried to balance coverage during the Gaza War produced a tension between a reportage situation that could favor pro-Palestinian solidarity among readers, on the one side, and a framing of the reportage that was favorable to Israel, on the other.

On the background of German-Jewish history and precaution against the rise of a "new" Israel-centered anti-Semitism, this way of "balancing" is quite understandable. But it may also provoke a backlash and even make existing latent anti-Semitic prejudices and stereotypes salient: Prejudices from the repertoire of *latent* anti-Semitism – e.g., "One [i.e., the German press] is not allowed to say what one really

thinks about the Jews." – or insinuations from the repertoire of *manifest* anti-Semitism – e.g., "International Jewry has a firm grip on the German press and dictates how it has to report."

6.   How the German public copes with media frames

<div align="right">
You don't believe in war,
but what's that gun you're totin'?'
(P. F. Sloan, Eve of Destruction)
</div>

According to the present state of framing research, media frames do not have a linear effect on public opinion. The effects of framing result more from the interaction between media frames and the a priori mental models (individual frames) with which people make sense of the issues covered by the media. Depending on the recipients' mental models, partisan war journalism may also produce a backlash, and either we should not be overly optimistic about the potentially positive effects of PJ.

In a recent experiment (cf. chapter 14) we confronted the participants in six experimental groups with differently framed reports on either Israeli or Palestinian violence: A Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv in April 2006 and an Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip at the end of February and beginning of March 2008.

Using original material from the German quality press and based on Kempf's (2003) model of escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage, each of these scenarios was framed either

- according to an escalation oriented pro-Israeli war frame which condemns Palestinian violence and/or justifies Israeli actions, or
- according to an escalation oriented pro-Palestinian war frame which condemns Israeli violence and/or justifies Palestinian actions,
- or according to a de-escalation oriented peace frame which focuses on the costs of war for both sides.

In accordance with previous studies (cf. Bläsi et al. 2005, Spohrs 2006, Schäfer 2006, Möckel 2007), the results of the experiment were quite encouraging for PJ. The participants generally evaluated the peace frames as more understandable, less biased, more balanced and more impartial.

Nonetheless, these effects were not uniform.

1.   Due to their sensitivity to the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims (cf. Herman & Chomsky 1988), participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or on the edge of one) rejected reports about Palestinian violence as biased in favor of Israel, and conversely, those who interpreted the conflict according to a pro-Israeli war frame rejected reports about Israeli violence as biased in favor of the Palestinians.

2. As well, participants dismissed media frames that were incompatible with their own positioning to the conflict as less understandable, more biased and partisan in favor of the opposing side.
3. Moreover, even participants who themselves interpreted the conflict according to a peace frame projected the Israel-friendly bias of German mainstream coverage onto the media peace frame and regarded it as somewhat biased in favor of Israel.

7.   Summary

Summarizing both the theoretical considerations and the empirical studies that I have presented in this paper, I conclude that the norms of quality journalism are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the production of quality journalism during conflicts and crises. In order to give peace a chance,

1. journalists need to refrain from the media's focus on negative news
2. they need to refrain from a superficial balancing of their reports, and
3. they need to mistrust the superficially plausible, refrain from oversimplification and ask the right questions.

If they succeed, they will find an audience that appreciates their coverage as more understandable and less biased, more impartial and more balanced than conventional war reporting.

Nonetheless, we should not be over-optimistic about the beneficial effects of PJ. In an antagonistic situation where society members have already made up their minds as to who is good and who is bad, journalists must be aware that news recipients who already side with one party or the other may reject the peace frame as less understandable and more biased in favor of the opposing party.

Moreover, in an antagonistic situation like this, PJ risks coming under fire from belligerents on all sides and, therefore, requires great courage on the side of journalists. Nonetheless, PJ is a worthwhile endeavor, and in the long-run it may contribute to a society's co-construction of reality in a more beneficial and productive way.

Media peace discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks

Dov Shinar

1.   Premises

The importance and the absence of a peace discourse in the media and of the need and possibility to invent one are analyzed on the basis of normative, professional, and academic premises acquired from previous work on the topic (Shinar 2000).

The normative premises are that the media should use the considerable powers they have acquired in international communications – as active participants, catalysts, mediators, and messengers (in addition to the traditional roles of observers and reporters) – in order to promote peace (Shinar 2003 [cf. chapter 4], Lynch 1998); and that the media should be involved in the promotion of peace, regardless of:

a.   Conservative objections to an alleged loss of objectivity linked with the promotion of peace;
b.   Theoretical and practical questions about what version of peace should be promoted; and,
c.   Economic and political institutional constraints built into the media structure, including the notions of media intransitivity, speech without response, and non-communication, in which the style and discourse do not allow for critical dialogue (Baudrillard 1972, 2001b).

Objections about the loss of objectivity can be countered with the argument that the transition of media roles from reporter/observer to participant and catalyst in international relations are part of the ongoing erosion of a mythical "objectivity" and of the acceptance of subjective reality construction concepts. Questions of what version of peace should be promoted can be settled by demanding that free speech, professional integrity and ethics be guaranteed, just as in the coverage of crime.

Institutional constraints can be countered by elaborating concepts, practical rules and field procedures, such as reporting based on peace, facts, people, and solutions, rather than on war, propaganda, elites, and victory (Lynch 1998).

The normative premises require the media to produce persuasive symbols of security, alternatives to those of war. The media should create a plausible sense of change in the roles played by archenemies once they become peacemaking partners. Finally, they should act as participants and catalysts in psychological adjust-

ment – including the reduction of dissonance, paranoid feelings, etc. – to the un-known environments created in peace processes, since these traumatically contradict a long-term climate of war.

The professional premises are: The code-of-conduct that calls for media respon-siveness to social change also calls on the media to join in peacemaking efforts. Criticisms of media performance in the recent wars in the Middle East and else-where call for new ways to encourage peace journalism, in the spirit of the work done by Lynch (1998, 2003), Kempf (2003) and others. Finally, peace coverage is limited by professional preferences for war and violence and by the absence of a peace discourse in the professional media repertoire.

Based on competition, high news-value and ratings, the current economic struc-tures of the media entail a preference for war. Together with instant-transmission technologies, these structures impose ethical constraints on the accuracy of infor-mation and on crosschecking practices. Such structural constraints do not neces-sarily exclude the promotion of peace from the media repertoire, as they do not involve structural changes, and as under certain circumstances the news-value of peace might be increased. What is involved is an appropriate execution of well-defined professional policies and a more attentive professional attitude in media practice.

Coverage of the Rumanian revolution and the Gulf War (Shinar & Stoiciu 1992) teach that the absence of well-defined policies might increase manipulation and enhance self-manipulation – the priority given by international news editors (more than their field reporters) to incoming items that fit their own state-of-mind, psy-chological predispositions and news-value expectations, rather than to accept ev-idence from the field. In the coverage of the Rumanian revolution and the Gulf War, self-manipulation has produced myriad myths (conspiracy, "the monster", spontaneous reaction, national and international unity, and "clean" techno-ecolog-ical warfare (ibid. 248-250)). When editorial expectations are not fulfilled, the me-dia tend to voluntarily act as loudspeakers for war and violence, and to disseminate news based on unverified official briefings, rumors, false information, and editors' wishful thinking. A stronger emphasis on professional attitudes and preoccupation with the ethical constraints produced by new technologies might moderate demon-ization and fortify the humanization of media images, make the coverage of vio-lence less sensationalistic and yellow and help overcome accuracy traps.

The academic premises are that the invention, development and marketing of a media peace discourse should be included in the current research agenda. Impor-tant as they may be, social commitment, well-defined policies and professional at-titudes are not sufficient to allow the media to make significant contributions to peace. Without adequate attitudes and proper tools, journalism is impaired in the performance of this service. One such crucial tool, media peace discourse, is cur-rently missing in the journalistic repertoire. Thus an improved agenda for research on peace journalism and discourse should be directed at recommending ways to

overcome the customarily negative (or at least indifferent) media attitude towards peace and to increase the news-value of peace coverage.

2.   Conceptual building blocks

The development of a peace-oriented media discourse can be assisted by at least three conceptual building blocks.

2.1 Identifying strategies

The first building block concerns the existing strategies employed by the media to frame peace stories. Together with an embryonic peace discourse that can be detected sporadically, and with the experimental demonstration of certain forms of peace discourse (see Lynch 1998), peace is usually framed in strategies designed to increase its news-value, such as the discourses of war, of trivialization, and of ritualization (Shinar 2000).

Framing peace in the discourse of war is the most frequently used coverage strategy (Shinar 2000), as it adapts the terminology of war and violence to peace coverage (cf. Galtung 1998, 2002), to symbolic clichés, and to direct quotations of leaders' military discourse.

In the absence of a peace discourse that satisfies dominant news-value demands, trivialization is the process whereby gossip, trivial information, colorful human-interest stories, and media personalities are upgraded to become news. Ritualization is the adoption, by the media, of ritual elements typical of peacemaking negotiations and ceremonies that enjoy high news-value. This discourse appears both in isolated cases and in the coverage of entire rituals such as media events (Dayan & Katz 1992). Isolated elements include the use by the media of symbols of loss and suffering; symbolic transition (from war to peace, from enemy to partner); a time dimension (duration of the conflict and of negotiations, marathon sessions); last-minute crises; and public opinion measurements (Shinar 2000).

2.2 Evaluative strategies

The second conceptual building block is the evaluation of the strategies used by the media to cover war and peace in the context of their unequal news value. The use of dominant war discourse to cover peace shows an adaptive acceptance by the media of the lower news-value of peace stories. This does not encourage the development of alternative frames, rhetoric or imagery. Nonetheless, research on this strategy helps to contextualize it among the dominant discourses – such as the discourse of state leaders and the discourse of the victims (Bruck 1988) – and to question other types of media rhetorical structures, such as specialized political discourse, expert strategic discourse and scientific public discourse (Meyer 1995), bureaucratic technical discourse and the discourse of survival (Bruck 1989).

The informal touch of trivialization – and its more reputable versions, such as the journalism of attachment (Bell 1996), victim journalism (Hume 1997), justice journalism (Messman 2001) or engaged journalism (Lynch 2003) – might add some appeal and news-value to peace framing. But this strategy is useful only with regard to some specific aspects. As human-interest stories can easily detract from deeper analysis, this strategy does not allow for a treatment of peace beyond a superficial level. Thus it can be no more than a secondary feature of a peace-oriented discourse. Nevertheless, judging from a news-value point of view, its human story and tabloid gossip style make the trivialization strategy important in the total consideration of a media peace discourse, and thus research on this strategy should be encouraged.

At present, it seems that the ritualizing process lends itself to alternative framing better than other strategies. The use and development of this strategy in peace-oriented coverage, particularly in media events, might enhance the legitimacy of peace rituals and celebrations, and integrate them into the dominant media discourse.

Moreover, the repetitive, performative and representational qualities of media events (Dayan & Katz 1992) might help to create a discursive mechanism that enhances the psychological immediacy and social insulation necessary for the mobilization and regularization of behavior aimed toward given goals (Geertz 1973), such as the transition to a climate of peace.

2.3 Constitutive rhetoric

The third conceptual building block is the discursive mechanism known as constitutive rhetoric – the creation, change and legitimization of realities through texts, rhetorical constructs and the manipulation of symbols. The application of constitutive rhetoric to the construction of a media peace discourse is based on the premise that the assignment of meaning is a central feature in the symbolic role of the media. Through this process, normative choices are introduced into the socio-cultural agenda, showing the world as an organized universe of meaning (Turner 1977). The assignment of meaning by the media often takes the form of ritual action that stores meaning "in symbols which become indexical counters in subsequent situational contexts (ibid., 63). This approach is applicable to media rhetoric and imagery in many areas, including the coverage of peace.

Constitutive rhetoric is thus a mechanism that assigns meaning to new symbolic entities or processes through the combination of social or historical narratives with ideological objectives. Charland (1987) illustrates this mechanism with the invention of the term Quebecois – an alternative ideological frame created in 1967 to challenge the hitherto dominant French-Canadian (Charland 1987). Shinar mentions the invention of terms in the Jewish Zionist and Palestinian national movements in order to mobilize and activate their members (Shinar et al. 1990). Examples of the Israeli and Palestinian constitutive rhetoric include:

Israeli	*Palestinian*
war of independence	disaster of 1948 (nakba)
war of liberation (1948)	
Sinai Operation	Suez War
Yom-Kippur War	October War
return (shvut)	return (awda)
saboteur, armed men, gangs	boys, freedom fighters, shahid
(martyr)	
terrorists	heroes
Israeli soldiers, our boys	thugs, demons
Eretz Israel, liberated territories	occupied land
Judea and Samaria	West Bank, Palestine
Biblical names of settlements	El-aksa Brigades, Intifada.
"Peace of Galilee Operation"	Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Constructed in every sense, such value-laden connotative discourse legitimizes and integrates organizational and political myths into social structures, creates reference publics (Lipsky 1970), and calls audiences into being (Charland 1987). Thus, together with supplying peace narratives through journalistic practices, the ideological orientations of peace journalism – towards conflict rather than war, fact rather than propaganda, people rather than elites, and solutions rather than victory – can serve as bases for creating the constitutive rhetoric of a media peace discourse.

3.   Creating a media peace discourse

Together with work conducted directly on the deconstruction of war discourse and the construction of peace discourse (Kempf 2003), some paradigmatic frameworks and variables taken from media research can be used for additional conceptual leverage. Examples refer to style, as demonstrated in media events research (Dayan & Katz 1992), and to content, as displayed in the textual analysis genre (Snow & Benford 1992, Browne 1984).

3.1 Style of peace journalism and discourse: Media events

Media events research is particularly related to professional effects, narrative techniques and performance styles; it provides the following style variables:

3.1.1 Redefining the rules of journalism: New styles

Media events redefine the rules of journalism. One classic example is the public pledge made by British newspapers following Princess Diana's funeral to moderate media interference with the private lives of the Royal Family. Media events emphasize the integrative and consensual dimensions of journalism, add credibility and respectability to journalistic work and provide media organizations with op-

portunities to test new formats, to revive journalistic enthusiasm and to restore a sense of professional achievement (Dayan & Katz 1992). These can be important contributions to both a change in media attitudes in favor of peace journalism and to the creation of a media peace discourse. Such qualities reduce the adversarial and challenger images in discourses inherited from the Cold War and increase the news-value of peace.

The creation of new peace-coverage formats might also help to reduce the role-conflict linked to the need journalists feel to use reverential rhetoric in their self-ascribed ceremonial roles when covering media events.

3.1.2 Narrative styles: New options

Media events studies offer three types of narratives – *Conquests*, namely the live broadcast of rare events where a   "hero – facing insuperable odds – enters the enemy camp unarmed ...", such as Anwar Sadat's journey to Jerusalem; *Contests,* "rule-governed battles of champions in sports and politics, such as the World Cup or presidential debates"; and *Coronations*, ceremonial parades, featuring the "ritual transformation of the hero from one status to the next, such as the Kennedy, Rabin, or King Hussein state funerals (Dayan & Katz 1992, 27-29).

Such narrative styles can be further explored and combined in a media peace discourse. Although Dayan and Katz do vaguely recognize that these styles can be combined, their basic premise is that these categories are mutually exclusive. A more flexible approach can depart more explicitly from a Weberian ideal-type classification, in order to accommodate the various combinations possible in media events related to peacemaking and peacekeeping. Thus the Barak-Arafat "gentlemen's dispute" over who should precede whom in going through a door at Camp David, or the hugs and kisses of Israelis and Palestinians at the Geneva talks in 2003, illustrate the presence of a symbolic ritualizing discourse. Touches of drama can thereby be introduced into the joint appearance of contest, confrontation and coronation formats, thus increasing their news-value. Conquest and coronation are also combined in the geography of peace coverage, focusing on sites where negotiations occur and peace treaties are signed, such as, in the Middle Eastern case: Cairo, the Arava desert (where the Jordanian king crossed the border), Tel Aviv, the Gaza Strip, Oslo and more recently Geneva.

3.1.3 Performance styles: New dimensions

Research on media performance styles can enrich peace coverage. In the case of media events, they include motifs of equal access, humanization, dramatic coherence and the interpretation of contexts and symbols (Shinar 2000).

Equal access is a structural feature of media events. It is well illustrated in the Israeli daily *Yedioth Ahronoth* by a caption that accompanied a photo of the ceremony at which the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was signed: "Even those who did not own a TV set wanted to see the making of history yesterday. In Gaza, they

crowded into appliance stores and did not forget to applaud at the right moments" (*Yediot*).

Humanization concerns the multi-faceted, humanized and sometimes-trivialized pictures induced by the puzzle effect made possible by television technology. In peacemaking ceremonies, for example, global audiences can witness, in addition to formal gestures, the handshakes, the military bands and the soaring balloons, presidents wiping away tears, vice-presidents' wives taking souvenir snapshots with pocket cameras and ministers drinking bottled mineral water.

Dramatic coherence is a style component that shapes a story into a form familiar to the audience, as in sports coverage clichés. In reporting peacemaking events, the Israeli press has often recurred to Shakespearean metaphors such as "The Taming of the Shrew," with reference to Arafat, or the story of Romeo and Juliet, with reference to the secret Jordanian-Israeli talks that led to the peace agreement.

Interpretation of contexts and symbols is a function performed particularly during breaks and low points in live broadcasts of media events.

Some Middle Eastern examples include insights provided by media personalities on their memories of contacts with foreign leaders, on the history of the sites chosen for peacemaking ceremonies, or on protocol items, such as the seating plans at official peacemaking banquets.

3.1.4 Contents of peace journalism and peace discourse: Framing techniques

While media events research can contribute to the stylistic development of a media peace discourse, research on major motifs, composed of many smaller frames or sub-texts, such as in super-texts (Browne 1984) and master-frames (Snow & Benford 1992), can suggest the potential contents of such a discourse. Research on the application of these techniques to peace-related symbolic and ritual media coverage – such as peace processes in the Middle East; Northern Ireland; the Intifada; the 9/11 attacks on the USA; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – has yielded significant variables and strong indications of enhanced news-value. The coverage of such events as super-texts produces a symbolic language that combines spontaneous popular reactions with strategies of media coverage. They illustrate a possible analytical framework in which super-texts or master-frames include smaller peace-related frames. The following observations on peace-related symbolic and ritual behaviors in media coverage – of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in November 1995 and of Sir Elton John's peace concert, held in Belfast in May of 1998 to celebrate the peace agreement in Northern Ireland – feature master frames that can be considered as preliminary categories of a possible analytical framework for defining the news-value criteria for peace-related events. These categories include peace-related sites and occasions, rituals and products.

Sites and occasions

In the coverage of the Rabin assassination and in its aftermath, peace-related sites and occasions included the coverage of symbolic sites and moments, such as the Square of the Kings of Israel (site of the assassination, later symbolically renamed Rabin Square), Rabin's house, and his tomb. Dramatic footage, such as Rabin's last moments before the shooting, granddaughter Noa's eulogy and Arafat's expression of condolence was broadcast repeatedly, and an industry of public remembrance rituals flourished in which Rabin's name was given to streets, squares, medical centers, research institutes, schools, railway stations and restaurants. In the case of Northern Ireland, Elton John's peace concert was held at a critical moment in the peace process, and the coverage emphasized sites such as Stormont Castle, Belfast and the like.

Rituals

In the coverage of the Rabin assassination, the media showed peace rituals that included young people, later called the candle kids, sitting in circles in the square, lighting candles, singing and drawing graffiti on themes of peace; crowds wandering around the square, many of them watching the full media coverage of the official funeral on large TV screens, thus becoming both participants and coverage items for the crews on the site. In the Elton John peace concert, lighting candles and body language emphasized ritualistic features.

Products

In the coverage of the Rabin assassination, peace-related products included the evocative phrase Shalom Haver (Goodbye, Friend), used by President Clinton in his eulogy, later printed on bumper stickers by Israeli peace movements, and by their opponents, who used variants of the same phrase to react; also videocassettes, posters and photo exhibits are included in this category.

Peace-related products in Elton John's peace concert included Elton John himself, peace-related songs, CDs and other mementos sold on the spot that may have enhanced the news-value of that peace event.

4.   Conclusions

Communications research can be useful in devising an inventive and flexibly updated agenda that explicitly recognizes and copes with the challenges posed by new developments. Our analysis and discussion leads, first, to offering a media framing dimension for the characterization of war and peace journalism and discourse, as described in table 1.

War-oriented media framing
Framing peace stories in a war discourse Trivialization Ritualization
Peace-oriented media framing
Style (media events techniques): • Redefining rules of journalism • Adapting narrative styles: conquests, contests, coronations • Adapting performance styles: equal access, humanization, dramatic coherence, interpretation of contexts and symbols Content (textual analysis genres): • "master-frames", "super-texts" made of peace-related sites and occasions, peace-related rituals, and peace-related 'products' Constitutive rhetoric: • Assignment of meaning to new symbolic entities/processes (i.e. peace) through reality construction and combination of social and historical narratives with ideological objectives

Table 1: Adding a media dimension to Galtung's (1998, 2002) characterization of war journalism and peace journalism: Peace- and war-oriented media framing.

Secondly, research and development efforts to create media peace-coverage along these lines could produce an updated media research and development agenda directed at:

1. Adapting media values and practices to current realities, in which the newly acquired higher status of the media in international relations can be used to overcome negative media peace-related attitudes and peace-coverage techniques inherited from the Cold War;
2. Increasing the news-value of peace coverage in the media frame contest, rather than conducting missionary attempts to change war-oriented media structures and professional codes of conduct;
3. Devising well-defined professional policies, whose proper execution might reduce media self-manipulation and external pressures;
4. Creating and marketing a media peace discourse with satisfactory news value based on the appropriate application of the available findings of innovative research.

Part II

The Israeli media

The peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media[1]

Dov Shinar

1.   The Middle East: A case of cultural conflict

One of the puzzling questions posed by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is how to understand and explain the contradiction between the peace process based on the now defunct Oslo agreement and the violence that has accompanied it. Good illustrations of this are the surprise expressed over the eruption of the second Intifada in response to what had been seen by many Israelis and their supporters around the world as the generous offers made by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at the Camp David talks in 2000; and the criticism made by many Palestinians and their supporters of the lack of trust demonstrated by the Sharon government, and the excessive violence it has employed in response to Palestinian Authority declarations of readiness to renew talks.

In attempting to explain the contradiction, politicians, scholars and journalists have used a variety of terms and concepts. Arab/Islamic and Israeli/Jewish mentality, conflicting ideologies – nationalism, colonialism/anti-colonialism – and struggles over scarce resources such as land, oil, and water have been unconvincingly invoked as single or major factors. Although admittedly present in the conflict, none of them, neither singly nor in combination, has sufficed to fully explain the conflict's nature, contradictions and implications.

A fuller explanation of the contradiction can be achieved by combining the variables found in the positions of leading anthropologists, political psychologists, historians and others into an integrated cultural approach. Departing from the premise that the Middle Eastern conflict is anchored in profound symbols of the pursuit, formation, and preservation of Israeli and Palestinian collective identities, the present analysis is an effort to achieve the still-needed conceptual and operational application of this approach.

Thus, essentialism – the integration of primordial sentiments and inherited symbols of collective consciousness and identity, such as blood, race, language, land, or religion, offered by Clifford Geertz (1973) – can be regarded as a crucial cultural

---

1   Updated version of the author's "Cultural Conflict in the Middle East: The Media as Peacemakers", published in: Gilboa, E. (Ed.), Media and Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinions, Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2002.

composite element in long-term highly-intensive conflicts. The complex cultural character of such conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, is highlighted by Herbert Kelman's argument (1979, 1986, 1992a, 1998) that they are more than international or intergovernmental, as they affect the societies involved at the deepest levels of identity and existence. Anthony Smith's (2003) approach to culture as an integrative concept – which combines elements of subjective consciousness with ethnicity, "blood and origin", and long-term cultural characteristics with shorter-term civil and national affinities – offers a third important basis for a cultural approach to the understanding of conflicts and their contradictions. And, Michael Ignatieff highlights the centrality of identity symbols and traditional cultures in the civic and ethnic nationalism he discovered during his visits to the former Yugoslavia, Germany, the Ukraine, Quebec, Kurdistan, and Northern Ireland in the early 1990s.

2.   Cultural conflict: Exclusive, deep, long-lasting, total, global

Israeli-Palestinian relations suggest that cultural conflicts can be characterized by their exclusivity, depth, duration, totality and global nature.

The concept of Jihad illustrates the exclusivity of cultural conflict. Benjamin Barber (1992, 1995) has used this concept to describe the re-tribalization of human society, expressed in recent years by the dilution of nation-states, the establishment of new boundaries and the strengthening of specific identities. The Jihad's centrifugal movement has revived forgotten divisions, closed communities, and fundamentalist movements. Its essentialist nature rejects the centripetal character of Barber's second major current: "McWorld", the transnational socio-economic and cultural homogenization, inspired by globalizing markets, technology, and communications, and by a rapid diffusion of Western products. Michael Ignatieff (1993) gives indirect support to this view by making a conceptual distinction between a Jihad-inspired ethnic nationalism built around cultural symbols, and a more liberal and cosmopolitan, McWorldist concept of civic nationalism.

The Jihadist nature of cultural conflict is expressed in the total refusal to accept "the other". In cases such as the Middle East, this refusal can serve to culturally and symbolically fuel highly-escalated conflict. Applied to territory, this is particularly interesting. As a resource or commodity, territory has been the subject of conflict, such as in the most recent Peru-Ecuador war of 1995, which was resolved by diplomatic negotiations and agreements, followed by reconciliation and the reestablishment of full relations. In contrast to such cases, territory in the Middle East represents a raison d'être and not just a strategic or economic resource, displaying symbols essential to the formation, existence, and preservation of collective identity. Jerusalem, Galilee, Hebron, Bethlehem, Judea and Samaria, collectively and individually, as well as the tracts of land between them, are exclusive symbols of being Jewish, Moslem, Christian, Palestinian or Israeli. The difficulty in making any compromises on such sentiments is central to the Middle Eastern conflict. Unlike conflicts in which violence and war are political, economic or ideological tools, the

essentialist exclusiveness of Jihadist thinking and action fuels the view of war as a manifestation of acceptable primordial sentiments, in which mutual recognition is almost impossible, suspicion and animosity permeate all spheres of life at all times, and violence is generally legitimized.

The strength of such feelings clarifies the depth of cultural conflict. Depth has to do with roots. The view of the Middle Eastern conflict as a mere national confrontation is artificial, irrelevant, and inadequate. Nationalism, a relatively recent European invention,[2] is capable of explaining cases of war and reconciliation in the context of territorial or economic conflict, but fails to explain the persistence of cultural conflict. Thus, the failure of all ideologies developed in the 19th century, including nationalism, to deal with cultural conflict, triggered a search for alternative, tighter frames of collective identity.

The continuity of cultural conflicts differs from the dynamics of conventional belligerence, in which war is an eruption of violence between more or less well-organized armies that interrupts periods of relative or absolute peace. Thus, unlike the Peru-Ecuador and similar conflicts, in cases of cultural conflict violence does not necessarily stop when peace agreements are signed. Israelis and Arabs have fought five conventional wars: in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. In contrast, however, with the cyclical alternation of war and peace in conventional conflict, hostility has been uninterrupted in the area since the early 20th century, conducted by official forces, secret services, armed militias, terrorist/guerrilla organizations, and civilians. The low intensity and irregular categories of war elsewhere have found intense daily expressions in the Middle East: during the 1950s and 1960s they included the activities of Arab "infiltrators", Israeli retaliatory measures, and Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-Egyptian clashes; in the war of attrition that followed the 1967 war; in the rise of the PLO in the area, and the attempts made by Israel, Jordan, and others to destabilize the organization since the 1970s; during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s and the withdrawal more than a decade later; in the first and second Intifadas; and in the terrorist/guerilla activities interspersed over the entire period. The pattern has not really changed during the peace process that resulted from the Oslo agreements. Israel and the PLO officially pledged mutual recognition and peaceful relations, but nevertheless violence has continued. In this sense, the cultural conflict approach strongly correlates with models in warfare research, where cultural elements greatly contribute to escalation.

Totality and globality are defined by span and space. Cultural conflict is not confined to official military battle zones, as in conventional war. In the Middle East, this has been demonstrated by Palestinian violence against airline passengers, Olympic athletes, and civilians inside and outside Israel; by the violence of Israeli occupation forces and settlers against Palestinians; by battles between Mosad and

---

2   This argument is based on the "modernist"/instrumental" historical approach offered by Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and others to the concept of "nation" as a relatively new development in Europe during the late 18th and 19th centuries, rather than a pattern of social organization developed in the Middle Ages or earlier, as maintained by historians of the "primordialist" school.

Palestinian organizations in which no difference was made between guilty and in-nocent. For the Israelis, the totality of war has been expressed in acts of terrorism against military personnel and civilians; in the universal long period of obligatory military service for men and women; in the constant state of alert; and in the num-ber and frequency of deaths and injuries. For the Palestinians, the totality of war has been expressed in the infringement of human rights and humiliating contacts with military occupation; in daily physical danger of bodily harm and death; and in violent interventions by Israeli settlers and others. No Palestinian family has been sheltered from this reality.

These characteristics clarify the extent to which conflicts rooted in culture are dif-ficult, perhaps impossible to resolve.

3.   "End-of-conflict" and reconciliation versus transformation

Lessons from the Middle East – the Oslo agreements and the second Intifada, for example – allow at least two perceptions of peace processes: the first maintains that peace agreements mean end-of-conflict and reconciliation.

The other maintains that negotiations and treaties represent no more than a trans-formation of the conflict's nature. End-of-conflict and reconciliation are concepts applicable to one or more dimensions of conflict – territorial, political, economic, ideological, ethnic, religious. These concepts seem adequate to study conflicts that do not result from the search for identity symbols, and whose solution does not affect essentialist sentiments.

But they do not seem to function in the contradictory coexistence of peace treaties and eruptions of violence which are typical of cultural conflict. Thus, since the mid-1990s, doubt has accompanied the hopes aroused by the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In doubt was the now irrelevant question of whether the Oslo peace pro-cess was irreversible. Indeed, doubts emerged with the assassination of Prime Min-ister Yitzhak Rabin; with the political downfall of his partners, his party and his peace camp; with the victory of the Israeli right and its anti-Oslo positions in the elections of 1996 and 2001; with the escalating violence employed by Palestinians and Israelis, not always well-conceived, not always proportional, and always con-doned by right-wing, left-wing, and national unity governments. On the other hand, hopes about the success of the process have been nurtured by the unprec-edented and paradoxical return of large and important tracts of land to the Pales-tinians by Benjamin Netanyahu's right wing government in 1996-1999; by public expressions supporting the process, including Ehud Barak's election in 1999; and by a more or less viable Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, at least until September 2000. The contradiction of these tendencies has been expressed, first, in the gulf between declarations made by both sides in favor of peace vis-à-vis their radically opposed essentialist positions on the questions of Jerusalem, the settlements, or the Palestinian right of return.

A second expression of the contradiction, particularly since September 2000, has been the continual breaching of cease-fire agreements, mostly by Arafat, but also by Israel.

In order to understand this contradiction, adequate concepts are necessary.

The exclusivity, depth, continuity, totality, and globality of cultural conflict do not allow for viewing peace processes as full or even partial and gradual reconciliation.

This clarifies why the resolution of conflict is so difficult, why cultural wars do not end when the cannons fall silent, and why peace is not secured by the signing of agreements.

4. Conflict transformation

Another vision is that peace processes in cultural conflicts do not lead to reconciliation but rather to a transformation of the conflict (Burgess et al., 1997; Lederach, 1995; Vayrinen, 1991). The terms conflict resolution and conflict management serve to clarify this vision. The former implies the possibility and need to end conflict. This implication assumes that conflict is a short-term phenomenon that can be resolved permanently. The assumption behind conflict management is that conflicts are long-term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved. But the notion of management suggests that people in conflict can be guided or controlled. In addition, management suggests that the goal is to reduce or control conflict volatility rather than to deal with the real sources of conflict.

Conflict transformation does not suggest simply eliminating or containing conflict, but recognizes the complex nature of some conflicts, in which relationships are changed, communication and patterns of social organization are altered, and images of the self and of the other are transformed. Conflict transformation is also a prescriptive concept.

It suggests that while conflict is destructive, it can be transformed, and that self-images, relationships, and social structures can be improved. This involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and people or groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can improve mutual understanding.

Even when interests, values, and needs appear to be irreconcilable, progress can be made if groups engaged in conflict can achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other. Thus, the presidents, government ministers, politicians, diplomats, and journalists who took part in the celebrations of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements were undoubtedly participating in historic events. Together with millions of TV spectators around the globe, they witnessed the end of one era and the beginning of another. However, the optimism of the agreements, and the less euphoric reality of ongoing violence, did not signify conventional post-war peacemaking. They represent, at best, a changing pattern in the relations of long-stand-

ing warring parties. Instead of a direct confrontation, this new structure has featured an interaction of two coalitions, new in their transnational orientation, and rare in their intercultural composition.

On one hand, a hitherto impossible peace coalition, made up of the Israeli and Palestinian official positions, and supported by the governments of Jordan, Egypt, North Africa, the Gulf, the United States, Europe, and others, has been making efforts to provide the peace agreements with acceptable and durable contents. On the other hand, an alliance of the extremes, bringing together an unprecedented mix of radical right-wing Jewish Israelis, Islamic fundamentalists, PLO critics, and others, has been directly and indirectly supporting each other, through the use of verbal, diplomatic, and physical violence, to reject any agreement opposed to their essentialist-Jihadist convictions.

5.   Peacemaking models and crises of expectations

The confrontation of the coalitions explains the violence that accompanies the process, shows the resilience of cultural conflicts, even when political agreement is reached, and demonstrates the stable nature of cultural conflicts, even in the context of political treaties between powerful entities.

Mistaken interpretations of conflict can have serious consequences. Viewing the Oslo process as reconciliation ignores the importance of these factors. This and the belief that the process represents the end of the conflict produced the confusion, frustration and crisis of expectations that have been affecting all involved: right- and left-wing Israelis; settlers, and peaceniks; and Arafat's supporters and opponents among the Palestinians and in the Arab world.

Those who interpreted the spirit of Oslo according to the transformation model and considered the cultural environment and the realistic chances of reducing tension and violence, have lowered their level of expectations, which enabled them to perceive the crisis less radically, and react to violence more rationally.

Moreover, it can be expected that in addition to providing more realistic interpretations of reality, the transformation approach might contribute to the areas of policy-making, crisis management and education, and explain how to relate to the two coalitions, how to deal with the extremes and how to control polarization within the Israeli and Palestinian societies.

6.   The media in war and peace

How are the media involved in these processes? What is their share in creating crises of expectations, and how can they contribute to easing them and to promoting realistic peace processes? We now turn to these questions.

International communications in recent decades can be described along two major

axes: the first is a modification of media functions; the second is media preference for war and violence rather than peace coverage.

6.1 Modification of functions

The roles of the media in international relations have changed. The traditional tasks of gathering and selecting facts, and of constructing, encoding, and repre-senting realities (Tuchman 1978, Hall 1980) have been expanded. Journalists are no longer expected to simply present the news "fairly and without bias in language … unambiguous, undistorting …" (Fowler 1991, 1).

In recent decades, the media have assumed new roles. The 1970s' Kissinger media diplomacy, elaborated in academic detail two decades later (Kissinger 1995), con-firms Abba Eban's (1983) diagnosis of the impact open media diplomacy has had on the collapse of traditional diplomatic reticence. Media organizations and pro-fessionals now participate in international relations, both at-large and as catalysts and diplomatic brokers (Larson 1986, Gilboa 1998).

As participants-at-large, the media take part in exchanges between journalists, policy-makers, and field staff (Gitlin 1980, Larson 1988), as illustrated by the TV sets in decision-makers' offices and 'situation rooms'; by briefings in official air-planes or in sealed compounds, such as in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War (Andersen 1991, Servaes 1991); and by media-monitored secret negotiations such as in Camp David (1979); Dayton, Ohio (1995); Stormont Castle (1997, 1998); and Wye River (1998).

As catalysts, the media provide arenas and resources for international dialogue. They include shuttle diplomacy (Kissinger 1995); tomahawk diplomacy used in the 1998 Kosovo and Iraq crises (*TIME*, October 19, 1998); media exchanges (Clinton-Saddam, Rabin/Netanyahu-Arafat/Assad); and media events, such as summit meetings and the signing of peace agreements (Dayan & Katz 1992; Gilboa 1998).

As diplomatic brokers, the media conduct and sometimes initiate international me-diation, in ways that often blur the distinctions between the roles of reporters and diplomats. This is illustrated by the participation of the media in diplomatic process-es, such as Walter Cronkite's claim to having inspired Anwar Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem (Cronkite 1996, Gilboa 1998); or *ABC's* Ted Koppel's live-on-air Jerusalem 'town meeting', conducted during the Intifada in 1988, and featuring unprecedented face-to-face Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (ABC News, 1988); and, by work behind enemy lines, such as *CNN's* Peter Arnett's reporting from Baghdad during the first Gulf War (Arnett 1991), Christian Ammanpour's in Iraq, during Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and Al Jazeera's coverage of the war in Afghanistan in 2001.

6.2 Media preference for war and violence

Professional and historical reasons explain the preference for war as media subject matter and symbolic inspiration. War is more compatible than peace with media

professional standards, conventional discourse and economic structures. War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results (Galtung & Ruge 1970, Bird & Dardenne 1988, Goldstein 1994). This preference is magnified by the vivid colors, clear-cut polarities, unexpected features, and primordial sentiments typical of cultural conflict; and its variety of images and voices exceeds that of conventional warfare, conveying Aristotle's "pity and fear" at their "best". The typical peace coverage of press conferences, "talking heads" and airport scenes, has much lower news value.

The history of international journalism adds weight to this preference.

Political constraints – mostly the Cold War's – caused the media to adopt the governmental rhetoric of power and violence in their official discourse. Peace talk was labeled communist in the 1950s and 1960s, and challenger discourse until the late 1980s, with low popularity and entry into the general-audience media (Gamson 1988, Meyer 1995). This is also typical of communications research, where revisionist historians have been documenting the claim that the development of media research coincides with research done for official agencies since World War II. The work of some "founding fathers" was sponsored and funded by the Radio Bureau of the Office of War Information, the Information Division of the War Department, the US Air Force, and the CIA (Robinson 1988, Bruck 1989, Simpson 1994).

Although there is no conclusive evidence of a direct and causal relation between warfare and research approaches, one cannot ignore that most of these researchers founded or joined leading communication departments and institutes (Rowland 1983); that research on the media coverage of Vietnam and the Middle East deals only briefly with peace talks; and that, compared with the multitude of media studies on Middle Eastern wars, there are only few studies of the media in the peace process.

7.   A new media environment

The new powers of the media as actors in international processes have made a significant contribution to the crisis of expectations that has typified the peace process in the Middle East. The clarification of this argument calls for a discussion of the media climate since the end of the Cold War.

The features of this new climate – concerted peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, together with the revival of radical and sometimes violent separatist movements and demands (Ignatieff 1993, Barber 1995) – have posed significant normative and practical challenges to the media.

One question is whether the media should use their new powers to promote peace. Conservative objections to a peace-oriented media on the grounds of loss of objectivity can be countered with the argument that the changing functions of the

media in international relations are part of an ongoing erosion of mythical "objectivity" and of the acceptance of subjective reality-construction concepts. The question of "whose version of peace should be promoted?" can be answered by demanding that free expression, professional integrity and ethics should be guaranteed, just as in the coverage of conventional crime.

Even considering the differences in the news value of war and peace, professional integrity and ethics demand that, together with legitimate considerations of sales and ratings, the media orient themselves to values that match their critical stand on crime and drugs; and that in accord with the code-of-conduct which calls for media responsiveness to social changes, they should join current peacemaking efforts. Finally, if this position is accepted in general, it should certainly be adopted with regard to cultural conflict, because of both its frightening dimensions and the media potential to help in its transformation. In this sense, the media should be required to produce persuasive symbols of security, alternatives to those of war; to construct credible realities of change in the roles played by arch-enemies, once they become peacemaking partners; and to act as participants, catalysts, and brokers in the psychological adjustment – including in the reduction of dissonance, paranoiac feelings, etc. – to the unknown environment created by peace processes, that dramatically differs from a long-term climate of war.

8.   The media in the Middle Eastern conflict

Another question is how can and how should the media be involved in the new international climate. The performance of local and foreign media in the Middle Eastern conflict can provide considerable insight into this topic. Since the Oslo process became public, the media have been dealing with the dilemma of how to function in a peacemaking era, and of choosing a model to guide coverage. Two phases are characteristic of this dilemma. In the first, between the mid-1990s and September 2000, the end-of-conflict and reconciliation model inspired coverage. However, like the leaders and politicians who adopted this model, the media had difficulty in explaining the violence which had been accompanying the process from as early as 1996, after which the peace camp began to lose momentum.

In the second phase, starting in September 2000, the media have been forced, together with Israeli and other leaders and in the face of changing public opinion, to abandon the reconciliation model, at least in order to resolve the contradictions between the peace process and the ongoing violence.

8.1 Preference of the reconciliation model

Public opinion on the peace process, led by the Oslo negotiators and by the media – at least until September 2000 – has shown a preference for reconciliation, negotiation and mutual concessions. Also the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin served to fortify the consensus around the Oslo agreements (Wolfsfeld 2004).

On the other hand, there are serious doubts about the belief, cherished by the Israeli right wing, that the open and full media mobilization behind the Oslo agreements resulted in a brainwashing process in which public opinion was captured. Wolfsfeld's contention that many critical positions were expressed by and in the media indeed reduces the validity of this argument. Nevertheless, it is equally acceptable to claim that the professional style and the general direction of the world's media coverage contributed directly and indirectly to the creation of a favorable public climate toward the Oslo process. This has been expressed, for example, in the wide coverage and in the tone of wondering admiration attached by the media to the main actors in the process, to the signing of the agreements, and to events such as the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Peace to Arafat, Peres and Rabin. Some additional findings provide good illustrations of the formation of this sympathetic climate. Wolfsfeld finds that the public and political environments and social consensual expectations have influenced the positions taken by the media, particularly the overall optimistic tone that has obscured imminent dangers. Other studies (Dente Ross, Mandelzis) point to the favorable discourse and framing of the Oslo process in the international press and the legitimacy given by the Israeli media to the parties in the process, particularly Yasser Arafat and his PLO movement. This is rather surprising, since it contradicts the traditional preference of the media for the action and drama of war and violence.

Background factors and professional reasons can provide at least some clarification. Background factors include the emotional openness of the public towards peace; the symbiotic relations between the media and governments; and inferences from earlier peace processes.

- *Emotional openness of the public:* When the Oslo negotiations became public, a climate developed characterized by emotional openness and psychological readiness to see the agreements in terms of reconciliation, particularly among the agreements' supporters. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the Israeli extreme right was more realistic than the left and than the media, with its reservations against interpreting Oslo in terms of reconciliation. Right-wing activists and parties have supported and promoted the notion that the conflict has deep cultural roots. Even those who reject their radical conclusions have to respond to the accuracy of this diagnosis.
- *Media-government symbiotic relations:* The tendency of the media to adopt official views in return for an open flow of information is well known. In the wake of the Cold War, particularly after Oslo, the Israeli and international media could not afford to ignore the manifestations of governmental and public opinion supporting the peace process.
- *Inferences from earlier peace processes:* The peace processes with Egypt and Jordan gave the media and the public an idea of what peace should be. The inferences from these agreements to the Palestinian case seemed even more plausible with the recognition by the media that even though the former agreements have not developed into full normal relations, they have included

gestures of reconciliation on the part of Anwar Sadat, King Hussein, Menahem Begin, and Yitzhak Rabin; and an "acceptable" amount of violence.

Professional reasons derive from the paradox that reconciliation has news value, particularly against a background of violence. A good example is the ample coverage given to King Hussein's visit to the Israeli town of Beth Shemesh in 1994 and the humble and conciliatory stance he took in apologizing to the families of young women killed by a Jordanian soldier in a border incident.

Thus the media could not ignore the developing climate in favor of reconciliation. The professional factors related to this dynamics include some aspects of news value: polarization and contrast; and media events.

- *Polarization and contrast increase the news value of an item:* In the reconciliation model, these practices seem to convert the coverage of violence into the exception that proves the rule. Examples include the massacre committed by Baruch Goldstein in Hebron's Cave of the Patriarchs in 1994; the violence which accompanied the opening of the Wailing Wall tunnel in 1996, and even the first stages of the Intifada. These were covered by the media in an alternating style, in which stories of violence were contrasted with coverage of the ongoing peace process, a factor that enhanced the news value of both types of stories.
- *Media events:* Dayan and Katz's media events theory (1985, 1992) illustrates the emphasis on reconciliation in peace coverage. The perception of newsworthy reconciliation is evident in various types of media events coverage: The signing of peace agreements, in pre-planned highly performative and widely-covered rituals of new or renewed friendship, can be identified as *coronation events*: "ceremonial parades … ritual transformation of the hero from one status to the next" (Katz & Dayan 1985, 306).
  Also a tone of reconciliation, accompanied by high news value, is present in *conquest events*, where a "hero – facing insuperable odds – enters the enemy camp" (ibid.), as in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.
  Examples of this type of matching between reconciliation and news value in the Middle East include the official and unofficial visits of Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli officials to each others' cities and sites during negotiations; the presence of Arab leaders at Yitzhak Rabin's funeral; Arafat's visit of condolence to Lea Rabin; the participation of Israeli leaders in King Hussein's funeral, etc.
  The coverage of *contest events*, "rule-governed battles of champions in sports and politics, such as the World Cup or presidential debates" (Dayan & Katz 1992, 26), in terms of reconciliation, also enjoys added news-value. This was demonstrated by Netanyahu's highly-promoted negotiation discourse ("if they give [security] they get [land]; if they don't give, they don't get"); or by the already famous scene in which Ehud Barak and Arafat play the role of gentlemen jostling each other at the entrance of the White House, in the best tradition of slapstick comedy.

8.2 Abandoning the reconciliation model

It is not surprising that the escalation of violence in the fall of 2000 did not support theories of reconciliation. Ehud Barak's spectacular defeat in the Israeli election of 2001 provides irrefutable evidence to that effect. The media, local, regional, and international alike, discontinued the promotion of such perceptions. They did not go all the way, however. Abandoning the reconciliation model did not mean adopting the conflict transformation model, because of the conflict's cultural nature.

Thus, since late 2000 most explanations given by the media about changes in Palestinian-Israeli relations have dealt with the failure to reconcile rather than with the deeper roots of the conflict. Media coverage of Israeli and Palestinian violence has focused on the vanished dream of ending the conflict rather than on its complex cultural nature and context. Here too, studies such as Wolfsfeld's (2004) and Dor's (2003) confirm that the reasons are linked with the contradictory nature of the professional requirements of news value and efficiency, in the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model on one hand, and in the conflict transformation model on the other.

- *Results*: The adoption of the reconciliation model by the media created end-of-conflict expectations. Abandoning the model made the media emphasize the escalation of violence.

These are clear and striking results. In contrast, the open-endedness of the transformation model does not allow for a decisive presentation of results, a fact that imposes additional work on media professionals, reduces interest and produces lower news value.

- *Complexity:* The transformation model demands the media to present, and audiences to understand, complex processes, whereas both the media adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model focus on simple events which increase production efficiency and have higher news value.
- *Historical duration:* The transformation model requires the media to describe (and audiences to perceive) the long course of events. Also historical insight must be provided and understood. This requires more work and reduces news value. In contrast, the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model emphasizes the present, demands less effort on the part of the media and their audiences and has higher news value.
- *Rationality:* As it emphasizes logic and rationality, the transformation model requires the investment of more effort by the media and by audiences.

The adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model involves emotional factors which have higher news value and are less labor-consuming in media production and consumption alike.

- *Personalization and concretization:* The transformation model focuses on collective values and abstract symbols, while the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model involves relations between people and concrete entities. The latter is clearly less labor-intensive and has higher news value.

The characteristics of the transformation model with regard to these news value criteria are considered less attractive by media producers and consumers, at least compared with the reconciliation model.

9.   Discussion

At least until September 2000, the media did not show much interest in the cultural nature of the conflict. Inspired by professional norms of efficiency and news value, the media preferred to emphasize the openness of public opinion to reconciliation, positive governmental attitudes in this direction, and historical deductions from previous peace processes. Two major professional strategies were used in this context: the first was polarization and contrast, focusing on reconciliation against the background of the violence that has preceded and accompanied the peace process. The second was the coverage of media events related to reconciliation.

By using these practices, the media have contributed to the arousal of hope before and disappointment of expectations after the failure of the process. The Intifada forced the media to abandon the discourse of reconciliation. Frustrated by the collapse of the process, along with the majority of the public, the media returned to focusing on the escalating violence rather than on the deep cultural aspects of the conflict.

The conclusion is that the media must take the crucial and necessary step in full: to internalize the cultural meanings of the conflict; to transmit these meanings to the public, in order to raise the consciousness of their significance and consequences; and to encourage public debate, first on peacemaking under constraining cultural conditions; and secondly, on the choice between an interminable violent feud and a great but acceptable burden imposed by the transformation of conflict.

Adopting this strategy can pose a dilemma, calling upon the media to make a choice between the ideology of contributing to peacemaking and the professional demands of efficiency and news value. Confronting this dilemma might help the media deal with the idiosyncrasies of the transformation model and with the professionally uncomfortable dimensions of cultural conflict coverage. The satisfaction of these demands is difficult, because it means departing from current norms and standards. But this is the real test of an ethics and morality that goes beyond the technical levels of media professionalism.

5

The changing image of the enemy in the news discourse of Israeli newspapers, 1993–1994

Lea Mandelzis

1. Images, myths and media

Theorists writing about images, myths and stereotypes are inclined to focus on pre-existing, value-laden groups of ideas derived from culture and transmitted by communication. Kuhn (1996) discusses how elements of images and representations produce meanings within social and historical contexts which are disseminated by mass communication through narratives and myths (Nossek 1994). Roach (1993) explains that images and myths sustain beliefs that justify war-making and the need to view the "other" as an enemy. Geertz (1977) adds that as symbolic systems, myths and news act both as models *of* culture and as models *for* culture.

Barthes (1993) holds that meanings are produced through the codes at work in representations, and that while meanings might appear to be natural, they are, in fact, produced: they are constructed through identifiable processes of signification in all representations.

O'Sullivan et al. (1994) define the role of myth as a guide for understanding, expressing and communicating self-identity in a specific culture. They argue that in anthropological ritual, a myth is an "anonymously composed narrative that offers explanations of why the world is as it is". News, like myths, provides a way for people to create order out of disorder and transforms knowledge and familiarity into shared communal experiences (Bird & Dardenne 1988). Ultimately, the relationship between the information function of the news text and the meanings of context often convey opinions drawn from myths and images in the culture of the political and ideological discourse-makers and the audience (Barthes 1993).

Furthermore, journalism has a strong bias towards elites, both as sources of information and as subjects to cover (Galtung 1996). News discourse is based not merely on facts, but also on information that is invariably interpreted in a subjective way. Bernstein (2002) explains that the media use stereotypes in order to represent reality. "Stereotyping is an ideological process that works to the advantage of the powerful groups in society" (Bernstein 2002, 266).

Bird & Dardenne (1988, 71) propose that news stories, like myths, do not "tell it like it is", but rather "tell it like it means". Jalbert (1983) also argues that ideology is a routine feature of the social production of news articles that are compatible with political and economic interests. Dennis (1991) maintains that since the press is closely connected with the state structure, the media – despite their presumed adversarial role – are largely sympathetic to government policies, especially in foreign policy.

2.   The significance of myths and stereotypes in Israel

Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has served as an enduring source of political and ideological discourses influencing personal identity, collective memory, social beliefs, myths and language (Bar-Tal 1995). In contemporary Israel, where war and terrorism constitute daily reality, the shared rhetoric is that of a nation under threat (Arian 1995). Conflicts with Arabs and Palestinians, in particular, are routinely stereotyped by images and myths which are widely supported by the public, media and political leaders. These incorporate concepts inspired by biblical quotations such as "a nation which shall dwell alone" and "the whole world is against us".

The personification of the contemporary enemies of the Jewish people draws on past tradition. Examples include: Titus, the Roman emperor whose army destroyed the second Jewish Temple in AD 70; Haman, the advisor to King Ahaseurus of Persia in the fifth century BC; and Adolf Hitler, who destroyed half of European Jewry in the Second World War. These images are frequently combined to emphasize the links between the Jewish past and present.

Prior to the Oslo peace process, the Israeli media displayed only a crude understanding of Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians. Indeed, images of Arafat and the PLO in the Israeli media (see below) were typical of the rigid thinking that characterizes conflict situations. Elizur (1993) defines a stereotype as an image whose affective or emotional content does not change even when it can be demonstrated that its cognitive content is inaccurate. She argues that when political leaders use stereotypes, they reinforce concepts and distort reality.

Denial of the opponent's rights, demonization of intentions, condemnation of actions and emphasis on the threat posed all undermine the legitimacy of the opponent. Dehumanization also serves to justify hostile acts, since the enemy is cast "into extremely negative social categories which are excluded from human groups within the limits of acceptable norms and values" (Bar-Tal 1989, 170). This creates a vicious circle where perceptions are so distorted that opportunities for conflict resolution may be missed.

Nossek (1994) argues that the Israeli press used the Holocaust to magnify the significance of the Palestinian threat. This reinforced the psychological need for consensus and the ethos of national security. Representation of this ethos became a

dominant cultural process in forging Israeli collective identity. According to Arian (1995), Israeli leaders sought to promote the idea of Israel as a nation-state under threat. The motif of the Holocaust continued to play a central role in the conceptions and rhetoric of political leaders, especially those of right-wing Likud governments. On the other hand, the existence of the State of Israel enabled its Jewish citizens to feel relatively safe in their own nation-state.

3.   Perceptions of Arafat and the PLO in Israel

For most of the first twenty-five years of Israeli history, official rhetoric portrayed Palestinians as Arabs lacking any distinct national identity. This attitude was reinforced by a statement attributed to former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in 1969: "There has never been a Palestinian nation" (Rolef 1997). For almost three decades following the establishment of the PLO in 1968 (Bechor 1995), Israeli propaganda depicted it as a terrorist organization whose raison d'être was to establish a Palestinian state including the whole area of Palestine (Dennis 1991), including the territory of the State of Israel.

Generations of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, together with Palestinian demands for the destruction of the State of Israel, generated hatred and fear which, in turn, influenced Israeli attitudes towards Arafat and the PLO. Arafat was represented as a bloodthirsty terrorist intent on destroying Israel and the Jewish nation. Rubinstein (1995) relates that outside the Middle East Arafat was called the head of the Palestinian guerrilla organization, while Israelis described him as the head of the PLO terrorist organization.

Jalbert (1983) writes that for years Palestinians were referred to by Israelis as terrorists. A distinction was initially made between the PLO led by Arafat and the Palestinian people. But since the 1982 Lebanon War, when it became clear that the majority of Palestinians regarded the PLO as their sole representative (Hiro 1996), the category terrorist was routinely applied to all Palestinians by the Israeli media.

The use of stereotypes to promote social solidarity (Abercrombie et al. 1994) through news discourse, according to structural linguists (Levi-Strauss, 1995), creates images intended to appeal to audiences rather than to reproduce reality. To Jews in Israel, Arafat was a demon in their modern mythology and a perpetrator of terror. Successive Israeli governments referred to Arafat and the PLO as terrorists and murderers, while depicting Israeli citizens as victims. Prime Minister Begin (1977-1983) referred to Arafat as "Hitler in his lair" (Corbin 1994, 15). The attitudes of both Labor and Likud governments were illustrated by former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir when he affirmed his refusal to deal with the terrorist PLO, who wanted only to destroy Israel and the Jewish people**.**

One common denominator which until the signing of the Oslo accords characterized all Israeli prime ministers, from Golda Meir (1969) to Yitzhak Rabin, was hatred of Arafat and his policies. It is hard to describe the extent to which even "the

hairs on his face", in the words of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, were the subject of worldwide derision (Rubinstein 1995, 29).

Loathing of Arafat was thereby combined with sweeping generalizations, traditional fears and Holocaust-related anxieties. He was referred to as "the Nazi in the Bunker," and "the beast on two legs" (Barnea 2002). He was generally depicted as wearing a military uniform and carrying a revolver, with a *keffiah* (headress) arranged in the shape of the map of Palestine.

From the early 1980s on, a few Israeli peace activists, such as members of the Communist Party and a handful of academics, started to meet with PLO members and Arafat clandestinely, in Europe as well as locally. In his own account of clandestine meetings with PLO activists, the editor of the left-wing weekly *Haolam Hazeh*, Uri Avnery MK, attests to the value of these initial encounters:

Political decisions are made by people. People's actions are shaped by their perceptions. Mere politicians do not understand the underlying psychological realities of the world in which they move. Our job is to change these realities on both sides in order to change the course of events from war to peace (Avnery 1986, 334).

"Such contacts, however, were extremely rare prior to the period of the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1987-1991). Indeed, it was not until 1986 that the Israeli government regarded it as necessary to explicitly prohibit meetings with the PLO by legislating the Order for the Prevention of Terror" (Rolef 1997).

In his memoirs, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) (1994), the second most important PLO official, provides details of secret contacts between Israeli government officials and the outlawed PLO. During the Likud government, PLO officials and Likud politicians met in Europe in December 1991; and during the Labor government, PLO leaders met with a senior Labor Party activist in late October. Bechor (1995) also documents meetings between Israeli and PLO activists.

The Intifada led to a new era of diplomatic relations between Israel, the Palestinians and some neighboring Arab countries. These developments emerged as a result of the 1991 Madrid conference, at which Israeli and Palestinian delegations met for the first time to discuss peace talks.

The delegation of local Palestinian leaders from the West Bank was defined by the Israeli government and media as the alternative leadership. Israel thereby hoped to establish an alternative Palestinian leadership to replace the exiled Arafat and the PLO as their representative (Bregman & El-Tahri 1998). These developments also paved the way to the Oslo peace process and the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan (Shamir & Shamir 1993).

Dehumanization of the enemy on the battlefield always serves an essential psychological function, but in times of peace, this function changes. Before the Oslo peace process, Arafat had personified the enemy and the Palestinian problem. Af-

ter Oslo, the emphasis changed from the identification of the Palestinian problem to efforts to bring about reconciliation and peace negotiations.

The mutual recognition between PLO and the government of Israel on 13 September 1993 was supported by most of the world and challenged, in a way, the myth of the Jews as a "nation that shall dwell alone". Israeli media discourse reflected the public jubilation and a sense of victory. Newspapers, in particular, were subsequently full of peace ideology and portrayed the former enemy as a friend. The image of Arafat presented in the post-Oslo media gave the impression that terror was now a thing of the past. From then on, Arafat was the chairman of the PLO and the leader of the Palestinian people, the partner for peace. An opinion poll conducted by Gallup Israel in December 1996 revealed the transformation of Arafat's image when he was selected as the favorite character on the *Hartuzim* (satirical puppet show) on Israel Channel 2 (Barnea 2002).

Ezrachi (2002) argues that the representation of Arafat as either a satanic figure or as a partner in peace was a response to strong emotional needs. The changing image of the enemy in the news texts over time corresponded to the political changes that took place post-Oslo. Therefore, it is important to characterize the Israeli government and the press relations prior to the analyzed results.

4.   The Israeli government and the press

The intense political partisanship that characterized the Israeli media, due mostly to security considerations, shaped the relationship between the government and the news media. During the period under review, most legal restrictions on the dissemination of information were neutralized by contentious security concerns which marked the boundaries of the ongoing political process in Israel, a relatively small country in size and population. These factors created symbiotic relationships between media and politics (Goren & Rothman 1982). The effects of political culture on the construction of media frames in a democratic state flowed two ways: politicians needed media channels in order to reach audiences and solicit support. In turn, the media looked to political institutions as key sources of information of public interest.

Goren and Rothman (1982) discuss the day-to-day performance of the press that was affected by the legal framework – a combination of laws derived from British mandatory powers, yet influenced by a liberal tradition and aware of the requirements of security – which marked the boundaries of the relationship. She argues that the Israeli press was committed to the preservation and defense of the state and subject to the conflicting demands of an intensely politicized situation. This commitment created a special relationship between government and media; although information was frequently leaked to the media, a strict form of self-censorship was practiced.

Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that journalists inevitably interpret the world from a national, or even nationalistic, perspective, especially when they cover conflicts involving their own country. On the other hand, political opponents' information and access to the media depend mostly on their ability to ensure that events provide a good narrative. Consequently, political conflict affects the struggle for access to the media and the control of meaning.

Mobility between media and politics in Israel has implications for journalists and politicians in terms of informal relationships and patterns of information, and many political personalities have worked with the media. The founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, was a foreign correspondent for the Austrian *Neue Freie Presse* in Paris (Elon 1975), Berl Katzenelson, one of the leaders of the Israeli Labor Party, was the editor of a daily newspaper, *Davar*. Many MKs, such as Yossi Beilin, held important positions in the media before entering politics. "The existence of such relations apparently supports the conception that perceives the media as an integral part of the socio-political system and the establishment that heads it, a kind of bond between elites" (Caspi & Limor 1999, 275).

Furthermore, many political figures have engaged journalists as advisors or spokespersons who effectively served the organization by framing the information disseminated to the public. In addition, the military censor imposed security censorship on the media. These factors together created a degree of control over the media which was contrary to the social responsibility model of communication, freedom of expression and the public right to know (Segal 1990). The best example of this was the ability of the Rabin government to keep the secret channels of communication during the Oslo process hidden from the media by maintaining complete control over events and then controlling the flow of information in the first week after the story broke.

Lehman-Wilzig (1994) argues that a better educated citizenry, new communication technologies and gradual reduction of national security tensions all increased the pressure on the authorities to reduce control and censorship. The media therefore became more open, and greater freedom of expression was evident, particularly among the print media.

Israel is a pluralistic society with a hegemonic culture and many sub-cultures. In the 1990s, it was still devoted to the concept of building the State of Israel on the basis of a pervasive approach that led to Jewish domination of most aspects of Israeli society.

Although Israel is a democratic state which upholds the tradition of freedom of the press in practice, the media has always worked under war conditions which were inductive to self-censorship. According to Geertz (1977, 244), despite its Western orientation, Israel exhibited many features typical of developments in the cultural processes of the Third World – collective integration, cultural renaissance, and socio-economic change, "an interplay between institutional change and cultural reconstruction". He argues that such a process can be characterized as a series of simultaneous, multi-dimensional interactions between internal and external

forces, from which various results may emerge with different patterns, rates, and rhythms (Geertz 1977).

6.   Research findings on changing images

During the pre-Oslo period, Arafat and the PLO were virtually ignored in news articles (in the course of 255 days, they were mentioned only 5 times in *Yedioth* and 7 times in *Haaretz*). The political de-legitimization of the enemy by the 1986 ban on contacts with PLO members was upheld by media discourse. Arafat and the PLO were de-legitimized in news discourse, which treated them as a non-issue. In the nine pre-Oslo months, Arafat and the PLO barely figured in either newspaper. As primary actors, they appeared in 6.8% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 8.1% in *Haaretz* (see table 1). As secondary actors, they appeared in 9.4% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 5.8% in *Haaretz* (see table 2).

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
	N =73	N=284	N=148	N=431
Arafat & the PLO	6.8%	40.1%	8.1%	29.5%
Local Palestinian leadership	15.1%	2.8%	16.2%	4.2%
Others*	78.1%	57.1%	74.7%	66.3%
Total relative change	20%	80%	26%	74%

*This includes neighboring Arab states, the Gulf states and other Muslim countries, the US, European countries, the United Nations, Hamas and Hizbollah, and the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza.

Table 1: Representation of primary foreign actors in news articles relating to security, peace and politics during the pre- and post-Oslo periods

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
	N =32	N=142	N=69	N=231
Arafat & PLO	9.4%	28.9%	5.8%	21.6%
Local Palestinian leadership	12.5%	4.2%	17.4%	4.3%
Others*	79.1%	66.9%	76.8%	76.1%
Total relative change	18%	82%	23%	77%

* This includes neighboring Arab states, the Gulf states and other Muslim countries, the US, European countries, the United Nations, Hamas and Hizbollah, and the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza.

Table 2: Representation of Secondary Foreign Actors in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

The total frequencies of the perceived enemy (Arafat, the PLO, the local Palestinian leadership) were represented pre-Oslo by 21.9% of foreign actors in news articles in *Yedioth* and 24.3% in *Haaretz*. It is also noteworthy that the local Palestinian leadership, which participated in bilateral talks with Israel, was represented twice as often as Arafat and the PLO (defined as enemies) (6.8% in *Haaretz* and 8.1% in *Yedioth*) in both newspapers during the pre-Oslo period (see table 1).

In order to show the dichotomy in the news discourse representation between the legitimate Palestinian local leadership and the de-legitimized PLO leadership headed by Arafat in Tunis, I separated them from table 1. Tables 3 and 4 show the breakdown within the category of Palestinian actors between the different Palestinian representatives and the changes in the political and ideological news discourses between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. These tables show the different frequencies with which Arafat and the PLO were mentioned in news articles, either as primary or secondary actors. The Palestinian delegation that negotiated with the Israelis in Washington pre-Oslo evidently became irrelevant post-Oslo, and almost disappeared from the news.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth				Haaretz			
	Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo		Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo	
	N=12	100%	N=104	100%	N=23	100%	N=114	100%
Arafat	3	25%	78	75%	7	30.4%	79	69.3%
PLO	2	16.7%	25	24%	5	21.7%	31	27.2%
Local Palestinian leadership	7	58.3%	1	1%	11	47.9%	4	3.5%

Table 3: Representation of the primary Palestinian representatives (foreign actors) in news articles relating to security, peace and politics during the pre- and post-Oslo periods

Table 3 shows the significant transformation of actors (the enemy) in the news discourse; from de-legitimization (i.e., perceived as almost a non-issue) to dominant actors. During almost nine months prior to the signing of the Oslo accords, Arafat appeared in only 3 news articles in *Yedioth* (25%) and the PLO (16.7%), with 2 references as primary actors. In *Haaretz,* Arafat was covered by (30.4%) in 7 news articles, while the PLO had 21.7% (2 references). During this period, the local Palestinian leadership figured in 58% (7 references) in *Yedioth* and 47.9% (11 news articles) in *Haaretz.*

Post-Oslo, Arafat's frequencies immediately rose to the very high level of 75% (78 news articles); the PLO rose to 24% (25 news articles); together they were represented with a total of 99% of news articles in *Yedioth*. In *Haaretz*, Arafat was represented with 69.3% (79 news articles) and the PLO with 27.2% (31 news articles). Together they totaled 97.5%. In contrast, the local Palestinian leadership vanished from the news, figuring in just 1% of the news in *Yedioth* and 3.5% in *Haaretz*. This is indicative of the fact that the media legitimized Arafat as the Pal-

estinian representative and recognized him as a partner for peace, while automatically ignoring the local Palestinian leadership.

Clearly, both newspapers displayed the same attitude towards the Palestinian actors: the dramatic increase in representation is demonstrated by the role Arafat played as the PLO leader and representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO, although represented more often post-Oslo, appeared in the news media less often than Arafat, both pre- and post-Oslo.

Arafat was clearly perceived in the news discourse as the leader of the PLO during the two periods. The local Palestinian leadership, which received much coverage pre-Oslo, was represented post-Oslo by an "eloquent absence, their silence; or refracted through the glance or the gaze of others" (Hall 1986, 9).

In sum, analysis of data pertaining to *Haaretz* and *Yedioth* demonstrates the same policy towards Arafat as leader of the PLO and the Palestinian nation pre- and post-Oslo. The local Palestinian leadership, represented as partners in 'peace talks' pre-Oslo, became marginal post-Oslo, while Arafat and the PLO became the representatives of the Palestinian nation and legitimized partners for peace**.**

The news reality that validated the change in Israeli government policy towards Arafat, the PLO and the local Palestinian leadership is illustrated in the tables below.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth				Haaretz			
	Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo		Pre-Oslo		Post-Oslo	
	N=5	100%	N=39	100%	N=10	100%	N=48	100%
Arafat	1	20%	16	41%	1	10%	13	34.2%
PLO	2	40%	21	53.8%	3	30%	24	63.2%
Local Palestinian leadership	2	40%	2	5.1%	6	60%	11	2.6%

Table 4: Representation of the secondary palestinian representatives (foreign actor) in news articles relating to security, peace and politics during the pre- and post-Oslo periods

Table 4 shows the representation of secondary references to Palestinians in the news pre- and post-Oslo. The tendency in both newspapers was evidently similar to those illustrated in Table 3. As expected, during the pre-Oslo period *Haaretz* granted significant representation to the local Palestinian leadership (60%), Arafat was represented in 10% of news articles, and the PLO in 30%. This conformed to the agenda of the Israeli government, which de-legitimized Arafat and the PLO in the pre-Oslo period. *Yedioth*, a populist newspaper, said less than *Haaretz* about the local Palestinian leadership, who were represented by 40% (2 news articles), the PLO (also 40%, 2 news articles) and Arafat (only 20%, 1 news article).

However, both newspapers dramatically increased their representation of the PLO and Arafat in the news discourse post-Oslo, thereby granting Arafat and the PLO

a new status as legitimized political partners for peace. Shimon Peres (interviewed on 3 May 2002) pointed out that, "for the first time, Arafat recognized worldwide the right of Israel to exist in peace and security according to UN resolution 242, and Israel recognized Arafat as the Palestinians' leader". Indeed, Arafat and the PLO were seen as representing the Palestinian nation and became active partners in peace negotiations and conflict resolution.

The data below demonstrate the dramatic changes in the news representation of the Palestinian actors.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	41.7%	99%	52.1%	96.5%
Local Palestinian leadership	58.3%	1%	47.9%	3.5%

Table 5: Changes between two Palestinian forces as primary actors during the pre- and post-Oslo periods (data derived from table 3)

In the popular newspaper *Yedioth*, the data showed a dramatic change between the two periods. In *Haaretz*, the change was less marked but still significant. The frequency of mentioning Arafat in *Yedioth* increased by 230%; in *Haaretz* it increased by 190%. However, the total frequency with which Arafat and the PLO are represented in the news indicates a significant correlation in both topics. The primary representation in *Yedioth* was 99% and in *Haaretz*, 96.5%.

The differences also apply to the local Palestinian leadership, which was more prominent in pre-Oslo *Haaretz* than in *Yedioth*. The differences between the two newspapers can be explained by the fact that *Haaretz* is a quality publication with an emphasis on political issues. *Yedioth* became more political post-Oslo in response to the demands of its readers. However, both newspapers reflected government policy and discourse, and responded to the public need for information. The differences between the two newspapers are marginal and point to the same policies pre- and post-Oslo.

The relative change in the new discourse of both newspapers can be seen in Table 6.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	30%	70%	35%	65%
Local Palestinian leadership	98%	2%	93%	7%

Table 6: Relative changes between two palestinian forces as primary actors during the pre- and post-Oslo periods (data derived from table 5)

Table 6 reveals the dramatic changes in the news discourse relating to Arafat and the PLO, *i.e., from 30% pre-Oslo* to 70% post-Oslo in *Yedioth*, and from 35% pre-Oslo to 65% post-Oslo in *Haaretz*. The local Palestinian leadership evidently became irrelevant, changing from 98% pre-Oslo to 2% post-Oslo in *Yedioth* and from 93% pre-Oslo to 7% post-Oslo in *Haaretz*.

It is interesting to analyze the representation of the secondary actor in the Palestinian arena and to examine the interplay in both newspapers between the primary actor and the secondary one. The same tendency regarding the main foreign actor was shown regarding the secondary one. First, the representation of Arafat increased dramatically in the news coverage post-Oslo. Second, the representation of the PLO also increased, more so in *Haaretz* than in *Yedioth*. Third, the local Palestinian leadership lost its position in the Israeli news media.

While the changes described above are very clear, the interplay between the primary and the secondary actors is particularly interesting. In both newspapers, Arafat and the PLO, as the primary actor, was more prominent than the PLO, both pre- and post-Oslo, while as the secondary actor the PLO gained more prominence (53.8% in *Yedioth* and 63.2% in *Haaretz*) than Arafat (41% in *Yedioth* and 34.2% in *Haaretz)* in post-Oslo. As secondary actors, the Palestinians became marginal (5.1% in *Yedioth* and 2.6% in *Haaretz*). In general, the tendency of the secondary actor in both newspapers was similar to the primary one in terms of the pre-Oslo enemy, who became a legitimate partner post-Oslo. These results for the secondary Palestinian actors are illustrated in Table 7.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	60%	94.8%	40%	97.4%
Local Palestinian leadership	40%	5.1%	60%	2.6%

Table 7: Changes between two Palestinian forces as secondary actors during the pre- and post-Oslo periods (data derived from table 4)

As in Table 5, which shows data on the primary actors, the data in Table 7 shows changes between the levels of representation of Arafat and the PLO, on the one side, and the local Palestinian leadership, on the other. A perfect correlation in frequencies was revealed in both newspapers: Arafat figured as the primary actor more than twice as often as he was featured as a secondary actor in post-Oslo. In *Yedioth*, he appeared to be more salient than in *Haaretz,* although with a very small difference. In short, table 7 shows that both newspapers exhibited the same policy and the same changes in the representation of Arafat and the PLO image pre- and post-Oslo and are similar to the final results of tables 3 and 4.

Post-Oslo, the local Palestinian leadership, Arafat and the PLO together were represented as follows:

- •   Primary actor   = 99%   in *Yedioth* and 96.5% in *Haaretz* (cf. table 5).
- •   Secondary actor = 94.8% in *Yedioth* and 97.4% in *Haaretz* (cf. table 7).

The relative change in the new discourse of both newspapers can be seen in table 8.

Categories	Yedioth Ahronoth		Haaretz	
	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo	Pre-Oslo	Post-Oslo
Arafat & PLO	39%	61%	29%	71%
Local Palestinian leadership	89%	11%	96%	4%

Table 8: Relative changes between two Palestinian forces as primary actors during the pre- and post-Oslo periods (data derived from table 7)

Table 8 reveals the dramatic change in the news discourse relating to Arafat and the PLO: from 39% pre-Oslo to 61% post-Oslo in *Yedioth,* and from 29% pre-Oslo to 71% post-Oslo in *Haaretz*. The local Palestinian leadership became irrelevant and dropped from 89% pre-Oslo to 11% post-Oslo in *Yedioth* and from 96% pre-Oslo to 4% post-Oslo in *Haaretz*.

The following quotations illustrate stereotypical perceptions of Arafat in the pre-Oslo period:

"Arafat [in exile in Tunis] congratulated the deported terrorists, praised the sacred dead and called on the Palestinians to remain steadfast to their land" (*Haaretz*, 31 March 1993).

Prime Minister Rabin told American Jewish leaders that "there is no change in Israeli relations with PLO, and we will not negotiate with them" (*Haaretz*, 2 August 1993, shortly before the signing of the Oslo accords).

Arafat was hardly ever mentioned in the political news discourse in Israel. His image, however, was reinforced by news articles about the Middle East policy of the US, Israel's most important ally (through third and fourth topics in the texts). The following quotations attest to this trend:

"[Warren] Christopher [US Secretary of State] told the Palestinians: 'For you, Arafat is a president, but not as far as we are concerned. We do not recognize him'"(*Haaretz*, 12 March 1993).

"American reporters noted that the key to peace talks lies with the Palestinian people" (*Yedioth*, 23 February 1993).

Post-Oslo, Arafat and the PLO became so popular in the Israeli media following the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO that both newspapers declared him a partner and a neighbor. Depicted pre-Oslo as the head of the terrorist PLO, Arafat became the post-Oslo leader of the Palestinians, who signed the "peace of the brave" (*Haaretz* and *Yedioth*, 14 September 1993). Arafat himself was cited

in both newspapers using the term: "peace between the brave" (*Haaretz* and *Yedioth,* 17 January 1994). He was frequently represented in the news in both newspapers. Furthermore, journalists often used the same adjectives and titles to describe both Arafat and Rabin, and these two leaders were represented with similar frequencies in each of the news articles.

A featured news article on the first page of *Haaretz* was randomly selected to analyze Arafat's frequencies during the pre-Oslo period (21 March 1993). This showed that the Palestinians were mentioned 19 times, the PLO twice and Arafat once. On the day the Oslo accords were signed (13 September 1993), one news article in *Haaretz* mentioned Arafat 21 times, the PLO 16 and the Palestinians just 6 times. Post-Oslo, one randomly selected news article in *Haaretz* (6 October 1993) mentioned Arafat 20 times, the PLO 15 and the Palestinians 3 times. Similar figures apply to a selection of articles from *Yedioth*: Pre-Oslo (2 May 1993) the Palestinians were mentioned 11 times in a randomly-selected news article, the PLO once and Arafat once. Post-Oslo (6 October 1993) the main article mentioned Arafat 16 times, the PLO 11 and the Palestinians only 4 times, and on 30 December 1993 the news article mentioned Arafat 18 times, the PLO 7 and the Palestinians, 10 times.

When mentioning Prime Minister Rabin, news articles referred to Chairman Arafat. When the prime minister was referred to by his surname, the same convention was applied to Arafat. When articles mentioned Yitzhak Rabin, they also mentioned Yasser Arafat. For the first time, Arafat was referred to as Mr. Arafat and was portrayed as a normal person.

A quotation illustrates the positive atmosphere relating to Arafat as a partner:

"It was a good meeting between Rabin and Arafat at the Eretz checkpoint … The two reached an agreement, and the peace process was fuelled again … It was undoubtedly the most successful meeting between Rabin and Arafat to date. The two personalities who, to put it mildly, do not like each other, renewed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Arafat, for his part, promised to suppress terrorism. In general, Arafat supplied the goods yesterday" (*Yedioth*, 26 September 1994).

Arafat was also legitimized in the Western world:

"… the American media event where US President Clinton hugged both Arafat and Rabin while shaking hands…" (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002, cf. chapter 9).

"The peace era has begun and the war era ended" (*Yedioth* and *Haaretz*, 13 September 1993).

"The handshake that changed the Middle East"; "A new Middle East" (*Yedioth* and *Haaretz*, 14 September 1993).

Both newspapers published opinion polls that strengthened and supported the Oslo peace process and government policy. According to a Dahaf Institute poll

which was published on the front pages of both *Haaretz* and *Yedioth* on 15 September 1993, 61% of Israelis supported the Gaza and Jericho First plan [granting autonomy to the PA in Gaza and Jericho under Arafat]. "The PLO suggested an integrated economy between Israel, Jordan and the PA" (*Yedioth* and *Haaretz,* 29 September 1993). Another poll by the Dahaf Institute, published in both *Yedioth* and *Haaretz* (18 February 1994), revealed that 64% of Israelis expected that a Palestinian state would be established.

6.   Conclusions

It is easy to speak glibly about the image of an enemy and to describe him impressionistically without precision or a systematic assessment. However, the results of quantitative content analysis demonstrate the transition from de-legitimization to total legitimization and are supported by quotations from news articles. The news media reflected through its discourse a change of image – from the stereotype of ultimate evil emerged a new stereotype, namely a partner for peace.

Hiro (1996) argues that Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres were both sincere in their commitment to achieving peace. They accepted the basic premise that the core intent of Oslo was to create the semblance of a balance of power between Israelis and Palestinians over five years so that the two peoples could start to coexist peacefully. He stresses that the change in the image of the enemy was reflected by mutual trust leading to the establishment of a telephone hotline between Rabin and Arafat, along with the use of hidden channels of communication.

The Israeli media experienced a dramatic and immediate transformation, as reflected by media discourse. The phrase "the peace of the brave" was used to invoke the idea of a "Brave New World". Ari Shavit (1997), a veteran columnist in *Haaretz*, uses the expression "messianic times" to describe the intoxicated atmosphere and pervasive sense of triumph. He also illustrates the change in the media discourse:

"We felt the great powers were with us and became ecstatic. We didn't hesitate to mobilize our powers as reporters. We believed that the global changes reflected the 'end of history', the end of conflict and wars, and that Rabin and Peres would create for us a Western Europe in the Middle East" (Shavit, *Haaretz*, 26 December 1997).

Kempf (1998) argues that the more a society is involved in conflict, the more escalation-oriented will be its media coverage of the conflict. He explains that even the most powerful political leaders cannot just switch to a cooperative strategy once a cease-fire or peace treaty is achieved. They risk losing power or even their lives. Willingness to compromise may even be regarded as betrayal. (Indeed, such was the case in Israel, where Rabin was murdered by a Jewish religious fanatic.)

Beliefs which help a society to endure ongoing conflict remain dominant. Thus, transformations from the habit of war to the norm of peace require a gradual de-

construction of stereotypes in addition to trust-building; this can be achieved by developing a strong civil society. This process cannot be achieved by simply adopting a new political discourse and ideology that idealize cooperation, as reflected by post-Oslo Israeli news media discourse. "If stereotypes and prejudice are only suppressed, they will prevail and return to the surface of social life as soon as they are given the slightest chance" (Azar & Cohen 1979, 169).

The danger of an ideology is rooted in the performance of image and the promotion of the enemy's political identity (Young, 1992). Rubinstein (1995) argues that due to bitter differences over the Middle East conflict, the personal opinion of each reporter determined whether Arafat was immediately described as the PLO leader, or the chairman of the PLO executive.

Hitherto, it was Shavit (1997) and Barnea (2002) who accused the media of promoting a "left-wing religion" in the aftermath of 13 September 1993. Barnea (2002) recalls that after the major wave of terrorism in 1996, a well-known journalist, Dankner (1996), wrote in *Haaretz*: "Arafat is not the Evil Empire's terrifying Caesar anymore … he is the chosen leader of the Palestinian people who made a peace treaty with the Israeli people" (Barnea 2002, 7). However, the dramatic change in the enemy's media representations did not mean any profound change on the level of traditional political and/or public perceptions. The following "peace process" has been extremely difficult, and a lot of evidence can be found that in fact it was not really a peace process (Said 2000).

In this context, Ezrahi (2002) argues that Israeli journalistic concepts and values adapted to the emotional needs of the Israeli public in order to rationalize Israeli security policies. He claims that serious analysis could reinforce realistic forces and influences, even when they conflict with deeply-held attitudes.

McHoul (1993, 42) raises a question based on Foucault's (1967) theory of change:

"If the historical flow of ideas is radically discontinuous and are also part of the system, then aren't we left in a rather difficult situation: either to accept the system or submit to the chaotic and random changes brought about by discontinuity?".

Clearly, these images illustrate how the government and the press relate to simplistic personifications of the enemy as threats to Jewish existence and the Jewish state. Obviously, the media should be concerned about the question of Arafat's mythological construction. After representing him for decades as the ultimate enemy and arch-terrorist, how did he become overnight a legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation, a human being, a neighbor and a partner? Moreover, the news discourse did not raise any issues in relation to the Palestinian delegation in peace talks and their continuing role in the process. Furthermore, no news or any background information about Palestinian culture was conveyed to the Israeli public.

Analysis of findings related to Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians shows how mass communication implements "reality" elements in news discourse. It could be argued that news discourses in the printed press are part of the ideological and po-

litical policy of government, and disseminate messages to the public, identifying the enemy of the nation and conferring legitimacy on potential partners for peace.

The findings show that the newspapers faithfully reproduced and legitimated different political attitudes during each period. Comparisons between the representations of security, peace and political topics and actors in each period show that the routine news strategy was to highlight official policies and policy statements.

Finally, I argue that the media news discourse informs the public about political priorities through mediated political discourse that changes according to government policy, in addition to global processes, regional circumstances and local ideology. Although the Israeli media reclassified the actors, there continued to be traditional perceptions which emphasized an enemy for the sake of maintaining group consensus.

Changes in the political, social, and media environments and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens of Israel[1]

Anat First & Eli Avraham

1.   Introduction

In this article we will examine the ways in which the Arab population of Israel[2] is portrayed in the Hebrew media, with particular attention to the coverage of two violent incidents by national newspapers. The events selected are those surrounding the First Land Day, which occurred on March 30, 1976, and those which took place in October 2000 during the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada. In both cases Israeli Arab civilians were killed, and both are considered milestones in Israeli history and in the fractured Arab-Jewish relationship in particular. In our opinion, investigation of the media reporting of these events is of great importance because during times of conflict people rely on media even more heavily than usual, and they shape their views of reality (Cohen et al. 1990). Consequently, the purpose of this research is twofold: 1) to explore how the way in which the Arab citizens of Israel are portrayed in times of violent conflict encourages Jewish citizens to perceive them as a threat, and 2) to examine the means of presentation in terms of a time frame, in accordance with the view that the presentation process is a dynamic one affected both socially and symbolically by a changing reality. This will be done via a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media content.

1.1 Presentation and stereotypes in the coverage of the "other"

The way minorities are covered in the media has become a major topic in media research. The reason for this interest lies in the fact that presentation is a central component of cultural life in all societies (Hall 1997a, b). Researchers who have dealt with the coverage of minority groups in the media have found that in most cases there has been a tendency to either ignore them or to portray them negatively. Such coverage implies that the "other" represents a threat to the social or-

---

1   The authors would like to thank the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) for sponsoring this research.
2   Throughout our research we used the terms: "Israeli Arabs", "the Arab citizens of Israel", "the Arab population", etc. These terms are used most often in research on this topic.

der. In addition, implicit in this coverage is the notion that because they are different from "us", minorities are to blame for our economic and social difficulties. The description, coverage, and portrayal of the "other" in the media, whether based upon religious, national, ethnic or other differences, is accompanied in many countries by the widespread use of generalizations, stereotypes, and prejudices, and ignores the background, causes, and political-social context that has given rise to difficulties and crises involving minorities in many areas (Avraham 2001, First 2001, Weimann 2000, Wolfsfeld 1997b).

As we know, the mass media help us consolidate our interpretation of political, social, and economic conflicts. The media play a similar role in describing the "others" of our world. The term construction is used with regard to news stories, because news reports are stories created in the framework of a specific narrative which organize and define everyday events in a wider context (Wolfsfeld 1997b). In this process, the news continually presents impressions through pictures and words of different social groups and identities. In this manner, the media constructs for viewers the affiliations of certain groups and defines "us" and "them" and our national awareness, which is itself also an artificial social product, pertaining to an imagined community (Kellner 1995).

The presentation process is affected by both the political-social reality and the symbolic reality in which it occurs. The influence of political-social reality functions on two levels. First, the effects of processes and events occur in a given time and environment. For example, the outbreak of a conflict increases the distinction and polarization between "us" and "them" (First 2001). In addition, there is the framework of relations between the political institution and the media institution (Caspi & Limor 1992). As mentioned above, the symbolic reality in which the presentation process occurs is comprised of various means of expression, including literature, art forms, and the media. The last of these formats includes the news, which is the central source that constructs our political, social, and economic agenda. The influence of this reality itself acts on two levels. First, the proliferation of channels presents an ever-increasing number of images. Second, the process of constructing the media product includes the routines of media organizations, the process of encoding information, for example, who was it who covered the "other", interpreted his actions, etc.

The presentation process includes stereotypes created during the sorting out and cataloging of the various fields, for aspects of society are subject to interpretation based on the physical environment or the symbolic environment in which they appear. This results in a distortion of the social reality of social groups, which inevitably become media subjects. The discussion of the means of presentation includes at least three indexes which assist in examining the location of the group within a given society: 1) How does the group appear in the context of the media – is it "extinct", portrayed stereotypically or "normally"? 2) What are the status systems with which group members are affiliated, in other words, the nature of the visibility of the "other", which is generally measured in terms of professional social position and status characteristics? 3) What are the modes of interaction

between members of the dominant group and members of the minority group? These relationships indicate the extent of proximity between the groups. The existence of daily social interaction on an equal footing indicates that the hierarchy of power is diminishing (Gross 1991, Greenberg & Brand 1994).

1.2 Media frames

The discussion of media frames constitutes the connecting link with research on the question of representation, in other words between processes and products, since a dialectical relationship exists between the two. An analysis of the theories dealing with media frames demonstrates that different definitions exist. Here we are discussing the frame from the point of view of the media, regarding which there are a number of competing and complementary definitions (Gamson 1989, Gitlin 1980). A summary of the various definitions demonstrates that the framing process includes the placing of facts or components perceived as reality in frames that provide them with coherency, meaning the presentation of a causal explanation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendations for a solution. A media frame can be identified through a newspaper's use of metaphors, key sentences and symbolic means, including words and pictures. It should be noted that there is a constant competition among the various factions and interest groups which want to employ the media frames most suited to them. Additionally, in periods of conflict, the emphasis is placed primarily on the impact of the conflict, and less on its nature and possible solutions (Cohen et al. 1997, First 1998). Framing, according to Liebes (1997), includes the following mechanisms: excising, sanitizing, equalizing, personalizing, demonizing, and contextualizing. The framing mechanisms as such are in accordance with the methods we presented regarding the presentation of the "other". In general, it is widely noted that the viewpoint of news framing includes mechanisms of frame representation – of the exclusion and alienation of the "other" – which occur in a certain symbolic and cultural context.

1.3 Effects of socio-political environments on media content

Media serve as ideological instruments by delineating and distributing the parameters of discourse. News writers use framing mechanisms, as well as known socio-cultural codes, to transform the news from unusual and unexpected events into understandable media contents (Gitlin 1982, Hartely 1982). The presenter, namely the media organization, has reciprocal relations with the changing social and political environment and is also part of it. Accordingly, the presentation process is a dynamic one. In this environment there are a variety of cultural assumptions regarding a society's central values, which in turn affect the behavior of media personnel and the manner in which the news is presented, as well as the product itself (Avraham 2002, Gans 1979, Gitlin 1980).

The constructivist approach holds that news reporters prefer news stories that are recognized as effective and culturally acceptable, and tend to lend them profes-

sional approval. Editors' decisions are influenced by their opinions regarding the target audience and the belief that dominant groups have little interest in the status of minorities, unless such information might upset their day-to-day lives (Jakubowicz et al. 1994, van-Dijk 1996). Gill (1987) noted that there was a greater tendency to place a minority group in more marginal media frames the less the values and goals of that group were consistent with those of the political and media elite. Ottosen (1995) holds that changes in the images of minorities stem from changes in the political elite's minority conceptualization. According to Ottosen, it is important to deal with minority images because stereotypes of and generalizations about marginal groups tend to legitimize the use of violence against them by the establishment/government (Avraham 2001).

1.4 From 1976 to 2000: Changes in Israeli society

As previously mentioned, the media is a product of a particular country and culture, and as a consequence media images are dynamic. This cultural context is affected by two different sources, socio-political reality and the symbolic reality which is part of it and in which it creates and is created. All realities make their distinctive contribution, but we must not forget that there are permanent relations of reciprocity among them.

1.4.1 Changes in the social-political reality of Jewish Israeli society

Israeli society underwent profound changes in the period covered by the research (1976-2000). We will not delineate these changes here, but will rather briefly summarize a number of processes related to our discussion. The framework of relations between Israel and the Arab countries, as well as with the Palestinians, has undergone significant changes as a result of a number of events, including the peace agreement signed with Egypt in 1979, the Lebanese War in 1982, the first Intifada, which began in December 1987, the Gulf War of 1991, the mutual recognition agreements that were signed in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the Oslo Accords), the peace treaty signed with Jordan in 1994, and the beginning of negotiations with the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese aimed at ending the continuous state of conflict. Primarily as a result of the Oslo Accords, peace was recognized as a political option whose recognition sharpened the political debate, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. The peace process ultimately became deadlocked, and the Al Aksa Intifada broke out in October 2000.

The political system has also undergone significant changes. These changes include the end of Labor Movement hegemony in 1977 and the formation of a government by the Right (the Likud Party) for the first time. In addition, the larger parties became weaker, and the political system went from one with a dominant center to one with a divided center (Arian 1997). In this period over a million immigrants arrived in Israel, and the process of globalization and the communications

revolution brought changes to politics as well as to societal values. Ethnic groups began to fight for their identities, individualism as an ideology grew in strength, universal values became acceptable, and a civil society began to develop (Timm 2001). Politically and culturally speaking, the hegemony of the pseudo-Western secular Israeli was broken, and a number of almost autonomous societies and cultures began to appear separately from one another, even if they were dependent upon one another, one of them being the Arab-Israeli society.

1.4.2 Changes in Arab Israeli society

Most researchers who have dealt with the question of the identity of the Arab population in Israel agree that it is comprised of two central components. There is a civil element, resulting from the very status of Arabs as citizens of the State, and a national component, resulting from the national affinity of Arabs in Israel for the Arab world and the Palestinian people in the territories (Al-Haj 2000). The formation of the identities of Arabs and their relationship with the State of Israel have been affected since the establishment of the State by four central focuses. These include: the local focus, namely, the internal structure of the Arab population; the national focus, pertaining to formal and informal status within the State of Israel; the regional focus, relating to the cultural and national affiliation with the Arab world, and in particular with the Palestinians in the territories; and the religious focus, involving the ethnic identities of the Moslems, Christians, and Druze. Ghanem and Osatski-Lazar (2001) maintain that an analysis of the events of October 2000 within the framework of the Al Aksa Intifada must include an additional focus, the global focus. They claim that the end of the Cold War was accompanied by an emphasis upon local and regional politics. It should be noted that there is a constant interaction among all of the above factors, though we shall primarily emphasize the first two. In the period covered by our research, from the 1970s to 2000, changes occurred in all four focuses. In the local realm, Israeli Arabs have undergone a process of modernization in economy and education (Al-Haj 2000, Kimmerling & Migdal 1999). Arab society has experienced a widespread politicization reflected in changes in voting habits, nationwide organizational developments and the development of political parties. Indeed, during the elections for Prime Minister in 1999, MK Beshara, an Israeli Arab, declared his intention to run as a candidate (Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar 2001).

In the regional realm the Israeliness of the Arab citizens of Israel has been discussed again and again. Their Israeliness is expressed first and foremost in terms of their formal status, as they are citizens of the State of Israel, constituting 18% of the population. Nevertheless, the Israeliness of Arabs is incomplete, and they are marginalized in Israeli society. In other words, they have little influence on any level of daily life. Additionally, their interpretation of their citizenship is inconsistent with the acceptable Jewish interpretation of loyalty to the State, empathy with its nature, and identifying with Jewish symbols. Although it seems that Israeli society is undergoing processes of democratization and is more amenable to the entry of marginal groups into the center, this process does not include Arabs

(Smooha 2000, Ghanem & Ositski-Lazar 2001). The Yom Kippur War (1973), the Lebanese War (1982), the first Intifada (1987), and increasing ties with the populations living in the territories have led to a growing process of Palestinianization, a growing sense of Palestinian national identity amongst Israeli Arabs (Al-Haj 2000).

The two major events chosen for this research and the period it covers emphasize the consolidation of national identity as opposed to civil identity. Both involve incidents of protest by Arab Israelis against actions of the Israeli government that culminated in the deaths of demonstrators – six in the first and 13 in the second. In the first, a series of violent confrontations took place on March 29-30, 1976 over the expropriation of land owned by Arab Israelis by the State and was later dubbed the First Land Day. The second, the events of October 2000, which began with demonstrations on Thursday, September 28, 2000 against Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, was an important stage of the Al Aksa Intifada in the occupied territories. On October 1, the Arab citizens of Israel began to stage protests which developed into violent clashes with security forces throughout the country and continued for ten days.

The Arabs are the "other" in Israeli society because they are situated outside of the Israeli-Jewish collective and are portrayed as such in the media. However, their presentation is neither homogeneous nor static and is influenced by the framework of political relations that the different Arab groups apply to the State of Israel in a given period (First 1998). Previous studies dealing with this subject concluded that the Hebrew media generally ignore the Arab population, and the little coverage there is deals primarily with disorder and perennial subjects such as crime, involvement in terrorism, violence and civil disorder (Asia 2000, Avraham et al. 2000, First 1998).

1.4.3 Changes in the symbolic reality

There are conflicting views regarding the role of the press in Israeli society. This debate is particularly acute when examined in the context of liberal democracy. Usually, the Israeli press tends to behave no differently from state presses in undemocratic countries, e.g., with various self-imposed prohibitions (Pappe 1997). The central explanation for such behavior was the Arab-Israeli conflict that has beset the State of Israel since it came into being. In times of war the press has supported national aims and portrayed the conflict from the national perspective (Liebes 1997). As such, the Israeli media (both print and broadcast) adopted the task of promoting the national cause in a variety of ways (see for example: Dor 2001, First 2001, Niger et al. 2001). There is no doubt that during the years covered by our research (1976-2000) a revolution took place in the national press (Caspi & Limor 1992). Ideological party-oriented newspapers died out (aside from the ultra-Orthodox press), their place being taken by privately-owned newspapers. The battle for the hearts of readers altered the format of major newspapers such as *Ma'ariv* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, popular newspapers which together account for

approximately 90% of the market. Newspapers began to devote greater space to personal stories and focused upon difficult news in the humane format of the soft story (Roeh 1994). Likewise, dramatic changes took place from the 1970s to the year 2000 in television stations. In this period the monopoly of public television came to an end, and commercial stations as well as cable television started up. Such developments increased the competition in all Israeli media forms.

2. Research methods

2.1 Research questions

Two central questions are at the heart of this research:

1. How is the "other" portrayed in the national media during the outbreak of national-ethnic conflict? In other words, how are Arab Israelis depicted in the Israeli press?
2. Has there been a change in this representation in various newspapers over the course of the years, and how can such changes be explained?

In this study we have used two research methods to examine the questions posed: an analysis of quantitative content and an analysis of the qualitative content of 388 articles and media texts.

2.2 The sample population

Media: The two newspapers studied were *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *Haaretz*. These two papers were chosen for the following reasons: *Yedioth Ahronoth* is an independent commercial newspaper that is popular with the mainstream. It targets the public at large, its news items have emotional appeal and concentrate on personal stories, and it is the most widely-read newspaper in the country. *Haaretz* is an independent newspaper that is considered both high quality and elitist. It speaks primarily to the well-educated public and the elites, emphasizes institutional critique and adopts a liberal perspective.

Sample Period: We analyzed all the articles appearing in the two weeks following the events detailed in all the sections of the newspaper (aside from the sports section). Our analysis focused on two periods of time: the first two weeks following the events of Land Day in March 1976 (in our qualitative analysis we studied the two weeks preceding these events as well) and the first two weeks of the Al Aksa Intifada of October 2000.

2.3 Quantitative content analysis

In order to answer the questions posed by the research, a coding system was constructed to assist in the measurement of the dependent variables. The validity and reliability of this coding system was arrived at by means of three judges, who

agreed amongst themselves an average of 93% of the time regarding the different variables on the coding page. In order to reach this percentage, the judges went through a training course, and a number of pre-research tests were made (pre-test). The coding page for newspaper analysis included the following variables: type of newspaper, date, location, length of news piece, type of event, writer's name and ethnic background, subjects reported on, existence of quoted sources, references to injured Arabs and their description, the Arab participant and his description, connection between the article and civil protest, terrorism, the Arab world and the Palestinians, the use of historical arguments, or group demands and issues mentioned in the article.

2.4 Qualitative content analysis

In the current research, after viewing and reading all the articles pertaining to the events of our investigation, we extrapolated key components that in our opinion characterized the coverage of Israeli Arabs and were consistent with the characteristics described in the theoretical portion of this paper. These include types of framing, generalizations, limitations, objectivity and subjectivity, context, group voice or voice hegemony, sources of information and the writer's ethnic background.

3. Findings and interpretation

The data is presented through comparisons of the newspapers and the periods. The analysis of the press includes the analysis of 388 items (articles, opinion editorials, caricatures, photographs) from two newspapers. A total of 147 items were analyzed in 1976 and 241 items in 2000.

3.1 Coverage salience

1976: In the printed press there were 147 articles dealing with events surrounding Land Day; 80 articles appeared in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 67 appeared in *Haaretz*. An analysis of these articles demonstrates that the event was prominently portrayed in the national newspapers. Information regarding the event appeared 14 times in the headlines on the first page of *Yedioth Ahronoth,* amounting to about 18% of the covered material. However, in *Haaretz* 10 references appeared in the front page headlines, amounting to approximately 15% of the covered material in the group. The events were accompanied by a large number of editorials. Comparison with studies on the coverage of Arab citizens during non-crisis periods (Aburaiya et al. 1998, Avraham 2001) demonstrates that this event received very extensive coverage. The average size of each article was 226 square centimeters.

2000: Regarding the events of October, there were 241 articles dealing with the topic, and they can be divided almost equally between *Yedioth Ahronoth*

(113 articles) and *Haaretz* (128 articles). The matter was deemed of high importance, for most of the reports appeared on the front pages or the news pages. It should be noted that the subject appeared in 18% of the cases in the headlines or on the front page of *Yedioth Ahronoth*, as compared to 6% on the front page of *Haaretz*. The importance of the events studied is apparent from the number of editorials devoted to them in the newspapers (14% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* as compared to 18% in *Haaretz*). The average size of each article was 433 square centimeters.

3.2 Clashes accompanying the event: Disorder

1976: The event was typically categorized as a civil disorder. The total coverage of Land Day in *Yedioth Ahronoth* dealt with 30 events in terms of demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life. This represents about 38% of the total events. The report in *Haaretz* was quite similar. Twenty-six articles, amounting to about 39% of the articles printed, dealt with events in which there were civil disturbances such as demonstrations involving property damage and loss of life. In other words, the newspaper preference was more for events involving damage and personal injury, as opposed to discussions of the issues, their implications, alternative solutions, etc. As a result, the Arab Israeli community was identified more than anything else with violence and civil disorder, as well as with the protest it expressed.

2000: The event was classified in less than half of the articles as a civil disorder, in 41% of the examples in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, as opposed to 52% in *Haaretz*. The events were portrayed in various manifestations, including demonstrations, marches, property damage and loss of life.

3.3 Who is the spokesman: Is this the hegemonic voice?

1976: An analysis of the sources of quoted information reveals that in about 60% of the articles there was use of an information source in both newspapers. Security sources were provided with an opportunity to respond or reply in about 25% of all articles. In 40% of the articles there were responses from Jewish leaders to the events, whereas the responses of Arab leaders appeared in only 19% of the articles. At first glance, one might assume that Arab politicians were given sufficient representation, although an analysis of those quoted reveals that they were primarily Arab politicians who opposed the strike (Koren 1994).

2000: Generally speaking, it can be said that the Jewish political institutional voice was far less apparent in both newspapers as compared to 1976, primarily in *Haaretz*. In this newspaper, the responses of Jewish leaders dropped to 26% in 2000. Concurrently, the defense establishment gained in strength as a news source. The most quoted source in both newspapers continued to be that of the security forces. In *Yedioth Ahronoth*, the security forces were cited in 32% of all articles, as compared to about 38% of all articles in *Haaretz*. A survey of the subject

matter list shows that in *Yedioth Ahronoth* there was a similar level of presentation over time for Jewish leaders, which ranged between 29% and 31%. In comparison, while in *Haaretz* there was an increase in the level of presentation for Arab leaders (from 12% in 1976 to 22% in 2000), *Yedioth Ahronoth* showed a decrease from 21% to 12%. Additionally, the Arab participants mentioned in articles were still politicians (21% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 28% in *Haaretz*), though the demonstrators' voices can also be heard (5% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 16% in *Haaretz*), along with those of the people in the street (5% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 9% in *Haaretz*). It seems that *Haaretz* tends to portray a greater variety of opinions than *Yedioth Ahronoth.*

3.4 Similarity in subject matter in the two newspapers

1976: An analysis of the subjects most often covered demonstrates a small difference between the newspapers. In *Yedioth Ahronoth* the seven most covered subjects were, in descending order: the connection of the events with coexistence and the status of Arab Israelis in the State, activities of the security forces, the protests themselves, the response of Jewish leaders, attempts at further incitement, internal struggles between group leaders and the responses of Arab leaders.

2000: An analysis of the most frequently covered subjects reveals that in *Yedioth Ahronoth* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: connection with coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (49%), the protests themselves (47%), actions of the security forces (45%), the responses of Jewish leaders (29%), reports of Arab casualties (25%), attempts at further incitement (18%) and reports of Jewish casualties (18%). In *Haaretz* the seven most often covered subjects, in descending order, were as follows: the protests themselves (73%), actions of the security forces (45%), links to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State (48%), reports of Arab casualties (22%), complaints of discrimination (26%), responses of Jewish leaders (26%) and the responses of Arab leaders (22%).

Despite the similarity in the subject priority and the amount of coverage between the two newspapers in 1976, the differences between them were more pronounced in 2000 in two areas: group discrimination and the responses of Arab leaders. In *Haaretz* there was a preference for covering complaints of discrimination (26% of all articles in *Haaretz* as opposed to 15% in *Yedioth Ahronoth).* A similar level of coverage was maintained regarding the responses of Arab leaders (22% in *Haaretz* versus 12% in *Yedioth Ahronoth*). It seems that the focus of reporting in *Yedioth Ahronoth* was the Jewish collective. It appears over time that *Yedioth Ahronoth* still preferred to cover matters relating to coexistence and the status of Israeli Arabs in the State. In these articles the events were examined in the light of the group's status in the State and in connection with its activities regarding coexistence. The subject of Arab leaders' responses received less coverage in 2000. It should be noted that in *Haaretz* there was a sharp increase in the coverage of complaints of discrimination, yet a decline in reporting on attempted in-

citement and Jewish casualties. This contrasts with the increase in reporting of Arab casualties (from 18% in 1976 to 37% in 2000).

3.5 The reporter and the Jewish perspective

1976: In *Yedioth Ahronoth* no articles were found regarding the "other", the Arab. Likewise, the newspaper did not contain any reports or editorials written by Arab citizens. In *Haaretz* only 6% of the relevant articles were written by Arab reporters or analysts. Coverage of the events presented the Jewish perspective, in terms that implicitly or explicitly invoked notions of "us" versus "them". This type of presentation is important for two reasons. First, the group is separated from "us", the Jewish citizens, and secondly, by their very classification as "others" Arabs are perceived as different from the majority group, and therefore their legitimacy is questioned:

"… *We* dismantled 'El Arad' (an Arab Party) … and *we* exiled from the country some of the inciters … *we* closed Arab newspapers, *we* dispersed demonstrations, *we* closed Arab stores and schools …" (*Yedioth Ahronoth* 23.3.76).

2000: In this period, the first glimmerings of the voices of Arab Israelis appeared. There were 16 articles written by Arab writers in *Yedioth Ahronoth,* and these articles accounted for 14% of all articles dealing with the subject. In *Haaretz* there were only five articles by Arab writers, making up only 4% of the total coverage of the subject. It appears that the number of Arab writers had increased, with the most dramatic increase appearing in *Yedioth Ahronoth.* This increase was due to the hiring of an Arab writer, as well as a new willingness to permit Arab Knesset members and Arab newspaper editors to respond to events. The percentage of articles mentioning the number of Arabs who had been shot doubled in relation to Land Day (11% in *Yedioth Ahronoth,* 16% in *Haaretz*).

3.6 Group leadership: Hostile and non-representative

1976: In addition to the alienation of the Arab population of Israel, in two major areas a similar process of de-legitimization occurred in the media regarding the group's leaders. First, for a variety of political reasons, news organizations declared the group leaders to be off limits, thereby implying that they had joined Israel's enemies by trying to prevent the land expropriation and by speaking out against discrimination. Secondly, the leadership was portrayed as non-representative of the group. Characterizing the leaders as "nationalistic *extremist* forces" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 30.3.76), "*Rakah* (the Arab Communist Party) propagandists" (*Haaretz*, 29.3.76), "subversive elements" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*) belittles their public activities. Moreover, it was claimed that supporters of the strike were not representative of the population, and the disparagement of the legality of the strike created a platform for those opposed to the strike. The strikers were disparaged in two ways. First, their ability to think autonomously was belittled through caricatures and portrayals of Israeli Arabs standing in front of a *Rakah* pharmacy in which a nefarious

pharmacist was urging them to purchase a magic potion (*Haaretz*, 31.3.76). Second, the leaders were characterized as PLO members, and in another caricature stones thrown by demonstrators form the letters PLO (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 2.4.76). Along with providing a stage for those opposing the strike, the leaders of the strike were distanced from the discourse, while their statements and claims were disparaged.

2000: Both newspapers found that the ultimate reason for the actions of Israeli Arabs stemmed from incitement by Arab MKs. This is how events were described in *Haaretz*: *"The Arab MKs are partners in the bitter consequences ..."* (p. A1, A3, 2.10.00). In other words, these MKs were initiating some of the events. According to an article in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *"Incitement by MKs craving ratings"* (p. 1, 18, 2.10.00) was behind many of the events. It was in fact implied that these leaders had incited the incidents in order to increase their popularity. Despite the article's warning, one can also find in it the understanding that "the Arab MKs are the principal representatives for the organization of dialogue between the majority and minority. We can ask them not to be swept along by the fickle masses, but rather to steer its behavior". An interesting explanation was provided (*Haaretz,* 6.10.00) for the behavior of the Arab Israeli leadership: "Minority leaders are either weak or agitators".

3.7 Interpretation of events: Discriminated against or in league with the enemy?

1976: An analysis of the reasons for the strike will help us understand how the media construction of events controls the depiction of reality. In other words, were these demonstrations against discrimination, deprivation, and land expropriation – as the demonstration organizers claimed – or provocation by a marginal, unrepresentative group with ties to the enemy? It seems that most of the news commentators chose the second media frame, portraying the developments with an emphasis upon the ties between the organizers of the demonstrations and the Arab world or the Palestinians, as part of the unceasing struggle to destroy Israel. "'The Arabs are stabbing us in the back', said a Jewish businessman '… the Arabs are raising their heads. *It is undoubtedly another link in the demonstrations in Judea and Samaria designed to make the State smell bad* …" (*Haaretz*, 23.3.76). The manner in which events were reported dismisses the demonstrators' stated reasons for the demonstrations. Instead, "correct" reasons were given for the demonstrations: "… at first glance the Land Day demonstrations were 'against discrimination, against land expropriation'; although the truth is well known to us. Well-known sources demonstrate that there is no discrimination involved in the matter" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 1.4.76). An additional connotation of "us" and "them" relates to the relations with the superpowers at the time – "we", the West, versus "them", the East bloc. Along with the adoption of a media frame and the interpretation provided by the establishment, we discerned an attempt to view the land expropriations as not only harmless to the residents, but as actually improving their situation.

Two competing explanations were given for the strike, which are reciprocally related. First, the Arab population of Israel is an enemy and allied with the Arab world and the Palestinians. Second, this was an attempt by *Rakah* to dominate the Israeli Arabs and incite them against the State. *Rakah*, according to the descriptions of the news reporters, is a political enemy whose legitimate existence must be terminated. At the same time, spokespersons of the establishment (for example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arab Affairs) were given the stage, which they utilized to sharply criticize the activities of *Rakah*:

"… the Prime Minister – Yitzhak Rabin, who sat in the Knesset during a no-confidence vote advocated by the *Rakah* faction, will speak wonders of the self-restraint of the security forces, faced with *the violent and provocative deeds inspired by subversive elements* …" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 31.3.76).

2000: "The Fire has Spread to Israeli Arabs" was the headline that dominated the front page of *Yedioth Ahronoth* (2.10.00), and in such a manner that the conflict in the territories was linked to the clashes with the Arab citizens of Israel. A supplementary headline on the same day reported about the significance of the events: "Rioting in Arab villages in Galilee and the 'Triangle' severed the connection with the North of the country". The notion that a real threat was growing was underscored by a picture printed on the same page. The caption accompanying this picture informs readers that, "Arabs threw stones and border policemen *were forced* to fire rubber bullets". The association between the general Arab-Israeli conflict and the Al Aksa Intifada was made through the use of various media techniques. These include: *language* – "Intifada in Galilee and Jaffa" (p. 4, 23); *visual documentation* – the pictures; via *newspaper graphic design* – in proximity to a picture of the clashes in Galilee was another picture of identical size of a boy, Mohammed A-Dura, who had been shot in clashes in the Gaza Strip; *use of symbols* – the use of the same logo during the coverage of the events in the territories and in Arab villages in Israel.

This association blurred the lines between the two conflicts in such a way that it implied the unity of the Palestinian forces going to war in Israel. From the events reported that day in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, one could reach the conclusion that it was an all-out war, one vast battlefront, with "three days of battles in the territories and in Israel, accompanied by live fire" ("War of Independence?" p. 2). To enhance the portrayal of the country as under siege from "all the centers of opposition", one could still see the green line (the 1967 border) on the map, but it was quite blurry and vague. This associative process in *Yedioth Ahronoth* continued. On October 3, 2000 the paper printed two pictures of equal size. One was taken in Israel and showed young Israeli Arabs burning tires, and alongside it was a picture of incidents in the territories in which a young Palestinian can be seen desecrating an Israeli flag. In contrast to the reports in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *Haaretz* (2.10.00) reported about the rioting in the territories in its front page headline. The newspaper's reports did not include the same implied rhetorical threats, although they

could be inferred from the reporting of the overall situation, which was restrained as a result of editing by security sources:

"*Security* sources expressed deep concern regarding the dimensions of the protests amongst the Israeli Arab public. In their opinion, the obstruction of roads for long periods of time is a very disturbing sign of what may come next. They expressed concern that the strikes and protests had been coordinated from the start with the Palestinian Authority."

The tendency of *Haaretz* not to link events in the territories with those occurring inside Israel was evident in the supplementary headline on the front page (3.10.00):

"Rioting increasing: five Israeli Arabs were killed yesterday, two more succumbed to their wounds. In the territories: two Israelis and about 15 Palestinians were killed in shooting incidents."

The major headline of the newspaper focused upon the events in Israel and delved into the significance of the events for the government with statements such as "Barak and Arab Israeli leaders will meet in an attempt to bring calm".

3.8   Historical contexts of events and patterns of identity

1976: We sought to determine whether the articles provided historical explanations of the events, and whether the reader could ascertain the demands of the group involved in the incident. In the above case, there is a long history of the nationalization of land, and the strike had a defined purpose – to bring an end to the confiscation of Arab land. In both newspapers, the historical reasons for the events were delineated in just 13% of the articles. The group's demands ranged in both newspapers from 11% to 16%; and both claims together amounted to about 10%. Additionally, we sought to determine if the articles made any reference to civilian protest, specifically, to its civilian context in the State of Israel or primarily to the Palestinians in the territories and the Arab world. Although the strike is the ultimate civilian protest activity, the connection to civilian protest appeared in fewer than 50% of the articles (43% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 51% in *Haaretz*). The relevance of the context of Arab identity was made via references to both the Palestinians and the Arab world. The first reference to the Palestinians was made in *Yedioth Ahronoth* in 64% of the articles, and in *Haaretz* in 49% of the articles. Reference to the Arab world was made in *Yedioth Ahronoth* in 44% of the articles and in 37% of those in *Haaretz*. Furthermore, an interesting finding is the high percentage of links found between the strike and terrorism, despite the inherently civilian nature of the strike (19% of the articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth*).

2000: At the onset of the disturbances, the group was presented as having just one goal – identification with the Palestinians in the territories. Only after Arab civilians were shot were references made to the discrimination suffered by the group, with primary emphasis on the civilian status of the Arab residents. It is in-

teresting that there was a decline in the percentage of these two components in comparison to 1976. Reference to the historical reasons for the events was made in about 20% of the articles. Group demands are more prominent in *Haaretz* than in *Yedioth Ahronoth* (22% as compared to 12%). In both newspapers, the two claims made together in the same article appear in no more than 11% of the items.

As mentioned above, an additional aspect of context entails the contours of the surveyed group's identity. The group's connection with the Palestinian people was initially portrayed in articles in both newspapers – 71% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 63% in *Haaretz*, thereby emphasizing the element of Palestinian identity. After three days had passed, however, the public discussion shifted to the group's civilian identity, a topic discussed in about 48% of the articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 43% of those in *Haaretz*. Reference to the Arab world occurred in between 15% (*Yedioth Ahronoth*) and 9% (*Haaretz*) of the articles. In light of the fact that at first group coverage was more limited regarding Palestinian activities, the reference to terrorism was limited in both newspapers (8% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 6% in *Haaretz*).

3.9 Blaming the group for members' deaths and supporting security forces

1976: News reporters had a tendency not to accept the group's claims regarding the question of who was to blame for the violence that broke out, resulting in many dead and injured amongst the Israeli Arabs. In most of the articles it was claimed that the group's policies were responsible for the response of the security forces, who had had no choice but to use live ammunition in self-defense. In other words, group violence was the catalyst for the violence of the security forces. Likewise, the security forces were lavished with praise for their actions:

"The violent breach of the curfew necessitated the use of weapons" (*Haaretz*, 31.3.76).

"… in no other country could a situation arise in which a group, for all intents and purposes a fifth column, would dare to attend Parliament the day after orchestrating and implementing violent confrontations, and *accuse the State of committing crimes*" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 1.4.76).

News reporter enlistment in the State's defense was so widespread that in some cases identification with the security forces went beyond support for their claims (in other words, the security forces were compelled to use live fire):

"… *Congratulations … it is our duty to send commendation to our police, who so faithfully carried out their duties in these difficult times* … (an editorial extolling the security forces) (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 4.4.76).

The law-and-order syndrome became clear in discussions of the security forces. The legitimacy of maintaining public order, first and foremost, stemmed from the

view of the news reporters that the law was not the appropriate response for dealing with a violent strike:

"This decision can be appealed in accordance with law – *and anyone who attempts to use the means of incitement and violence will be met with the appropriate response*" (editorial article in *Haaretz*, 28.3.76).

2000: In most articles the security forces were given starring roles, primarily the police and senior officers. Discourses on "law and order" predominated. Police actions and the deaths of Israeli civilians did not merit any serious criticism and were portrayed as regrettable but unavoidable. News commentators did not challenge the principle of "law and order". For example, when an automobile driven by an Arab pediatrician was fired upon on October 3, *Yedioth Ahronoth* described the incident (4.10.00) as follows: "Nazareth Police involved in another serious incident". The newspaper concluded the article with the response of one of the police chiefs, who placed the blame on the doctor: "Just as the doctor drove down the road, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the police. The startled doctor drove towards the police. The police suspected that he had thrown the Molotov cocktail – and opened fire in response. The incident is being investigated." Despite the problematic answer, the news personnel did not ask additional probing questions. It seems, once again, that the group was held responsible for a member's death. It was not until October 4 that for the first time an editorial criticized police behavior. In a piece on page 2 of *Yedioth Ahronoth* the editor criticized the actions of the security forces, declaring that "a black flag of illegality hovered over the command to use live ammunition against the demonstrators".

We have thus seen the similarities in the manner in which events have been presented over the years. Nevertheless, the question remains: in what way was the coverage of the events of October 2000 different from that of the events of 1976?

Despite the similarity, one could find in the pages of the newspapers in 2000 a call for coexistence and an understanding of the pain that burst forth from the "other". That is, in addition to the criticism of Arab Knesset members, criticism could also be found of the Israeli Right, along with sympathy for the anger of Arab citizens of Israel. Criticism was leveled primarily in editorial articles in which one could find empathy for the pain of the "other", a desire to continue living together, and criticism of "us" as well. In *Haaretz* there were editorial articles and criticisms by a growing number of journalists. In an article entitled "On the Temple Mount and Speaking Out Against Discrimination" a journalist described "emotional youths speaking with a sense of distress about 'Jewish occupation', discrimination, humiliation, unemployment and despair" (3.10.00). Despite the problematic framing of the events in *Yedioth Ahronoth* (as described above), by the second day of the news reporting (the third day of the incidents) other voices could also be heard. One writer, in an article entitled "Save My City" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 3.10.00, p. 4), blamed both the Jews and the Arabs, saying, "It's a great day for Jewish and Moslem fanatics, who see peace as anathema. It's a devastating failure for the advocates of peace, who did not understand how to translate their dream into an un-

derstandable language". The writer also expressed understanding of and empathy for the others' situation: "The Islamic and Jewish nationalist racists leave no alternative for this population, having been caught for decades between the Israeli hammer and the anvil of nationalist fundamentalism".

Another senior reporter, in an article entitled "The Pain Bursts Out" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 3.10.00, p. 13), described the battlefield (his section was called "In the Line of Fire") in an Arab village, Um El Fahm. Although he felt himself to be in danger during his stay in Nazareth, he quotes the words of Arab leaders and their claims against the government, the police, the media, and the attitudes of these groups towards the Arab population. In addition to criticism, the writer attempts to understand the sources of the uprising and to delineate them with the assistance of his doctor friend, who felt he had been turned into a second-class citizen. "These things are well known, but it hurts so much when said by your good friend, among the best students in the class, a person who did everything, everything to be an Israeli." He also reaches the conclusion that Arab-Jewish relations have not been completely shattered by these events. "Regarding my compatriots, the crisis is an outburst of accumulated pain."

Another difference can be found in the cessation of the process of objectification of Israeli-Arab citizens. On the fourth day of clashes the news pages (p. 2) of *Yedioth Ahronoth* already featured photos of six Arabs killed. In addition, pictures of two Nazareth residents who had been killed appeared on October 10. The caption under the main picture in the article, which was taken from television, was "Bidding the Children Farewell".

The victims from Nazareth were personalized in both *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *Haaretz*. However, in *Yedioth Ahronoth* more emphasis was placed upon the feelings of the victims' families, whereas *Haaretz* presented the opinions of the family members about the behavior of the security forces.

As we have stated, the media ecology underwent a change, and the press could not ignore the images on the small screen. In fact, in *Yedioth Ahronoth* we found the story of an Arab woman doctor and her sister from Nazareth who were beaten by police forces. They were assaulted while on their way home as they stopped with a small group of people on Fountain Square in Nazareth. The article covered the story of the woman doctor, and alongside it was a picture of the policeman who had struck the woman – a picture taken from television. Additionally, voices of the "other" could be heard as well. In *Yedioth Ahronoth*, next to the opinions of a Jewish leader were those of an Arab reporter ("Dangerous Turning-Point", p. 1, 21), both of which appeared under similar frames on the front page of the newspaper. One could read the positions of these adjacent articles in two contrasting ways. There are those who would claim that the article by the Arab writer pales in light of the newspaper's general tone, according to which Arab Israelis were part of a general threat, the aim being to enhance the feeling of conflict. Conversely, others might claim that despite the troubled atmosphere, the newspaper chose to give the "other" an opportunity to express his position.

4.   Discussion and conclusion

A comparison of the types of media coverage of the events surrounding Land Day and the early events of the Al Aksa Intifada of 2000 amongst the Arab population in Israel reveals that there were both similarities and differences between the newspapers, as well as across the years. The similarities and differences both revolve around the central means of presentation in minority group presentation, and the myriad ways of portraying political-social conflicts in the framework of symbolic reality. Coverage of the events surrounding Land Day in the press during 1976 provides a classic example of symbolic extinction, objectification, and stereotyping, and the unequal balance of power in the reciprocal relations between majority and minority groups. Newspaper framing included different means of presentation that helped to belittle the existence of the group, its demands, its explanations for the demonstrations and its proposals for resolving the conflict. Quantitative symbolic extinction could be found in the number of articles, small in both number and size, devoted to the topic. Qualitative extinction of the Israeli-Arab citizens was expressed by means of descriptors applied to the strikers, such as: "traitors", "rabble", "agitators", and "fifth column". Such an approach provided legitimacy for blaming the group for its death. The Israeli-Arab citizens suffered from objectification – transparency both as strikers and as victims. The number of spokesmen who organized or participated in the strike and appeared in the media were few indeed. The victims remained anonymous – without homes, ages, professions or life stories.

The balance of power between the groups was clear. Reciprocal relations arising from the coverage reveals a paternalistic relationship in which the larger group – the Jews – did not assume responsibility for the deaths of members of the other group, the Israeli-Arab citizens. The press provided a platform for the Jewish politicians and security forces, and in order to completely de-legitimize the events surrounding the strike, it provided a platform for those amongst the Arab citizens of the State who opposed the strike. Reciprocal relations were expressed primarily on an institutional level concerning both the political institution and the media institution. In terms of the political institution, we found that the views expressed were primarily those of the Jewish establishment, emphasis being given to those who organized the strike, *Rakah*. In terms of the media institution, the voice of the "other" was not heard. In other words, no Israeli-Arab news reporters were quoted at all, a fact that additionally contributed to the alienation of the Arabs from their citizenship as Israelis. The news stories' declared support for the security forces and the labeling of the leadership of the strike as enemies of all citizens of the State contributed further to this alienation. The focus upon official sources and the adoption of their language and the terminology they employed to interpret the events created closed perspectives that left no place for alternative viewpoints. The reporting in both newspapers portrayed the strike as involving the disruption of public order, and the frame of coverage was accompanied by the de-legitimization of the group's activities, its leaders and its demands, while all Arab citizens were generalized to belong to the enemy. There was agreement amongst writers

that *Rakah* was to blame. Although it was possible to interpret the events in different ways, the writers chose to interpret them in the context of an attempt to harm Israel, instead of depicting a group that had been treated unjustly and therefore demanded change and justice.

All of the points mentioned above regarding the coverage in 1976 can be made regarding the coverage of the events of October 2000 as well. The most prominent characteristic of the news reporting was the portrayal of the actions of the Arab citizens primarily as disrupting civil order. However, this time the framing of the stories was more threatening. The events were portrayed as a war against the very existence of Jewish citizens in their homeland, the initial central comparison being made to a "war for independence". The alienation and disenfranchisement of Arab citizens were also increased by these incidents. A connection was found between the protests and events in the territories and other incidents such as rioting and violent demonstrations perceived as posing an existential threat to the Jewish population (as appears in other research, such as Niger et al. 2001). The process included the use of language, visual documentation, graphic editing, and the use of various symbols. A villain was found once again, just as in the previous conflict. This time it was Israeli-Arab Knesset members, primarily members of the Arab Parties. Reporters themselves supported the actions of the security forces, criticism of the security forces was extremely limited, and the security discourse was once again predominant. Arab citizens were once again blamed for their own suffering, and the coverage and the interpretation of the events through graphic editing, pictures, and maps made their activities synonymous with the larger Arab-Israeli conflict.

Comparison between the two newspapers showed that in 1976 there was a difference in the coverage of events, but the difference was rather slight. The topics covered were similar, and the frequency of their appearance was similar as well. The reason for this can be summed up with the phrase "crisis drives Jewish writers back home", that is, there is a tendency amongst journalists to rally around the official version of incidents. Likewise, in October 2000 the phenomenon of "coming back home" occurred amongst news-people who once again rallied around the official stance, although this time there was increased latitude that permitted the voicing of other opinions. Despite the similarity between the two periods, there were some significant differences as well. The first prominent difference between the two periods was the volume of reporting. The number of articles in both newspapers together almost doubled from 147 articles in both newspapers about events surrounding Land Day in 1976 to 241 articles during the outbreak of the Al Aksa Intifada. Additionally, the size of the articles themselves almost doubled between the two periods. This finding demonstrates the increased importance of the topic in the national, political, and social day-to-day events of the State of Israel, which, in turn, permitted a greater variety of voices to be heard.

Another change could be found in the voices that occupied the journalists' stage. First of all, the voice of the Jewish political establishment was muted, while the voice of the defense establishment grew in strength. The Arab citizens' voice also

underwent a change. There was a difference in the number of Arabs who appeared as writers of articles and editorials, as well as of those interviewed in the newspapers, and the content of their messages changed as well. Whereas in 1976 the Arab-speakers played second fiddle to Jewish opinions, and those quoted largely opposed the strike, by 2000 the opinions of Arab citizens were presented as a contrast to those of the Jews in an attempt to portray events from the Arab perspective. Change also occurred in the framework of the reporting itself. The most significant turning-point took place in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, where for the first time there were Arab journalists, and leaders and representatives of the group were allowed to offer alternative points of view about the incidents. Whereas the voice of Jewish reporters and Jews interviewed in 1976 was unified, by 2000 a variety of voices could be heard, both on the Jewish side and on the Israeli-Arab side, thereby to some extent fragmenting the unity. In both newspapers one could find articles and editorials about Jews who expressed sorrow, empathy, and a desire to mend the tapestry of relations between Jewish and Israeli-Arab citizens. Such articles appeared by the second day of the incidents. Likewise, Arab writers and intellectuals were allowed to express their opinions, and their articles and editorials could be found, for example, on the first page of *Yedioth Ahronoth*.

In 2000 the differences between the newspapers had increased. *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* each focus upon different target audiences, and the editorial decision-makers of the newspapers believe that their audience differs in its points of view and outlook regarding the Arab population in Israel (Avraham 2001). As a matter of fact, interviews with journalists demonstrate different outlooks regarding the target audience. The *Yedioth Ahronoth* writers who were interviewed claimed that there is a connection between the editors' behavior and the views of the target audience. In their opinion, editors prefer not to publish positive articles about Arabs because such articles would not interest their audience. In contrast, for *Haaretz*, the outlook of the target audience, its preferences and what it needs to know are totally different from those of *Yedioth Ahronoth*. A reporter covering the group alleged that the newspaper staff expects him to air the problems of Arabs in the newspaper, since it is deemed important that the target audience know about them. On one hand there is the viewpoint of *Yedioth Ahronoth*, which believes that the reader is not interested in objective coverage of matters affecting the Arab population of Israel. This contrasts with *Haaretz*, which seeks to advance the group and its affairs by means of fair and comprehensive coverage. The differences in outlook inevitably express themselves in different coverage and attitudes between the newspapers and the group. This extinction was evident primarily in the difference between them in topics covered. For example, *Haaretz*, far more than *Yedioth Ahronoth*, preferred topics such as charges of discrimination by the group, reports of Arab casualties, and the opinions of Arab leaders. The latter preferred items such as attempts by Arab leaders to incite unrest, reports of Jewish casualties, and the opinions of Jewish leaders about the incidents.

During the coverage of both events, the press exhibited a tendency to adopt the interpretations and definitions provided by the security forces in order to explain,

and to a certain extent to justify, the response of the security forces. When these definitions become the dominant tools of the media, the media itself becomes part of the security process. Through the newspapers' coverage, the use of security definitions and the linkage of the protests to other events and events in the occupied territories, readers were in effect prepared to think of the events in the context of an immediate and existential threat to their lives, which in turn provided legitimacy and justification for the use of all the means at the disposal of the security forces (Koren 1994).

Although both newspapers framed the "other" in a similar fashion, the reporting of the two newspapers definitely changed over time. In *Haaretz* the difference was paramount between 1976 and 2000. *Yedioth Ahronoth* portrayed a greater feeling of threat than that described in *Haaretz*, and the latter presented a more balanced and consistent picture. Both newspapers utilized permanent logos accompanying the coverage of the events in the initial days following the outbreak of the events – a permanent headline that went with the pages dealing with the different aspects of the events and a secondary headline that varied depending upon the subject covered on that page. A feeling of moderation was created by the relationship between the text and the pictures, between the different texts, excessive and contrasting expressions, and the graphic editing of the newspaper. The impression of moderation in *Haaretz* stemmed largely from the style, the lack of both pictures and emotional terms. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the style of the articles, which focused more upon reports and was more security-establishment oriented, created the sense that an appeal to the collective seemed more rational. It should be noted that both newspapers made scant criticism of the defense establishment. *Yedioth Ahronoth* tried to portray events in the Jewish collective life of Israeli society. Moreover, the reporting in *Yedioth Ahronoth* underwent a change during the period surveyed, and the initially enflamed tone was moderated over time, reaching its peak in a lengthy research article in the weekend edition on the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Arabs.

The events of 2000 transpired in a socio-political reality marked by reciprocal relations that signified a different symbolic reality. Jewish citizens and Arab citizens alike had undergone significant changes since 1976. The Zionist armor now had cracks, ideological differences between different Jewish groups had grown, and the old rule of the elite (Kimerling 2001) was no longer secure. In addition, substantial changes had occurred amongst the Arab population in Israel, primarily during the last decade. A new, stable generation had arisen with a firm national identity, as well as consolidated political views. The grandchildren of the generation of 1948 and the children of those who had led the Day events in 1976 stood at the center of the political arena during the events of 2000 (Rabinowitz & Abu Bakar 2002). Likewise, there was radical change in the media ecology accounting for the basis of the symbolic reality in which the process of representation and framing transpires. Despite the differences both between the two newspapers and the periods of the events, the distinction in press coverage between "us" and "them" still exists and is the result of a vicious cycle that has yet to be resolved. The problem

is that the Jewish writer reports and broadcasts to the Jewish audience from the Jewish viewpoint. However, it is apparent that this distinction is less clear-cut than previously. Changes can be found in the prominence of Arab opinions aired, the names applied to the group, the nationality of the writers reporting and analyzing the events, the references to the names of victims, an increase in the diversity of Arab voices reflected in the articles, and so forth.

In conclusion, both similarities and differences stem from the fact that both the socio-political reality and the symbolic reality have undergone vast changes. At the same time, reciprocal relations between them have changed the process of representation and framing. A comparison between the media's behavior in the two periods provides a better understanding of the coverage of the events of 2000 than if the events were analyzed in isolation. This comparison provides us with a better perspective regarding the path taken by the media in Israel since the 1970s. Accordingly, despite the criticism we have made of the manner in which the media covered the "other", there has been a change for the better.

Enemies, fellow victims, or the forgotten?

News coverage of Israeli Arabs in the 21st century

Anat First

1.   Introduction

Like the media coverage of any group, that of Israeli Arabs is closely allied with the socio-political reality in the country. Therefore examining the representation of Israeli Arabs by the Jewish majority in the Israeli media in a variety of political situations is important. In the 1990s, the representation of this group was characterized by post-colonial trends along with symbolic annihilation and defamiliarization (which also typify representation of other weaker population sectors in the Hebrew media). Arab politicians and intellectuals began to appear on TV and newspapers (First 2002). The present paper considers the representation of Israeli Arabs in the symbolic reality at the beginning of the 21st century, examining whether the same features remain as in the 1990s.

Several reasons underlie the choice to study the period from 2000. The first relates to changes in the socio-political reality of relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs in the wake of different circumstances (as will be elaborated later-on). The second concerns changes in the symbolic reality, primarily in the operation of *Channel 2*, the most popular commercial TV station in Israel. The third relates to the change in the interactions between these two realities – the socio-political and the symbolic – as a result of the antipolitical mood that has come to pervade Israel[1] (Hermann et al. 2008).

In view of these developments, this study compares coverage by the Israeli news media at four points of contact between the majority and the minority, in four different political contexts:

- The Second Intifada – the October 2000 events, in which 13 Arab citizens were killed by security forces;[2]
- The eve of the issuance of franchises for the operation of *Channel 2* by the

---

1   Researchers report different types of antipolitics, from fundamental rejection of politics and the political system, through the demand to replace the existing regime with a different form of government, to criticism of the existing regime and the desire to introduce changes into it (Hermann et. al. 2008).

2   The data regarding these events was collected as part of a study conducted by the author and Dr. Eli Avraham, funded by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University.

> Second Authority for Television and Radio (responsible for regulating com-
> mercial broadcasts) in 2003,[3] during a struggle for control of one of the cen-
> tral arenas of symbolic reality in Israel;
> • The Second Lebanon War in July-August, 2006,[4] in which both Jewish and
> Arab citizens of Israel were attacked, resulting in the death of 19 Arabs and
> 25 Jews;
> • The publication of "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel" in
> December 2006, in which the minority proposed a new socio-political agenda
> that challenged the power of the Jewish majority.

Comparing media coverage of these four situations can help clarify the relationship be-
tween the two groups and identify the dominant civil discourse in the Israeli media.

1.1 A new-old socio-political reality?

Arabs in Israel are the "other" virtually by definition, as they constitute a national
group living in an *ethnic democracy* (Smocha, 1999). Their otherness is two-fold,
stemming from the fact that they are a religious/ethnic/national minority in a given
imagined community, the State of Israel, and from their links to another imagined
community, the Palestinians. In addition, each of these communities – one estab-
lished and the other now coalescing – is in conflict regarding definition of its own
borders. The Israeliness of the country's Arab citizens has been a frequent subject
of discussion, associated primarily with their formal status as 18% of the country's
population. This means that they are subject to Israeli laws, participate in elec-
tions, and are fully aware of democratic principles and civil rights. Their Israeliness
is also reflected in their way of life. Nevertheless, this Israeliness is flawed in at
least two ways. First, Arabs live in the periphery of Israel and on the margins of
its society and institutions, so that they constitute a sociological minority lacking
influence in respect to most of the major issues affecting their lives. Secondly, their
interpretation of their citizenship does not coincide with the accepted Jewish con-
notation of loyalty to country and identification with its Jewish character and sym-
bols (Ghanem & Ossitzky-Lazar 2001).

The decision to focus on media representation in the 21st century derived from
the changes that have taken place in both the Jewish and Arab societies in Israel.
The Jewish population became aware of the changes in Arab society during the
events of October 2000, when a central role was played by a new generation
dubbed the stand-tall generation. These young men and women, the majority in
their late twenties or early thirties, were born to the children of 1948, the year of
Israel's independence (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2002). The group emerged in re-
sponse to the appeal of the Arab parties in the '90s to "call for a fundamental
change in the official definition of the State of Israel and transform it from an eth-

nonational to a liberal-democratic state, a country for all its citizens in which the Palestinians are recognized as a national minority" (Peled & Shafir 2005, 164). The 1990s marked a change in the nature of the Israeli Arabs' citizenhood. In terms of the discourse on citizenhood, it might be said that the Arabs, who had been excluded from the republican or ethnonational discourse, began to benefit from and participate in the liberal discourse (for example see Kimmerling 2004).

In the same period, Jewish Israeli society was undergoing a capitalist upheaval, which primarily entailed converting the hegemonic Fordist model into a neoliberal one spurred by rapid globalization (Filk & Ram 2004). Significant changes were also taking place in relations between Israel and the Arab countries and the Palestinians; the peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994); the war in Lebanon in 1982; in 1987 the First Intifada; in 1991 the Gulf War; the Oslo Accords in 1993, declaring mutual recognition, were signed between Israel and the PLO. Thus in the 1990s, particularly after the Oslo Accords, peace was viewed as a political option in the war-torn Middle East. The new understanding intensified the political debate, leading in late 1995 to the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In addition, in the last decade of the 20th century, some one million immigrants joined Israeli society. This mass immigration, along with globalization and a revolution in communications, led to changes in politics and values. Ethnic groups began fighting for their identity, individualism intensified together with a growing advocacy of universal values, and a civil society started to emerge (Timm 2001). At the end of the 20th century, the Zionist ethos was epitomized in two conflicting yet converging cultural codes: the universal or human, i.e., the liberal discourse of citizenhood; and the particular or national, the ethnonational discourse. The October 2000 events undermined the delicate balance that had begun to evolve in Israeli society (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2002).

In the years between the October 2000 events and the Second Lebanon War (the summer of 2006), attempts to examine the relationship between the two sectors were made both by official[5] and voluntary bodies. In 2006, relations between Arabs and Jews were again tested. Whereas the two groups had clashed in the autumn of 2000, in the summer of 2006 they both became victims of war, the targets of thousands of missiles launched at Israel by Hezbollah, (a Lebanese Shiite Muslim group) killing Arabs and Jews alike. In late 2006, the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee issued "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel", framed by a large consensus of Israeli Arab academics and public figures. This document related nationally and culturally to the collective rights of Israeli Arabs. In terms of civil discourse, the group was seeking to reposition itself in the liberal discourse while generating a separate ethnonational discourse.

During this same period, clear indications of antipolitics became discernible in contemporary Israel. As a rule, citizens recognize the importance of the political, and feel anger and frustration with the system, which is not fulfilling the tasks expected

---

5   For example, the Or Commission was set up to investigate the October 2000 events, publishing its conclusions in September, 2003.

of it, and with decision-makers, who are not attentive to the public's needs and wishes, and prefer to promote their own interests over the public's. The antipolitical is not characterized by an exit, and often shows increased interest in public issues (Hermann et al. 2008). The media allows the voice of antipolitics to be heard, thereby strengthening its position in the balance of power.

1.2   Discourse of representation

The media is the stage on which the representation process is played out, the instrument through which the images of different groups in society are disseminated and restructured. These images help to shape the worldviews of individuals and groups, enabling continuous negotiation both with socio-political reality and other individuals (Kellner 1995). At the same time, the media is the primary agent for instilling ideology, enabling the social world to be regimented, both overtly and covertly, in a manner consistent with the worldview of the "strong", while silencing the "weak" (Hall 1997). Thus, by repetition, a symbolic space represented by the discourse of the "strong" is created. In it, according to Orbe (1998), groups of others adopt the discourse of the "strong". This dynamic is often evident in the colonialist representational discourse, disseminated by official school texts as well as popular texts, which has often served as an authoritative tool for constructing images of both the "strong" and the "weak".

Representation as a constant act of constructing identities also constitutes a force for creating stereotypes, which help to structure otherness in an orderly interpretive scheme perceived as natural. This scheme serves as an instrument for perpetuating stigmas and exclusion, and as such is a major element in colonial discourse. However, given that representation is a dynamic process, otherness can be presented in a positive light, as a challenge to the existing order, thereby enabling the emergence of post-colonial discourse (Bhabha 1994, Hall 1997). This type of discourse can be seen in the attempts of minorities to propose alternative agendas.

Relations between the "strong" and the "weak" have been investigated in respect of three factors: 1) visibility – the presence or absence of "others" in the written and/or photographic text, measured by means of a head count; 2) the quality and nature of visibility – in what roles, contexts, and behaviors are members of the different groups shown; 3) majority-minority relations – the degree of interactions between the groups (Avraham et al. 2004, First & Avraham 2004, Greenberg & Brand 1994). The discourse of representation is an integral part of the discussion of media frameworks, as it refers to the content of the framework (First 2002). In other words, the mutual relationship between the manner of representation and the media framework gives rise to the media product (First & Avraham 2010).

The representation of Arab citizens as "others" in the Israeli media is neither fixed nor homogeneous; it is influenced by political relations between the various Arab groups and the state at any given moment (First 2002). Studies from the 1990s[6] found that the Hebrew media tended to ignore the Arab population, and the cov-

erage that did relate to it generally dealt with offenses: crime, hostile activities, violence, breaches of the public order, etc. (Wolfsfeld et al. 2000). Arabs were viewed as a menace and an enemy by the socio-political environment. Furthermore, Israeli Arabs were perceived stereotypically by the mass media as a threat to the Jewish majority. They were often depicted by means of generalizations which presented a negative image that could also be found in other systems in society (First 2002, Liebes 1997).

As noted above, the discourse of representation relates to symbolic reality, so it is also important to consider constructs and dominance in this context. From the late 1980s and throughout the '90s, the Israeli media ecology underwent a series of changes, the primary one being the end of the monopoly previously held by *Channel 1*, the single state-supported TV station. In 1988, cable TV arrived in Israel (although it did not broadcast news and current affairs programs), and in 1993 *Channel 2* was officially launched. This revolution altered viewing habits, with more hours spent in front of the television and more TV sets per household. In addition, the news was aestheticized and subjectified (Liebes 2003). A second commercial station, *Channel 10*, began operating a decate after. The borders of prime time were now extended, beginning every evening at 7:00 with a newscast. In fact, news and current affairs programming in general was expanded, thereby also expanding representation in symbolic reality of the more highly regarded groups in society.

The current study focused on two key questions relating to print and electronic media coverage of the four events listed above:

- How were Israeli Arabs, the "other" in Israeli society, represented in news reports of the two different types of national conflict?
- How were Israeli Arabs represented in normal times (between or after the conflictual events)?

2. Method

In order to examine these questions, quantitative and qualitative content analyses were performed on items relating to the events appearing in newspapers and TV newscasts.

2.1 Quantitative analysis

For the period of each of the events, a coding system was developed to aid in measuring the dependent variables. Validity and reliability of the system were ensured by the use of three judges (male and female Jewish students in different degree

---

6   Research into the representation of Israeli Arabs gained momentum in the 1990s. Before that time, study of the image of the Arab was limited, dealing with official sources and primarily textbooks rather than popular culture (e.g., TV programs, the press, radio).

programs in Media Studies), who yielded a mean intercoder agreement rate of 93% for the different variables. To achieve this high rate of agreement, the judges underwent prior training and several pretests were conducted. Since the analysis related to two essentially different types of media, print and electronic, two separate coding sheets were designed.

The coding sheet for the press as well as the TV broadcasts contained the following variables: name of newspaper/broadcast; date; page in the paper/ ordinal number of item in broadcast, mention of the item in the headlines; length of item; classification of event; name and ethnicity of reporter; theme of coverage; reliance on quoted sources (provide name); inclusion of name and description of Arab casualty; name used to refer to the group; depiction of Arab participant and biographical details provided; reference to civil protest, terrorism, Arab and Palestinian world; description of historical circumstances or group's demands; subjects covered in item.

2.2 Events analyzed

October 2000 events. On Thursday, September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, then leader of the opposition, visited the Temple Mount. The following day, at the conclusion of Friday prayers on the Temple Mount, clashes again broke out between the Muslim worshippers and the police, with dire consequences: seven Arabs were killed and hundreds of Arabs and dozens of policemen were injured. At the same time, fierce battles were taking place between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the territories (outside the borders of the State of Israel). The conflict between the Israeli security forces and the Arab civilians spread to various locations within the country and lasted for nearly two weeks. By the time it was over, thirteen Arab citizens had been shot dead (Peled & Shafir 2005).

The eve of the issuance of franchises for the operation of Channel 2 (2003; 2005). In late January 2005, four groups submitted bids to operate Channel 2, the major commercial TV station in Israel. Two were to be awarded an exclusive franchise that would be in effect until 2015[7]. One of the key issues on the public agenda during the time leading up to the tender was the question of cultural diversity in commercial TV broadcasts. The bidders were asked to enhance cultural diversity which stemmed from the results of a study commissioned in 2003 by the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The study examined the representations of different social groups on the commercial television channels 2 and 10 (Avraham et al. 2004). During the run-up to the issuance of the broadcasting franchises, a follow-up study was conducted, and the results were published in 2005.

The Second Lebanon War. The official name given by Israel to the war waged from July 12 to August 14, 2006 in Lebanon and northern Israel. Fighting began with

---

7   In essence, the choice of the franchisees would determine who would control the predominant TV content in the country, and who would benefit from the anticipated income from commercials during this period, estimated at 68 billion shekels.

the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by members of Hezbollah. Over the course of 34 days, battles raged between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters in south Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked targets deeper in Lebanon, and Hezbollah fired thousands of missiles of different types at Israel, striking at the civilian population (Shelah & Limor, 2007). It is suggested that the coverage of the war contributed to the antipolitical mood in Israeli society.

"The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel". This document, framed by the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee and the Committee of Local Arab Authorities and published in December 2006, outlines the authors' vision of the future character of Israel and its transformation into a country for all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike. Reviewing the history of the establishment of Israel from the vantage point of Israeli Arabs, it presents the Palestinian historical narrative. The "Vision" contains a list of historical and legislative demands for far-reaching changes in the civil status of the country's Arab citizens. In the broader context, it can be seen as a further step in the consolidation of Israeli Arabs as a political community representing a national minority within the State of Israel.

2.3 Sample

Event	Media	Sampling dates & nos.
October 2000 events[a]		Sept. 29-Oct. 14, 2000
	Newspapers: *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*	241 items
	Television: *Channels 1 & 2*	181 news items
Eve of issuance of Channel 2 franchises[b]		19 weeks in 2003
	Television: *Channels 2 & 10*	2.222 news items[c] in 2004
Second Lebanon War		July 12-Aug. 14, 2006
	Newspapers: *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*	113 items mentioning Israeli Arabs
	Television: *Channel 10*	500 items on the main evening newscast
"Future Vision of Palestinian Arabs in Israel"		Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007
	Newspaper: *Haaretz* Electronic media: ynet.co.il, nrg.co.il	11 items

a.   For a detailed discussion of this event, see First & Avraham (2004).
b.   For a detailed discussion of this period, see First & Avraham (2004).
c.   In other media genres, no more than a negligible number of references were made to Arab citizens (Avraham et al. 2004).

Table 1: Sample description

Overall, in each period there was a relatively small number of Israeli-Arab citizens. Therefore simple distribution breakdown was sufficient.

2.4 Qualitative analysis

The main methodology used in this analysis was a qualitative content analysis. Researchers using this method consider texts to reveal general discourse patterns (Pauly 1991) through the appearance of motifs, characteristics, labels, definitions, stereotypes, and generalizations presented in the media as exclusively characterizing specific social groups (Dahlgren & Chakrapani 1982). Using this method, general patterns of discourse characteristic of the Arab population's coverage were extracted from 181 television news items. These patterns were identified on the basis of the theoretical framework discussed above – factors 2 and 3 in representation's discourse – that is, the quality and nature of visibility and the majority-minority relations. Thus, I looked at patterns of relevant discourse such as: generalization, exclusion, legitimization, type of voice (Avraham 2003, First 2002), sanitation, comparison, personification, demonization, and context (Liebes 1997).

The qualitative analysis referred to both text and image based on the perception according to which images cannot be understood without their captions (Barthes 1977) and that words hold greater power than do television images (Schudson 1995). For this reason the following analysis refers first to verbal texts and then to the corresponding visual components.

3. Results

A brief review of the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses appears below. The results are presented in the chronological order of the events to which they relate.

3.1 October 2000 events

During the first two weeks of the second Intifada, a total of 181 relevant TV news items were broadcast, 118 on Channel 1 and 63 on Channel 2. The mean length of an item was approximately two minutes. On five of the 14 days of the study, *Channel 1* presented over 10 items dealing with Israeli Arabs in its various newscasts, whereas over 10 items appeared on *Channel 2* on only a single day. Israeli Arabs were the subject of the opening item on three evenings, all on *Channel 2*. Of the 181 items, 67 were mentioned in the headlines of the newscast. A total of 241 items appeared in the print media, divided almost equally between *Yedioth Ahronoth* (113) and *Haaretz* (128). The subject was deemed of prime importance, as most of the reports appeared on the front page or the news pages (First & Avraham 2004). Although the data indicates an increase in the press coverage of Israeli Arabs compared to previous investigations (Wolfsfeld et al. 2000, First 2002), the

number of references to this group was still far below its proportion in the population.

The framing of the coverage in the press, and even more so on television was typified by depiction of the group as a whole in reference to disruption of the public order by objects. Disassociation between all Israeli Arabs and their status as citizens was found both in print and in TV newscasts. They were seen on the screen in demonstrations resulting in casualties or damage, rioting, or at funerals, that is, primarily in the context of violence. Moreover, stress was laid on the severity of the conflict. In view of the large number of items relating to this aspect of the events, the coverage of casualties appears surprising: on *Channel 1*, only 14 items (11%) made reference to casualties among Israeli Arabs, and the number on *Channel 2* was even lower (4 items; 6%). When they were mentioned, the Arab casualties were again generally objectified: In other words, no biographical details, such as name, age, place of residence, or occupation, were provided (First & Avraham 2004). For example, the report of Yael Sternhell on *Channel 1*'s *7:30* newscast (Oct. 2, 2000) said: "It [x] began in the territories. Rioting by Israeli Arabs too. In Nazareth and Sakhnin several casualties have been laid to rest in recent days." (The anonymity of the description is particularly striking because of what is missing: the precise number of casualties buried or their names. Such information would be included in any report of the killing of Jewish citizens; for further examples, see: Dor 2001, Zanberg et al. 2001). On the whole, the voice in the items was the hegemonic Jewish voice. Thus, 32% of the items made reference to Jewish leaders, whereas Arab leaders were mentioned in just 14%. Security was the predominant discourse, with the majority of items offering broad coverage by and on the security forces, principally the police. Only five days after the start of the events did any commentary critical of the police appear in the press (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, Sever Plotzker, Oct. 4, 2000, p. 2). The dissociation of Israeli Arabs from their status as citizens and characterization as belonging to those responsible for the clashes was intensified by the context. That is, the coverage related to them as a group and linked them with the Palestinians in the territories and with the Intifada. Most of the coverage ignored the reasons and historical causes behind the events, focusing almost exclusively on the violence itself. Only 12% of the items on both TV channels related to historical factors, and the group's demands were presented in a mere 6% of the items (First & Avraham 2004). In addition, the overwhelming majority of journalists reporting on the Israeli Arab population were Jewish. In contrast to the absence of the Israeli Arab narrative, the Jewish narrative was presented by the use of terminology drawn from the War of Independence, for example: "Yesterday, for the first time since 1948, the Galilee was cut off from the center of the country after thousands of Arab demonstrators blocked most of the roads" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, "Intifada in the Galilee and Jaffa", Oct. 2, 2000, pp. 4, 23).

In comparison to the results of studies of the coverage of Israeli Arabs during previous events, in 2000 there was a rise in the visibility of this sector of the population and their voice was heard, albeit to a very limited extent. Their presence was felt as early as the *Channel 1* 7:30 news on the day Ariel Sharon visited the Temple

Mount (Sept. 28, 2000). While both newspapers contained harsh criticism of the Arab members of Knesset, they also printed items that were critical of the Israeli right and displayed understanding of the anger of Israel's Arab citizens. Criticism of the political system (the police, the minister of public security, etc.) appeared mainly in op-ed pieces which expressed empathy with the pain of the "other" and a desire to continue to live together, as well as disapproval of the "we." In *Haaretz*, alongside commentaries by Gideon Levy and Amira Hass and critical pieces by Aviv Lavie, Nir described "excited youngsters talking in hoarse voices about 'the Jewish occupation', discrimination, humiliation, unemployment, and frustration" ("Showing Concern for the Temple Mount and Protesting Discrimination," Oct. 3, 2000). In *Yedioth Ahronoth* as well, which generally tends to present the Jewish viewpoint, other voices could be found in news items as early as the second day of events (e.g., Sami Michael, "Save My City", Oct. 3, 2000, p. 4). The objectification of Israeli Arabs ended on the fourth day: the news page (page 2) of *Yedioth Ahronoth* ran the pictures of six of the Arabs killed in the clashes, and *Haaretz* printed the names and pictures of all the casualties.

On the whole, power remained in the hands of Jewish male reporters (90% of all items). They chose to associate Israeli Arabs with the Palestinians in the territories and to demonize the Arab parliamentarians, accusing them of behavior ranging from improper conduct to incitement (First & Avraham 2004).

3.2   Eve of the issuance of Channel 2 franchises: Struggle for control of symbolic reality

In the course of this period, the representation of Israeli Arabs was examined twice, once in 2003 and again in 2005. The results of the first measurement showed reference to the group in 3% of the 2.222 TV news items analyzed. In the main, they appeared in the context of aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., internal politics, activities of the security forces, international diplomacy), with a mere five items dealing with the quality of life of this population (with neither positive nor negative judgments), as compared to 403 reporting on the life of the Jewish sector. In the fields of economics, business, commerce, and industry, Jews predominated, appearing in 133 items, whereas not a single item featured Arab citizens. Israeli Arabs were covered in 75% of the reports on breaches of public order, with their voice being provocative four times more frequently than that of Jews. In terms of the balance of power, in 99% of the coverage, the voice of the newsreader, expert, or commentator was Jewish (Avraham et al. 2004). No differences were found between *Channel 2* and *Channel 10* in respect to the representation of this sector of the population.

The follow-up study (La'or et al. 2006) was conducted shortly before announcement of the results of the tender (Oct., 2004-March, 2005), when the contenders had already been presented with the data regarding the presence and absence in the media of different groups in the population. The quantitative results indicated no improvement whatsoever in the representation of Israeli Arabs in news and cur-

rent affairs programs on the commercial stations. In fact, reference to Israeli Arabs dropped from 3% to 2%. In the words of the research report: "The representation of minorities remains insufficient relative to their proportion in the population. The minimal representation of Israeli Arabs and new immigrants is particularly glaring" (La'or et al. 2006, 3). The franchisees appear to have defined the borders of representation primarily in ethnocentric terms. Indeed, Dr. Amal Gamal describes the condition of Israeli Arabs as "still suffering from double exclusion. By and large, they are excluded from the TV screen, and when they do appear, they are typically presented in a stereotypical manner implying cultural and social subservience" (ibid., 57).

3.3 Second Lebanon War

The most striking finding from this period is the drop in the visibility of Israeli Arabs in the media as compared to both the coverage of the October 2000 events and the data of the Second Authority for Television and Radio. Of the 500 items on the war shown in the various newscasts and bulletins on *Channel 10*, only 20 centered on Israeli Arabs. This is despite the fact that Arabs accounted for 40% of all civilian casualties in Israel. The mean length of the items on this sector of the population was two and a half minutes. A similar picture emerges from analysis of the print media. Over the course of the war, Israeli Arabs were mentioned in 113 items in the two papers (*Haaretz*, 68; *Yedioth Aharonoth*, 45).

However, the few Arab citizens who did appear in the print and electronic media were not anonymous. As a rule, a full biography was presented, including name, place of residence, and often occupation and severity of injury. In the newspapers, Israeli Arabs were the subject not only of news items, but also of human interest stories (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 28%; *Haaretz*, 22%), with the coverage tending to depict them as fellow victims (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, 73%; *Haaretz*, 59%). Reporting in *Yedioth Ahronoth* was largely episodic; that is, there was no reference to failings on the part of the authorities or the question of compensation for damaged property. These issues were, nonetheless, addressed in *Haaretz*. For example, an article headlined "Compensation Forms – Only in Hebrew" (*Haaretz*, Aug. 4, 2006, p. 6) reported on the demand of the human rights organization Adalah that this problem be redressed, along with the response of the Social Security Institute. Nevertheless, the process of inclusion was interspersed with motifs of distancing and defamiliarization. This range of representation derived both from the dominance of the Jewish voice (in news items as well as commentaries and op-ed pieces), and from the Arab voice, which refused to condemn Hassan Nasrallah, (secretary-general of Hezbollah) as demonstrated by an article by Jackie Khoury (*Haaretz*, July 24, 2006, p. 6) headlined: "Nasrallah's Missiles Threaten to Ignite Tension Between the City's Jewish and Arab Citizens". The writer depicts two leading figures in the city of Acre, Arab MK Abas Zkoor and Chief Rabbi Yosef Yashar, both proponents of coexistence. After the first missile attack on Acre, Zkoor appealed for an end to the fighting, calling on "leaders on both sides to act rationally and stop the destruction and killing". This, however, did not satisfy Rabbi Yashar,

who regretted that Abbas "did not denounce Hezbollah". Another headline stated "Israeli Arabs Do Not Know Who to Blame – Olmert or Nasrallah" (Yoav Stern, *Haaretz*, July 26, 2006, p. 1). The writer reported that "while the family of the two children refused to condemn Nasrallah, members of Awad's family held him responsible for the crisis (the "two children" and Habib Awad were Israeli Arabs killed in missile attacks – A. F.). These two opposing opinions demonstrate the diversity of the Arab public, as well as its confusion."

The op-ed section of *Haaretz* contained several pieces by Israeli Arabs against the war (e.g., "War Won't Bring Peace", Raja Zatra, Aug. 13, 2006, p. B1), along with a number of items dealing with this population's opposition to the fighting. *Yedioth Ahronoth* published human interest stories, including "Youngsters 2006" (Shaul Golan, Aug. 1, 2006, *24 Hours* magazine section, p. 4), in which a quarter of the page was filled by a picture of a handsome young Arab, posing like a model, at his place of work. The caption read: "The routine of war. Wassim Zidani, 19, from Tamra, an employee of a pipe and piston factory in the industrial zone of Kiryat Bialik. He has worked in the plant for almost a year, along with his father, who has been there for many years. They are bused to the job, and work 8 hours a day. Aside from one employee on vacation, all the others showed up for work on all the days missiles were falling, as did the owner. Wassim: 'What do we have to fear?'"

The few items on the *Channel 10* news that were devoted to Israeli Arabs demonstrate the ambivalence between representing them as "others" or as equally vulnerable fellow citizens. On July 20, 2006, the TV correspondent could not accept the views of the father who lost two children in a missile attack and yet was unwilling to condemn Nasrallah. What is more, the father blamed the Israeli government throughout history for the death of his children. Later in the item, however, the reporter displayed empathy for this man, offering a historical explanation for the discrimination against Israel's Arab population and describing their feelings. Thus they were presented at one and the same time as traitors and as people whose distress was understandable. A similar example can be found in Ruby Hammershlag's item about Kfar Rajar, a town which straddles the Israel-Lebanon border. Broadcasting on July 25, 2006, the correspondent referred in the very same breath to the local population and to Hezbollah, making it difficult to understand whether Rajar was an Israeli village or a Hezbollah stronghold. Later in the item the picture became clearer when the reporter interviewed the head of the local council and even allowed him to make a direct appeal to the Israeli authorities for food supplies because "we're talking about human beings here, not animals".

A process of defamiliarization can be seen in most of the televised news items. For example, an item broadcast on July 19 opened with the reporter declaring: "Shortly after five o'clock this evening, the largest Arab city in Israel also came into Hezbollah's line of fire." This, then, was not just another city whose citizens were attacked, but the city of the "others" – Nazareth – and the population was astounded. "The citizens are in shock. No one thought Hezbollah would aim its missiles here." When the reporter appeared unable to understand how Arabs could be targeting Arabs, one of the residents came to his aid: "Missiles can't distinguish

between Jews and Arabs", explained the man from Nazareth, adding, "We're all in the same war and share the same fate".

The question of Israeli Arabs' identity was ever-present, with the question "are 'you' part of the 'we'?" looming large. In an item broadcast on Aug. 7, 2006, a resident of Wadi Nisnas, an Arab section of Haifa, stated after a missile attack that "you can't destroy a whole nation," and wondered how long "you" (the Jews) would continue to try to do so. The reporter asked, "What do you mean by 'you'? Don't you feel part of us?", and the interviewee replied, "You don't let us feel part of you." TV correspondents repeatedly examined the identity of the Arab population. Particularly interesting is the ambivalent attitude regarding the Druze, members of a religious group with connections to Islam, and who serve in the Israeli army. Thus, for example, Yinon Magal described the return of a Druze unit from the battlefield (Aug. 14, 2006). The item opened with a shot of dusty soldiers carrying the Israeli flag, as the reporter declaimed that this Druze unit was coming back from a month of fighting. After praising their operations, he stated that none of their members was injured. "How did that happen?" he asked one of the soldiers, Tarek Abid. Abid explained: "The warriors have no fear. They are united around the same objective, soldiering, fellowship, everything." Later, as the soldiers were shown resting on the banks of the Sea of Galilee and meeting with their families, the reporter turned to one man holding his son in his arms with his father by his side. "Do you have any family in Lebanon?" he asked. The father, Gamal Abu Salah, replied, "Yes". Magal then asked his son the soldier: "And when you're fighting there, do you think about the fact that you have family in Lebanon?" "Of course", he answered. "But I don't know any of them. You can't tell who's a relative and who isn't. Whoever's shooting at you, you shoot back." The reporter went on to declare that "the army considers these men very brave soldiers" and noted the number of terrorists they had killed. The item concluded with a further interview with Tarek Abid about the fierce battle fought at Beit Yahoun. The difficulty, the soldier explained, was that terrorists were everywhere.

Apart from several op-ed pieces written by Israeli Arabs and items by non-Jewish male journalists, which appeared in both papers (a total of seven pieces written by Arab journalists or politicians), the dominant representer was the male Jewish reporter, who made use of republican discourse and allied himself with the homefront which was hurting and had no doubt who was to blame. When discussion of the homefront related to Israeli Arabs, the same pressing questions about instrumental issues, such as shelters, supplies, or early warning systems, were raised, but were generally accompanied by concerns regarding the degree to which these citizens identified with the shared fate. The group of Israeli Arabs was represented by the interview with Azam Azam (an Israeli Druse businessman jailed for spying on Egypt and released after 7 years) (*Channel 10*, July 25, 2006), who spoke of the loss of citizens from the Arab village of Marar. This item related solely to bereavement and pain, arousing empathy that was reinforced by the words of other witnesses to the event. The other group given expression in this context was the authorities, represented by the police and Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz. The po-

lice explained that they were charged with protecting Israel's Arab population and were carrying out that task, and Mofaz declared that after the missile attacks there could be no doubt that the Arabs were part of the State of Israel and the common struggle against Hezbollah, and that they would enjoy the same protection as every other citizen of Israel. In addition to Israeli Arabs, Jewish citizens, and the Jewish establishment, reporters used another player in the arena to frame the Arab population. This was Hezbollah leader, Nasrallah. With his help, it was a simple matter to turn Israeli Arabs into the enemy, as he himself regarded them as martyrs.

Indeed, throughout the war, journalists played an active role in framing Israeli Arabs. This is illustrated very clearly by the dispute in *Haaretz* between the journalist Ben Caspit and MK (Knesset member) Ahmed Tibi. Caspit expressed incredulity at Tibi's conviction that Minister of Defense Amir Peretz was a terrorist and Nasrallah was not. He called on the Arabs either to decide they were loyal citizens or to leave the country (Aug. 1, 2006). Tibi replied that it was his democratic right to oppose the war, even if Jews regarded his opposition as betrayal. He, stated that he was born in Israel and would continue to live there (Aug. 2, 2006). But it is the article by Uzi Benziman that appeared in *Haaretz* a month after the end of the fighting (Sept., 2006) which best demonstrates the same sort of framing offered by Amnon Abramowitz during the October 2000 events (First & Avraham 2004). According to Benziman, and other Jewish Israeli journalists, "During and after the Second Lebanon War, the Israeli Arabs crossed the lines". Thus Benziman explicitly defines the status of this population, once again, as the enemy.

3.4 "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel"

A review of *Haaretz* and the Internet sites of the other two leading Israeli papers, Ynet.co.il (*Yedioth Ahronoth*) and nrg.co.il (*Maariv*)[8] revealed only a small number of items on this subject. *Haaretz* published 8 items on the news pages, one in the financial section, and 22 op-ed pieces by Jews or Arabs; none of the Internet sites had more than five items appearing in various sections. Although the Hebrew press presented the views of the authors of the "Vision" and public figures from the Arab population, the pieces prepared by Jewish journalists centered on the threat to Israel's Jewish identity, a framing that delegitimized both the document and its authors.

Writing in *Haaretz*, Yoav Stern (Dec. 10, 2006) reported on the appeal of the head of the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, Shauki Hatib, to the Israeli public to conduct a debate of the document "not in the corridors of the General Security Agency, but in the public discourse". According to Stern, Hatib "was responding to the remarks of the head of the Security Agency, Yuval Diskin, in a meeting of the government, claiming that the document threatened the Jewish and demo-

---

8   The Internet search was conducted in December, 2006 and was restricted to the sites of the established newspapers. Since that time, many more references to this subject have appeared in both political and academic contexts.

cratic identity of Israel and reinforced the Palestinian identity of the Arabs in the country". Stern went on to state that the Vision's provisions "indeed attest to the trend in the Arab public to strengthen their independent identity in confronting the establishment. The document reflects the demand to grant collective rights to this public which they do not now enjoy. In the section dealing with relations with the government, the document demands the right of veto for the Arab population in critical decisions, in effect turning Israel into a binational state." This type of reporting was typical of the established media.

4.   Enemies, fellow victims, or the forgotten?

Since 2000, discourse on Israeli Arabs has been primarily ethnonational, with the post-colonial discourse fading into the background. The analysis shows that the positioning of this sector of the population in the media has remained unchanged, both when they represent the other side in the conflict and when the enemy is across the border. Moreover, the visibility of Israeli Arabs in the media has declined since 2000 (see data, Wolfsfeld 2007).

The media represented the October 2000 events as a clash between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens largely in dichotomous fashion: the apprehensive Jews were the "good guys", and the Arabs were the "bad guys", perceived as collaborators with the Palestinians in the territories. Their political leaders played the role of chief instigators. The Jewish ethnonational discourse in socio-political reality was duplicated in symbolic reality, and the critical voices fell silent. Israeli Arabs were positioned as a menace on Israel's national security map, and their loyalty to the country was questioned. This, together with the Jewish public's sense that it was under threat, cast Israeli Arabs as part of the enemy (Smooha 2006). Thus, the otherness of this population was intensified by the fact that they could not take part in the discourse, not only because of its nature, but also, and perhaps more significantly, because they were perceived of as the enemy. This discourse was represented by a wide range of journalists who enlist in times of crisis (Zandberg & Neiger 2005) and fill most, but not all, of the media space. In the cracks and small gaps that remained, a liberal discourse was conducted on the subject of the rights of Arab citizens and discrimination.

Even after the October 2000 events were over, they continued to impact the quantity and quality of the televised representation of Israeli Arabs. *Channels 2* and *10* reneged on their promise to increase the visibility of Arabs on screen.[9] Thus, despite the explicit assurances of the station editors and managers to give higher priority to the representation of Arab citizens, their visibility on both channels declined. The follow-up study of the Second Authority for Television and Radio, which examined representations of various groups in Israeli society, found that while the Zionist religious public and new immigrants were represented more in the run-up

---

9   See Anat Balint's interview with Hulud Masalha of the ilam Center (*Haaretz*, Feb. 12, 2006).

to issuance of the *Channel 2* franchises, the presence of Israeli Arabs on news and current affairs programs dropped from 3% to a mere 2%.[10]

During the Second Lebanon War, the media played a major role in shaping the homefront (Liebes & Kampf 2006) and giving it a voice. This function became even more significant in view of the ineptness of the political establishment.[11] In light of the role of the print and electronic press in representing the Jewish civilian population (Keshev 2007), the scarcity of references to the suffering caused to Arab citizens is especially conspicuous. What is more, even in items about Arab civilians, who account for 60% of the population of Haifa and northern Israel, the region which came under attack, the coverage opened with the question of their loyalty and identity, and only later moved on to a description of their human suffering. The thematic framing, which called for discussion of the government's investment in infrastructure in the Arab sector (such as enforcing the regulations concerning shelters and sirens) was absent from most of the items. In addition, coverage of the evacuation of particularly vulnerable Jewish populations from the north of the country made no mention of the unique difficulties typically involved in asking Arab citizens to leave their homes.

Given the growing ethnonational discourse after the Second Lebanon War in both the socio-political and symbolic realities, the attempt of Israeli Arabs to initiate discourse on their rights met with fierce opposition. That is to say, in the months following the war, the country refused to conduct a public, i.e., media, discussion of a subject that appeared to be a threat to the Jewish nation. Thus, discourse on the rights of Israeli Arabs, perceived as an Arab ethnonational discourse, remained a source of conflict between the two communities. Bhabha (1994) contends that identity is constructed in respect to the other. It might therefore be said that Jewish identity is dependent on Palestinian identity, and vice versa. According to Bhabha, this relationship creates a middle ground which he terms third space. It would seem, however, that coverage of Israeli Arabs does not yet follow this pattern of relations. If a third space should ever develop here, it is likely to emerge first in other genres perceived as less threatening to the shaping of the national Jewish identity.

Israel is an ethnic democracy (Smooha 1999) that still manages to promote the principle of ethnic unity. In contrast to the antipolitical discourse that pervades the media, the country does not cross the national line. Nevertheless, it would appear that alongside this imagined unity – a unity that was once represented by republican discourse and is today represented by ethnonational discourse – the liberal discourse of civil rights continues to exist and develop in some eras. It seems that one can find an Arab in reality shows or even in drama (which is not a stereotype), but not in the news or on commentary shows.

---

10 The current paper relates only to news and current affairs programs. Until recently, Israeli Arabs did not appear on the screen in Hebrew programming. In the past few years, however, Arab actors have begun to be included in Hebrew-language soap operas, reality programs, and TV dramas.

11 For the role of the media in times of crisis in shaping the civil society, see Frosh & Wolfsfeld (2007).

Part III

U.S. and Canadian media

Framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in thirteen months of *New York Times* editorials surrounding the attack of September 11, 2001

Susan Dente Ross

1. Introduction

The world changed for U.S. citizens and residents on September 11, 2001. When two commercial planes plowed into the upper floors of the twin World Trade Center towers in New York City at about 9 a.m. eastern time, the inhabitants of the most powerful nation on the globe began to recognize their own vulnerability and their connection to the rest of the world. The attack not only killed hundreds and toppled two symbols of U.S. financial leadership and strength; the event challenged the perceived invincibility of the nation's borders. As one newspaper headline proclaimed, September 11 marked the advent of a "new world order".[1]

The attack stunned the nation not because the United States is a stranger to violence. Indeed, some U.S. streets and neighborhoods are among the most dangerous in the world. And terrorism had touched the United States before. Certainly the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, which killed 168 people, and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center alerted a secure and complacent populace to the potential for indiscriminate violence against innocents on U.S. soil. But nothing prior to September 11 had so clearly awakened U.S. residents to the inability of their government to protect them from international terror.

No events prior to September 11 created widespread fear among the nation's residents. The magnitude of the attack and the apparently massive failure of U.S. intelligence to forewarn a tranquil nation irrevocably altered the country's self-image. In some sense, then, the United States joined the rest of the world on September 11, 2001. On that date, global terrorism and violence reached the shores of the nation.

The events of September 11 also created a natural experiment in which to study the possible effects of major news events upon newspaper framing. This research examines one elite U.S. newspaper's framing of international violence and terror-

---

1   Bangor Daily News, September 12, 2001.

ism through its unsigned editorial-page commentary about Palestinian/Israeli conflict before and after this critical discourse moment, as Gamson (1992) has called the cataclysmic events that tend to galvanize public attention. Framing analysis examines the interaction between news discourse and the construction of public understanding of issues (Pan & Kosicki 1993).

Media accounts constitute an increasingly important source of citizen knowledge about public affairs and international issues and contribute significantly to the social construction of reality. While most Americans rely on broadcast media for the bulk of their international news, scholars suggest that print media's greater scope for comment and analysis (critical to framing) affects the salience of issues, the agendas of opinion leaders and public policy makers, and the attitudes of the public (Althaus & Tewksbury 2002, Jordan 1993, Brody 1984, McCombs & Shaw 1972). Scholars repeatedly have studied framing in the *New York Times* and on its editorial page because of the newspaper's prestige and its role in shaping national and international opinion (Mueller 1973, Baker & O'Neal 2001).

This initial study focuses on framing in *New York Times* editorials, which embody and publicly articulate the newspaper's official positions and establish the newspaper's tone and character (Daugherty & Warden 1979). Other studies have examined prestige newspaper editorials as the key to American newspaper framing of the Middle East (Wagner 1973, Daugherty & Warden 1979, Trice 1979). Framing in newspaper editorials is significant because editorials signal the importance of topics to the public (Leff 2000). However, scholars do not agree on whether the frame of reference established in editorials represents a "seamless continuation" (Chomsky 2000) or differs significantly from the framing found in news content (Gilboa 1987). Future research by this author will examine the *New York Times'* news framing of Palestinian and Israeli issues and events during this same 13-month period to explore this question.[2]

This analysis of *New York Times'* editorial framing of Israeli-Palestinian conflict contributes to knowledge about media framing and media influence on international misunderstanding, intolerance, and violence. Research into the framing of this conflict in the year 2001 begins to assess whether the post-September 11 reality in the United States affected the national media's framing of international violence and terrorism particularly as related to the Arab and Muslim world. This initial study affords rare insight into the nation's portrayals of foreign terrorism, violence, and peoples at a critical point in the United State's history of terrorism.

2.   Framing

Whereas positivists assert that only one fixed, empirically knowable reality exists, this study assumes multiple and varying realities are constructed through dis-

---

2   A Proquest search identified 2637 *New York Times* articles including either "Palestin***" or "Israel*". Nearly 49% of these articles are news stories.

course (Berger & Luckmann 1966, Holzner 1968, Lincoln & Guba 1985). In this view, media – like all texts – "powerfully summon and propagate the social orders in which we live" and help shape the reality individuals construct for themselves (Stillar 1998, 1. See also Parenti 1993, Bennett 1983). While reality construction is a complex and interactive process, newspaper content conveys explicit and implicit judgments that create a coherent whole and attribute a specific meaning to discrete facts through the definition of news, selection of sources and facts, and use of various semantic devices (Pan & Kosicki 1993 55, Domke 1997, Entman 1993, Gamson 1989, Gamson & Modigliani 1989, Gitlin 1980, Parenti 1993, Van Dijk 1991, Tuchman 1978, Goffman 1974). Media framing determines the relevance of information and establishes a context for comprehension (Gamson et al. 1992, Gamson 1989, Gitlin 1980, Tichenor et al. 1980, Tuchman 1978). In this way, frames influence what people think about and how people understand the world around them (Pan & Kosicki 1993).

While abundant research suggests that journalists do not intentionally bias their news stories toward specific interpretations, newspaper editorials are inherently subjective and are intended to adopt a particular interpretation of events and to persuade readers (Van Dijk 1991, McQuail 1994, Itule & Anderson 1997). Yet, the structural, professional, and organizational pressures that incline the media toward certain news frames also affect editorials (Liebes 2000, Ghanem 1996, Shoemaker & Reese 1996, Van Dijk 1991, Gitlin 1980, Hofstetter 1976). Shared values and practices throughout a nation's media lead to common frames (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, Ghanem 1996, Gamson 1992, Hofstetter 1976). Dependency on government sources encourages media to privilege the government's construction of key issues and events (Wolfsfeld 1997b, Paletz & Entman 1981, Gans 1979, Shoemaker & Reese 1996). Additionally, the need to condense and simplify voluminous material and the strong orientation toward crisis coverage draw the press away from complex historical context or abstract frames (Wolfsfeld 1997b, 153).

The well-documented tendency for media to legitimate some groups and perspectives and to de-legitimate others is condoned in editorial opinion (Wolfsfeld 1997b, Gurevitch & Levy 1985, Steuter 1990, Tilly 1978). Editorials – to a greater degree than putatively objective news coverage – are likely to reflect the media propensity to embrace the official national government perspective and to favor those with political and economic power (Schlesinger et al. 1984). Moreover, editorials may be expected to emphasize the tendency for U.S. media "coverage of terrorism news [to] bear a remarkable resemblance to many sentiments common in U.S. foreign policy, and, indeed, conservative North American political culture" (Steuter 1990, 274).

Yet the role of the media in international conflict is neither simple, nor clear (Noakes & Wilkins 2002, Wolfsfeld 1997b, 2001; Gamson 1992). Noakes and Wilkins (2002) argue that media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict increases in response to dramatic events and framing varies with expressed U.S. government attitudes (see also Daugherty & Warden 1979). Weare, Levi & Raphael (2001) found newspaper editorial opinions were tied to newspaper corporate interests.

Similarly, Wolfsfeld (2001a) found media alternately promote or challenge government positions depending upon the media institution's level of autonomy and resources (p. 60) and its self-perceived role (1997b). He suggested media adopt either a law and order frame or an injustice and defiance frame depending upon where media cast themselves on a continuum of the following four key roles:

1.   Aggressive Watchdog of government (power corrupts frame);
2.   Advocate of the downtrodden (brutal repression frame);
3.   Semi-honest Broker (responsible citizen frame); or
4.   Faithful Servant parroting government (law and order frame) (p. 69).

Studies of the role of the media in Arab-Israeli conflict suggest media rarely report the conflict neutrally. Gamson's (1992) study of media coverage of nine critical discourse moments in the Arab-Israeli conflict identified the following five major frames:

1.   Strategic Interest (the story is not the conflict itself but rather the importance of the region in a "global chess game");
2.   Feuding Neighbors (the conflict involves a destructive cycle of attack and retaliation in which the true victims are the innocent bystanders);
3.   Arab Intransigence (Israeli victimization; Arab zealots intent upon destroying the state of Israel fuel the conflict);
4.   Israeli Expansionism (Arab victimization; Israel is a Western-supported colonial power intent on oppressing the indigenous people and extending the reach of racist Zionism); and
5.   Dual Liberation (justice; compromise is the only just solution because both sides have a historical claim on the land and a right to self-determination and safety).

Gamson (1992) found the conflict-oriented frame of Feuding Neighbors and the U.S.-centered Strategic Interest frame dominated an exhaustive media sample. The two injustice frames and the justice frame were much less frequent and appeared to the exclusion of each other. Wolfsfeld (1997b) explained the absence of competing justice or injustice frames as the logical result of media goals of clarity and simplicity. "The fact that the news media only allow for one injustice frame at a time is in keeping with its need to tell simple stories. It would, after all, be quite confusing to have two sets of victims" (ibid., 150).

Liebes (1992) found that U.S. news coverage of Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses fewer moral dilemmas and constraints upon U.S. journalists than would coverage of a conflict directly involving U.S. soldiers, U.S. territory, or U.S. interests. The relative remoteness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reduces the tendency for U.S. journalists consistently to minimize the costs and accentuate the benefits of government actions in which the U.S. military is engaged (Liebes 1992). In addition, in U.S. coverage of the Intifada, "the effort to present 'balanced' coverage result[ed] in greater attention being paid to the weaker side" (p. 48). Finally, two recent studies found that media criticism of government policies is most likely when policy makers lack consensus (Jakobsen 2000, Robinson 2000).

Research then suggests that – given U.S. non-involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the government policy for a negotiated peace in the region – media would generally

- increase coverage in response to specific events in the region and following September 11,
- support the weaker side in times of crisis, and
- function as neutral Brokers of information (Liebes 1992, Wolfsfeld 1997a, Robinson, 2000).

However, the United States has actively supported the state of Israel for more than half a century, Americans identify strongly with Israelis (Christison 1997, 1998a, 1998b), and the U.S. government has labeled certain acts of violence in the region as terrorism. Accordingly, the author anticipates that:

H1: The New York Times will behave as if the nation is directly involved in conflict and will adopt the Faithful Servant role;

H2: New York Times' editorials will favor the Feuding Neighbors and Strategic Interest frames to reflect U.S. concerns; and

H3: Competing justice/injustice frames will not appear.

3.   Method

To evaluate the framing of violent Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this analysis employs a close reading of editorials appearing in the leading elite New York City newspaper, the *New York Times*, during the thirteen-month period surrounding September 2001. Every editorial from March 2001 through March 2002 referencing Israel or Israelis and Palestine, Palestinian, or Arab was included in the analysis. The study involves 34 editorials, or an average of roughly one editorial every week and a half.

This critical framing analysis provides both quantitative data on the frequency and nature of *New York Times* editorials on Palestinian and Israeli issues and systematic qualitative analysis of the editorial discourse about these two nation states and their interactions. Although the focus is on editorials rather than news content, the analytical approach borrows heavily from the work of Gamson (1992), Liebes (1992), and Wolfsfeld (1997b). First, editorial titles, which cue readers to the topic and the angle adopted, are treated as a distinct discourse unit (Van Dijk 1988). Each editorial is categorized into one of seven frames based on the dominant frame of the editorial taken as a single unit. In addition to the U.S. Strategic Interests frame, three justice frames and three adversarial frames are considered. The justice frames encompass 1) Israeli Need for Justice (Arab Intransigence), 2) Palestinian Need for Justice (Israeli Racism), and 3) Dual Justice. The three aggression frames are: 4) Israeli Aggression, 5) Palestinian Aggression, and 6) Feuding Neighbors.

Rich descriptions of *New York Times* editorial commentary are supplemented by discussion of the numerical distribution of editorials within and among framing cat-

egories. Although the number of editorials within categories in this study is too small to offer statistically significant results, the quantitative analysis provides valuable guidance on relative editorial emphasis. Framing mechanisms including excising, sanitizing, equalizing, personalizing, demonizing, and contextualizing are discussed (Liebes 1992). The media role as watchdog, advocate, broker, or servant is explored.

This work establishes the baseline (a sort of elaborate pretest) for a broader multi-national examination of news media framing of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in news and editorial content in prestige newspapers, government documents and public statements, and public opinion polls in several countries.

4.   Results and discussion

4.1 Frequency and title focus of editorials

On average, 2.6 editorials on Israeli-Palestinian conflict appeared in the *New York Times* each month of the 13-month period under study (see figure 1). The apex of commentary was March 2002, with six editorials on the topic, and the nadir was September 2001, with none. From July through September 2001 only three relevant editorials appeared in the newspaper.

Figure 1: Frequency of editorials

The title focus of editorials ranged from Palestinian or Arab actions to U.S. strategic interests to the stability of calm in the region (see figure 2). The largest number of editorial titles, more than one-fourth, focused on U.S. strategic interests, pointing readers' attention to the "diplomat balance" needed in the region, the posture

of the Bush White House, "America's Mideast responsibilities", and the missed opportunity of the Camp David accords. These editorial titles alternated between recognition of the tactical and the moral incentives for U.S. regional involvement.

A   Israelis   D   U.S.
B   Palestinians   E   Cease fire
C   Israelis & Palestinians

Figure 2: Focus of editorials

Nearly one fourth of the editorial titles focused on Arabs or Palestinians, often equating or conflating the two groups. Titles in this group dealt with Arab "belligerence", "smuggled arms", the Saudi initiative, and the Beirut summit. Commentaries also scrutinized "Arafat's role" and discussed "Arafat's last chance" and the need for "looking beyond Yassir Arafat". The titles in this group tell two stories. On one hand, Arabs and Palestinians are portrayed as terrorist criminals intent on undermining calm. On the other, Arafat, Arabs, and the Saudis are legitimate brokers of peace.

An equal number (roughly 18%) of the editorials took aim at regional violence (Feuding Neighbors frame) or at the cease-fire and peace process (Dual Justice frame) without placing responsibility upon either Palestinians or Israelis. Six titles discussed bloodshed, violence, "the gathering storm" and the "Mideast maelstrom". Six titles also referenced diplomatic efforts and the "peace clock".

The smallest number of editorial titles directed attention to Ariel Sharon and Israeli actions. The vast majority of the nearly 15% of editorials in this category discussed Israeli barricades, air strikes, "unwise offensive" actions, and the "limits to force". Consequently, while fewer editorial titles explicitly named Israeli rather than Pal-

estinian interests, Israeli-labeled titles tended to cite concrete Israeli acts and were almost exclusively negative in tone.

4.2 Editorial frames

Gamson's (1992) study of news frames found that "strong and competing claims about deep historical injustices" did not dominate American media discourse about Israeli-Palestinian conflict (p. 54). Rather, the Feuding Neighbors frame of "fanaticism and the nurturing of long-standing grievances" and the governmental Strategic Interests frame were most common.

The framing presented by the editorials studied here is different. Editorials are distributed almost equally among the seven frame categories, with one exception (see figure 3). The most notable finding is that none of the editorials impose the Palestinian Need for Justice frame. This absence precludes competing justice frames from appearing (Gamson 1992). While editorials do discuss Israeli militarism and offensives, Israeli actions are framed as an overreaction or excessive reliance on force to advance a legitimate cause rather than as unjust oppression of innocent Palestinians.

A Strategic interests	D Israeli aggression
B Israeli need for justice	E Arab aggression
C Dual justice	F Feuding neighbors

Figure 3: Editorial frames

- All frames are not distributed evenly throughout the period of study, however (see figure 4). Strategic Interest stories are sporadic. Adversarial frames appear in 10 of the 13 months, starting from a high in March 2001, declining

to a low plateau from July through January 2002, and then rising back to their peak in March 2002. In contrast, justice frames appear in only six months: in May, June, and August 2001 and again in December and then February and March 2002. While frames of aggression create a rather constant backdrop for editorial discussion of the Palestine Authority and Israel, issues of justice and injustice arise episodically, most often in conjunction with external peace initiatives. Justice frames appeared in the context of discussions of U.S. peace negotiations and then later related to Arafat's perceived failures and the promise of the Saudi peace initiative.

Figure 4: Total justice frames vs. adversarial frames

The Strategic Interests frame appears in only three months and dominates only the two months immediately following the September 11 attack. These editorials speak directly to the U.S. desire to achieve peace in the region as a means of advancing the U.S. war against terrorism. Similar U.S. interests are evoked peripherally in some editorials commenting upon various peace initiatives, but the peace editorials present Israeli-Palestinian conflict not as a pawn of global strategy but as an issue of autonomous significance.

While the Feuding Neighbors frame arises in one-fifth of the editorials, it is absent for six months, from September 2001 to February 2002. In editorials adopting the Feuding Neighbors frame, both sides at times are portrayed as violently harming innocents, but there is a difference. Israeli views included in the editorials often justify their assaults as necessary defense or protection of the safety of their citizens. Editorials also mitigate Israeli culpability by representing "misplaced" Israeli acts as retaliatory and responsive to "brutal" terrorist Palestinian assaults. Ariel Sharon generally is presented as an unwilling participant in the "carnage;" Yassir

Arafat is an impotent, unreliable, Janus-faced sponsor of terrorism. These editorials acknowledge a two-sided dynamic of violence that "must somehow be broken", but they simultaneously place blame for the "ruinous ordeal" disproportionately upon Palestinians.

The losses and suffering of the Palestinians thus are made acceptable in this body of editorial commentary. Their human costs often are ignored or minimized. Israeli troops – as distinguished from the people of Israel – kill faceless, nameless groups of Palestinians. The number of dead goes unreported. Or when 20,000 Israeli troops "in full battle dress, riding in tanks and backed by fire from Apache attack helicopters ripped their way through large refugee camps", the harm is summarized simply as "more than 160 Palestinians" dead. The human losses from the "destruction of hundreds of houses, the innumerable roadblocks and daily Palestinian humiliation" go unmentioned. Recognition of Palestinian humanity is rare and often backhanded. For example, an editorial denouncing Israeli occupation of Ramallah acknowledges the "victimhood" of the Palestinians but also calls them "Israel haters" and says, "they have not taught their young the virtues of peaceful coexistence".

The humanity of Israel is emphasized and Palestinians simultaneously are de-humanized through descriptions of the human losses incurred by Palestinian suicide bombers. The dominant image is a faceless, unprovoked, Palestinian terrorist engaged in random killing of "Israelis on an almost daily basis". Palestinians murder "a 10-month-old Jewish baby" and pack bombs "with nails and bullets that [tear] through a crowd of innocent teenagers" and leave "Israeli families in mourning". Funerals fill the land of Israel, and the individuals and families that make up the nation suffer unjustly. Israeli rage is understandable if, at times, excessive.

Here the victimization of Israel frame dominates (Wolfsfeld 1997b). The entire Palestinian population often is defined as suicide bombers. The editorials present Palestinians as a conflagration of hate, a plague of death, a suicide cult, and a puppet spouting anti-American and anti-Israeli vitriol. Yet the Palestinians are not entirely demonized; they are not evil incarnate. They are poorly led by Arafat; they are fueled by generations of enmity. Arab Aggression frames Palestinians as members of an antiquated, "murderous" caste "consumed by old hatreds", constantly "stoking tensions" with peace-loving Israelis, and intent upon pushing the Jews "into the sea". The Palestinians are terrorist suicide bombers led by a bitter hypocrite who taunts Israel to hide his own ineptitude. Arabs are hateful provocateurs. In one editorial, for example, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is quoted as saying that Israel is "even more racist than the Nazis".

This sense of injustice against Israel becomes dominant in the Israeli Need for Justice frame. For example, an editorial discussing Sharon's White House visits contrasts Sharon's efforts to resist militants in his government with Arafat's refusal to renounce violence. The editorial notes that Arafat's "strategy of talking peace while waging war is spreading death across Israel".

The Israeli Aggression frame, which might counterbalance the Arab Aggression frame, actually portrays Israel and its leaders as long-suffering, law-abiding individuals who have been provoked into violence. A law and order frame dominates. Thus, an editorial discussing Israeli "trenches, roadblocks, and tanks" barricading the city of Ramallah encourages Ariel Sharon to "strike a reasonable balance" to "ensure the security of Israel". The Israeli military occupation of off-limits zones of Palestinian-ruled areas of the Gaza Strip is called a response to provocations. And in March 2002, the "biggest military offensive in the Palestinian territories since the 1967 war" is "unacceptable" but mitigated by the fact that "no one expects Israel to remain passive".

Counter-intuitively, the Dual Justice frame incorporates many of these same traits into discussion of the "awkward hand [dealt] to both camps". Appearing in only five months, the Dual Justice frame recognizes that both sides have interests that deserve protection. However, the need for Palestinian sovereignty and security is routinely presented as less substantial or legitimate than the same interests of the Israelis. What Israelis deserve, Palestinians are begrudgingly or conditionally granted. Discussions of a just resolution to the conflict emphasize the need for compromise and often treat both nation states with condescending paternalism.

While the impression of unequal harm and asymmetric evil is pervasive, it is not total. Both sides of the conflict occasionally are said to engage in "bloodletting". One editorial speaks of "continuous carnage" and a "cycle of bloodthirsty revenge". An impression of senseless feuding emerges.

An editorial focused on White House efforts to find a successor to Arafat describes the shared plight of Israelis and Palestinians, thrown by destiny "together on a tiny, arid plot of land". This clearly presents the Dual Justice frame, but elaboration of regional historical context is infrequent; more often history does not extend beyond last week or last year. The context that dominates is short-term. Palestinian intransigence and failure to staunch violence are the baseline. Reference to U.S. historical commitment to the security of Israel is more common than discussion of the roots of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When mentioned, historical enmity, distrust, and violence between Arabs and Israel are not explained; history as told by these editorials begins in 1967 or 1948. Even then, only occasional reference is made to the 1967 war, to an apparently seamless history of Palestinian terrorism, or to "50 years of bitter conflict". This episodic treatment of the conflict deprives the audience of useful tools for meaning construction (Steuter 1990, Paletz 1982).

Editorials about Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the *New York Times* do not demonstrate the systematic elimination, or excising, of one side of the conflict evident in studies of news framing, but they do engage in sanitizing, personalizing, and contextualizing one or both sides of the conflict at various times (Liebes 1992). The application of these framing techniques is asymmetric. The editorials tend to identify human damage and losses, represent the humanity of the combatants, and contextualize the actions of Israelis more frequently than Palestinians. Israeli vio-

lence is the necessary condition of efforts to preserve law and order; Palestinian violence is an act of injustice.

4.3 Quotation

Use of quotes and even paraphrases in these editorials is rare. Yet, the use of sources and direct quotations in *New York Times* editorials frames Israel as the authority and the Palestine Authority as the challenger. The only direct quote attributed to an Arab source during the thirteen months studied is a quote from Syrian President Assad militantly equating Zionism and Nazism. In the only expression of Palestinian views, Ariel Sharon speaks for Yassir Arafat and articulates Arafat's position. Sharon himself is quoted and paraphrased more than any other source. He defines Israel's future course; he pledges to do all he can to advance the U.S. peace plan; he calls Arafat Israel's "bitter enemy;" he is the only one quoted in a piece on the Saudi peace initiative, which he dubs "an interesting idea;" and he says he will "conduct talks" only after the Palestinians have "been battered". While these attributed comments do not portray Sharon as benevolent, even-tempered or consistent, they do present him as credible and powerful. He shares a podium with the White House and U.S. and foreign diplomats. Arafat never ascends that stage. Indeed, Arafat and the Palestinians are left voiceless and powerless, at the margins of debate (Steuter 1990).

4.4 Media role

Studies of news coverage by U.S. media suggest the media treat Israeli-Palestinian conflict at once as "their" war and "our" war (Liebes 1992). The conflict is distant; it does not directly involve U.S. personnel; it does not directly threaten U.S. soil. Yet the Bush Administration is concerned about the effects conflict in the region will have upon his war on terrorism. And decades-old U.S. support of and alignment with Israel establish greater U.S. identification with Israel than with many other foreign nation states.

The *New York Times* reflects this complicated, or even conflicted, U.S. position in the Middle East. The role of the newspaper, as expressed through its editorial commentary on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, vacillates. While some editorials state the newspaper's long-standing support for U.S. policy in Israel (servant), editorials also embrace the roles of broker or advocate depending upon external events and the editorial's topic (Wolfsfeld 1997b). Consistent with previous findings on news framing, *New York Times* editorials adopt the role of faithful servant when they expound on the moral and global responsibility of the U.S. government to become more involved and to direct the resolution of conflict (Liebes 1992, Wolfsfeld 1997b). Commentaries about on-going tension or violence in the region advocate for Israel and succeed in portraying this heavily militarized state as the underdog. Headlines that vilify Arabs strengthen this advocacy role, but the strong law and order frame in many editorials suggests many editorials actually function to ad-

vance U.S. government policies. Thus, many of these editorials may be performing a servant function. Editorials examining Israeli-Palestinian response to peace plans or cease-fire initiatives and those discussing Israeli military offensives serve a more neutral, brokerage role. The media watchdog appears to be sleeping.

5.   Conclusions

The findings of this initial study of *New York Times* are inconclusive because of the limited sample size and uncertainty that the frames in news stories would reflect these same patterns. However, this work offers useful avenues to be pursued in future research, and it suggests that several of the author's hypotheses are incorrect. In this study, external events were tied more to frame selection than frequency of editorial comment. More specifically, the premise that editorial commentary on Israeli-Palestinian conflict as terrorism would increase following September 11 was not supported by this study. However, external events tended to trigger justice and injustice frames rather than aggression frames. The relative preponderance of editorials incorporating the Strategic Interest frame immediately after September 11 indicates that *New York Times* editorials did tie the conflict to the global anti-terrorism initiative of the United States immediately following the attack. Similarly, an increase in adversarial frames at the time of the Israeli military offensive of March 2002 suggests that some editorial framing responded to external crises.

Despite its wealth and relative autonomy, the *New York Times* editorial commentary rarely critiqued or criticized U.S. government policy. Lack of editorial support for the militarily weaker Palestinians also offers indirect evidence that the newspaper embraced U.S. policy positions on its editorial page. Contrary to this hypothesis, however, overt parroting and support of U.S. government policies in the region did not dominate *New York Times* editorials. While headlines embracing the U.S. Strategic Interests frame were most frequent, the internal frames of editorials did not adopt that headline frame except in the period immediately following September 11 and in discussions of the role of the Middle East in the U.S. war on terrorism, where U.S. interests were most strongly implicated.

Further study is needed to evaluate whether the disappearance of the Feuding Neighbors frame from editorials for the six months following September 11 relates to the preeminence of a servant role by the *New York Times* editorial page and the newspaper's associated interest in supporting U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the fight against terrorism during this period. The reemergence of this frame when regional violence escalated despite increased U.S. efforts to broker peace encouraged continued U.S. engagement in the region while distancing the nation from culpability for conflict. This suggests the Feuding Neighbors frame may reflect a servant role.

The finding that *New York Times* editorials framed Israeli-Palestinian coverage neither as "our" war nor as "their" war also supports this interpretation. Liebes' news

framing dichotomy did not apply effectively to *New York Times* editorial coverage of Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Liebes 1992). Instead, a trifurcated classification that categorizes conflict as "yours, mine, or ours" might be more apt. Under this classification, "our" wars would be wars fought outside national boundaries and without national soldiers but clearly involving significant and/or longstanding national interests or allegiances. U.S. coverage of Israeli-Palestinian conflict falls into this category, and *New York Times* editorial frames reflect the complex and contradictory interests and roles motivating media attention.

This study suggests that critical discourse moments such as the events of September 11 are but one in an array of significant factors shaping editorial framing of conflict. Cataclysmic events, national politics, media autonomy and political culture, and societal engagement in the conflict appear to interact with organizational standards and professional norms to determine media frames. Better understanding of this complex relationship is needed.

Discourses of blame and responsibility:

U.S./Canadian media representations of Palestinian-Israeli relations

Bruno Baltodano, Jared Bishop, Jay Hmielowski, Jezreel Kang-Graham,
Andrew Morozov, Brion White & Susan Dente Ross[1]

In the 21st Century, it is widely agreed that "the relationship between the United States and Canada is probably the closest and most extensive in the world" (U.S. Department of State 2006). The two countries share the globe's longest undefended border (5.500 miles), which former U.S. President Ronald Reagan called "not a point of division but a meeting place between great and true friends" (1978). The countries have close bilateral ties in trade, investment, and international law and policy, and they often work closely on multilateral issues.

Despite the profound and enduring connections between the two nations, U.S. media and the public give scant attention to Canada or the two nations' relations (Husselbee & Stempel 1997). Moreover, following the Bush administration's post-September 11, 2001, military initiatives against terrorism, political relations between the neighbors became increasingly chilly (U.S. Department of State 2006, Connelly 2004, Duff-Brown 2006). Even as the countries strengthened security agreements on border patrols and customs, Canada refused to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Canada also led the U.S.-opposed establishment of an International Criminal Court for war crimes. Canada banned the use of anti-personnel landmines through its Ottawa Convention, which the U.S. refused to sign. And, in 2005, Canada chose not to participate directly in the U.S. missile defense program. In rare and pointed news coverage during this period, highly placed Canadian politicians sharply criticized President G. W. Bush, and *FoxNews* called Canadians "ignorant". At the same time, polls showed that only 25% of Canadian voters would have supported Bush's re-election (Connelly 2004).

The schism between the two nations is also evident in international affairs. One area of increasing division between the two nations is in their attitudes and policies toward the Middle East. In 2005, for example, one poll indicated that the percentage of U.S. respondents with favorable opinions of Israel was 40% greater than the share of Canadians supporting Israel. Thus, while nearly 70% of U.S. respon-

dents viewed Israel favorably, only half of the Canadians shared that sentiment. An equal number of Canadians sympathized with the Palestinians.

Within the context of long-term bi-lateral peace and amicability between Americans and Canadians, academics repeatedly have theorized and debated the existence of fundamental and intractable differences of values that might help explain such differences and frictions (Baer et al. 1990, Carroll 2005, Lipset 1986, 1990; Grabb et al. 2000). Starting in the 1960s, Seymour Lipset argued that despite their profound interconnections and interdependence, and in spite of their shared roots, Canadians and Americans operate from distinct value systems. He distinguished between the military, revolutionary, and conflict-oriented values of early U.S. colonists and the traditional, Loyalist roots of English-speaking settlers of Canada.

This study examines coverage of events in the Middle East by the news media of the two countries as a product and an artifact of their cultures. If Lipset's theory holds, then, we would expect to find greater support for Middle East bellicosity in the U.S. than in Canadian media coverage.

1. Media, culture and ideology

Because journalists selectively transmit information in ways that reinforce cultural assumptions and beliefs (Gamson et al. 1992, Hackett & Zhao 2005, Howard et al. 2003, Paletz & Entman 1981), the media are at the heart of cultural debates such as this. Media act as a site of ideological struggle to delineate the boundaries of "our" identity and culture and to produce a system of social meanings that naturalizes dominant discourses (Karim 2000, Yep 2001) and influences how people construct their reality (Bennett 1983, Gurevitch & Levy 1985, Parenti 1993). Through sourcing, structure, and semantic traits, news reports tie together discrete bits of information to affix authority, morality, and causation within culturally resonant, coherent story lines (Gamson & Lasch 1983, Tuchman 1978, Van Dijk 1988). By defining items as newsworthy and placing them in "stories", the media establish associations, evoke myths, and reinforce rituals (Entman 1993, Gamson & Modigliani 1989, Iyengar 1991, Parenti 1993, Shoemaker & Reese 1996).

News stories *make* sense, meaning both that they construct sense and they embody commonsense, shared beliefs. The sense constructed within media is bounded by cultural values and power relationships. Thus, media under-represent non-elite perspectives and convey ethnocentric, nationalistic elite views that reflect government policies, legitimate the practices and ideas of the dominant social class, and reduce ideological threats to the status quo (Paletz & Entman 1981, Schlesinger et al. 1984, Shoemaker & Reese 1996, Wolfsfeld 1997b).

Here, we understand culture as a signifying practice (Hall 1980) that produces social meanings that reflect a particular social, political, and historical context (Yep 2001, 231; also Dunn 1998, Kuzio 2001). Culture as social process and communicative phenomenon derives from and creates a sense of difference and of belonging, a perception of ties and divisions, inclusions and exclusions, etc. (Connor

1978, Rosaldo 1993, Smith 1991, Triandafyllidou 1998). As such, culture is profoundly non-essentialist; it comprises "a complex set of shared beliefs, values and concepts which enables a group to make sense of its life and which provides it with directions for how to live" (Fay 1996, 55). Culture consists of and constitutes ordered but "conflicting beliefs and rules which offer mixed, contested, and ambiguous messages" (ibid., 56). From this post-positivist perspective, culture serves as a tool of politics and is used to silence, exclude, and mark other cultures as different, inferior, and amoral (Abu-Lughod 1991, Lazar & Lazar 2004, Leudar et al. 2004). This boundary marking paradoxically serves to "maximize psychological security" within the in-group (Bloom 1990, 71) while increasing the likelihood of conflict with the out-group it essentializes and demonizes (Barth 1969, Benhabib 1996, Merskin 2004, Triandafyllidou 1998).

The narrative conventions of journalism that place priority on drama escalate conflict and violence across cultural divides constructed by media's simplistic dualistic portrayals (Entman 2004, Hutcheson 2003, Nohrstedt et al. 2000, Ottosen 1995, Ross 2003 [cf. chapter 8], Wolfsfeld 2001b, 2004). Accordingly, the media serve a strong nationalistic function by covering international relations from an ethnocentric position that "bear[s] a remarkable resemblance to many sentiments common in [the government's] foreign policy and, indeed, [the nation's] political culture" (Steuter 1990, 274; see also Angus & Cook 1984). Thus, one would anticipate that a Canadian/U.S. cultural divide would be reflected in broad national differences in media coverage deeply intermeshed with the ideological underpinnings of the distinct U.S. and Canadian national identities and their disparate principles, policies and values (Holquin 1998, Schacter 2003).

Yet many perceive the mainstream North American media or even the Western media as monolithic and undifferentiated (Suleiman 2000, 26, Karim 2000). In this light, virtually seamless North American media perpetuate classically orientalist (Said 2002), bellicose, and jingoistic perspectives (Ismael & Measor 2003). Nearly uniform media content and business practices across the U.S./Canadian border (Dowler 2004) contribute to a public void and a lack of media space for anti-nationalistic or minority perspectives across North America (Lasn 1999; see also Hackett 1991). Some see Canadian media content as a transplant from the U.S. superpower (Ismael & Measor 2003, 7f./19). Exclusionary and anti-Islamic practices prevail (Karim 2000, Macarthur 1992, Said 1997, Shaheen 1984, 1997) and perpetuate reductive and racist notions about the Middle East in media across North America.

2.   Method

In this study, we chose to examine public discourse in Canada and the United States both as a reflection of such cultural issues and as a purveyor of peace or war. Here we explicitly wanted to examine whether media and government elites in the two nations differentially employed a discourse of war, with all of its conflict-escalating implications (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). More specifically, the research

team examined the discourse in the United States and Canada surrounding events in the continuing conflict between Israel and Palestine. The events at the heart of this paper are: 1. the Israeli pull out from Gaza beginning Aug. 15, 2005, and 2. the Palestinian presidential election in January 2005 following Yasser Arafat's death and the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, which resulted in Hamas winning a majority of seats. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict was of particular interest because throughout its long history numerous occasions have provided opportunities for peaceful resolution. These occasions, including the events examined for this paper, also have provided opportunities for the media to cover a conflict in a more peace-oriented way.

This work employs cultural/critical discourse analysis to enter "one of the most well-known and longstanding arguments in comparative social analysis" (Baer et al. 1990, 693). In this study, we examine the texts of two geographically proximate North American metropolitan newspapers (one in Canada and one in the United States) and the statements of government elites in Canada and the United States as cultural artifacts to argue that the American/Canadian cultural divide (Lipset 1986) is both insubstantial and strategic.

To examine the discourse in the two countries, we analyzed speeches by political elites and one newspaper from each country. *The Seattle Times* from the United States and *The Vancouver Sun* from Canada were chosen for their geographical proximity and similar circulation size. (Seattle, WA, and Vancouver, B.C., are roughly 100 miles apart. *The Seattle Times* circulates to almost 235,000 daily, while circulation at *The Vancouver Sun* is approximately 180,000 daily.) The group used critical discourse analysis to examine how political and media elites represented the two groups involved in the conflict. Critical cultural analysis or critical discourse analysis (CDA) attempts to make overt the power relationships performed through texts and to unpack the multiple and shifting ways in which "individuals and social or cultural groups define themselves and others" (Ylanne-McEwen & Coupland 2000, 210). A primary goal of CDA is to make visible how "the overall habitat of meanings and practices in which we dwell is the outcome of the variously deliberate pursuit by a variety of actors of their own agendas, with different power and different social and spatial reach, and with foreseen or unanticipated consequences" (Hannerz 1999). In doing this analysis, the group looked for noticeable differences in the identities constructed in the United States and Canada.

3. Analysis

Several strong similarities appeared across some two years of news coverage and political statements in Canada and U.S. about the two Palestinian elections and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Five dominant, recurrent themes emerged in the political and news discourse. We identified themes of Israeli benevolence, Palestinian opportunity, Palestinian failure, Palestinians as future threat, and Israeli actions are justified. These distinct themes present Israelis and Palestinians in largely

dichotomous and oppositional terms; the two parties are engaged in a zero-sum game. Such narratives establish and re-enforce narrow roles for both parties, place blame and responsibility, and indicate the appropriate (often unilateral) solution to conflict.

Canadian and U.S. politicians and the media representing current events in the Middle East employed story lines and tactics typical of what Galtung describes as war journalism (Galtung 2002). They also tended to adopt what Schafer (1999) called a securitization paradigm. This discursive strategy interprets most current issues in terms of security concerns about future threats and instability (Schafer 1999, Smith 2000). Because the future is inherently ambiguous, amorphous, colorless and indeterminate, future-based discourse offers optimal terrain to perform political and ideological work (Dunmire 1997, 2005; Hebdige 1993). Discursive strategies that attempt to map the future serve to "open up or close down particular lines of possibility" (Hebdige 1993, 275).

On occasion, both the media and government elites create a narrative in which peace is a possibility. Yet there is little evidence in any of these texts of more than occasional employment of the discursive tactics of peace (Galtung 2002). Even when texts present a situation in which peace *might* occur, the recommended solution generally requires one party to bend itself to the other's will in a win-lose game. Consensus, compromise and creative collaboration are not presented as realistic options. Often, steps forward by one party are discursively juxtaposed with retreats toward increased belligerence on the part of the other.

3.1 Israeli benevolence

One discursive thread in news and political texts emphasizes the actions of Israel, placing Israel in a dominant position of benevolent paternalism. Israel is represented as protective, providing aid and encouragement to the weaker, less capable, backward and, often, violent Palestinians. In media coverage of the Palestinian elections, for example, Israel is presented as an important actor, assuring that the process would be as free and fair as possible. The coverage presented Israel as making exemplary efforts to create favorable conditions for the Palestinian people to move freely within their country, ensuring everyone the opportunity to vote and encouraging smoothly operating Palestinian elections. Here, the Palestinian people are passive recipients of Israeli generosity.

Israeli paternalism is a theme in Palestinian election coverage. In one *Seattle Times* story, for example, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom is quoted as saying that "Israel will do everything it can in order to ease the conditions for the Palestinians to have their own elections" (Powell Wins 2004). The same story, without attribution, stated that "Israeli officials said they also were considering ways to allow Palestinians living in East Jerusalem to vote, probably by mail" (ibid.). *The Vancouver Sun* also presented Israel as the force behind functioning Palestinian democracy. Thus, one *Sun* article noted that:

"Despite the continuing violence, Israel said it remained committed to making the elections as free as possible. It is to increase the number of Israeli soldiers at checkpoints so Palestinians and election observers coming from Jerusalem will be able to enter the West Bank without delay. Under Operation Curtain Raiser, which is being conducted jointly with the Palestinian police, Israel will withdraw its troops from around West Bank and Gaza towns and cities so that the nearly 1.8 million voters can more easily go to the polls" (Fisher 2005a).

Here, Israel is portrayed as generous and conciliatory, supporting and facilitating Palestinian elections "despite the continuing violence" of the Palestinian people against Israel. In this context, Palestinian violence stands unexplained and without context, appearing wholly irrational. This text presupposes that Israel has been a patient partner in the peace negotiations throughout (Van Dijk 1988). By focusing on Israeli actions, the text marginalizes and undermines the role of Palestinians in their own elections.

The discourse surrounding the elections presents peace as possible. While the elections are the proximate cause of this opportunity, it is not Palestinian initiative toward democracy but rather Israeli forbearance that provides the tenuous and contingent occasion for peace. Following the election, President G.W. Bush, for example, "expressed optimism that [the Abbas] election would lead to a renewed push for Mideast peace" (Alberts et al. 2005). The media and government elites attribute the opportunity for peace as much to external influences and chance as to any Palestinian design. In this way, the elections themselves do not constitute a step toward peace (see discussion below regarding the Hamas victory) but act rather as a call to Palestinians to demonstrate their commitment to peace through additional unstipulated actions. Beyond constructing Israel as merciful and benevolent, these texts place responsibility for current violence and for any future peace solely on the Palestinians.

On rare occasions, this dominant discourse was challenged. Thus, two months after the Palestinian election of Mahmoud Abbas, a public statement by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew portrayed a different Israel. He expressed Canada's disappointment with government-sanctioned Israeli settlements in the West Bank and called the building "inconsistent with international law" and "out of step" with Israeli/Palestinian cooperation (Pettigrew 2005).

3.2 Palestinian opportunity

If Israelis are represented as cultivating the conditions for peace in the Middle East, then Palestinians are expected to take advantage of those opportunities and actually achieve peace. According to U.S. and Canadian media and political elites, the most recent opportunities for peace arose with the death of Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004, and its associated presidential election and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005. Thus, Arafat's death was not the loss of a beloved, if quixotic, Palestinian leader, but the precipitating event essential to renewing the peace process. In its coverage of the Palestinian presidential election, *The Seattle*

Times quoted Ariel Sharon as saying "an opportunity has presented itself" in the region; Arafat's death prompted a new Israeli attitude that peace could be achieved (Powell Wins 2004).

Government leaders in the United States, Canada, Israel, and other Western nations greeted the Palestinian election of President Mahmoud Abbas with a sense of optimism. The Prime Minister of Canada at the time, Paul Martin, called the election "a pivotal time in the Middle East. Canada joins the rest of the international community in urging Palestinians and Israelis to seize this moment and this momentum to work towards a comprehensive and lasting peace" (Alberts et al. 2005). Martin (Feb. 8, 2005) said the election marked "the beginning of a new era" in Israeli/Palestinian relations and an opportunity for increased Canadian "partnering" with the Palestinian government (Sept. 15, 2005).

The Sun coverage of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza demonstrated the tendency for news media to represent peace as an opportunity awaiting Palestinian cooperation. In one example of unattributed text, *The Sun* reported that President Bush had "offered Palestinians an olive branch, stating that if they proved their commitment for peace by fighting terrorist organizations, Israel was ready to talk" (Fisher 2005d). Throughout *The Sun*'s Gaza coverage, peace hinges on correct behavior by recalcitrant Palestinians. For example, "the removal of Jewish settlers and Israeli forces from Gaza [is] a chance for Palestinian militants there to behave more reasonably" (Fisher 2005c). As in the election coverage, selfless Israeli actions create occasions for Palestinians to seize opportunities for peace. Even in this context of Israeli occupation, Palestinians are defined as militants, Israelis as benevolent. Israeli withdrawal is not a righting of wrongs but a sacrifice intended to prompt Palestinians to move toward peace. Moreover, the placement of responsibility upon the Palestinians suggests their ultimate blameworthiness.

This same discourse appeared in comments and coverage following the death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. Here President Bush is represented as pushing both the Palestinian people and their elected leader to "commit to democracy and … stamp out corruption and terrorism". The improbability of such an outcome is indicated by Bush's statement that the election "must" establish the correct leadership and that "the U.S. would hold the new leader's 'feet to the fire' to ensure democracy and free elections prevailed" (Jones 2004). The U.S. president believes Palestinians will squander this opportunity for peace unless pressured. The text asserts the paradoxical contention that an open, democratic election must arrive at a predetermined outcome aligned with U.S. interests (Tomlin et al. 1997). The threatening and ominous tone of the Bush pronouncement underlines the suggestion that the U.S. may become more directly involved to force correct Palestinian elections.

In this discourse, Palestinian actions can contribute to a regional peace only through an election that achieves the goals identified by Israel and the United States. Opportunities for peace are borne out of conciliation and tragic circumstance, not Palestinian commitment or resolve; they demarcate the centrality of Israeli and Western moves in this process. Media and elites assert that the Israeli/

Western powers have dissolved the impediments for peace in the region, and the onus rests solely with the Palestinians. This focus on Palestinian behavior, embedded within this discourse and essential to the newspaper and elite accounts, takes a dramatic turn following Hamas' January 2006 electoral victories.

Two examples stand out in their reiteration of concern that this opportunity for peace is likely to, but should not, be squandered through Palestinian dereliction or malevolence. First, immediately following the vote, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice expressed the contingent nature of U.S. support for the Palestinian elections. She said, "The Palestinian people have *apparently* voted for change, *but* we believe that their aspirations for peace and a peaceful life remain unchanged" (Rice 2006b). According to Rice, "the positive" aspect of the election was "that the Palestinian people went to the polls in large numbers; they voted and they voted peacefully" (Rice 2006c). The presupposed negatives, then, are that Palestinians are violent and will not vote, and when they do, they will elect someone the U.S. considers unacceptable and unlikely to fulfill "the obligations of a Palestinian government".

Canadian officials echoed the U.S. position. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay (2006) withdrew from Canada's "full support" of the Palestinian government to a policy of critical review of "all funding", including "humanitarian aid", in light of "the statements and actions of a new government". Similarly, newly elected Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006) said "future assistance to any new Palestinian government will be reviewed … on an ongoing basis".

Media texts and political statements in both Canada and the United States consistently established Palestinians as solely responsible for peace. The texts give little suggestion of the hope of such an outcome, undermining the opportunity for peace by consistently representing the Palestinians as likely to fail to seize this potential.

3.3 Palestinian failure

The discursive blaming of Palestinians for regional violence and the failure to achieve peace is most pronounced with respect to the coverage of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Hamas's 2006 parliamentary election victory. The characterization of the radical, belligerent Palestinian is pervasive even in situations where Israeli and Western positions support Palestinian peace initiatives. Thus, when Israel withdraws from contested ground, Palestinians spurn the opportunity for peace and respond with violence. For example, one *Vancouver Sun* story reported that:

"Despite the [Israeli] government's decision [to withdraw], or perhaps because of it, there has been a steady increase in the number of Palestinian attacks in and from Gaza in recent weeks. Radical Palestinian groups jockeying for power have claimed their attacks have 'forced' Israel to leave Gaza. This has in turn given ammunition to those Israelis who oppose the withdrawal, who insist Sharon's fragile coalition government is giving in to terrorists" (Fisher 2004a).

This texts suggests that unnamed "radical Palestinians" are unconvinced by Israeli government concessions and believe Israel was "'forced' … to leave Gaza" because of increased Palestinian attacks.

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is constructed as an act of peace returned with Palestinian violence. Radical Palestinian groups strategically employ Israeli acts of peace to justify violence and disavow Israeli victimization (Cohen 2001). Palestinian violence is isolated and without context; it is fundamentally misdirected, purposeless. *The Sun* represents Palestinians as an irrational, unruly mob, turning guns against themselves as well, with "violent power struggles playing out in the streets of Gaza among militant groups, gangs and security forces vying to come out on top after the withdrawal" (Nessman 2004b). This positioning of Palestinian violence provides Israelis with political and rhetorical resources to challenge conciliatory policies that give ground to the enemy.

In contrast to discourses of Palestinian strategic malevolence, Israeli hard-line responses to the Hamas victory are depicted as logical and neutral, the natural response to Palestinian action not an independent escalation of belligerence. During its coverage of the parliamentary election, for example, *The Times* reported that:

"Hamas' victory virtually ruled out a resumption of stalled peace efforts, and could push Israel to take further unilateral moves to set its permanent borders, after last year's Gaza pullout"; and

"In Israel, the Hamas victory is almost certain to give a boost in March elections to Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the hard-line conservative Likud bloc and an opponent of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip".

"The right wing in Israel will be the clear beneficiaries of these [Palestinian] elections", said David Makovsky, director of the Middle East peace project at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He predicted Netanyahu would launch a new campaign blaming the rise of Hamas on the decision by Sharon to withdraw from Gaza (Hamas Win 2006).

Palestinians are constructed as acting against their own best interests and the interests of peace. The Israelis simply respond reasonably to the Palestinians' election of the "wrong" party.

Texts describing Hamas's electoral gains slight context to depict monochromatic Palestinian behavior and forecast near-certain conflict. This coverage often alludes to and contrasts recent prospects for peace with a near-certain violent future. One vivid example points to "six months ago, [when] there was optimism" and violence had "dropped nearly to zero … 'People felt we were getting into a new era and they would prosper', [economic consultant Ali] Badwan says. 'But all of a sudden it crumbled like a sand castle on a beach'" (Murphy 2006).

This metaphor suggests a wave of intemperate Palestinian votes crushing the fragile sandcastle of hope. The representation of violence as a natural and inevitable phenomenon ultimately destroys delicate prospects for peace (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). *The Seattle Times* used another violent image to represent the Hamas vic-

tory; it sent a "shock wave throughout the Middle East on Thursday as Israeli and Arab leaders indicated that prospects for peace talks were bleak" (Hamas Win 2006). Here the wave follows an explosive force, obliterating peace prospects and catapulting the region toward hopelessness. These waves of disappointment and failure recur throughout the discourses, consistently repressing anything but a hopeless future.

3.4 Palestinians as a future threat

Representations of Palestinians as a future threat pervade media and government elite discourses surrounding three significant potential steps toward peace – two democratic elections and withdrawal from contested territory. Reliance on securitization discourse contributes significantly to the overall representation of conflict in the region, emphasizing the problematization of the Palestinians, extending it into the future, and generalizing it beyond particulars. The discourse of threat casts the Palestinian/Israeli conflict as a Palestinian problem that projects a threat into the future. Characterizations of Palestinians as a future threat become salient within the context of prior Palestinian failures.

The representation of a Palestinian threat "functions in multiple ways to construe a particular version of future reality" (Dunmire 2005, 481). Such representations can be found in coverage by *The Vancouver Sun* and *The Seattle Times* of the Gaza withdrawal and the Palestinian elections. Discursive strategies define a future reality to privilege a specific version of the present that reinforces Palestinians as the problem (Hebdige 1993, Dunmire 2005).

Coverage of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza represents the withdrawal as a highly politically contested Israeli policy. The securitization discourse in these representations simultaneously articulates the Palestinians as a future threat and questions the wisdom of the withdrawal. The withdrawal is represented as the precondition for the emergence of an elevated Palestinian threat. *The Sun* reported inchoate "concern that Islamic militant opposition groups could try to seize power if Israel pulls out of the Gaza Strip" (Nessman 2004a). Similarly, *The Seattle Times* stated in unattributed text that "weapons flowing through the tunnels are now being used …to arm a future Hamas force that may try to take over the Gaza Strip" (Prusher 2004). *The Sun* also repeatedly employed the term chaos to signify Palestinian infighting. One headline in *The Sun* reported, "chaos among rival factions feared if Israel does withdraw from Strip" (Barzak 2004).

Coverage during the Palestinian elections provides additional examples of Palestinians as future threat. *The Vancouver Sun* reported that "two of Abbas's bodyguards were killed during about five minutes of wild shooting, which provided *a dark hint of what may lie ahead* during a campaign that many have predicted will be plagued by violence" (Fisher 2004b, emphasis added). Hamas often functions as a primary signifier of the Palestinian threat even if the party's political bid is unsuccessful and even when violence does not occur. For example, *The Seattle Times* reported that "even if support for Hamas is weaker, the group could under-

mine Arafat's successor" (Nissenbaum 2004a). *The Vancouver Sun* coverage reported that "although there has been very little of the Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence that had been predicted, Hamas has demonstrated that it can undermine Abba's leadership any time it wants by sharply increasing the number of mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli troops and Jewish settlements" (Fisher 2005a).

The pervasive future Palestinian threat provides discursive resources to justify pre-emptive Israeli military interventions to prevent harm to Israeli civilians. The threatening future serves to legitimize Israeli actions and undermine Palestinian claims of victimization. As Dunmire (2005, 484) suggests, "this projection of the future represents an eventual or potential reality that functions in the present as a rationale for a more immediate course of action".

3.5 Israel's actions are justified

Justification of Israel's violent actions comes not only from previously stated claims of victimization and pre-emption. The justification also arises from a culture that negatively portrays the Palestinian perspective and marginalizes Palestinian voices. Such media representations support increasingly aggressive action by the Israeli government and people, against the Palestinians.

In one dramatic example, a *Vancouver Sun* story quoted Ariel Sharon, who said Arafat's "ideological basis was the murder of Jews and the destruction of Israel" (Edwards & Alberts 2004). Another *Sun* reported that Hamas, which Canada and some other western countries branded a terrorist organization, had quickly announced an intention to avenge the deaths (Fisher 2005e).

In a *Seattle Times* story, Benjamin Netanyahu invoked images of September 11th to link terrorism in the United States to the political struggles between Israel and Palestine. The story elaborated a bleak future reality: "'The state of Hamastan is being created before our eyes', Netanyahu said, 'a satellite of Iran in the image of the Taliban'" (Hamas Win 2006).

The quote aligns Israel and the United States against an Arab/Muslim wave of terror. *The Times* not only presents this perspective but gives it prominence and credibility through direct quotation of Israeli elites early in stories, and through the application of noble and legitimating qualifiers to Israeli political actors. In contrast, no legitimating qualifications are applied to representatives of Hamas or the Palestinian territories when they are included in the discourse. Rather, *The Times* discredits Palestinian actors by challenging or denigrating their position or their motivations (see Fisher 2006d, Hamas' Apparent 2006; Hamas Win 2006). This contributes to a representation of Palestinian elections as a step toward greater strife and terrorism.

However well Hamas actually fared in the elections, a strong showing of the radical Islamic party – which calls for the destruction of Israel – is represented as a seismic shift in Palestinian politics and a stiff challenge for the Jewish state, Canada, the United States and the European Union. As Carroll (2005) showed, certain political

situations help frame the information around us. Similarly, Steuter (1990) demon-strated the tendency of the press to reiterate the dominant governmental protocol. While Israeli Army Radio quoted Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz to establish that Israel had not yet decided what its response to the dramatic Palestinian election results would be, *The New York Times* quoted Israel's acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, saying, "I will not negotiate with a government that does not meet its most basic obligations – to fight terrorism" (Fisher 2006b).

But Olmert, who was campaigning for Israel's own election, was quoted in the me-dia as saying that Israel was very willing to assist the Palestinian Authority if it met its commitments to disarm terrorists. This same coverage portrayed Israel and the West as being in a quandary over what to do with democratically elected deputies from Hamas, which boasted scores of bloody terrorist attacks and refused to re-nounce violence (Fisher 2006b).

These examples demonstrate the characterization that the Palestinians have brought violence and retribution upon themselves. This type of characterization comes not only from the Israeli people or Israeli government but echoes through the media and elite discourse in the U.S., Canada and the West.

"Our views on Hamas are very clear", White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters. "We do not deal with Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist organization. Under current circumstances I don't see any change in that."

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said a western demand that Hamas be excluded from the cabinet unless it renounces violence, disarms and accepts Israel's right to exist was still operative (Fisher 2006b).

These characterizations of Palestinians recurrently justified specific Israeli acts of conflict. Thus, the *Vancouver Sun* reported: "The war on terror is not over, and will take place every day and in every place. It is the natural right of the Jewish nation, as it is the right of any peoples, to hunt down those who wish to extermi-nate them" (Edwards & Alberts 2004).

Israel justified its refusal to transfer taxes and duties legally owed to the Palestinian Authority because "Olmert said his government could not tolerate 'a situation in which money transferred by the government of Israel will somehow end up in the control of murderous elements'" (Fisher 2006c).

These examples characterize the Palestinian people and their acts in ways that limit Israeli responses to continued violence. These texts project an almost singular duty upon Israelis to fight Palestinian initiatives, especially those that condone terror and violence. In this context, conflict seems endless and peace impossible.

4.   Conclusion

Through this research, we entered the debate about the relationships and differ-ences between the United States and Canada and their media. In line with Ismael

and Measor (2003), our findings show that discourses of the two nations represented the Palestinians and the Israelis in similar ways. This finding requires neither that the two countries share the same culture nor that each nation-state has a unitary and homogenous culture. Rather, our assertion is both more limited and more complex. We argue that, as the old adage holds, the exceptions prove the rule; much-touted differences between the Canadian and American cultures mask a deep and abiding shared set of values and assumptions about the West, about the other, and about the role of these two North American allies in the world. We find, like Carroll (2005, 9f.), that it is "political and social circumstances [that] shape the ways in which knowledge is created and received" and disseminated through the media.

The overriding narrative consistent in the elite discourse and the two papers throughout the various events ascribes legitimacy to Israeli actions while simultaneously de-legitimizing Palestinian moves within the framework of creating peace. Both papers and government officials represented the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as resolvable through reasonable Palestinian action. Discourses consistently established that the Israelis were doing everything they could to move the peace process forward. The onus rested upon the Palestinians to make the next move. Instead of moving forward and creating progress toward peace, however, the Palestinians were represented consistently as making poor decisions that squandered opportunities derailed the peace process and undermined their own interests. Failure to seize opportunities for peace constituted Palestinians as a future threat and justified Israeli "preemptive" aggression.

The discursive characterizations are by no means uniform or systematically homogeneous. The degree to which representations emphasized or increased the stridency and dualism within the overriding narrative differs among the two newspapers and the government elites. For example, *The Vancouver Sun* is more insistent and consistent than *The Seattle Times* in its evocation of these discourses.

Nonetheless, this study identifies a strongly consistent set of discourses across three political events, in two different papers, and in the discourse of political elites in both countries that challenges asserted fundamental cultural differences between Canada and the United States. This conclusion is limited by the relatively narrow scope of this study. Future research to explore these issues in greater detail and breadth will permit richer elaboration of potentially significant deviations from the overriding narrative and might reflect and constitute differences in the cultures of the Canada and the United States, their governments, and their newspapers.

Data sources

Alberts, S., Fisher, M. & McCabe, A. (2005, January 11). Bush invites Palestinian president. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A9.

Barzak, I. (2004, March 10). Gaza deal needed now, sheik says. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A12.

Edwards, S. & Alberts S. (2004, March 23). Sharon brushes aside criticism of Yassin killing. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A1.

Fisher, M. (2004a, September 24). Gaza attack puts Sharon on defensive. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A18.

Fisher, M. (2004b, November15). Deadly gun battle disrupts mourning. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A5.

Fisher, M. (2005a, January 8). Getting elected will be the easy part for Abbas. *The Vancouver Sun,* pp. A16.

Fisher, M. (2005b, Januray 10). Palestinians give Abbas a decisive mandate for peace talks The Vancouver Sun, pp. A1.

Fisher, M. (2005c, August 6). The other conflict in Gaza. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. C2.

Fisher, M. (2005d, August 16). Sharon appeals for unity. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A7.

Fisher, M. & Heinrich, J. (2005, August 18). Anguish, anger in Gaza as Israelit troops begin evicting settlers. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A7.

Fisher, M. (2006a, January 31). Hamas wants aid to keep flowing. *The Vancouver Sun,* pp. A7.

Fisher, M. (2006b, January 26). Hamas near the top in Palestinian election. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A13.

Fisher, M. (2006c, January 27). Hamas victory rocks Mideast. The Vancouver Sun, pp. A1.

Hamas' apparent win in Palestinian elections poses dilemma for U.S. (2006, January 26). *The Seattle Times*, pp. A1.

Hamas win shocks parties in Mideast even Hamas (2006, January 27). The Seattle Times, pp. A1.

Israel says all Hamas leaders are targets (2004, March 24). *The Seattle Times*, pp. A1.

Jones, G. (2004,November 13). Bush, Blair promise action on Middle East. *The Vancouver Sun,* pp. A14.

Murphy, J. (2006, March 12). Palestinians struggle without paychecks. The Seattle Times, pp A19.

Nessman, R. (2004a, March 3). Rival group suspected in killing of Arafat advisor. *The Vancouver Sun,* pp. A10.

Nessman, R. (2004b, March 9). Gaza pullout a deadly game of one-upmanship. *The Vancouver Sun*, pp. A8.

Nissenbaum, D. (2004a, December 22) New role sought as winds shift for Palestinians. *The Seattle Times*, pp. A3.

Nissenbaum, D. (2004b, December 25). Arafat's political heirs prevail in local voting. *The Seattle Times*, pp. A11.

Powell wins Israeli pledge on elections for Palestinians. (2004, November 23). *The Seattle Times*, pp. A8.

Prusher, I. (2004, May 19). Israeli army pounds Gaza Strip. *The Seattle Times*, pp. A6.

Rice, C. (2006a, January 11). URL: http://www.state.gov/

Rice, C. (2006b, January 26). URL: http://www.state.gov/

Rice, C. (2006c, January, 30). URL: http://www.state.gov/

Rice, C. (2006d, February 14). URL: http://www.state.gov/

Part IV

The German press

Coverage of the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in the German quality press[1]

Markus Maurer & Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

Rejection of and hostile attitudes toward Jews have a deep historical anchorage in many societies and have been continually expressed ever since early Christianity split off from Judaism in the first century, assuming very diverse forms before culminating in the genocidal anti-Semitism of the National Socialist period (Bergmann 2002). Although the open expression of anti-Semitic attitudes has steadily declined in Germany since 1945, current research has found evidence that many Germans still harbor latent anti-Semitic attitudes (Frindte 2006).

Drawing on the concept of *communicative latency* as used by Bergmann & Erb (1991a), Heyder et al. (2005) explain the, in part, high agreement with anti-Semitic attitudes as due to the dissemination of anti-Semitic stereotypes in European media discourse. According to these authors, criticism of Israel offers a roundabout way to circumvent the taboo on expressing anti-Semitic attitudes.

Support for this thesis is provided by two discourse analyses that concluded that the representation of the Middle East conflict was increasingly anti-Israeli in character (Anti-Defamation League 2002) and that following the Second Intifada German reportage included ever more anti-Jewish and NS-comparative stereotypes (Jäger & Jäger 2003). Wistrich (2004) also found a reason for this "new" form of anti-Semitism, among others, in the manner, e.g., in which even the German media report on the Middle East conflict. Thus, Israel was often portrayed as the aggressor, while Palestinian terrorism was minimized or trivialized. This strengthened old, already common prejudices and stereotypes against Jews and their alleged (economic) influence on (German) society and supported the frequent accusation that Israelis use, or rather misuse, the tragedy of the Holocaust to support their current aims and justify their policies. As well, in an interview published in the news magazine *Focus* on 17 May 2010, Stephan Krämer, the General Secretary of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland), crit-

icized "one-sided reportage on the Middle East conflict and uncompromising partisanship for the Palestinian position".

Specifically since the Gaza War, the taboo against making anti-Semitic comments in public discourse identified by Bergmann & Erb (1991a, b) has weakened. Not only has the tone of criticism become harsher, some individuals and groups have openly taken sides against Israel, and expressions from the repertoire of secondary anti-Semitism such as "Holocaust bonus" have found their way into political discourse. In reaction to the Israeli military operation against the Gaza aid convoy on 31 May 2010, there was a literal deluge of anti-Semitic comments on the Internet. In the social media Twitter and Facebook we can find examples of the entire anti-Semitic repertoire, including utterances that have virtually nothing to do with criticism of Israel. Nor are such anti-Semitic diatribes published in the Internet only anonymously: often the authors include their names and photos (cf. Kempf 2011b).

But should the German media really be held responsible for this alarming development? Does German media reportage on the Middle East conflict really express a negative bias against Israel? And if this is the case: What are the developmental tendencies of this bias? Has it really increased since the Second Intifada?

Since the studies by Jäger & Jäger (2003) and Wistrich (2004) worked with purely qualitative methods and/or analyzed reportage on more or less arbitrarily selected events, their findings cannot be generalized. The present study therefore seeks to find a partial answer to the questions posed above by making a comparative content analysis of reportage on the Second Intifada and the Gaza War using a representative sample of newspaper articles from the national German quality press.

2.   Study design

2.1 Content analytical variables

According to the current state of media effects research, media make their contribution to the social construction of reality by bringing particular topics into public discourse (agenda setting, McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and through the way they report on these topics (framing). This refers to how they "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entmann 1993, 52).

Starting from Kempf's (2003) model of escalation-oriented (War Frame) vs. de-escalation-oriented (Peace Frame) conflict coveraga, these aspects were analyzed on the basis of three dimensions which were respectively operationalized with a number of content analytic variables (cf. table 1; for a precise definition of the variables, cf. Spägele 2011): (1) What do the papers report about the conflict parties? (Representation of the conflict parties' behavior). (2) How do the papers evaluate the conflict parties' intentions and actions? (Evaluation of their intentions and

actions). (3) How do they punctuate the conflict? (Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims).

Representation of the conflict parties' behavior	
1. Israel	2. Palestine
1.1 Cooperative behavior	2.1 Cooperative behavior
1.2 Offers of cooperation (announcement of cooperative measures)	2.2 Offers of cooperation (announcement of cooperative measures)
1.3 Political demands	2.3 Political demands
1.4 Competitive logic	2.4 Competitive logic
1.5 Threatening behavior (announcement of confrontational measures)	2.5 Threatening behavior (announcement of confrontational measures)
1.6 Confrontational behavior	2.6 Confrontational behavior
1.7 Employment of force	2.7 Employment of force
Assessment of the conflict parties' intentions and actions	
3. Israel	4. Palestine
3.1 Support by third parties	4.1 Support by third parties
3.2 Legitimation of intentions (attribution of "good intentions")	4.2 Legitimation of intentions (attribution of "good intentions")
3.3 Justification of behavior	4.3 Justification of behavior
3.4 Self-critique from own ranks	4.4 Self-critique from own ranks
3.5 Critique of behavior	4.5 Critique of behavior
3.6 Delegitimation of intentions (denial of rights)	4.6 Delegitimation of intentions (denial of rights)
Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims	
5. Israel	6. Palestine
5.1 Defensive position	6.1 Defensive position
5.2 Strength and confidence of victory	6.2 Strength and confidence of victory
5.3 Threat to and mistrust	6.3 Threat to and mistrust
5.4 Victims	6.4 Victims
7. Calculation and comparison of victim statistics	

Table 1: Content analytical variables

2.2 The samples of newspapers and articles

The subject of the study was the reportage on the Second Intifada and the Gaza War by five highly regarded national German newspapers: *Die Welt* (DW), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR) and *Die Tageszeitung* (taz). The choice of these five newspapers has

proved reliable in many content analytic media studies, whereby we can assume that they cover the entire political spectrum (Wilke 1999). Because they do not all publish Sunday and holiday editions, in general we did not consider these.[2]

We defined as our statistical population for the Second Intifada all the articles published in the time period from 28 September 2000 until 8 February 2005 that fulfill the criteria "Israel" and "Palestine*". In order to guarantee the comparability of the search results for the various databases, we specified no further restrictions. To take the samples, this time period was subdivided into 18 time periods (quarters).[3] The total number of articles identified per newspaper and time period is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Total number of identified articles on the Second Intifada per newspaper and time period

In the case of the Gaza War, the statistical population was defined by all the articles published in the time period from 27 December 2008 until 19 January 2009 that met the criteria "Hamas or Gaza*".[4] To select the random sample, the study period

2   Since not all the selected newspapers were available in a single database, we used several different sources: The Lexis Nexis database was our source for newspaper articles from the papers *taz* and *DW*. Access to *FAZ* articles was obtained via Frankfurter Allgemeine Archiv BiblioNet on the Internet. In order to obtain access to SZ articles, the *SZ* LibraryNet archive was used, which is available online. FR articles were obtained from two databases. This was necessary because not all the FR articles were available from a single database for the two time periods that we studied. Thus the articles from 28 September 2000 to 31 December 2002 were selected from the annual editions of the FR data CDs, on which respectively all newspaper articles of a given year are recorded. After 1 January 2003, all the FR articles are available at Lexis Nexis, and so this database was used as a source beginning on this date.
3   Thereby the first quarter (4/00) extends from 28 September 2000 until 31 December 2000. For the years 2001 to 2004, we understand the quarters respectively as periods of three months. The time period in 2005 extends from 1 January 2005 to 8 February 2005, and for the sake of uniform nomenclature and for better readability, in the following it will likewise be referred to as a quarter, even though it actually amounts to only a little more than a month.
4   The official end of the conflict was on 18 January 2009. Since this was a Sunday, and Sunday editions were excluded from the sample, the reportage from 19 January 2009 was included in the study period in order to include in the analysis reportage on the end of the war.

was subdivided into days so that in this case there were 19 time periods. The total number of articles identified per newspaper and time period is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Total number of identified articles on the Gaza War per newspaper and time period

The samples were constructed according to the principle of random selection.[5] Our goal was to select 40 articles per newspaper for each of the two wars (at least 2 per time period and newspaper). For the Gaza War this could not be achieved in each case, however, for which reason in the end 78 newspaper articles from *DW*, 79 from *FAZ*, 80 from the *SZ*, 80 from *FR* and 79 from *taz* were included in the analysis, which resulted in a total random sample size of N = 396 newspaper articles.[6]

2.3 Data analysis

We evaluated the content analytical data in three cumulative steps. In a first step, we compared the total distribution of the Israeli variables with that of the Pales-

5   In order to assure the comparability of the newspaper articles and simultaneously to limit the samples as little as possible, we selected articles at random from the available newspaper articles that had respectively between 300 and 600 words. After selection, we checked the articles for relevance. We regarded articles as relevant if they at least largely focused on or had as their topic the respective conflict. If we judged an article as not relevant, we omitted it from the sample, and chose another article using the described procedure. For cases where we could not find enough relevant articles in the range of 300 to 600 words, we expanded the word count first by 100 words upward and downward. If we could still not find enough relevant newspaper articles, we successively increased the word count by 100 words until we had enough relevant newspaper articles.

6   Thereby for each time period, first two newspaper articles per newspaper were picked from the above-defined basic statistical population in the random sample, whereby we obtained 36 articles per newspaper for the 18 time periods of the Second Intifada and 38 articles per paper for the 19 time periods of the Gaza War. In addition, for the Gaza War, from the time period in which in all the newspaper articles were to be found (7 January 2009), two further articles were selected per newspaper. For the Second Intifada, two additional newspaper articles per newspaper were selected respectively from the time periods with the greatest and the second greatest total number of newspaper articles (first and second quarters 2002).

tinian variables. In a second step, we compared the distribution of the variables during the Second Intifada with their distribution during the Gaza War.

However, Kracauer (1952) already pointed out that the counting procedures of quantitative content analysis neglect the interdependencies of the various parts of a text and the relationships among the variables. What matters for the orientation of a text is not the frequencies with which the various text characteristics appear, but rather the patterns they form. If we additionally take into account that the analyzed texts stem from various different newspapers that represent a very broad political spectrum, we cannot assume that all the texts will employ the same reportage style. A newspaper's reportage style can also change over time, and various texts from a given newspaper (to some extent depending on the respective theme) can employ different styles. Consequently, we can assume that the frequency distributions of the text characteristics (= variables) portrayed in steps 1 and 2 represent a mix of various (latent) reportage styles[7] in which the text characteristics are combined in typical patterns (Kempf & Reimann 1993).

In order to unmix the distribution of text characteristics and to identify the latent styles, in a third step we did latent class analyses (LCA) of the following groups of variables: (1) Representation of Israeli behavior, (2) Representation of Palestinian behavior, (3) Evaluation of Israeli intentions and actions, (4) Evaluation of Palestinian intentions and actions, and (5) Punctuation of the conflict. The number of classes suitable for the description of the data was identified in accord with Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC).

2.4 Interpretation foil

In the interpretation of the results, the specific features of the two wars should be taken into account, which are in part mirror images of each other. Whereas the Palestinians started the Second Intifada and understood it as a reaction to Israeli provocation, Israel started the Gaza War and understood it as a response to a series of Palestinian provocations. The Second Intifada represented a longer period (several years) of limited destructive strikes by both sides, during which there were also repeated diplomatic initiatives. The Gaza War consisted, in contrast, of a short phase (a few weeks) of hot war with massive Israeli military strikes and less extreme acts of violence by the Palestinians (not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively). Any possible differences in the reportage on the two wars therefore reflect not only a change in the attitudes of the media to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but rather at the same time also differences in the reported events.

Nor is the choice of what the media report on (e.g., Israeli or Palestinian victims) just a result of the facts and/or media sympathy for one side or the other: It is also due to so-called *news factors*, such as cultural, political and/or historical proximity, negativity and personalization of the events, etc. These constitute the news

---

7   We thereby speak of latent styles because these cannot be directly read from the frequency distribution of the style characteristics.

value of an event and essentially influence whether it becomes a newsworthy report or not (cf. Eilders 1997).

With regard to the potential effects of news reportage, we cannot assume a linear media effect, as Lasswell (1927) still believed. How readers will react to a newspaper article (e.g. with sympathy for either the Israeli or the Palestinian side) is not determined just by what and how the article reports about the two sides and/or what attitudes the author expresses. It rather depends on the mental models according to which readers interpret the events and assign meaning to reports. A study (unrepresentative) by Kempf (2011b) indicates that we can thereby expect a widespread peace orientation in the German public. The majority of the study participants interpreted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to a pro-Israeli, neutral or pro-Palestinian peace frame, only a small minority interpreting it according to a pro-Israeli war frame or respectively a pro-Palestinian frame balanced on the edge of a war frame.

Finally, the feared reinforcement of anti-Semitic prejudices by the media is not necessarily due to reportage hostile to Israel. It might also occur because the reported events and their interpretation offer possibilities for linkage to existing latent prejudices and stereotypes (e.g., the "international Jewish conspiracy") and thus can contribute to making the prejudices salient.

3.   Results

3.1 Comparison of reportage on the two conflict parties

If we regard the overall distribution of the analyzed text characteristics going beyond the two conflicts (cf. figure 3, table 2), it is apparent that more is reported on the Israelis overall than on the Palestinians ($\chi^2 = 176.81$, df = 1, p < 0.0001). Due to the news factor social, cultural, historical proximity, this speaks for a greater closeness of the German quality press to Israel. Whether the reportage tends to be more positive or negative toward Israel cannot, however, be deduced from this.

Only with regard to victims do the German papers report less about Israel than about the Palestinians. This is, however (still) no proof of distortion of the reportage in a direction hostile to Israel, but rather corresponds, primarily, only to the actual numbers of victims.

Overall, German reportage is dominated by negative news. It centers on the employment of force, the victims of violence, as well as on the conflict parties' confrontational and threatening behavior. Due to the news factor negativism, this can put not only the Palestinians, but also Israel in a bad light, but is counteracted by the frequent justification of Israeli behavior and the frequent representation of cooperative Israeli measures, whereby on balance Israel comes off better than the Palestinians.

A   Cooperative behavior   H   Support by third parties
B   Offers of cooperation   I   Legitimation of intentions
C   Political demands   J   Justification of behavior
D   Competitive logic   K   Self-critique from own ranks
E   Threatening behavior   L   Critique of behavior
F   Confrontational behavior   M   Delegitimation of intentions
G   Employment of force

N   Defensive position
O   Strength and confidence of victory
P   Threat to and mistrust
Q   Victims
R   Calculation and comparison of victim statistics

Figure 3: Comparison of the reportage on the two conflict parties

There is no significant difference in the frequency of reportage on the employment of force by the two parties, on their political demands, on support by third parties, on self-critique from the ranks of the respective party and the (extremely low) frequency with which critics question the rights demanded by them and/or accuse them of malevolent intentions. On the one side, this speaks for an equal distance from *both* parties, while simultaneously trying to avoid black-and-white portrayals and to also highlight the *pluralism* of the two societies (self-criticism).

Significantly *more often* thematized are Israel's defensive position, the threat to Israel and/or distrust of the Palestinians, the justification of Israeli actions, Israel's good intentions and/or the recognition of Israel's rights, Israel's cooperative behavior and its willingness to cooperate, wherein a certain measure of sympathy for the Israeli mode of action is expressed.

Significantly *more often* thematized is also, however, critique of Israeli actions. The German quality press is thereby quite *critical* of Israeli policy. Likewise significantly *more often* thematized are Israel's competitive logic, Israel's confrontational be-

havior and threats to it, which make Israeli policy appear uncompromising, and also Israel's strength and confidence of victory. These make Israel seem overly powerful and could possibly elicit a David versus Goliath effect.

Variable	χ^2	df	p
Representation of the conflict parties' behavior			
Cooperative behavior	25.013	1	< 0.001
Offers of cooperation	13.682	1	< 0.001
Political demands	1.231	1	0.267
Competitive logic	35.836	1	< 0.001
Threatening behavior	38.443	1	< 0.001
Confrontational behavior	37.820	1	< 0.001
Employment of force	2.024	1	0.155
Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions			
Support by third parties	0.000	1	1.000
Legitimation of intentions	13.971	1	< 0.001
Justification of behavior	130.580	1	< 0.001
Self-critique from own ranks	0.000	1	1.000
Critique of behavior	19.782	1	< 0.001
Delegitimation of intentions	0.054	1	0.816
Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims			
Defensive position	22.629	1	< 0.001
Strength and confidence of victory	21.191	1	< 0.001
Threats to and mistrust	55.790	1	< 0.001
Victims	29.23	1	< 0.001

Table 2: Significance of differences in the reportage on the two conflict parties

3.2 Comparison of reportage on the two wars

Differences in the reportage on the two wars (cf. table 3) are on the one side due to the different character of the two conflicts, but at the same time, we discern a tendency to soften an unfavorable reportage situation for Israel.

Representation of the conflict parties' behavior

During the Gaza War (as opposed to the Intifada), articles focused less often on cooperative behavior, offers of cooperation and threatening behavior on both sides, along with confrontational measures on the Israeli side. The focus of the reportage shifted to Israeli use of force, on the one side, and the Palestinians' confrontational (political) measures, on the other side (cf. figure 4).

Due to the different character of the two conflicts, this conveys the impression of an increasing asymmetry between (excessive) Israeli use of force and Palestinian political confrontation.

Variable	Israel			Palestine		
	χ^2	df	p	χ^2	df	p
Representation of the conflict parties' behavior						
Cooperative behavior	20.766	1	< 0.001	9.612	1	0.002
Offers of cooperation	5.602	1	0.018	6.378	1	0.012
Political demands	0.359	1	0.549	1.609	1	0.205
Competitive logic	0.157	1	0.692	0.357	1	0.550
Threatening behavior	6.777	1	0.009	7.795	1	0.005
Confrontational behavior	18.428	1	< 0.001	18.705	1	< 0.001
Employment of force	11.856	1	< 0.001	0.000	1	0.998
Assessment of the conflict parties' behavior						
Support by third parties	15.890	1	< 0.001	15.890	1	< 0.001
Legitimation of intentions	2.210	1	0.137	1.763	1	0.184
Justification of behavior	8.157	1	0.004	21.042	1	< 0.001
Self-critique from own ranks	7.231	1	0.007	0.560	1	0.813
Critique of behavior	0.039	1	0.844	0.607	1	0.436
Delegitimation of intentions	1.086	1	0.297	1.726	1	0.189
Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims						
Defensive position	8.100	1	0.004	9.505	1	0.002
Strength and confidence of victory	35.051	1	< 0.001	17.882	1	< 0.001
Threats to and mistrust	3.762	1	0.052	3.857	1	0.050
Victims	19.349	1	< 0.001	1.679	1	0.195
	χ^2	df	p			
Calculation and comparison of victim statistics	4.336	1	0.037			

Table 3: Significance of the differences in reportage on the two conflict parties

Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions

While the articles focused on support by third parties for both sides more often during the Gaza War than during the Second Intifada, the frequency with which they justified the behavior of both conflict parties decreased during the Gaza War. At the same time, however, the imbalance between the two parties also increased. While Israeli behavior was justified a bit more than twice as often during the Second Intifada than that of the Palestinians (I : P = 2,2 : 1), during the Gaza War

this happened four-and-a-half times as often (I : P = 4,5 : 1). At the same time, the frequency with which Israeli self-criticism was thematized decreased in contrast to the Second Intifada (cf. figure 5).

A   Cooperative behavior
B   Offers of cooperation
C   Political demands
D   Competitive logic
E   Threatening behavior
F   Confrontational behavior
G   Employment of force

Figure 4: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior during the two wars

H   Support by third parties
I   Legitimation of intentions
J   Justification of behavior
K   Self-critique from own ranks
L   Critique of behavior
M   Delegitimation of intentions

Figure 5: Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions during the two wars

The asymmetry that comes to expression thereby between increased representation of Israeli use of force, on the one side, and (relative to Palestinian behavior) increased justification of Israeli behavior, on the other side, suggests reportage biased in favor of Israel. This, however, entails the danger of a boomerang effect that could exacerbate already existing attitudes critical of Israel and quite simply favor their generalization to "the Israelis". The latter outcome is all the more likely, because during the Gaza War Israel appeared increasingly to be a monolithic bloc (cf. decrease in self-critique).

Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims

A similar tendency was found with regard to the punctuation of the conflict and the representation of its victims (cf. figure 6). While the reportage on threats, victims and victim statistics during the Gaza War shifts in favor of the Palestinians, this is counteracted in that Israel (relative to the Palestinians) is increasingly represented in a defensive position, and Israel's superior strength is (relatively) less often thematized.

N   Defensive position
O   Strength and confidence of victory
P   Threat to and mistrust
Q   Victims
R   Calculation and Comparison of victim statistics

Figure 6: Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims during the two wars

- While the representation of the threat to Israel remains unchanged, the threat to the Palestinians was clearly more often thematized during the Gaza War than during the Second Intifada. Whereas during the Second Intifada Israel was represented as threatened almost five-and-a-half times as often as were the Palestinians (I : P = 5,4 : 1), this relationship declines to only twice as often during the Gaza War (I : P = 2,1 : 1).
- At the same time, during the Gaza War there were fewer reports on Israeli victims than there were during the Second Intifada. The representation of

Palestinian victims remained unchanged, in contrast, and the calculation and comparison (usually in favor of the Palestinians) of victim statistics increased.

- To be sure, the strength and confidence of victory on both sides were thematized more often during the Gaza War than during the Second Intifada. The relationship between them shifts, however, in a direction that makes Israel's power seem less superior. Whereas during the Second Intifada Israel's strength and confidence of victory are represented almost two-and-a-half times as often as those of the Palestinians (I : P = 2,4 : 1), during the Gaza War this declined to only twice as often (I : P = 2 : 1)
- At the same time, articles represented both parties in a defensive position less often during the Gaza War than during the Second Intifada. However, the relationship between the two parties again shifts in favor of Israel. Whereas during the Second Intifada Israel is represented in a defensive position twice as often as the Palestinians (I : P = 2 : 1), this occurs more than three times as often during the Gaza War (I : P = 3,3 : 1).

3.3 Latent styles of the reportage on the two parties

Summarizing the previous results, we can speak of a – despite critical distance from *both* conflict parties – reportage favorable to Israel which softens reportage situations unfavorable to Israel and punctuates the conflict in Israel's favor. The results of the LCA also confirm and further differentiate this finding.

3.3.1 Representation of the conflict parties' behavior

Number of classes	Israel			Palestine		
	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC
1	-1475.47	7	2964.93	-1209.98	7	2433.96
2	-1415.08	15	2860.15	-1177.50	15	2385.00
3	-1382.77	23	2811.54	-1162.85	23	2371.70
4	-1368.65	31	2799.31	-1154.28	31	2370.56
5	-1360.60	39	2799.19	-1149.20	39	2376.40
6	-1357.37	47	2808.74	-1144.91	47	2383.82
7	-1354.92	55	2819.85	-1141.09	55	2392.18
Sat. Model	-1334.12	127	2922.24	-1130.78	127	2515.56

Table 4: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior, goodness-of-fit statistics of the LCA

In order to reconstruct the latent styles of the representation of the conflict parties' behavior, for each of the parties a LCA was calculated that in Israel's case led to the identification of five classes, in the case of the Palestinians to the identification of four classes (cf. table 4). The reportage styles identified in this way can be divided into four groups: (1) Poorly contextualized focus on violence, (2) Competitive

logic and confrontational behavior, (3) Dialectic of confrontation and cooperation and (4) Focusing on cooperative behavior.

Poorly contextualized focus on violence

For both conflict parties, context-poor focusing on violence (cf. figure 7) is the most common style of representation of their behavior. In the case of Israel, it is characteristic of 33.7%, in the case of the Palestinians, of 49.6% of the analyzed texts.

- Israel, class 1 (33.7%) is characterized by the representation – almost without exception – of Israeli use of force, often in connection with confrontational behavior and sometimes with its threat.
- Palestine, class 1 (49.6%), in contrast, much more frequent and still poorer in contextualization, but not as negative. Articles very often report on Palestinian violence, sometimes in connection with the threat of confrontational measures. Occasionally the representation of cooperative Palestinian behavior softens the negativity of the style.

A   Cooperative behavior   E   Threatening behavior
B   Offers of cooperation   F   Confrontational behavior
C   Political demands   G   Employment of force
D   Competitive logic

Figure 7: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior – poorly contextualized focus on violence

Competitive logic and confrontational behavior

Competitive logic and confrontational behavior (cf. figure 8) dominate 20% of the representations of Israeli behavior and 35% of the representations of Palestinian behavior. Thereby one Israeli style faces two Palestinian styles, which together not only appear more often overall, but are also more strongly negatively shaded.

- Israel, class 3 (20.0%): Often (and more frequently than in all other classes) explicitly thematized, competitive logic finds expression in (with no exceptions) the threat of confrontational behavior that usually also goes together with the representation of confrontational behavior and usually also with the

representation of Israeli employment of force. Often this is softened by the representation of cooperative measures and sometimes the announcement of cooperative measures.

- Palestine, class 2 (22.4%): To be sure not explicitly thematized, competitive logic finds expression in the representation (almost without exception) of unconditioned confrontational behavior and Palestinian use of force, which often goes together with the threat of confrontational behavior and not infrequently with political demands and is only occasionally softened by the announcement of cooperative measures.
- Palestine, class 4 (12.6%): This thematizes (almost without exception) confrontational Palestinian behavior, very often in connection with the use of force and is only occasionally softened by the announcement of cooperative measures.

Figure 8: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior – Competitive logic and confrontational behavior (legend cf. figure 7)

Dialectic of confrontation and cooperation

The dialectic of confrontation and cooperation (cf. figure 9) is typical of 41.9% of the representations of Israeli behavior, but of only 15.4% of the representations

of Palestinian behavior. For one Palestinian style there are two Israeli styles that differ in the intensity of the thematization.

Figure 9: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior – Dialectic of confrontation and cooperation (legend cf. figure 7, page 176)

- Israel, class 2 (22.2%) thematizes (almost without exception) not only confrontational, but also cooperative behavior, often in connection with their threat or respectively announcement, mostly in connection with the representation of Israeli employment of force and often in connection with political demands.

- Israel, class 4 (19.6%), gives Israeli behavior somewhat less attention in contrast with class 2. The articles often focus not only on confrontational, but also on cooperative behavior. Israeli use of force and Israeli political demands are less frequently thematized. The threat or respectively announcement of confrontational or respectively cooperative behavior are never thematized.

- Palestine, class 3 (15.4%) very often contrasts the representation (almost without exception) of cooperative behavior and (relatively frequently) its announcement with the representation of Palestinian confrontational behavior and/or Palestinian use of force, relatively often connected with political demands and not infrequently with the threat of confrontational measures.

Focusing on cooperative behavior

A style that focuses on cooperative behavior (cf. figure 10) is found only in the representation of Israeli behavior and is there characteristic of 4.4% of the reportage.

• Israel, class 5 (4.4%): is usually marked by the representation and/or announcement of cooperative behavior, which, however, relatively frequently goes together with the representation of confrontational behavior and/or Israeli employment of force, sometimes also with the threat of confrontational measures.

Figure 10: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior – Focusing on cooperative behavior (legend cf. figure 7, page 176)

Comparison between the Second Intifada and the Gaza War

If we compare the frequency of the various different styles during the two wars (cf. figure 11), we see that in the Gaza War Israeli use of force was focused on about twice as often as in the Second Intifada (Israel, class 1). In contrast, the ocus on Palestinian use of force (Palestine, class 1) decreased in favor of a focus on competitive logic and confrontational behavior (Palestine, classes 2 and 4).

Israeli behavior
$\chi^2 = 26.08$, df = 4, p < 0.0001

Palestinian behavior
$\chi^2 = 20.82$, df = 3, p < 0.0001

Figure 11: Representation of the conflict parties' behavior – Frequency of the various different styles during the two wars

3.3.2 Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions

For each of the two parties, latent class analyses of the evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions produced a two-class solution (cf. table 5). Thereby we identified respectively a frequently employed style that gives the topic relatively less attention and a less often employed style that pays more attention to it (cf. figure 12).

Number of classes	Israel			Palestine		
	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC
1	-1114.45	6	2240.90	-977.35	6	1966.70
2	-1103.34	13	2232.68	-967.57	13	1961.14
3	-1096.97	20	2233.94	-964.45	20	1968.90
4	-1092.22	27	2238.44	-960.85	27	1975.70
Sat. Model	-1081.03	63	2288.06	-950.89	63	2017.78

Table 5: Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions. Goodness-of-fit statistics of the LCA

H   Support by third parties
I   Legitimation of intentions
J   Justification of behavior
K   Self-critique from own ranks
L   Critique of behavior
M   Delegitimation of intentions

Figure 12: Styles of evaluating the conflict parties' intentions and actions

Justification dominates critique

A great majority of the texts (84.8%) were marked by a style that to be sure relatively often criticizes Israeli behavior, but, however, clearly more often justifies than criticizes it. A comparable style of evaluating Palestinian behavior is much less frequent (29.6%) and somewhat negatively toned.

- Israel, class 1 (84.8%): Justification of Israeli behavior outweighs its critique with a ratio of R : K = 1.3 : 1. Relatively often there is also self-critique.
- Palestine, class 2 (29.6%): Justification of Palestinian behavior outweighs its critique with a ratio of R : K = 1.2 : 1. Self-critique is found just as often as critique and clearly more often than in the case of Israel.

Balance of justification and critique

A minority of the texts (Israel, class 2: 15.2%) uses a style that devotes great attention to the evaluation of Israeli intentions and actions and is characterized by a balanced relationship of justification and critique. We found no comparable style of criticism of Palestinian intentions and actions.

Critique dominates justification

A majority of the texts (Palestine, class 1: 70.4%) is critical of the Palestinians and pays little attention to the evaluation of Palestinian intentions and actions, however. Only critique of Palestinian behavior can be found relatively often, and not infrequently also self-critique. The critique of Palestinian behavior outweighs its justification with a ratio of K : R = 4.2 : 1.

Figure 13: Evaluation of the conflict parties' intentions and actions. The frequency of the various styles during the two wars

Comparison between the Second Intifada and the Gaza War

If we compare the frequency of the various different styles during the two wars (cf. figure 13), it appears that the assessment of Israeli intentions and actions re-

mains constant across the two wars. The assessment of Palestinian intentions and actions is, in contrast, clearly more negative during the Gaza War.

3.3.3 Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims

The LCA of the punctuation of the conflict and the representation of its victims identified six different styles (cf. table 6), which can be divided into three groups: (1) Threat to Israel, (2) Victims on both sides and (3) Palestinian victims and asymmetry of the conflict.

Number of classes	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC
1	-1675.30	9	3368.60
2	-1605.62	19	3249.24
3	-1591.70	29	3241.40
4	-1578.06	39	3234.12
5	-1567.25	49	3232.50
6	-1556.90	59	3231.80
7	-1549.58	69	3237.16
8	-1543.55	79	3245.10
Sat. Model	-1494.02	511	4010.04

Table 6: Punctuation of the conflict and representation of its victims: Goodness-of-fit statistics of the LCA

Threat to Israel

N   Defensive position   Q   Victims
O   Strength and confidence of victory   R   Calculation and Comparison of victim statistics
P   Threat to and mistrust

Figure 14: Punctuation of the conflict – threat to Israel

While to be sure only 12.3% of the analyzed texts focus on the threat to Israel, the threat to Israel so-to-speak forms the subtext of a further 23.7% of the texts,

which pay little attention to the punctuation of the conflict, however (cf. figure 14). The threat to which the Palestinians are subject, in contrast, never becomes the determining stylistic characteristic of the punctuation of the conflict.

- Class 4 (12.3%) is characterized by the representation without exception of the threat to Israel, views Israel more in a defensive position than the Palestinians and thematizes Israeli victims more often than Palestinian ones. The threat to Israel is, however, relatively often moderated by a representation of Israel's strength and confidence of victory.
- Class 2 (23.7%) pays less attention to the punctuation of the conflict, but is, however, characterized by a pro-Israeli subtext. This finds expression in an occasional mention of Israeli victims and the threat to Israel, but mentions its defensive position to be sure only in rare cases. It underlines this threat through occasional emphasis on Palestinian strength and confidence of victory and rarely also thematizes the threat to the Palestinians.

Victims on both sides

In all, 20.3% of the analyzed texts are characterized by the representation without exception of victims on both sides, which relatively often also goes together with a calculation and comparison of victim statistics (cf. figure 15).

Figure 15: Punctuation of the conflict – Victims on both sides (legend cf. figure 14)

- Class 6 (4.8%) is characterized by the punctuation of the conflict in the sense of a pro-Israeli war frame. It frequently sees Israel in a defensive position and emphasizes both parties' strength and confidence of victory, especially that of Israel (almost consistently), but often also that of the Palestinians.
- Class 3 (15.5%) is, in comparison to this, more balanced and punctuates the conflict more in the sense of a peace frame. Israel's defensive position is thematized somewhat less often, and sometimes the Palestinians are also portrayed in a defensive position. The parties' strength and confidence of victory are clearly less often thematized; those of the Israelis are entirely absent.

Palestinian victims and asymmetry of the conflict

In all, 43.6% of the analyzed texts focus either on Palestinian victims (33.4%) or on the asymmetry of the conflict (10.2%) (cf. figure 16).

Figure 16: Punctuation of the conflict – Palestinian victims and the asymmetry of the conflict (legend cf. figure 14, page 182)

- Class 1 (33.4%) represents at the most Palestinian victims, and only rarely Israeli victims. All other variables carry almost no weight. However, it sees Israel somewhat more strongly threatened and in a defensive position, but also stronger and more confident of victory than the Palestinians.
- Class 5 (10.2%) focuses on the strengths and confidence of victory of both parties and overall thematizes the victims less than class 1. While the threat to and defensive position of Israel are emphasized more strongly than in class 1, the threat to the Palestinians is much less often addressed, and that the Palestinians are in a defensive position is not thematized at all.
  In that the Palestinians' strengths and confidence of victory are relatively frequently thematized, the Palestinians' danger to Israel is to be sure emphasized. However, it is simultaneously relativized through the likewise quite frequent representation of Palestinian victims, the non-thematization of Israeli victims and the representation without exception of Israel's strength and confidence of victory.

Comparison between the Second Intifada and the Gaza War

If we compare the frequency of the various different styles during the two wars (cf. figure 17), we find a shift in victim representation and the punctuation of the conflict in a manner that is suitable to encourage reader solidarity with the Palestinians.

- The disinterested style with a pro-Israeli undertone (class 2) decreases, and the focus on the threat to Israel (class 4) likewise declines.
- The style that focuses on the asymmetry of the conflict (class 5) dramatically increases.

Punctuation
$\chi^2 = 41.2$, df = 5, $p < 0.0001$

Figure 17: Punctuation of the conflict. Frequency of the various styles during the two wars

As a counterweight to a pro-Palestinian solidarity-creating effect, the frequency of the representation of victims on both sides (class 6 and 3) remains virtually unchanged (it even decreases by 2 percentage points), but shifts in favor of class 6 (pro-Israeli war frame).

4. Summary and discussion

In summary, we find that – in accord with the news factor social, cultural, historical proximity – there was more reportage about the Israelis than about the Palestinians. The only exception is that reports about Israeli victims were less frequent. This corresponds, however, merely to actual victim statistics. A distortion in the reportage that is hostile to Israel cannot be inferred from this.

On the contrary, the German quality press has, in many regards, maintained a uniform distance from both conflict parties and attempted to make clear the pluralism of both societies. With regard to their support by third parties, their political demands, self-criticism from their own ranks and the (extremely rare) accusations of malevolent intentions, there is no significant difference in the reportage about the two parties.

Due to the news factor of negativism, the reportage is, however, dominated overall by negative news reports. Central to the reportage is the employment of force, the victims of the use of force, as well as confrontational behavior and threatening behavior on the part of both parties.

As a result, not only the Palestinians, but also Israel appear in a poor light, which, however, is counteracted by a certain measure of understanding for the Israeli manner of acting, so that on the balance Israel looks better than the Palestinians. Israel is more frequently seen in a defensive position than are the Palestinians, and the threat to Israel is more often thematized. Israeli actions are more often

justified, Israel's rights are more often recognized, and not only cooperative behavior, but also Israel's readiness for cooperation are thematized more frequently.

At the same time, the German quality press is also quite critical of Israeli policy: Critique of Israeli actions is more often thematized, Israel's strength and confidence of victory, competitive logic, its confrontational behavior and threats to it are more often reported than those on the Palestinian side. This makes Israel appear more powerful and uncompromising and can possibly promote a David versus Goliath effect that favors solidarity with the Palestinians.

Due to the different character of the two wars, during the Gaza War the reportage situation tended to change in favor of the Palestinians. There were more frequent reports on threats to the Palestinians and on Palestinian victims than during the Second Intifada, and the calculation and comparison of victim statistics was more frequent. Cooperative behavior, cooperation offers and threatening behavior were less often thematized on both sides, and the focus of the reportage shifted to Israeli use of force on the one side and confrontational Palestinian (political) measures on the other. While the focus on Palestinian use of force declined during the Gaza War in favor of a competitive logic and confrontational behavior, during the Gaza War Israeli use of force was focused on about twice as often as during the Second Intifada. Thereby an impression was given of an increasing asymmetry between Israel's (excessive) use of force and the Palestinian's (mere) political confrontation.

The picture drawn by the national German quality press of Israeli behavior during the Gaza War was thereby clearly more negative, and that of Palestinian behavior, to the contrary, not quite as negative as during the Second Intifada. This partial leveling of the differences between the representations of the two parties' behavior is, however, probably due more to facts and the specific characteristics of the two wars than to partiality in favor of the Palestinians. As well during the Gaza War, Israel's behavior was still less negatively represented than that of the Palestinians.

Quite contrary to this, the differences of the reportage about the two wars permit us to recognize a clear tendency to toning down a reportage situation unfavorable to Israel. The seemingly excessive Israeli use of force was balanced with reportage favorable to Israel that justified Israeli behavior, increasingly represented Israel (relative to the Palestinians) in a defensive position and less often thematized Israel's superior power. Admittedly, the frequency of the justification of *both* conflict parties' behavior decreased during the Gaza War, but the evaluation of Israeli intentions and actions did not change in comparison with the Second Intifada and also remained largely positive during the Gaza War. Instead, the reportage of events that could turn readers against Israel was counteracted by a negative shift in the evaluation of Palestinian intentions and actions. Even more strongly than during the Second Intifada, critique of Palestinian behavior predominated rather than its justification. Thereby the imbalance between the two parties increased in favor of Israel. Whereas Israeli behavior during the Second Intifada was justified

somewhat more than twice as often, during the Gaza War this happened four-and-a-half times as frequently.

This asymmetry between increased representation of Israeli use of force, on the one side, and increased justification of Israeli actions (relative to Palestinian behavior), on the other, is also mirrored in the punctuation of the conflict and the representation of its victims.

Thus, during the Gaza War the reportage on victims and numbers of victims admittedly shifted in favor of the Palestinians, but this was counteracted in that Israel (relative to the Palestinians) was increasingly represented in a defensive position, and Israel's superior power was (relatively) less often thematized.

To be sure, the ratio is no longer quite as strongly contrasting as during the Second Intifada, but during the Gaza War the threat to Israel was still represented more than twice as frequently as that to the Palestinians. And although during the Gaza War both parties were less often represented in a defensive position, the ratio between the two parties shifted in favor of Israel. While Israel was represented twice as often in a defensive position during the Second Intifada, this happened more than three times as often during the Gaza War.

There is no doubt that the reportage situation during the Gaza War could favor pro-Palestinian solidarity-increasing effects. Israel appears superior in power, the Israeli employment of force appears excessive, the Palestinian victim statistics are shockingly high, and the threat to Israel no longer seems as great as during the Second Intifada. Nevertheless, we cannot speak of a negative shift of the reportage to Israel's disadvantage. Quite to the contrary, the unfavorable reportage situation for Israel is counteracted by reportage favorable to Israel.

If the reportage on the Gaza War increased anti-Semitic prejudices, this was *not* because it reported in a manner hostile to Israel. On the contrary, it is the tension between a reportage situation that encourages distance from Israel among readers, on the one side, and a framing of the reportage favorable to Israel, on the other, that can make latent existing anti-Semitic prejudices and stereotypes salient. These include prejudices from the repertoire of *latent* anti-Semitism – e.g., "One (the German press) is not allowed to say what one really thinks about the Jews". – or insinuations from the repertoire of *manifest* anti-Semitism – e.g., "International Jewry has a firm grip on the German press, and dictates how it has to report".

Representations of victimization and responsibility during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in German quality newspapers[1]

Felix Gaisbauer

1.   Introduction

Many critics have accused the German press of reporting in a partisan manner about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Anti-Defamation League 2002a). As a result, they assert, the press fans not only anti-Israeli, but also anti-Semitic attitudes among readers (cf. Jäger & Jäger 2003, Wistrich 2004).

A forced conflation of anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel should be critically examined not only on logical (Klug 2003), but also on empirical grounds (Kempf 2010). But it must be emphasized that a transfer of anti-Semitic resentment to the state of Israel as "the collective Jew among the nations" (Cotler 2002, 7) is simply disguised anti-Semitism expressed through criticism of Israel (Frindte et al. 2005). Empirical findings from opinion surveys clearly show that – despite the decline in openly anti-Semitic utterances in Germany – many people quite certainly still harbor latent anti-Semitic prejudices, which they express through criticism of Israel (Heyder et al. 2005, 150f.). But – should we hold the media responsible for this disturbing situation?

Studies on this topic by Jäger & Jäger (2003) and Wistrich (2004) are solely qualitative and/or based on specific events that the authors did not randomly select. Due to these deficiencies, they permit no generalizations and are thus strongly limited to an undifferentiated description of the German (print-)media landscape. A quantitative content analysis of escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented reportage on the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in newspaper articles from the German quality press which deals with these inadequacies gives a more complex and balanced picture (Maurer & Kempf 2011a). According to this study, the German press reported in a distanced manner on both parties, whereby there was a tendency for the reportage on Israel to become more negative from the Second Intifada to the Gaza War, while this trend reversed for the reportage on the Palestinian side. Nev-

---

ertheless, the media representation of Israel was overall more positive, and the German daily press tried not to take the Palestinian side.

If German media reportage actually fuels anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic prejudices, it may do so more through a boomerang effect than through a systematic anti-Israeli bias in the reportage: Anti-Semitic prejudices could start from the ambivalence between a distance-evoking reportage on the one side, and a pro-Israeli representation on the other side. It could thus provide a breeding ground for not only *manifest,* but also *latent* resentments, ranging from the distorted perceptions of journalists voluntarily censoring their work to blatant conspiracy theories claiming that world Jewry controls the German press (Maurer & Kempf [cf. chapter 10]).

However, an escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented representation of the Middle East conflict is only one aspect of the reportage: The unequal media treatment of victims belonging to the respective conflict parties could strengthen such a boomerang effect by, e.g., provoking outrage at the disproportionate Israeli employment of force. Building on the same text material as Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10), this study aims to assess the representation of Israeli and Palestinian victims, as well as the attribution of responsibility for this victimization. How do the respective others (and vice versa) report on the victimization of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Are clear patterns of bias thereby recognizable? And if so, how often do these patterns appear during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War, and what tendencies in the reportage over time can be inferred from this? Finally, are patterns of bias thereby a matter of a widespread phenomenon, or can we hold specific newspapers responsible for them?

2.   Theoretical frames

2.1 Framing and media bias

The media make their contribution to the social construction of reality through the topics they introduce into public discourse (agenda-setting; McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and the way they report on these topics (framing).[2] "To frame" means, according to Entman (1993, 52), "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described".

As a function of *selection* and *salience,* in the sense of Entman, framing and the concept of *bias* are very close.[3] Thus Stevenson & Greene define bias as "the systematic differential treatment of one candidate, one party, or one side of an issue

---

2 *Priming* must be named as a third important media model. However, since priming is often understood as an extension of agenda-setting (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007) and is above all of significance for recipient-side media effects, I will refrain from presenting it here.
3 Entman even sees bias as an "organizing concept" of the media-effects model of framing, agenda setting and priming (Entman 2007, 163).

over an extended period of time. Bias is the failure to treat all voices in the marketplace of ideas equally" (Stevenson & Greene 1980, 116). Media bias in Middle East reportage is thereby the consistent and systematically different framing of the conflict parties over time.

In the study of media bias, we thereby almost of necessity face a dilemma that Stevenson & Greene describe as follows:

"News coverage which reflects the differences in the candidates or issues can be considered imbalanced and therefore biased. Media which treat candidates or issues differentially can be accused of bias because they are not giving equal coverage to all voices in the marketplace. But if they do treat contenders equally, forcing equivalent coverage in terms of time or space and content, they can be accused of distorting the differences that do exist. And by distorting the news, they are also guilty of bias" (Steveneson & Greene 1980, 116) .

As a solution to the problem of objectivizing bias, Stevenson & Greene propose a constructivist perspective and conclude on the basis of experimental evidence that the perception and effect of media bias depend less on the fairness or accuracy of journalists, and much more on the recipients themselves (cf. also Vallone et al. 1985). This viewpoint harmonizes with the framing research according to which media *effects* unfold in the interaction of media *contents* (media frames) with the mental models of their recipients (audience frames; Kempf 2006, Scheufele 1999). Thus the (postulated) one-sidedness of the picture of Israel in the media (cf. Jäger & Jäger 2003, Wistrich 2004) cannot completely explain the nature of anti-Semitic attitudes. The stocktaking attempted here of the characteristics of Middle East reportage (media frames) is nevertheless of central importance, since it can uncover the construction mechanisms and prevalence of media bias and thereby makes possible conclusions about the effects of these media contents, which must be worked out and supported in further studies.[4]

2.2 Framing and media bias in the representation of victimization and responsibility

The subject of this study is the representation of the victimization of the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the respective other conflict party in Germany quality newspapers during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War. Starting from the previous considerations, it should be possible to classify the studied newspaper articles in various media frames that differ in how aspects of victimization and re-

---

4   The Peace Research Project Group of the University of Konstanz is working on this question complex in the frame of the DFG Project "Criticism of Israel, Dealing with German History and the Differentiation of Modern anti-Semitism" (Israelkritik, Umgang mit der deutschen Geschichte und Ausdifferenzierung des modernen Antisemitismus). For a general overview of the project, see Kempf. (2011a). For the interactions of media frames and mental models, see Thiel (2010), Kempf & Thiel (2012), as well as on the media effects of TV documentaries about the Holocaust: Kopf-Beck et al. (in print).

sponsibility are emphasized or minimized. After identifying them, we will then be able to evaluate these media frames in a further step with regard to their equal or unequal consideration of the two conflict parties and thereby identify their possible bias.

Decisive for the structuring of media frames are, according to Entman (1991), stylistic characteristics that stimulate or weaken *identification* with the persons affected by an action, emphasize or suppress *responsibility* (*agency*) for the reported action, make a conceptual assignment *(classification),* as well as emphasizing or suppressing *generalizations* about the action or the actors to a broader context.

Herman & Chomsky (1988) differentiate how frames can be constituted in reportage on victimization and responsibility, distinguishing between "worthy" and "unworthy victims": Victims of state or interstate violence may suffer in an objectively comparable manner, but if their utility for sustaining enemy images varies, they are treated differently in terms of news value and degree of detail of reportage. While the causes of inequality in media representations of victims lie outside the scope of this study,[5] the framing characteristics through which this bias is manifested appear fruitful for the present work. Thus, Herman & Chomsky propose that "[w]orthy victims will be featured prominently and dramatically, that they will be humanized, and that their victimization will receive the detail and context in story construction that will generate reader interest and sympathetic emotion. In contrast, unworthy victims will merit only slight detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite and enrage […]. We would also expect great investigatory zeal in the search for enemy villainy and the responsibility of high officials for abuses in enemy states" (Herman & Chomsky 1988, 35).

Kempf & Reimann (1997) operationalized the stylistic characteristics of this type of framing of victimization and were able to empirically verify and further differentiate the style identified by Herman & Chomsky by studying the representation of Allied victims during the second Gulf War. In the present study, we combine the general framing aspects proposed by Entman (1991) with Kempf's (1997) approach and operationalize it for the respective Israeli and the Palestinian sides. We present these content analytical variables in the following section.

3.   Methods

3.1 Content-analytic variables

As victimizing events we define the reported concluded or ongoing actions of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through which, or as a consequence of which, the respective other conflict party or individuals belonging to it are victimized. Drawing on Herbert & Dunkel-Schetter (1992), *victimization* is pres-

---

5   Here it is a matter of frame-setting (Scheufele, 1999), thus of the process of constructing the media frames I discuss here. See also for Middle East reportage on this Langenbucher & Yasin (2009).

ent when media report that a conflict party or one of its members has experienced a negative and psychically or physically painful event and that this event is more or less uncontrollable by the victim. The special case of own victimization was separately coded if members of the conflict parties are described as victims of the actions of their own side (e.g. "friendly fire", on the Israeli side, or Hamas using its civilian population as "human shields", on the Palestinian side).

For subsequent identification of the event constellations reported on in the newspaper articles, we later summarized the so-coded text passages with similar events in higher-level categories. An overview of the frequency of the higher-level categories thus formed and included in the analysis is given by table 1.

Victimizing event	Frequency	
	Absolute	Relative
Israeli victimization	264	66.7%
Hostilities	40	10.1%
Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling	126	31.8%
Attack or raid	135	34.1%
Own victimization	17	4.3%
Non-specific/other	42	10.6%
Palestinian victimization	311	78.5%
Humanitarian situation	65	16.4%
Israeli military operations	69	17.4%
Israeli air strike/artillery shelling	111	28.0%
Isolated military operations	71	17.9%
Occupation	52	13.1%
Own victimization	61	15.4%
Non-specific/other	49	12.4%

Comment: n = 396 newspaper articles

Table 1: Higher-level categories and frequencies of the coded victimizing events

With regard to stylistic characteristics, the reader's *identification* should therefore be influenced by victim representations in which victims and/or targets of victimization are clearly characterized as civilian or military, the uncontrollability of the victimizing event by the victim is emphasized (uncontrollability thereby has the connotation of innocence, cf. Herbert & Dunkel-Schetter 1992), victim statistics are offered, or the text quotes witnesses to the victimization. In this context, a witness is every person or authority making a statement that can be recognized as differing from the views of the journalist. Therefore, witnesses can be not only members of the conflict parties (e.g., Hamas members or Israeli civilians), but also neutral third parties (e.g., UN institutions). The differentiation according to the

source of the statement (*journalist* vs. *witness*) and the orientation of the state-
ment go back to the concept of the *opportune witnesses* (Hagen, 1992). According
to this, journalists lend more space to communicators who are close to the editorial
line (are opportune), but the line of argumentation of these communicators is,
however, not further limited. Thus, even witnesses "opportune" for journalists, can
allow the reader to identify with the opposite side.

Coded as content analytic variables for the *emphasis on or suppression of respon-
sibility* were the provision of statistics on responsibility, the emphasis or respec-
tively justification/relativization of responsibility by journalists and witnesses. Cod-
ed as *categorization of action/actors* was the emotionalization of actions or of
perpetrators, as well as the representation of the victimizing event as aggression
or reaction. Coded as *generalization of the victimizing actions* (generalization of
responsibility) were, finally, text passages in which individual politicians or the pop-
ulation as a whole were held responsible for actions, or an inference was made
from the actions of perpetrators to the supposedly essential nature of the conflict
party.

The content analytic variables, as well as their frequency of occurrence, are sum-
marized in table 2. The coding unit was the entire newspaper article. Therefore,
with the exception of the victimizing event, which was in each case coded, the
content analytic variables were coded if they occurred at least once in an article.
For a more detailed presentation of the coding system, see Gaisbauer (2012,
26ff.).

3.2 Sample

The present study uses text material from Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10). The
newspapers analyzed were: *Die Welt* (DW), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ),
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR) and *Die Tageszeitung*
(taz). This selection consists of papers from the so-called German national quality
daily press and – except for the extreme ideological fringes – covers the entire
political spectrum. Since not all newspapers publish Sunday and holiday editions,
we excluded them.

Defined as the population for the Second Intifada were all the newspaper articles
of the above newspapers that in the time period from 28 September 2000 to 8
February 2005 contained the key words "Israel" and "Palestin*",[6] All the articles
in this time period that fulfilled these criteria were then subdivided into 18 intervals
(quartiles). Defined as the population for the Gaza War were all the newspaper
articles for the time period from 27 December 2008 to 19 January 2009 that con-
tained the key words "Hamas" or "Gaza*". We then subdivided the so-identified
newspaper articles into 19 intervals (days).

---

6   A wildcard "*" is a placeholder with an arbitrary number of places. The search for "Palestin*" thus
     yields results including "Palestine", "Palestinian", "Palestinians", etc.

Variable group	Frequency		Inter-coder-reliability	
	Absolute	Relative	Agreement	Cohen's κ
Results				
Event of Israeli victimization	265	66.9%	95.1%	0.89
Israeli own victimization	17	4.3%	95.1%	0.58
Event of Palestinian victimization	311	78.5%	93.8%	0.85
Palestinian own victimization	60	15.2%	95.01%	0.81
Israeli victimization				
Naming Israeli civilian victims	166	41.9%	87.6%	0.73
Naming Israeli military victims	73	18.4%	92.6%	0.78
Israeli uncontrollability of victimization	116	29.3%	92.6%	0.82
Humanization/individualization of Israeli victims	65	16.4%	90.1%	0.55
Provision of Israeli victim statistics	102	25.8%	92.6%	0.79
Quoting witnesses for Israeli victimization	48	12.1%	91.4%	0.49
Palestinian responsibility				
Emotionalization of Palestinian actions/ perpetrators	187	47.2%	93.8%	0.88
Representation as Palestinian aggression	199	50.3%	91.4%	0.83
Representation as Palestinian reaction	15	3.8%	97.5%	0.74
Provision of statistics on Palestinian responsibility	55	13.9%	90.1%	0.63
Emphasis on Palestinian responsibility by journalist	114	28.8%	91.4%	0.72
Justification of Palestinian responsibility by journalist	7	1.8%	96.3%	0.00
Quoting witnesses for Palestinian responsibility	179	45.2%	88.9%	0.77
Quoting witnesses against Palestinian responsibility	44	11.1%	93.8%	0.73
Generalization of Palestinian responsibility	22	5.6%	97.5%	0.74
Palestinian victimization				
Naming Palestinian civilian victims	216	54.5%	88.9%	0.78
Naming Palestinian military victims	176	44.4%	88.9%	0.77
Palestinian uncontrollability of victimization	96	24.2%	92.6%	0.78
Humanization/individualization of Palestinian victims	80	20.2%	95.1%	0.82
Provision of Palestinian victim statistics	162	40.9%	87.6%	0.72
Quoting witnesses for Palestinian victimization	100	25.3%	88.9%	0.69

Israeli responsibility				
Emotionalization of Israeli actions/ perpetrators	131	33.1%	81.5%	0.61
Representation as Israeli aggression	174	43.9%	91.4%	0.82
Representation as Israeli reaction	106	26.8%	97.5%	0.93
Provision of statistics on Israeli responsibility	68	17.2%	91.4%	0.62
Emphasis on Israeli responsibility by journalist	69	17.4%	85.2%	0.45
Justification of Israeli responsibility by journalist	73	18.4%	92.6%	0.74
Quoting witnesses for Israeli responsibility	194	49.0%	88.9%	0.78
Quoting witnesses against Israeli responsibility	164	41.4%	87.6%	0.74
Generalization of Israeli responsibility	6	1.5%	98.8%	0.66

Note: n = 396 newspaper articles

Table 2: Frequencies and inter-coder reliabilities of the content analytic variables

We constructed the random sample according to the principle of the *stratified random sample*. The goal was the selection of 40 articles per newspaper for each of the two conflicts (at least 2 articles per time period and newspaper). With regard to the Gaza War, this was not always possible, so that the final random sample included 78 newspaper articles from DW, 79 from FAZ, 80 from SZ, 80 from FR and 79 from taz. In all, this resulted in a random sample of n = 396 newspaper articles.[7]

3.3 Development of the coding system, coder training and inter-coder reliability

The coding system was first tested on 20 newspaper articles from the random sample and then further developed in steps until it should enable trained coders to reliably code the variables.

The author coded all 396 texts. To estimate inter-coder reliability, a second coder[8] was trained in the coding system, first using 20 texts that were not included in the reliability estimation, until the inter-rater reliability was satisfactory. Then the second coder coded a random sample of 81 newspaper articles (20.4%), which were likewise stratified according to the criteria of newspaper and conflict. The size of the random sample was set so that in the population of 396 texts and a type I

7   For a more detailed description of the population, as well as of the random sample construction, see Maurer & Kempf (2011a).
8   Special thanks to Beate Rohrer for working as the second coder and calculating the inter-coder reliabilities.

error of .05 the postulated minimal agreement rate amounts to 90% (cf. Riffe et al. 2005, 144ff.).

As a measure of the inter-coder reliability of the content analytic variables, we used the percentage agreements between the coders, as well as Cohen's κ (Cohen 1960). For the coding, we used the programs MaxQDA (VERBI 2010) und QDA Miner (Provalis Research 2011). The calculations were made with the package "irr" (Gamer et al. 2010) for the statistical software R (R Development Core Team 2011).

In order to deem the coding of a variable as reliable, Cohen's κ should be at least .70 or higher (a conservative criterion, cf. Lombard et al. 2002). Alternatively, the percentage agreement (a more liberal standard) should be 90% or higher. In three cases the reliability estimates do not fulfill these stringent requirements, but do lie in the acceptable range (cf. Wirtz & Caspar 2002, 59). The results of the reliability estimates are given in table 2.

3.4 Data analysis

The analytic strategy involved four cumulative steps. In a first step, the total distributions of the content analytic variables were compared between the two conflict parties. In a second step, the distributions of the content analytic variables for each conflict party during the Second Intifada were compared with the distributions during the Gaza War.

In a third step, latent class analyses (LCA) were calculated for the following groups of variables in order to identify the respective underlying latent reportage styles: (1) events of Israeli and Palestinian victimization, (2) representation of Israeli victimization, (3) representation of Palestinian responsibility, (4) representation of Palestinian victimization and (5) representation of Israeli responsibility. For the rationale to operationalize frames via latent class analyses, see Kempf (1997), Matthes & Kohring (2008), as well as Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10).

Finally, in order to determine how various event constellations combine with the reportage styles for victimization and responsibility of the two conflict parties to produce more differentiated reportage styles, in a fourth step, we performed a second-order LCA with the results of the first-order LCA from the third step, adding a dichotomous variable representing the two conflicts.

All calculations were made with R (R Development Core Team 2011) using the package "poLCA" (Linzer & Lewis 2011) for estimating the latent class models. As a selection criterion for the latent class models that represent the respectively best compromise between precision and parsimony in the data description, we used *Akaike's Information Criterion* (AIC; Akaike 1987). In addition, we give for the so-identified models the mean classification certainty (mean membership probability with which the newspaper texts belong to the respective latent class), as well as indices of the *proportional reduction of error* (PRE) and – insofar as possible – for the *explanatory power* (EP) of the model, with which the selected model is com-

pared to the saturated model in regard to its explanatory power relative to the *a priori* probabilities of the response patterns (PRE) or respectively in relation to the explanatory power of the pure random model (Kempf 2012b).

4.   Results

4.1. Comparison of the reportage on the two conflict parties

In the comparison of the overall distributions of the analyzed stylistic characteristics (cf. figure 1, as well as table 3), it appears that reports about Palestinian victimization are more frequent than ones about Israeli victimization, and thereby victim statistics are likewise more frequently given for Palestinian victims than for Israeli ones. However, only military – but not civilian – Palestinian victims are more often referred to.

A	Reporting victimizing events	H	Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators
B	Naming civilian victims	I	Representation as aggression
C	Naming military victims	J	Representation as reaction
D	Uncontrollability of victimization	K	Provision of statistics on responsibility
E	Humanization of victims	L	Emphasis on responsibility by journalist
F	Provision of victim statistics	M	Justification of responsibility by journalist
G	Quoting witnesses for victimization	N	Quoting witnesses for responsibility
		O	Quoting to witnesses against responsibility
		P	Generalization of responsibility

Figure 1: Overall frequency distribution of stylistic features by conflict party (n = 396)

With regard to the representation of the responsibility of the two conflict parties for the victimization of the other side, Palestinian actions are more often represented as aggression. A generalization of responsibility from the act or the perpetrators to the essential nature of the conflict party was clearly more frequently made to the disadvantage of Palestinians than to that of Israelis. Statistics emphasizing responsibility were more often given for the Israeli side. As well, wit-

nesses not only for, but also against, Israeli responsibility are more often quoted, whereby witnesses against Israeli responsibility are clearly in the majority.

These differences suggest that despite the more frequent reportage about Palestinian victimization, Palestinian acts of violence are clearly condemned as aggression. To the contrary, despite the more differentiated representation of Israeli responsibility, more understanding is awakened for the Israeli side.

Variable group	χ^2	df	p-value
Events			
Event of victimization	77.68	1	< .001
Own victimization	.09	NA[a]	1.0
Victimization			
Naming civilian victims	4.57	1	.325
Naming military victims	7.58	1	.006
Uncontrollability of victimization	1.58	1	.209
Humanization/individualization of victims	.94	1	.332
Provision of victim statistics	18.24	1	< .001
Quoting witnesses for victimization	1.89	1	.169
Responsibility			
Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators	.45	1	.502
Representation as aggression	6.47	1	.011
Representation as reaction	1.39	NA[a]	.379
Provision of statistics on responsibility	6.38	1	.012
Emphasis on responsibility by journalist	4.36	1	.368
Justification of responsibility by journalist	.49	NA[a]	.620
Quoting witnesses for responsibility	13.67	1	.000
Quoting witnesses against responsibility	6.37	1	.012
Generalization of responsibility	8.96	NA[a]	.039

Notes: Total-n = 396
[a] p-value was simulated because of violated assumptions for exact χ^2-testing using the Monte Carlo procedure with 10,000 replications.

Table 3: Comparisons of the probabilities of appearance of the stylistic characteristics by the conflict parties

4.2 Comparison of the reportage on the two conflicts

The comparison of the distributions of the analyzed stylistic characteristics between the two conflicts (cf. table 4 as well as figure 2 and figure 3) clearly shows that the media victim and perpetrator roles of the conflict parties have shifted.

Representation of victimization

A   Reporting victimizing events
B   Naming civilian victims
C   Naming military victims
D   Uncontrollability of victimization
E   Humanization of victims
F   Provision of victim statistics
G   Quoting witnesses for victimization

Figure 2: Frequency distribution of stylistic features for victimization by conflict party and conflict

A   Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators
B   Representation as aggression
C   Representation as reaction
D   Provision of statistics on responsibility
E   Emphasis on responsibility by journalist
F   Justification of responsibility by journalist
G   Quoting witnesses for responsibility
H   Quoting to witnesses against responsibility
I   Generalization of responsibility

Figure 3: Frequency distribution of stylistic features for responsibility by conflict party and conflict

In the reportage on the Second Intifada (in comparison to the Gaza War), reports

were more frequently made about Israeli victimization, more often not only civilian
but also Israeli military victims, victim statistics are more often given, and the vic-
tims were also more often humanized in the texts (cf. figure 2, as well as table 4).

Variable group	Israel			Palestine		
	χ^2	df	p-value	χ^2	df	p-value
Events						
Event of victimization	5.69	1	.017	.05	1	.820
Own victimization	.08	1	.771	1.04	1	.002
Victimization						
Naming civilian victims	15.23	1	< .001	1.51	1	.219
Naming military victims	8.23	1	.004	18.23	1	< .001
Uncontrollability of victimization	.95	1	.330	3.08	1	.079
Humanization/individualization of victims	24.31	1	< .001	.02	1	.881
Provision of victim statistics	29.14	1	< .001	.14	1	.710
Quoting witnesses for victimization	.48	1	.490	32.14	1	< .001
Responsibility						
Emotionalization of actions/perpetrators	6.75	1	.009	9.81	1	.002
Representation as aggression	1.42	1	.234	13.82	1	< .001
Representation as reaction	19.52	1	< .001	.56	1	.453
Provision of statistics on responsibility	.95	1	.330	5.11	1	.024
Emphasis on responsibility by journalist	.24	1	.624	3.50	1	.061
Justification of responsibility by journalist	.09	1	.769	1.37	NA[a]	.272
Quoting witnesses for responsibility	.65	1	.419	8.69	1	.003
Quoting witnesses against responsibility	9.58	1	.002	22.34	1	< .001
Generalization of responsibility	2.63	NA[a]	.221	18.83	1	< .001

Notes: Total-n = 396
[a] p-value was simulated due to violated assumptions for exact χ^2-testing using the Monte Carlo
 procedure with 10,000 replications.

Table 4: Comparisons of the frequencies of appearance of the stylistic characteristics of the different con-
flict parties and conflicts

The representation of the Palestinian side during the Gaza War was to the contrary
(in comparison with the Second Intifada) marked by more frequent mention of own
victimization of Palestinians by Palestinians,[9] less frequent mention of military vic-
tims and more frequent quoting of witnesses for Palestinian victimization. While

9   We can regard this as an indicator of a reportage that differentiates on the basis of civilians and com-
    batants: The representation of Palestinian own victimization includes above all mention of Hamas
    practices such as the use of human shields or the location of military positions in residential areas.

the conflict parties do indeed differ in the type of representation of victimization, the emphasis of the victimization between the conflicts and conflict parties appears to have shifted in opposite directions: While in the Second Intifada above all Israelis were portrayed in the victim role, this holds for the Palestinians in the Gaza War.

The representation of Israeli responsibility for Palestinian victimization during the Gaza War (in comparison to the Second Intifada) is characterized by two particularities: First, by a more frequent emotionalization and a less frequent representation of Israeli action as a reaction (however, no increase in representation as aggressor), and second, by less frequent citing of witnesses against Israeli responsibility (cf. figure 3 as well as table 4). This resembles the reportage on the Palestinians during the Second Intifada: Palestinian actions were more often represented as aggression and emotionalized, whereby the events were classified as terror in 50% of all cases (Gaza War: 18%). Statistics on Palestinian responsibility, as well as witnesses not only for, but also against Palestinian responsibility, were less often cited, whereby witnesses for Palestinian responsibility were clearly more frequently cited. Finally, responsibility during the Second Intifada was less often generalized to the Palestinian side. While the Palestinians were thus clearly represented as aggressors during both conflicts, this tendency was weaker during the Gaza War. At the same time, the emphasis on Israeli responsibility increased, so that we can conclude that there was a convergence over time of the reportage on Israel with that on the Palestinian side.

4.3 First-order reportage styles

To concisely summarize the previous results: the reportage shifted from the Second Intifada in comparison to the Gaza War so that a tendency to reverse the representation of the victim and a convergence in perpetrator roles took place. The results of the LCA support these results and allow further differentiations.

4.3.1 First-order LCA of the event constellations

First-order LCA for identifying overarching event constellations showed that a 5-class solution offers the best description of the data (cf. table 5; as well as figure 4; mean classification certainty = 0.87; PRE = 85%; EP = 54%).

- In class 1 (15.0%) the events of Israeli victimization are characterized by mutual hostilities and Palestinian shelling. Own victimization ("friendly fire") is more often thematized in comparison to the other classes. Palestinian attacks are never mentioned. In this class, to the contrary, Palestinian victimization is characterized by not only general (e.g., army incursions into occupied cities), but also isolated (e.g., targeted killings, raids) Israeli military operations, as well as by own victimization. This event constellation thus describes a conflict dynamic characterized by mutual hostilities during ground offensives with simultaneous Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling of Israel.

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-2219.68	1	4094	4441.35
1 Class	-2090.49	12	4083	4204.99
2 Classes	-2012.74	25	4070	4075.49
3 Classes	-1989.99	38	4057	4055.98
4 Classes	-1966.83	51	4044	4035.67
5 Classes	-1944.34	64	4031	4016.67
6 Classes	-1931.63	77	4018	4017.26
7 Classes	-1921.51	90	4005	4023.02
8 Classes	-1909.27	103	3992	4024.54
9 Classes	-1901.50	116	3979	4034.99
Saturated	-1706.70	4095	–	11603.39

Table 5: Goodness-of-fit statistics of the first-order LCA of the variables on victimizing events

- Class 2 (18.0%) is a collection of irrelevant or barely relevant texts in which all stylistic characteristics rarely appear (< 10%). About 33% of all texts in this class did not make any references to Israeli victimization (Palestinian side: about 21% of all texts).
- Class 3 (14.2%) includes newspaper articles in which Palestinian mortar and rocket shelling of Israel stands out as the characteristic type of victimization. All other events appear from rarely to occasionally, but always with below average frequency in comparison with the overall distribution. On the Palestinian side, Israeli air strikes and artillery shelling are most frequently cited, occasionally also own victimization. All other events are mentioned only rarely in comparison to the overall distribution. This constellation thereby characterizes a conflict dynamic of Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling and Israeli air strikes and artillery attacks.
- The representation of Israeli victimization by the texts in class 4 (28.6%) is clearly dominated by Palestinian attacks. On the Palestinian side, victimization is characterized by Israeli military operations not only of a general, but also of an isolated nature. Further thematized were the Israeli occupation and individual events summarized under "other". This conflict dynamic seems to illustrate a spiral of violence consisting of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations.
- Class 5 (24.2%) contains newspaper articles in which above all Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling, as well as Israeli own victimization are thematized. On the Palestinian side, reports are made above all about the poor humanitarian situation, own victimization and Israeli air strikes. This conflict representation is characterized by an emphasis on the victimization of the civilian population on both sides, as well as own victimization on both sides. In contrast to all other classes, these articles seem victim-centered, while the other articles seem more actor-centered.

A   Fighting
B   Rocket/mortar shelling
C   Attack
D   Self-victimization
E   Miscellanous

F   Humanitarian situation
G   Military operations
H   Airstrike / artillery
I   Punctual military operations
J   Occupation
K   Self-victimization
L   Miscellanous

Figure 4: First-order LCA: Constellations of victimizing events

At this point, it can be maintained in summary that the identified classes show the

effort of reportage to do justice to the complex interplay of the events of the con-
flict. We cannot identify a representation of events that points to a systematic dis-
tortion to the advantage or disadvantage of one conflict party. The LCA of the sec-
ond order should show how these conflict dynamics are structured with regard to
the thereby victimized.

4.3.2 Results of the First-order LCA of the representation of victimization

In order to identify the latent reportage styles (frames) in the representation of
victimization, latent class models were calculated for each conflict party. For the
representation of Israeli victimization, a 3-class solution thereby provides the best
description (cf. table 6; mean classification certainty = 0.90; PRE = 97%; EP =
93%), while for the representation of Palestinian victimization, six classes should
be taken into consideration (cf. table 5; mean classification certainty = 0.91; PRE
= 97%; EP = 95%).

Model	Israeli Victimization				Palestinian Victimization			
	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-1309.09	1	62	2620.18	-1537.34	1	62	3076.68
1 Class	-1247.01	6	57	2506.02	-1455.16	6	57	2922.31
2 Classes	-1112.49	13	50	2250.97	-1309.31	13	50	2644.62
3 Classes	-1091.49	20	43	2222.97	-1283.25	20	43	2606.50
4 Classes	-1087.59	27	36	2229.17	-1272.62	27	36	2599.24
5 Classes	-1084.14	34	29	2236.27	-1262.17	34	29	2592.34
6 Classes	-1081.40	41	22	2244.80	-1254.10	41	22	2590.20
7 Classes	-1079.57	48	15	2255.13	-1247.30	48	15	2590.61
8 Classes	-1078.62	55	8	2267.25	-1244.03	55	8	2598.05
9 Classes	-1077.15	62	1	2278.29	-1242.62	62	1	2609.24
Saturated	-1074.42	63	–	2274.84	-1240.30	63	–	2606.60

Table 6: Goodness-of-fit statistics of the First-order LCA of the variables on the representation of victim-
ization

Israeli victimization

The reportage on Israeli victimization can be subdivided into two substantive con-
tent classes (1 and 2), as well as *one class of no or only low relevance* (class 3)
which is characterized by very low probabilities of occurrence of the considered
stylistic characteristics (< 10%), but with 53% makes up the greatest share of the
overall reportage.

The naming of civilian vs. military victims is to be identified as the central charac-
teristic differentiating between class 1 and class 2, which are otherwise very similar
(cf. figure 5): While newspaper articles in class 1 (11.7%) always mention Israeli

military victims, they clearly less often cite civilian victims, whereby this tendency is reversed in class 2 (35.3%).

Class 1: 11.7%

Class 2: 35.5%

Class 3: 53.0%

A   Civilian victims   D   Humanization
B   Military victims   E   Victim statistics
C   Uncontrollability   F   Quoting witnesses

Figure 5: First-order LCA: Representation of Israeli victimization

Class 1 is characterized, besides the invariable naming of military and only occasional naming of civilian Israeli victims, by a frequent representation of the victimizing events as uncontrollable. Although victim statistics are often provided, only rarely are witnesses quoted for the victimization. In summary, in class 1 military victims are thus emphasized.

Newspaper articles in class 2, in which reports on civilian victims are always made, very often thematize (clearly more often than articles in class 1) the uncontrollability of the victimizing events. Civilian victims are often humanized, quantified in their extent by victim statistics and relatively often commented on by witnesses. In summary, in class 2 civilian victims are thus emphasized.

What stands out is that the victimization of civilians (class 2) is emphasized more often than all other stylistic characteristics, but the representation of the victimization of largely military victims (class 1) uses almost the same reportage style.

The emphasis on the uncontrollability of victimization, which appears in both classes, bears a connotation of innocence or respectively a suppressed connotation of involvement in the case of the military victims.

Palestinian victimization

A 6-class solution offers the best description of the reportage styles of Palestinian victimization (cf. figure 6). Similar to the reportage styles on Israeli victimization, the emphasis on civilian or military victims offers itself as a prominent characteristic to differentiate the individual classes.

- Class 1 (5.1%) is characterized by a strong humanization of civilian victims, who often acquire a connotation of innocence through the emphasis on the uncontrollability of the victimizing events. Victim statistics are seldom drawn on and never witnesses, whereby the individuality of the victim fates is strengthened. In summary, the representation of Palestinian victimization in class 1 occurs through the humanization and individualization of civilian victims.
- Class 2 (10.1%) emphasizes chiefly military victims, whereby victim statistics are always provided, the victimizing events, however, are never represented as uncontrollable, and the victims are only rarely humanized. This emphasis on military victims and statistics while simultaneously representing the victimization as controllable implies that it is a matter of reportage about skirmishes or respectively mutual acts of violence. In the overview, class 2 is characterized by an unemotional, objective representation of largely military victims.
- Class 3 (3.6%): This very rare reportage style is marked by the invariable naming of military targets/victims, while only occasionally mentioning civilian casualties. Invariably emphasized is that the victimization of these military victims was uncontrollable. Despite this connotation of innocence or non-participation, the reader is seldom encouraged to identify with the victims, because the victims are never humanized, but for that are relatively often named in statistics or thematized by witnesses. This combination of the uncontrollable victimization of combatants and military targets makes Palestinian combatants appear in class 3 as playthings of the military power Israel.
- In articles from class 4 (17.8%) not only civilian, but also military victims are always named whose victimization is represented as uncontrollable human suffering. To the contextualization of victimization made in this way, victim statistics are also very often added. However, the authors of these articles never let witnesses of victimization speak, for which reason class 4 is characterized by a representation of Palestinian victimization that aims at balance.
- Class 5 (40.0%): This by far largest class is consistent with the non-, or respectively hardly, relevant class 3 regarding Israeli victimization: All the stylistic features appear only rarely (< 10%) or occasionally (< 17%).

Figure 6: First-order LCA: Representation of Palestinian victimization (legend cf. figure 5, page 205)

- Class 6 (23.4%) is, like class 4, characterized by an emphasis on civilian victims. However, in class 6, military victims are only occasionally mentioned. The victims are more often humanized, and statistics are more often provided. Thereby the witnesses of victimization usually also have a word. In summary: class 6 thus represents a reportage style for Palestinian victimization that strives for balance, in which – unlike class 4 – civilian victims are emphasized.

Above all, it can be held that reports on Palestinian victimization are made not only more often, but also in a more differentiated way than those on Israeli victimization. Class 4 and class 6, which make up in all ca. 40% of the total reportage and are characterized by balance, as well as the further 40% of texts in class 5 that do not thematize Palestinian victimization, permit the provisional conclusion that unconditional partisanship for the Palestinian side by the press represents a marginal phenomenon. Nevertheless, very seldom are reportage styles used which thematize above all individual civilian fates (class 1) or represent Palestinian military victims as at the mercy of Israel's superior power (class 3). In contrast to them is class 2, which also surpasses classes 1 and 3 together in frequency of occurrence, in which above all Palestinian military victims are dealt with in a very distanced way and has no counterpart on the Israeli side. Whether with these very infrequent styles it is a matter of bias in the reportage will be shown by the second-order LCA, in which the interplay of these styles with the event constellations and representations of responsibility emerge with greater detail.

4.3.3 First-order LCA of the representation of responsibility

To identify the latent reportage styles (frames) in the representation of the responsibility of a conflict party for the victimization of the respective other side, latent class models were estimated for each conflict party. The analysis of the representation of Israeli responsibility yielded a 3-class solution (cf. table 7; mean classification certainty = 0.89; PRE = 85%; EP = 75%), while for the representation of Palestinian victimization a 4-class solution describes the data best (cf. table 6; mean classification certainty = 0.85; PRE = 96%; EP = 92%).

Model	Palestinian responsibility				Israeli responsibility			
	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
Pure random	-1924.73	1	510	3851.46	-1309.09	1	510	2620.18
1 Class	-1540.38	9	502	3098.76	-1247.01	9	502	2512.02
2 Classes	-1303.12	19	492	2644.25	-1112.49	19	492	2262.97
3 Classes	-1283.31	29	482	2624.63	-1091.49	29	482	2240.97
4 Classes	-1269.11	39	472	2616.22	-1087.58	39	472	2253.17
5 Classes	-1260.31	49	462	2618.62	-1084.14	49	462	2266.27
6 Classes	-1249.73	59	452	2617.46	-1081.40	59	452	2280.80
7 Classes	-1243.44	69	442	2624.88	-1079.57	69	442	2297.13
8 Classes	-1238.69	79	432	2635.37	-1078.62	79	432	2315.25
9 Classes	-1234.83	89	422	2647.66	-1077.15	89	422	2332.29
Saturated	-1213.39	511	–	3448.78	-1074.42	511	–	3170.84

Table 7: Goodness-of-fit-statistics of the First-order LCA of the variables on the representation of responsibility

Israeli responsibility

The representations of Israeli responsibility for Palestinian victimization can be described with three classes of reportage styles (cf. figure 7). Due to the low frequency of occurrence of the studied stylistic features (< 10%), one of these styles is to be judged as not or scarcely relevant (class 2; 30.7%).

A Emotionalization	F Justification by journalist
B Representation as aggression	G witnesses for responsibility
C Representation as reaction	H witnesses against responsibility
D Statistics on responsibility	I Generalization of responsibility
E Emphasis by journalist	

Figure 7: First-order LCA: Representation of Israeli responsibility

Of the "content" styles, class 1 (60.3%) is to be regarded as a representation critical of Israel, but not, however, as an anti-Israeli representation of Israeli responsibility: Israeli action is quite often represented as aggression, but just as often as reaction. Statistics for the emphasis on Israeli responsibility are relatively often provided, and likewise Israeli action is often also emotionalized. Not only the authors of the articles in this class, but also witnesses emphasize Israeli responsibility more frequently than they justify or defend it. However, the author often also deals with the opposite side and permits it a voice through witnesses. Conspicuous hereby is

that the question of responsibility is more often thematized by witnesses than by journalists themselves. Rarely, but most often in comparison to the other classes, responsibility is generalized to the disadvantage of the Israeli side.

To the contrary, class 3 (8.9%) should be considered a pro-Israeli reportage style: Israeli action is without exception represented as reaction and seldom as aggression. There is rarely any emotionalization of Israeli action, and statistics are never given. While the journalist never emphasizes Israeli responsibility, he or she does, however, frequently quote witnesses who do this. Israeli responsibility, to the contrary, is fairly often relativized, not only by journalists, but also by witnesses. In general, relativizing stylistic features appear more often than ones that emphasize, and responsibility is never attributed solely to the Israeli side. This consistent moderation of Israeli action as merely reactive cannot be judged to be balanced: (1) While "objective" indicators of Israeli responsibility (statistics) are only rarely given, witnesses for Israeli responsibility are sometimes given a voice, but in comparison to the witnesses for exoneration, they are much less frequently heard. (2) The journalist himself, who never appears accusing, comes to the assistance of these witnesses with justifications.

While the major share (ca. 60%) of the German reportage on the Second Intifada and the Gaza War gives a balanced, detached representation that can be assessed as one that weighs the pros and cons of Israeli actions, that likewise does not shrink from naming escalating actions as such, in about 31% of the newspaper articles this is not thematized. A small share of the reportage (ca. 10%) is, to the contrary, to be judged as a pro-Israeli representation of responsibility for Palestinian victimization. It can be maintained that no purely anti-Israeli class can be identified, as, e.g., Wistrich (2004) supposes.

Palestinian responsibility

The representations of Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victimization is best described by four classes or reportage styles (cf. figure 8), whereby one of the styles can be judged on the basis of a consistently low probability of occurence of the examined stylistic features (< 10%) as not or respectively scarcely relevant (class 2; 38.6%).

- Class 1 (18.2%) is characterized by an emphasis on and emotionalization of the actions of the Palestinian side as aggression. Relatively often responsibility is generalized solely to the disadvantage of the Palestinian side. Aspects of balanced reportage, such as the occasional representation of Palestinian action as reaction and the quoting of witnesses to relativize it, are, however, not counterbalanced, as Palestinian responsibility is always stressed by quoting witnesses and often emphasized by journalists. In all, the texts in class 1 thereby express a clear assignment of responsibility and generalization by journalists and witnesses.

Figure 8: First-order LCA: Representation of Palestinian responsibility (legend cf. figure 7, page 209)

- Class 3 (28.0%) resembles class 1, but differs in that the journalist brings in less emotionalization and/or representation of own views on Palestinian responsibility and, for that, tends rather to cite witnesses for responsibility. The Palestinian side is never represented as reactive. Summing up, the special feature of class 3 is the clear assignment of responsibility by witnesses.
- Class 4 (15.1%) is characterized by an emphasis on and emotionalization of Palestinian action, as well as a clear representation of the Palestinian side as the aggressor. While with classes 1 and 3 witnesses are often quoted (i.e. involved persons or third parties have a say), here the journalist seems to determine the representation. Thereby a clear assignment of responsibility by journalists in class 4 is in summary to be emphasized as a characteristic feature.

Above all, it is recognizable that Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victimization is clearly maintained: Palestinian action is only rarely represented as a reaction to Israeli action. The consistently high probabilities of occurrence of emotionalizations of these actions as stylistic techniques indicate that Palestinian actors and violent acts are not only explicitly named, but also condemned as such. The greatest difference in the substantive classes 1, 3 and 4 appears to consist much more

in who makes these attributions: Not only is the clearest tendency in class 1 toward the assignment and generalization of responsibility, but also both journalists and witnesses emphasize Palestinian responsibility. To the contrary, in class 3 this emphasis is more often made by witnesses than by journalists themselves, while the frequency of occurrence of the features is reversed in class 4. The frequency with which journalists express views in class 4 suggests that these articles belong chiefly to the form of the commentary.

4.4 Second-order reportage styles

Already after the results of the first--order LCA, a few conclusions can be reached with regard to possible media bias: While there are more frequent reports of Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility than the reverse, the Palestinian side is also represented in a more differentiated way. This is shown not only in the clearer naming and rejection of Palestinian acts of violence, but also in the distance from Palestinian military victims that has no counterpart on the Israeli side.

Conspicuous, however, is also that a large share of the newspaper articles seldom or even never thematize victimization and responsibility. According to Entman's definition of framing as salience and selection, this gap in the construction of media bias can also be significant, since due to it victimization or responsibility are not dealt with and can thereby be suppressed. The second-order LCA gives information on the question of how the various event constellations and various reportage styles about victimization and responsibility for this combine to form differentiated frames and on how the reportage differs during the two conflict phases. According to the AIC, an 8-class solution (second order) provides the best possible description of the data (cf. table 8; mean classification certainty = 0.93; PRE = 74%).

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	AIC
1 Class	-2750.61	17	1782	5535.21
2 Classes	-2528.29	35	1764	5126.58
3 Classes	-2355.02	53	1746	4816.04
4 Classes	-2309.31	71	1728	4760.62
5 Classes	-2274.57	89	1710	4727.14
6 Classes	-2244.19	107	1692	4702.37
7 Classes	-2214.87	125	1674	4679.74
8 Classes	-2193.62	143	1656	4673.25
9 Classes	-2177.95	161	1638	4677.91
Saturated	-2165.64	179	–	4689.27

Table 8: Goodness-of-fit-statistics of the second-order LCA

The following representation of results is structured as follows: First, we examine

how the two conflicts are distributed within the eight latent reportage styles of the second order to determine whether some reportage styles dominate during one of the two conflicts. In a second step, we describe *how* reports are made about the conflict dynamics during both conflicts, that is: how the content analytic patterns of the event constellations of victimization and responsibility of the two conflict parties combine with each other in the latent reportage styles.

Latent reportage styles during the Gaza War and Second Intifada

Conflict	Second-order reportage style (class)							
	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5	Class 6	Class 7	Class 8
Gaza War	0.1725	0.0000	0.1156	0.1801	0.1512	0.0000	0.3806	0.0000
Second Intifada	0.1546	0.2622	0.1122	0.0429	0.0000	0.2859	0.0000	0.1421

Table 9: Conditional distribution of the eight second-order reportage styles in the conflicts

The distribution of the eight second-order reportage styles within the two conflicts can be found in table 9. It is clear that latent classes/reportage styles 2, 6 and 8 appear only during the Second Intifada. Reportage styles 5 and 7 are to the contrary only observed during the Gaza War, while this is mainly the case with class 4 (80%). Besides these conflict-specific reportage styles, classes 1 and 3 are present with both conflicts and, moreover, in each case almost equally often. With this background knowledge, the content of the latent reportage styles of the second order are presented in the following.

No/hardly any serious consideration of the perpetrator / victim themes: Class 1

Class 1 (both conflicts): 16.4%   Class 3 (both conflicts): 11.4%

A   Constellation of events   D   Palestinian victimization
B   Israeli victimization   E   Israeli responsibility
C   Palestinian responsibility

Figure 9: Distribution of the content analytical first-order latent classes within second-order latent classes 1 and 3

Reportage style 1 (cf. figure 9) appears approximately equally often with both conflicts. Only occasionally are there reports of victimizing events on both sides. Those first-order latent classes always dominate, which previously were classified as not or hardly relevant, since they very seldom display the studied stylistic features. The quite low percentage (16.4%) of newspaper articles during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War making no reference to victimization suggests that the media above all report on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it is in phases of escalation (news selection criterion "negativism"). However, it must be mentioned as a reservation that only newspaper texts from phases of escalation in the Middle East conflict were sampled. If no thematization of victimization was present in the sample, this was above all because it was a background article on individual persons or progress and setbacks in negotiations.

Pro-Palestinian frame, which consistently faded out Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility: Class 3

Reportage style 3 appears approximately equally often during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War. Relatively often thematized are mutual hostilities during ground offensives and Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. Occasionally – but frequently in comparison to the overall distribution – no or hardly any reports are made about the victimization of the two sides. Likewise, there is occasionally an event constellation characterized by Palestinian rocket attacks, Israeli air strikes, as well as Palestinian own victimization. It is conspicuous that not only Israeli victimization, but also Palestinian responsibility for this are scarcely thematized. The representation of Palestinian victimization often emphasizes civilian victims or tries for balance. In comparison, Palestinian victims are frequently represented as playthings of the military power Israel.

This reportage style is consistent with the criticisms made, e.g., by Wistrich (2004), but constitutes, however, only 11.4% of the overall reportage. Further conspicuous is that this pro-Palestinian frame appears in both conflicts, and is also found no more frequently during the Gaza War than during the Second Intifada.

Pro-Israeli frames: Classes 5 and 8

Classes 8 (7.2%) and 5 (7.5%) are similar not only in their content, but also in their frequency of occurrence and are therefore best represented in terms of their differences (cf. figure 10).

• Class 8 appears thereby exclusively during the Second Intifada and reports above all on the conflict dynamic of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations. Usually civilian Israeli victims are emphasized, whereby relatively often there is a clear assignment of responsibility or generalization to the Palestinians by witnesses or journalists. Palestinian victimization, to the contrary, is seldom thematized. Along with this, Israeli responsibility for this victimization is likewise not/scarcely thematized. If it is addressed, the representation of the responsibility question is pro-Israeli. Consequently, class 8 represents

a pro-Israeli frame which either fades out or justifies Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility.


Figure 10: Distribution of the content analytical first-order latent classes within second-order latent classes 5 and 8 (legend cf. figure 9, page 213)

- Class 5, in contrast to class 8, appears exclusively during the Gaza War and often represents a conflict dynamic that thematizes the suffering of the civilian population of both sides. Relatively often there are also reports on Palestinian rocket attacks and Israeli air strikes. With about equal frequency, Israeli civilian victims are emphasized, but Palestinian victimization is not thematized. This class is the only reportage style in which there is usually a clear attribution of responsibility to the Palestinians by journalists and – in contrast to class 8 – only occasionally by witnesses. However, there is never silence on the question of Palestinian responsibility. Palestinian victimization is scarcely dealt with, and likewise the question of Israeli responsibility, which when addressed is often pro-Israeli and seldom critical of Israel. Class 5 thereby constitutes a pro-Israeli frame that largely fades out Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility.

In summary, the pro-Israeli reportage style in class 8 thereby represents a pendant to class 5 during the Second Intifada. That in class 8 (Second Intifada) Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility are faded out or even justified, while these aspects are largely "only" faded out in class 5 (Gaza War), is an indication of the decline in the pro-Israeli reportage over the course of the conflicts, which can be interpreted as a stronger reserve to the disadvantage of Israel. However, it must be noted that this shift in reportage might be partly attributable to the different character of the two conflicts.

Frames that try for balance: Classes 2 and 4

As well class 2 (13.2%) and class 4 (11.1%) are similar in their content (cf. figure 11) and with regard to their frequency of occurrence, while they appear respectively only during one of the two conflicts.

Figure 11: Distribution of the content analytical first-order latent classes within second-order latent class-es 2 and 4 (legend cf. figure 9, page 213)

- Class 2 appears exclusively during the Second Intifada and thematizes the conflict dynamic of the spiral of violence of Palestinian attacks and Israeli mil-itary operations, often also mutual hostilities during ground offensives, as well as Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. With the representation of Is-raeli victimization, above all military victims are emphasized and Palestinian responsibility is simultaneously emphasized by drawing on witnesses. The representation of Palestinian victimization aims at a balance between civilian and military victims, but tends to emphasize civilian victims more strongly. The tendency in the representation of Israeli responsibility is pro-Israeli. Class 2 can thereby be characterized as a frame that strives for balance (with a pro-Israeli tendency) that on the Israeli side emphasizes above all military, and on the Palestinian side, above all civilian victims.
- The reportage style characterized by class 4 appears mainly during the Gaza War (about 80% of this class) and very often thematizes Palestinian rocket attacks and Israeli air strikes, as well as relatively often also event constel-lations characterized by mutual hostilities during ground offensives, as well as Palestinian rocket/mortar shelling. Thereby on the Israeli side, above all civilian victims are emphasized. Palestinian responsibility for Israeli victim-ization tends to be more strongly emphasized than in class 2, and sometimes also generalized. The representation of Palestinian victimization likewise strives for balance between civilian and military victims, but in contrast to class 2, it tends to more strongly emphasize military victims. The represen-tation of Israeli responsibility likewise tends to be pro-Israeli, but is also more critical of Israel. Class 4 thereby represents a frame that tries for balance (with a pro-Israeli tendency), on the Palestinian side emphasizes above all military, and on the Israeli side, above all civilian victims, and thereby deals with the responsibility of both sides more critically than does class 2.

The movement in the opposite direction in the victim representations of classes 2 and 4 is surprising in view of the massive bombardments of the Gaza Strip and the

high numbers of Palestinian civilian victims during the Gaza War. Generally, these results suggest that the overall reportage (i.e., on both conflict parties) was more critical during the Gaza War. The consequently also more strongly critical report-age on Israel could, however, – as found by Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) – thereby be counterbalanced, so that the emphasis in the Gaza War is no longer on Pales-tinian, but rather on Israeli civilian victims. Consequently, during the Gaza War in-dividual journalists may have attempted to respond with solidarizing reportage to increasing public criticism of Israel and the pressure for justification linked with it.

Tendencies over time: Classes 6 and 7

Class 6 (14.4%; cf. figure 12) is characterized by the fact that the reports are ex-clusively on the Second Intifada and thereby above all on the spiral of violence of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military operations. Thereby as a rule Israeli civilian victims are named. Relatively frequently there is a clear attribution of responsibility and generalization to the Palestinian side not only by journalists, but also by wit-nesses, frequently also only by one of the two authorities. The representation of Palestinian victimization either strives for balance or portrays the Palestinians as playthings of Israeli military power, whereby the question of Israeli responsibility is usually discussed in a way critical of Israel and often in a pro-Israeli manner. In summary, it is thus a matter with class 6 of a pro-Israeli frame that, however, also thematizes Palestinian victimization.

Figure 12: Distribution of the content analytical first-order latent classes within second-order latent class-es 6 and 7 (legend cf. figure 9, page 213)

Finally, class 7 (18.8%; cf. figure 12) has a reportage style that appears exclusively during the Gaza War and thereby usually represents a conflict dynamic character-ized by the suffering of the civilian population and the own victimization of both sides. Occasionally, mutual hostilities during ground offensives are also thema-tized, as well as Palestinian rocket and mortar shelling. Very often there is no or scarcely any thematization of Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility. When these topics are addressed, however, in comparison often military and, with

only less than average frequency, civilian Israeli victims are named, whereby at-tributions of responsibility are above all made by witnesses. Class 7 is the only class with the frequent occurrence of a representation striving for a balance of Pales-tinian victimization, emphasizing civilian victims, whereby in comparison civilian Palestinian victims are often humanized and/or individualized. Military victims are, however, only seldom emphasized. The representation of Israeli responsibility is largely critical of Israel or is sometimes also infrequently thematized – however, the representation is in comparison only rarely pro-Israeli. Thereby, class 7 can be evaluated as a pro-Palestinian frame that largely fades out Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility.

Summary and results of the second-order reportage styles

The short descriptions of the various second-order classes are represented in sum-mary form in table 10 and – insofar as possible – arranged in terms of content and chronology in accord with the above portrayal. This juxtaposition of the various frames allows an assessment of possible systematic variations and thereby of bias and its tendencies over time. In all, the distribution of the reportage styles from the Second Intifada to the Gaza War speaks for (1) an increasing pro-Palestinian bias (classes 6 and 7) alongside of (2) a simultaneous weakening of pro-Israeli biased reportage (classes 8 and 5) that (3) in the frames with a pro-Israeli ten-dency that try for balance (classes 2 and 4) are thereby counterbalanced, in that Israeli civilian victims are spotlighted in place of Palestinian civilian victims. The consistently pro-Palestinian frame (class 3; 11.4%), as well as the non-themati-zation (class 1; 16.4%), thereby undergo no change over time, but rather appear about equally often in both conflicts.

Second Intifada	Gaza War
Class 3 (11.4%): pro-Palestinian frame of Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibil-ity consistently faded out	
Class 6 (14.4%): pro-Israeli frame that, however, also thematizes Palestinian victim-ization	Class 7 (18.8%): pro-Palestinian frame that largely fades out Israeli victimization and Palestinian responsibility
Class 8 (7.12%): pro-Israeli Frame of Pales-tinian victimization and Israeli responsibility faded out or justified	Class 5 (7.48%): pro-Israeli frame that largely fades out Palestinian victimization and Israeli responsibility
Class 2 (13.2%): Frame that tries for bal-ance (with pro-Israeli tendency) that above all emphasizes on the Israeli side military, and on the Palestinian side above all civilian victimization	Class 4 (11.1%): Frame that tries for balance (with pro-Israeli tendency) that above all emphasizes on the Palestinian side military, and on the Israeli side above all civilian victim-ization, and thereby, however, deals critically with the responsibility of both sides as class 2
Class 1 (16.4%): No/hardly any reference to victimization and responsibility	

Table 10: Summary representation of the second-order reportage styles (frames) on victimization and responsibility during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War

4.5   Newspaper as covariate

In view of the quite clear positioning of the reportage for one of the conflict parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the question arises of whether the eight identified super-ordinate frames comprehend the overall reportage of the German quality press or are merely attributable to individual newspapers with extreme positions. Beyond this, it is of interest whether the newspapers only take a position on one of the two conflicts and report on it in a biased way.

To answer these questions, we can introduce the newspaper in which an article was published as a covariate and test the bivariate distribution of the frames (second-order latent classes) with this covariate for statistical independence, in order to determine whether the frequencies of occurrence of the individual frames differ only randomly or whether a systematic bias is present. In order to avoid any unnecessary oversimplification of the data, the following calculations are directly based on the membership probabilities of the latent class results. To test the hypotheses about the positions of the newspapers to one of the two conflicts, those frames that did not appear during the respective conflict were dropped. Since due to in part too low cell filling, the thus created contingency tables violated the preconditions for normal Pearson-χ^2 tests, the p-values were simulated by means of Monte Carlo procedures with 10,000 replications.

Thereby it appears that there is no connection between newspaper and frame (χ^2[df = 28; n = 396] = 33.31, p = .225). The newspapers thus do not differ in a statistically significant way with regard to the frequency with which they published articles interpreted in the sense of the frames. As well, there was no connection between the identified frames and the publishing newspaper, either during the Second Intifada (χ^2[n = 200] = 17.82, p = .362) or the Gaza War (χ^2[n = 196] = 21.27, p = .158).

That the here identified frames – and thereby the manifestations of bias – are used uniformly by all the newspapers of the German quality press suggests that they constitute simultaneously present phenomena and not specific partisan publication strategies on the part of individual papers.

5.   Summary and discussion

The goal of the present study was the identification and description of super-ordinate frames in the representations of victimization and the responsibility for it on the sides of the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this study, we used text material from Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) on the reportage of the daily German quality press during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War.

In regard to the overall distributions of the studied stylistic features it appears – not surprising since the same sample was used – as with Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10), that during both conflicts there were more reports on Palestinian victims. To supplement this, we can add, however, that this applies only for military, but not for

civilian Palestinian victims. At the same time, Palestinian actions are more often clearly identified as acts of violence.

A comparison of the overall distributions between the two conflicts permits the conclusion that – while the conflict parties do indeed differ in the manner of representation of victimization – the emphasis on victimization shifted in opposing directions between the conflicts and conflict parties: While in the Second Intifada Israel was above all portrayed in the victim role, in the Gaza War this holds for the Palestinians. With regard to the representation of responsibility for the victimization of the respective other side, the Palestinians are clearly represented as the aggressor during both conflicts, whereby this tendency is weaker during the Gaza War. Simultaneously, the emphasis on Israeli responsibility increased. In all, these results therefore speak for a reversal in the victim roles and a convergence in the perpetrator roles from the second Intifade to the Gaza War.

The results of the first-order LCAs permit a further differentiation of these conclusions: While reports on Israeli victimization express more empathy in general, and military victims are represented similarly to civilian victims, Palestinian victimization is more often thematized in a more differentiated manner, insofar as distinctions are, to be sure, made between civilian and military victims, but this is done in a manner that ranges from the emotional portrayal of individual fates to factual, matter-of-fact thematizations to the representation of Palestinian combatants as playthings of superior Israeli military power. In the framing of responsibility it appears that for the Israeli side the question of responsibility for the victimization of the other conflict party is either critically examined (but not in an anti-Israeli way) or relativized in a pro-Israeli way, while responsibility is always clearly assigned to the Palestinian side and only varies in the degree of vehemence with which, or respectively through which authorities (journalist and/or witnesses) this occurs.

In the sense of Entman's (1993) definition of framing as a function of salience and selection, in particular those content analytic first-order classes are of interest that use no, or hardly any stylistic characteristics to emphasize or suppress the salience of victimization or aspects of responsibility. Only in their interaction (second-order LCA) does it become clear that in most cases "remaining silent" can be regarded as partisanship. Thematically grouped according to conflict (Second Intifada vs. Gaza War) and bias tendency (pro-Israeli vs. pro-Palestinian), the distribution of reportage styles (second-order classes) from the Second Intifada to the Gaza War speaks: (1) for an increasingly pro-Palestinian bias (classes 6 and 7) with (2) a simultaneous reduction of pro-Israeli biased reportage (classes 8 and 5) that (3) is thereby counterbalanced in the frames that strive for balance with pro-Israeli tendencies (classes 2 and 4): Replacing Palestinian civilian victims, Israeli civilian victims are shifted into the foreground. Throughout the conflicts, the continuing pro-Palestinian frame (class 3; 11.4%), as well as the non-thematization of victimization and responsibility (class 1; 16.5%), undergo no change.

The examination of the publishing newspaper as a covariate showed that the distributions of the frames differ only randomly, not only across both conflicts, but

also within the two conflicts. In their reportage, all the newspapers employ all frames to the same extent: The here-identified forms of bias are therefore global phenomena of the German (print) media landscape. Therefore, the press is not to be judged as biased "in itself", and it can be maintained instead that individual articles clearly take sides and thereby follow the above formulated classes and trends.

This study confirms the chief results of Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) on escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented aspects of reportage: These authors also found a pro-Palestinian shift from the Second Intifada to the Gaza War that was, however, moderated by a counterbalancing pro-Israeli trend. In viewing the frequencies of the frames, this counter-steering with regard to the representations of victimiza-tion and responsibility does not compensate for the shift in victim roles and the convergence in the representation of the responsibility of the conflict parties. Thus, from the Second Intifada to the Gaza War, the media balance (if there ever was one) in the examined aspects shifted to Israel's disadvantage.

It is quite possible that these biased media frames, following the definition of Ste-venson & Greene (1980), merely reflect the respective particularities of the conflict parties. However, in their complex interaction with their recipients' mental models, these media frames could continue to have an influence through not only a "David versus Goliath", but also a "boomerang" effect. The noticeable unequal media treatment could evoke in recipients outrage at the Israeli employment of force that they feel to be disproportionate and thereby capable of being linked with anti-Se-mitic resentment.

Furthermore, Maurer & Kempf also found that there were no systematic differenc-es between the studied newspapers in the employment of escalation vs. de-esca-lation-oriented forms of representation. This is consistent with the present finding that the newspapers also largely agree with regard to their reportage on aspects of victimization and responsibility. Still not considered, however, is the seemingly most salient means of representation for print media: photographic images. Thus, as a function of selection and salience, the meaning content of texts on the same facts can vary considerably, and the visual contrasting or support of a newspaper article with photos should also exert a considerable influence on the effects of me-dia. Thereby the question arises of whether and how texts and images combine to form unified media frames or make competing interpretation and identification offerings to readers.

The first insights from a study of photographic illustrations of the parties to the Middle East conflict taken from a sub-sample of the newspaper articles used here (Hagemann 2011) suggest that the newspapers differ greatly in their visual rep-resentations of the conflict parties. Since not only for Maurer & Kempf, but also in the present study strong correspondences were found in the content of the textual aspects examined, yet the photographic Middle East reportage does not repeat these correspondences, so the meaning content of text frames is probably re-framed for readers by photos.

Future research should therefore take into account not only the textual, but also the visual characteristics of newspaper articles and examine their content congruence or discrepancy in order to add to our understanding of the increase in bias and changes of attitudes due to media representation.

A Palestinean state – yes or no?

Constructing political discourse in the Israeli print news media:

An experimental design

Samuel Peleg & Eitan Alimi

1. Framing: How to construct interests to realities

How do people make sense of political issues, or how do they interpret and analyze the myriad of concepts, ideas, dilemmas and disagreements, which compose the conundrum of politics? What are the tools, which enable people to assess and construe meaning and solutions to political puzzles, and consequently, to choose and to identify with an obtainable preference? Alternatively, who propagates and circulates political preferences to the public, and how does this promulgation process transpire? How does the public become aware of the political agenda and is he genuinely and fairly being informed as to all relevant disputes and controversies? These questions are not to be taken for granted. Despite the persistence and centrality of political beliefs in our daily lives, most of them are ambivalent and unclear to the extent that habitually we cannot positively and assertively adhere to any, nonetheless defending them in the quarrels expected to emanate from incompatible understandings and interpretations of a plural society.

The research concentrates on the structuring of comprehension and interpretations to political reality in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, focusing on one particular facet: the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. This question will serve us to examine the processes and dynamics of constructing a public and political discourse, as it is conveyed to and understood by the readers of the written media. The post-modern mass media has become the principal site for manipulating public opinion. Gurevitch & Levy (1985) claim that the preponderance media messages in society and the emerging influence of the media discourse on public priorities turn the public communication channels into a conniving battle ground. One of the major devices in the shaping and reshaping of opinions is the concept of *framing*. To frame a story means to formulate a narrative, explicitly or subtly, which suits the narrator's needs and interests. A frame is composed of a cognitive and an emotional dimensions, which relate to two main questions: how to think of an issue, and what to do about it (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). Our research examines frames that favor and disfavor the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. This is done by embedding the two opposing view-

points in a similar text of report on current developments in the subject. A third version of the same text is added which bears no predetermined frame. Each formulation will be read separately by different reading groupings. Similar ensuing questions will be asked of each group. The purpose of the investigation is to explore the relation between patterns of media frames (both the structural and the content dimensions) and the various ways in which the reading public asserts its comprehension and realization of the relevant topic.

In the next section we underline the main themes of our research: the construction of political discourse by elites; the framing of messages, and the quest for a winning formula, which can allure audience and enhance authority and power. Next, we systematically examine techniques of text manipulation to detect changes of interpretation and comprehension with readers. An elaborated research design of three different tests is used for that purpose. Finally, preliminary results of an initial small-scaled experiment (n = 26) are discussed as a precursor for a full-fledge study.

2.   Some guiding questions

Our initial assumption is, that whoever devises the public and political discourse and determines its direction, timing, rhetoric and repertoire of images and symbols, are the elites. The wider public is the attentive audience, the spectators or the readers (Peleg 2003). The Elites, or the designers of public opinion consist of the political decision makers, military commanders and experts, community leaders and social activists, business moguls and industrialists and media tone-setters. These rivaling groups are involved in flagrant wars of words on vying interpretations of reality and their transmission to the public (Lakoff 2000).

The contending views of the elites clash on the definitions of the issues at stake and on their relative importance. Each contender endeavors to create its own narrative in the most persuasive and coherent style to get the attention of the audience. The infiltration of a definition to the public discourse in line with the spirit and interest of a certain position demarcates an achievement to the belief and conviction of the winning elite. The interpretations that sustain the words battles become conspicuously prominent in the way ordinary citizens comprehend and discuss the issues of the hour. These explanations are transferred from the elites to the public through framing. The more the frames are simple, concise and effective the more capable they are of being immersed in the public discourse. If the frames are carefully selected to resonate with existing cultural and social norms, it would facilitate their assimilation in public usage even further (Snow et al. 1986, Gamson & Lasch 1983).

The intriguing question that arises from the aforementioned assumption is whether a winning formula exists. Put it differently, what should be the characteristics of a frame that could capture readers' attention and direct their judgments and attitudes? This question takes us back to the issue of how does a frame work, and in

what ways does it align intentions of leaders with comprehensions by recipients. If indeed, a frame is a narrative that structures and links events, occurrences, and developments into a coherent and consistent storyline (Tversky & Kahenman 1981, Kinder & Sanders 1996), what would then constitutes a good story? What would constitute an intriguing narrative? The bulk of research on this topic tended to concentrate on the competence (or incompetence) of the narrator (Nelson & Kinder 1996), or on the forms of linkage and types of communication between speakers and listeners (Mandelberg 1997). Seldom, however, attention was given to listeners, viewers, and readers – to their set of interpretations and understandings. What would make a story interesting and appealing for readers? What would make readers adopt a story, using it as a cognitive mechanism for organizing their experience and making sense of their environment?

These sorts of questions shift our attention to the realm of cognitive psychology. More specifically, they focus on mechanisms of interpretation and comprehension by which readers handle information and massages. The research leads to operational questions such as how do these mechanisms operate; what generates a deeper level of comprehension; which texts, whether written or transmitted, would be better absorbed, and which emphases would be embraced and which deserted. The inquiry can be farther expanded towards the writers and disseminators, trying to detect rules of a more comprehended text. Furthermore, it can be asked to what extent is it possible to accommodate a massage to the needs, ambitions and general mood of an audience in order to harness readers to the political objectives of the writers? Here, the important issues of mobilization and consensus building become relevant by highlighting possible linkages between leaders and adherents. The interaction between elites and rank and file can be translated in two opposite directions: maintaining order and social control or challenging it. However, in each case, mobilizing people and rallying them around shared frames and understandings is crucial.

3.   The context: For and against a Palestinian state

Kinder and Berinsky (1999) combined two research directions in cognitive psychology to create an original framework to assess the comprehension level of readers and the extent of influence framing has on interpreting text. The first direction is taken from a series of studies on jury deliberations and how the decision on guilt or acquittal is arrived at (Pennington & Hastie 1988, 1992). Their research clearly indicated two manners (or two frames) by which the findings and the evidence were presented to the members of the jury: in the order the defense and prosecution counselors presented the case according to their respective witnesses (the witness order), and in the order of temporal and causal events to create a linear and coherent story ('the story order'). The former adheres to trial management, considerations of jurisprudence and action-reaction dynamics between legal counselors of the rivaling parties. The latter aligns with the consistent logic of a narrative and the rationale of a storytelling. The conclusions of the research were un-

equivocal: members of the jury thought they had understood the case better, and cast their ballot accordingly, when they were exposed to the chronological account rather than the witness account. The consistency of the narrative, the coverage of all details and the logical unfolding of events from beginning to end, have convinced them that their decision was right.

The second line of inquiry also emphasized the idea that comprehension of a text increases if the story is told in a coherent and sensible way. Walter Kintsch's work (1998) concentrates on written articles and how their modification augments comprehension of the messages the writers are interested in propagating. Kintsch discerns two ways in which text can be manipulated: a micro-structure and a macro-structure. The first is a change *within* the text, as for example, the difference in meaning that might emerge from reading "the IDF has entered the Cassbah of Nablus tonight" as opposed to reading "the IDF has entered the Cassbah of Nablus, the hub of terrorist activities, tonight". The second is a change *of* the text, a re-organization of paragraphs, division to sections, adding titles or captions, emphasizing or de-emphasizing certain portions of the wording. A dry and laconic story on a nightly raid in Nablus would win over readers less than a piece embellished with the title "the Cassbah of Nablus has been purified of terrorists". Such a positive framing to the military action is bound to elicit supportive comments of readers. Similarly, a critical frame to the same news would be transferred to the readers by a title like "Innocent civilians were killed tonight at the Cassbah of Nablus". This authentic information would appear in the positive formulation as well, albeit in a much humble, inconspicuous way.

These two mentioned studies underlined some of the readers' preferences: they tend to look for motivations and reasons and link them with outcomes. Thus they establish linearity and a story flow that elucidate its moral. Additionally, readers like to hear or read texts that support or enhance already existing, but not fully ascertained, beliefs and attitudes. Readers find it difficult to grapple with radical or ambivalent texts, which cause disorientation and undermine preconceived notions. The designers of frames are fully aware of this. They cultivate familiar cultural and moral beliefs and they nurture the cause-effect nexus in their messages.

The fusion of the two psychological works was our point of departure. We wanted to explore how newspaper readers in Israel make sense of what they read. We want to check how framing affects comprehension and what are the characteristics of a successful frame. We think that an effective way to detect and analyze changes in perception of texts is by experimentation. We intend to identify variations in appreciation of content by using experimental and control groups. Participants of each group will be given identical texts formulated in dissimilar, even opposing, frames. Our topic of choice is highly relevant and significant: the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. Our choice relies on three grounds: a) the bearing of the issue particularly in the aftermath of the fall of Husseinite Iraq and the regional political developments expected to emerge from this significant change of power; b) the durability of the issue as one of the most salient bones of contention in the Middle East conflict; and c) the existence of entrenched emotions and views

among most readers regarding that dilemma. These advantages carry a certain caveat as well: the ingrained opinions might contaminate our findings, especially of the third test, due to the inability to distinguish between a preconceived notion and a newly acquired notion from a given text. We will attend to this dilemma in our conclusion. In any case, the centrality of the Palestinian State idea among Israelis sustained the causal link between cause and effect, both among exponents and opponents of the idea, which was propitious to our cause.

Two frames, a positive and a negative approach to the possibility of a free Palestinian state, are examined. The experimental groups will read the framed texts, while a control group will be exposed to the same news report but in a conventional news format, i.e., a frameless text[1]. This narrative is reminiscent of the witness order of Pennington and Hastie: a storyline, which does not insist on linear logic and a cause-effect scenario. Our initial assumption is that readers exposed to the frame favoring a Palestinian state will understand and interpret the issue in that vein, whereas those who received the opposite frame will grasp the same information in quite the contrary fashion. Ultimately, we surmise, comprehension hinges upon the writers' vantage point and their talent to sway the readers. The control group, we assume, is supposed to be averagely split between exponents and opponents. The principle of unity in material and information for each group must be diligently kept in order to avoid the attribution of variance to structural dissimilarities.

The favorable frame for a Palestinian state (hereunder- *pro-state*) will attempt to promote its narrative in support of a political process by emphases and nuances underscoring legitimacy, trust and empathy toward the Palestinian side. For instance, paying attention to the formal title of Abu Maazen, the Palestinian Prime Minister, to bestow on him the same grandeur Sharon and Bush enjoy; preceding the Israeli response with the Palestinian one, in order to give it more weight, and highlighting the constructive dimension in Abu Maazen's words by a selective subtitle. The hostile, or suspicious frame (hereunder- *anti-state*), will encourage in its text the opposite feelings: mistrust, de-legitimacy and apprehension of political developments. Therefore, this version will omit Abu-Maazen's formal title; no direct expressions of the Palestinian leader will be cited only indirect impression of his words in order to minimize any affinity to him; the Palestinian comment will come only after the Israeli one and a subtitle will underline its destructive and threatening face. The word Palestinians will appear as Philistines in the negative text to remind readers of the old Biblical foe of the Israelites. The *pro-state* text will emphasize the advantages of an independent state, while the risks will be scattered and absorbed all over the article until they lose their logic and lucidity. The *anti-state* text will do the same, only conversely (cf. appendix, p. 244).

---

1 Some claim (among them, one of the authors of this paper), that there are no frameless texts at all and that every text conceals normative messages on behalf of the writer's beliefs. This is a legitimate claim, however, the distinction here pertains to structured and systematic manipulation of texts, which are geared at the overt and explicit persuasion of the reader in a specific ideological direction. This is not the case of an essay whereby the author's opinion is subtly and mistakenly sneaked in.

The three groups of readers will consist of students, about 40 to 50 in each group. The student population has some merits: a) facing the budget limitations, our ability as university lecturers to reach potential participants in a most efficient and parsimonious way; b) most students experience a stage in life, in which their worldview is not quite cemented, and thus, they are relatively open to the type of manipulation we want to test; c) contrary to other groups, students tend to talk politics (Gamson 1992) more frequently and can be more comfortably identified as an attentive crowd in line with Russell Dalton (1988), and finally, d) the students' population can be defined as pluralistic and as including members of all sections of society[2]. All respondents will be briefed together on the objectives of the experiment. We will describe our intention as attempting to observe the influence of a pertinent political news item on political interest and the propensity to political activism. Then, they will be randomly assigned to their reading groups, and each one will fill out a personal details form such as gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideological and political affiliation and the extent of interest and awareness of political issues[3] (cf. Peleg & Alimi 2005, 15ff.). After consolidating the three groups, they will be given the three prospective formulations of the same news item. Every participant is allowed only one thorough reading. Upon completion of the reading, respondents will be tested along three dimensions of comprehension: memory, categorization and meaning (Kinder & Berinsky 1999). The three tests, or assignments, are the following:

1. *Memory:* In this first test, the short-term memory of the readers is examined. Respondents are asked to list ten items (in words or sentences) from the material they just read. They are asked to *cite* exactly as was written in order to impose a unified and solid criterion on the validity of items mentioned. The assumption guiding this test is that memory will be aided and enhanced by framing. Thus, it is expected that readers of the manipulated texts will remember items more vividly than those who dealt with the non-treated material, and that the items memorized will be those in tune with the prevailing frame. That is, the readers of the *pro-state* frame will remember items acknowledging the state while those in the opposite group will recall items admonishing it.

2. *Categorization:* This is a more profound test of our attempt to discover how text is comprehended. Beyond the immediate process of the short-term memory, participants will be requested to aggregate the items they managed to recollect into groups and categories. Here, in addition to instant memory, respondents need to engage in identification, characterization and classification processes. Assuming that indeed, structured text influence comprehen-

---

2   These would be college students, whereby the political and socio-economic profile of the students tends to be more balanced and more reflective of the general Israeli population than university students (cf. Peleg & Alimi 2005, 15 for a description of distributions).

3   The purpose of this questionnaire is twofold: first, we are interested in the demographic information about respondents; second, we are interested in their opinion on sociopolitical matters. The first purpose will supply us with a cross-sectional sample and help us determine how representative our group. The second purpose will give us insight on positions and opinions regarding current affairs, in which we intend to make use later when we measure change.

sion, this test will help indicating how framing influence associations, labeling and organization.

3. *Meaning:* The final test investigates the implication of each item in the eyes of the readers. After the classification procedure, we will use a questionnaire in which each respondent will be asked to assign meaning and significance to what they managed to remember and categorize. They will have to attribute both descriptive and normative meaning to each item (what it is and what it should be), and how can this meaning be realized (Snow & Benford 1988, Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

Figure 1 illustrates the experimental design:

Figure 1: The experimental design

We started up with a trial run of 26 respondents. We wanted to verify the reliability and validity of the framed texts, as well as the three assignments. We also sought to assess whether the handling of the text was too crude and thus, easily traced by readers. Lastly, we wanted to ascertain whether the questionnaires really gauge what they are supposed to and that the variance in response is due to differences

of interpretation and understanding and not due to the ambiguity of the questions (Polit 1996)[4]. Two statistical software are used to process the data obtained: SPSS and ANTHROPAC. The latter is useful for classification of the research participants according to the ways they categorize the various information items provided by us during the second phase of the measurement – the categorization test.[5] The preliminary findings are introduced at the end of each test. But due to the modest sample of the initial experiment, we point out early suppositions with humble regard of statistical significance.

4.   Processing and analyzing the data

The Recall Test – comprises of those text items participants were asked to provide (a maximum of 10). We intended to code those items according to the various texts read by the different groups (pro-state, anti-state, neutral) together with the specific text items a given participant recalled. In addition to counting the text items each participant recalled, we payed careful attention to those items coded as pro-Palestinian state, anti-Palestinian state, and neutral, as can be seen in table 1.

Participant No.	Participant group affiliation	Pro-state	Neutral	Anti-state	Total items recalled
Participant 1	Group 1	5 (0.5)	1 (0.1)	4 (0.4)	10
Participant 2	Group 3	2 (0.25)	5 (0.63)	1 (0.12)	8
Participant 3	Group 2	4 (0.66)	2 (0.33)	0 (0)	6
Participant 4	Group 3	0 (0)	7 (0.77)	2 (0.22)	9

* Values in parentheses represent the relative weight of recalled items
   (e.g. 4 out of 6 equals to 0.66)

Table 1: Coding of items recalled

Two closely related questions come to mind. The first and more general question is whether those who were exposed to a thematically structured text would indeed recall more items than those exposed to episodically structured text. Concomitantly, we ask whether those participants exposed to a *pro-Palestinian-state* text would recall more items coded as *pro-state* than participants exposed to the other two types of text.

---

4   We used two different reliability tests: the Cronbach α at 0.70 and the Guttman Split-Half method at 0.61.
5   ANTHROPAC is designed for data collection and analysis. It allows the use of both qualitative and quantitative data and the performance of descriptive and inferential statistics such as pile-sorting and cluster analysis.

In order to answer these questions, we calculated the relative weight for the number of answers each participant gave within a given category. For example, the first participant in the above figure provided five out of ten items coded as *pro-state* for which the relative weight is 0.5. We follow the same calculation for the other participants within each category. The final product constituted three scales, one for each category, ranging from 0.0 (zero items recalled) to 1.0 (ten items recalled in a given category). Next, we performed several one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) for testing statistically significant variance among the readers of the various types of text (our independent variable, namely, the frame in each text) pertaining to the scale mean calculated for each category in the dependent variable, that is, participants' ability to recall and comprehend the items.

The more general question of whether or not readers of a thematically structured text recalled more items than recalled by readers in a non-structured text is addressed by an analysis of variance as well. This time the dependent variable is not a calculated mean scale for a given text type from the relative weights, rather it is the sum of items participants recalled (the last column in table 1). As such, this scale will range from zero (no item) to ten (ten items recalled). Here too, we tested for significant difference among participants from the various groups and sum of items they recalled.

Preliminary findings: Inspecting the findings from a bi-variate distribution and the three analyses of variance reveals interesting patterns.[6] Our first question: whether those participants who read a thematic text would recall more items than those who read structured text – receive a clear-cut answer. Participants who were exposed to the latter recalled more items than those who were exposed to a non-structured text. Strikingly, despite the small sample, the differences between the group means turned out to be statistically significant at the level of 95% (f = 4.26; df = 2; p = .02). An illustration of this pattern is seen in figure 2.

Our second question, whether participants who read a specific text recalled more items pertaining to their version than participants who read the two other texts. As can be seen in table 2, summarizing the results from the analysis of variance performed for each of the three items scale, while it is possible to detect a crude pattern, it is less obvious compared to the first question. Recall that each items scale ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, calculated by the relative weight of the number of items coded as, for example, anti-state of the total items recalled for a given participant.

---

6   Prior to the actual coding of the items recalled we carefully went over various possibilities and decided whether they would be coded as *pro-state*, *anti-state* or neutral. Whenever we confronted a lack of agreement over the actual coding of a specific recalled item we used the textual context as the criterion upon which a decision was reached at. Lastly, a given item was counted only when it had been recalled in high level of accuracy. For example, we counted "road map plan" (originally "road map") yet rejected "occupation is undesired ... future generations" (originally "it is not right for Israel to maintain the occupation over three and a half millions Palestinians".

A Pro-state   B Anti-state   C Non-framed

Figure 2: Group affiliation and total items recalled

Group	Pro-state scale mean /ANOVA 1	Anti-state scale mean /ANOVA 2	Neutral scale mean /ANOVA 3
Pro-state	.36	.23	.39
Anti-state	.26	.33	.39
Neutral	.49	.18	.31
F	2.57	2.60	.49
Sig.	.09	.09	.61
LSD*	Neutral and anti-state – p < .05	Neutral and anti-state – p < .05	

* LSD is considered as a fairly liberal POST HOC test. A larger sample size would necessitate a more conservative test such as Tukey.

Table 2: Groups by scale means

Again, while the difference among the group means is not statistically significant, an interesting pattern seems to surface nonetheless. Whereas the *pro-state* mean is higher than the *anti-state* mean in the case of participants from the *pro-state* group, the neutral scale mean is higher than both, which seems to contradict our expectation that participants who read the episodic text would receive a lower scale mean compared with participants who were exposed to thematic text. Comparing across the columns, it seems that this pattern is consistent. A simple explanation to this pattern is that neutrality over the issue of a Palestinian state in

the context of the Israeli society is far from being the case; it is almost unrealistic to expect Israeli citizens to be indifferent to such an issue. The fact the neutral scale mean is the lowest across the three groups coupled with the fact no POST HOC test came out statistically significant, strengthens our proposed explanation. For our purpose, the difference between participants who read the two thematic texts is indicative. Clearly, participants who read a *pro-state* text recalled more pro-state items, and participants who read *anti-state* text recalled more anti-state items. The difference between within group variance and between groups variance is less distinct in the case of participants who read a neutral text.

4.1 The categorization test

In the ultimate experiment, the gathered data from the categorization test will be analyzed using ANTHROPAC. The categorization test asks the participants to classify information items provided by us, according to various categories. There are no predetermined categories. Rather, the participants put together categories of items associated together according to their own independent judgment. The test is designed to examine the extent of similarity and/or lack of similarity among the clusters constructed by participants in the three separate groups. We ask whether it is possible to detect similar patterns of cluster construction among participants within a given group, and are these patterns distinctively differ from those made by participants from the other groups. Our hypothesis claimed that if readers of the same group similarly categorize disparate items together in a significantly different manner than other groups, it was owing to the framed text they read.

The analysis requires the organization of data in their respective categories. This method of classification is done using a co-occurrence matrix (Coxson 1999). A co-occurrence matrix reflects myriad of items combination possibilities based on the memory of each participant. A particular informative item is represented by the intersection of column and row in a symmetrical matrix. Whenever an informative item in a given column and an informative item in a given row were put into the same category, the intersection (a cell in the matrix) is marked "1". If the same two informative items are not part of a category the cell in the matrix is marked as "0". For example, if a given participant chose to associate together "terrorist acts" (item 1) and "existential threat" (item 2) in the same category, yet "economic growth" (item 3) in a different category, the intersection cell of item 1 and item 2 will get "1", and "0" in the intersection cell of item 1 and item 3.

The patterns of categories construction by the participants are read gradually and cumulatively into the matrix, where each cell contains the mode of intersection occurrences of the various informative items. In a situation where all participants, say, from the *anti-state* group associated "terrorist acts" with "existential threat" together while none associated "terrorist acts" with "economic growth", we would get thirty co-occurrences in the intersection cell for "terrorist acts" and "existential threat" as is the number of participants in the group. We would get, however, "0"

in the intersection cell for "terrorist acts" with "economic growth", as not one participant in the group associated the two items. Table 2 illustrates this process.

	Terrorist acts	Existential threat	Economic growth	Military collaboration
Terrorist acts				0
Existential threat	1/1/1/1/1/…30			1
Economic growth	0			0/1
Military collaboration				

Table 3: Co-occurrences matrix

Three matrices were constructed, one for each group. Each contains the different classifications conducted by all participants in a given group as they are aggregated to form the total classifications for the group. Each cell in the matrix represented the mode- the numbers of occurrences two informative items were associated together in the same category.

The analysis of the matrices will be conducted using additional two statistical procedures: Cluster Analysis (CA) and Multi Dimensional Scaling (MDS). CA inductively detects groupings of cases in the data, in our case groupings among informative items. MDS adds to this process by locating every item on a multi dimensional space, thereby allowing additional visualization of the categorization patterns. Of the various groupings, formation of clusters, methods in CA we will use Hierarchical Clustering which is appropriate for analyzing category classifications (Coxon 1999) as is the case here. In this method, clustering begins by finding the closest pair of cases according to a distance measure and combines them to form a cluster. The algorithm continues one-step at a time, joining pairs of cases, pairs of clusters, or a case with a cluster, until all the data are in one cluster. The clustering steps are displayed in an icicle plot or tree (dendrogram). The method is hierarchical because once two clusters are joined, they remain together until the final step.[7]

Finally, we intend to examine the total categorizations conducted by participants in each group (a MDS for each matrix) and accumulated into the co-occurrences matrix, while trying to detect meaningful and discernable dimensions in the way informative items are scattered over a space. The idea is that these dimensions will be useful in reflecting the similarity and dissimilarity (the distance) observed among the categorized informative items. MDS organizes data in a pre-specified number of dimensions, three in our case, in an attempt to examine the extent to which distances between items can be reproduced within a given configuration formed. Similar to CA, MDS uses algorithm for assessing possible configurations

---

7   Several techniques in hierarchical method exist, which differ in the calculation of the distance between each pair of cases and/or clusters. The convention, which we plan to follow, is to use at least two techniques for minimizing the possible influence of a given technique on the final clustering.

such that the configuration that better reflects the gathering of data is chosen. In other words, the more discernable dimensions gleaned from the scattered data better the fit between the configuration and the observed distances is.

Preliminary findings: Due to the small sample, we conducted only the manual run of the co-occurrence matrices. Respondents were given 15 items from all versions of the text. We counted how many times pro, anti and neutral items were batched together. Then we inspected the various combinations made by each group. We hypothesized that among the *pro-state* readers more combinations of items favoring this condition would be found, while hybrids of pro and anti items lumped together, would be rare. We expected an opposite trend with the *anti-state* readers. The matrices created 105 cells (15 cells at the horizontal axis times 15 cells at the vertical axis divided by two due to the symmetry and subtracting the 15 cells in which each item crosses with itself), where each cell holds the choices of each member in a group. The multiplication of the cell number with the readers number supplies the general number of entries in each matrix. Within this general figure the anti-anti, pro-pro, neutral-pro, neutral-anti and neutral-neutral cells can be identified (cf. Peleg & Alimi 2005, 18). Out of the 26 readers, eight were *pro-state*, nine were *anti-state* and nine read a frame-less piece. Of the fifteen items supplied to them, nine were defined as pro-items, four as anti-items and two neutral. In the combinations analysis some interesting patterns were detected:

In the *pro-state* group a full consensus was formed only once, when all eight members matched the item "improving the Israeli economy" with "progress in the political process". Despite the internal logic this nexus presents, in the neutral group only five members (55%) put them together, while in the *anti-state* group only four (44%). Thus, it is probable that the structured framing favoring a Palestinian State influenced the pro-sate readers in their categorization routine more than those who weren't exposed to the same version of the text.

On the other side of the combinations spectrum, there were nine cells in both framed text groups, with the value zero. In other words, nine potential combinations of items were not paired by anyone. However, there was a difference: while in the *pro-state* group six of these cases (66%) were pro and anti items meetings and the other three diffused among the rest of the potential options, among the *anti-state* readers the zero-cases were divided equally between anti-pro meetings and the other matching possibilities. The consistency revealed in the categorization of the *pro-state* readers is evident relative to their counterparts. Among the no-frame readers thirteen zero-cases were detected, whereby ten cases (77%) were pro-anti combinations. It is likely that they were more restrained in classifying items due to the lack of guiding framing in their text. On the other hand, the same absence of directives might have enabled more flexibility of interpretation because among the no-frame readers the number of cells in which most respondents (five to seven) matched items together is twice as high as in the two framed-text groups. Whereas in the neutral group twenty cells received the value of 1(for positive matching) from the majority of the group, only ten cells of the *pro-state* and eleven cells of the *anti-state* gathered similar support. This finding demonstrates

the limited leeway the structured text readers have had trying to understand the meaning of the items. They were categorizing items in a more concise and concentrated fashion while the no-frame text readers were more experimental and speculative in their ordering.

One result that does not support our assumption is disclosed in the *anti-state* matrix. Out of 54 possible cases of anti-anti pairing, a match we assumed would be solidly identified by readers of text offending a Palestinian State, only ten cases were marked as 1, that is, a mere 18.5% of that group referred anti-state items to the same category. By comparison, in the *pro-state* group, out of the 288 cases (36 cells X 8 participants), in 114 of them (39.5%) pro items were arranged together. This disparity might stem from the different interpretation the *anti-state* readers gave to some of their items. As described in Peleg & Alimi (2005, 18), some of the items given to respondents might be perceived as ambivalent. It is plausible that owing to the negative perspective in the *anti-state* text, some of the items were understood by readers of that group in an adverse way to what we had intended. For example, the item "freeze on settlements", mentioned in the text with regard to the conditions of advancing the peace process, and thus, emphasized by us as a pro-state item, might be perceived in a text hostile to withdrawal as having a negative and menacing meaning, hence consequently marked as an anti item. Selecting the items in this test becomes, therefore, a highly responsible task.

4.2 The meaning test

The third test is the test of meaning, or the test of the ultimate comprehension. At this stage we handed out another questionnaire, in which respondents were asked how they understood and analyzed the significance and relevance of each remembered item, both descriptively and normatively, and how was it possible to realize this meaning. Each question in the questionnaire is a research variable, and the statistical procedures to be implemented hinge upon the measurement level. Following this logic, cross-tabulation is used to investigate the relation between various meanings assigned to each question and the affiliation to a particular reading group. This statistical technique allows us, for example, to examine the affinity between the meaning allotted to the variable "the importance of reciprocity in the negotiations with the Palestinians" and the belonging to a specific group, for instance the *pro-state* group: How was the answer affected by the exclusive material that group was appointed to read. Such patterns of association may be analyzed according to the socio-demographic data we obtained in a preliminary questionnaire. Thus, it can be asked whether the relation discovered between the meaning given to, for example, the variable "economic growth as a result of an independent Palestinian state" and a reader of a certain framed text is due to the respondent's area of residence or her involvement in politics. Finally, we used appropriate association tests and criteria to measure the statistical significance of our initial assumption, that framing in and of a text influences the comprehension of the material.

Preliminary findings: What was the meaning attached by participants from the various groups to the multiple statements/questions? Is it possible to detect discernable patterns regarding the relationship between the participant's group and the level of importance granted to a statement such as "A Palestinian territorial continuity is not an existential threat to Israel"? As can be seen in figure 3, a general pattern in support of our hypothesis surfaced. It seems that while the majority of participants who read a *pro-state* text are divided between "approval" and "approval/disapproval" of such a statement, among those participants who read an *anti-state* text the category "disapproval" dominates.

A Pro-state   B Anti-state   C Non-framed

Figure 3: Level of territorial continuity threat to Israel by group affiliation

Examining the relationship between group affiliation and level of agreement with the statement "U.S. Involvement is Detrimental to the Resolution of the Conflict" produced less clear-cut findings. Whereas the *pro-state* text portrayed the U.S. administration involvement in a more positive manner and as crucial to the implementation of the Road Map, the *anti-state* text emphasized the U.S. administration in general and President Bush's lack of genuine interest and commitment to the situation in the region. The neutral text provided an informative coverage pertaining to the U.S. involvement.

Evidently, and as hypothesized, readers of the neutral text were the only ones who "approve/disapprove" with the statement; unexpectedly they are also the only ones who "strongly approve" of the statement that U.S. involvement is detrimental to resolution of the conflict. Such a mixed pattern surfaced with readers of the *pro-state* text as well. It seems that *pro-state* readers dominate in both "strongly disapprove" category (as expected) and, unexpectedly, "approve" category. It is possible to argue that such a mixed pattern can be representing of the lack of a

straightforward U.S. policy in regard to involvement in the conflict and, arguably, a widespread notion held by many Israelis that U.S. involvement is not necessarily beneficial to promoting a resolution to the conflict.

A Pro-state   B Anti-state   C Non-framed

Figure 4: Detrimental U.S. involvement by group affiliation

Finally, for capturing the general pattern of the relationship between group affiliation and the meaning attached to the ten statements all together we structured an index. The index represents a continuum ranging from "complete agreement" (designated by 10 – *pro-state* text) to "complete disagreement" (designated by 50 – *anti-state* text). Table 4 presents the descriptive findings of the ANOVA used for testing the possibility of a discernable difference between participants' group affiliation and their index's grades.

	N	Mean	Std deviation	Std error	95% Confidence intervall for mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower bound	Upper bound		
Pro-state	8	23.63	4.207	1.487	20.11	27.14	16	28
Anti-state	9	25.56	5.028	1.676	21.69	29.42	19	33
Non-framed	9	30.00	4.444	1.481	26.58	33.42	24	39
Total	26	26.50	5.171	1.014	24.41	28.59	16	39

Assignment index: Low = pro / high = anti

Table 4: Group affiliation by index's characteristics

Comparing between the mean values of *pro-state* and *anti-state* readers, it seems

that readers of a *pro-state* text would tend to attach higher importance to the various statements, hence the relatively closer mean value to 10 (23.6) than readers of the *anti-state* text (25.5). This result is further strengthened by the minimum and maximum values range for each group: *pro-state* readers do not exceed 30 (16-28) whereas *anti-state* readers are relatively closer to the "complete disagreement" pole (19-33). We do not see these results as fully supporting our hypothesis regarding a far more distinct differentiation between readers of the structured texts. A developing pattern, however, exists, as is demonstrated also by the index grade of readers of the non-structured text, which is congruent with our hypothesis.

5. Conclusions

Our point of departure has been the communication between the disseminators of political messages and their audiences. Political mobilization and activism necessitate a meaningful interaction between leaders and led. This contact is enhanced and secured once elites guarantee that their messages are appropriately understood by followers. Our research offers an experimental model to answer two questions: 1) How is a political text comprehended by a target audience, and how, as a result of such understanding, readers make sense of their environment? And 2) Who disseminates the messages and how do political alternatives conveyed to the readers? How is the public informed of the political agenda and is he equally and fairly updated regarding possible solutions? Is there a winning formula, capable of capturing the public's attention and manipulate its conception and knowledge? If there is one, what are its characteristics? The connection between the message sender and receiver brings out the notion of framing and the way it unites the intentions of the leader and the needs and conclusions of the adherent. The model is realized through framing notions and interpretations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more specifically, the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. We asked the research participants to express their opinion regarding such a state. We were measuring the association between their responses and the material they read. We wanted to find out to what extent their opinion was shaped by the frames concealed in the text.

Several conclusions and lessons emerge from our preliminary experiment and three tests:

1. In the first test, the memory test, we assumed that the readers who were exposed to a structured text would recall more items than those who read unstructured text. Moreover, we hypothesized that the type of items recalled would be stipulated by the kind of group they were assigned to (*pro-state* members remembering *pro-state* items and so forth). The results show that, indeed, there is a significant variance between the groups in the amount of items recalled, and that the framed-text groups remembered more. The nature of items recalled also confirmed with the different versions of texts, but to a lesser extent.

2. In the second test, the categorization test, we surmised that similar patterns of categorization might be found among members of certain groups, and that these patterns would be significantly different from other groups. The results prove us right, though to a milder extent than expected. Each of the structured text groups indeed emphasized its respective items but there were some items that were evenly classified by both teams. This is attributed to items, which might have been interpreted as either *pro-* or *anti-state*. In any case, the framed text groups were more assertive and clear in their matching than the non-framed text readers. The latter, as we suspected, classified their items randomly and unguided.

3. In the meaning test we attempted to detect an association between the meaning readers assigned to statements and the version of text they read. For example, we assumed that a statement such as "A Palestinian territorial continuity is not an existential threat to Israel" would be strongly objected by the anti-state group. This assumption gains some support, albeit not as decisive as we had expected. Along a general index of agreement or no agreement with the assertions, the distinction between the no-frame text readers to the framed text readers was more noticed than in between the two opposing framed texts.

In summation, our research uses the challenge of an independent Palestinian state to find out to what degree the opinion building process can be swayed or meddled with when inculcating texts with conscious and intentional frames. As we plan to expand the scope of this research, our attention is focused on three points: 1) Items selected for categorization must be unambiguous and clear-cut. 2) A change of topic might be considered. Comprehension might be affected by the acuteness and prevalence of a subject. In our study, the existence of a Palestinian State is critical in the minds of many Israelis. Thus, their opinion might have been forged by prior notion rather than framing. A less vulnerable topic may be more constructive. 3) Finally, an accurate prediction of opinion change is difficult to obtain in a single reading session. A more reliable expectation of opinion changing might be based on several rounds of exposure to texts and repeated testing. This type of panel research may give more validity to our preliminary findings.

This research might have long-range implications beyond indicating the nexus between manipulating a text and the comprehension of its readers. The suggestions and conclusions elaborated here can be incorporated into a broader research agenda, which deals with issues such as: authority and legitimacy (how do leaders lead, why do adherents follow?), recruitment and mobilization (how to animate and stimulate crowds?), political activism (how to elicit loyalty, commitment and willing to sacrifice?), propaganda and incitement (how to sway opinions and positions?), and from there, to even larger scaled explorations into the political, psychological and structural dimensions of regimes, political parties and social movements. If, indeed, this heuristic project holds the genetic code of understanding these central phenomena, then the road ahead is long and onerous but duly invigorating as well.

Appendix: Three versions of text

THE GOVERNMENT RATIFIED THE ROAD MAP: AGREED TO THE ESTAB-LISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

Nathan Guttman & Arnon Regular

Version 1: The non-framed text

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will meet the Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas to discuss the implementation of the first phase of the Road Map, which means a principled Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian State and the freezing of all Jewish settlements.

The government ratified the Road Map yesterday with a 12 to 7 majority. Four ministers abstained. Against the Road Map were ministers Landau, Katz and Scheransky and all the NRP and National Unity ministers. Netanyahu, Livnat, Naveh and Hanegbi abstained.

Before the vote Sharon said: A Palestinian State is not my life dream, but looking ahead, it is not right for Israel to rule three and a half million Palestinians. As one who knows every mountain and hill, I am familiar with the ideology, but we must seek a solution for future generations.

Sharon clarified in the outset of the deliberations, that lasted six hours, that the fourteen reservations Israel submitted to the American administration are 'red-lines' in realizing the plan. He added that as we progress in the political path, the economic situation would improve.

Abu Maazen's reacted: "the ratification of the Road Map is an important and positive first step but the real test is the implementation of the entire plan. The Israeli reservations are not part of the Map and therefore, irrelevant to its implementation. In addition, they are unacceptable to the Palestinians.

The American administration praised the Israeli decision. The spokesperson of President bush, who vacationed in his Texas ranch, said that this was an important move forward. The spokesperson added that "they were expecting to work with all parties in the region to realize the vision of peace President bush presented in his June 24 speech".

Version 2: The pro-state text

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will meet Abu-Maazen, the Palestinian Prime Minister to discuss the implementation of the first phase of the Road Map, which means a principled Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian State and the freezing of all Jewish settlements.

Big majority in the Government
The government ratified the Road Map yesterday with a 12 to 7 majority. Four ministers abstained. Against the Road Map were ministers Landau, Katz and Scheransky and all the NRP and National Unity ministers. Netanyahu, Livnat, Naveh and Hanegbi abstained.

Abu Maazen: The Ratification- An Important First Step
Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Maazen's reacted: "the ratification of the Road Map is an important and positive first step but the real test is the implementation of the entire plan. The

Israeli reservations are not part of the Map and therefore, irrelevant to its implementation. In addition, they are unacceptable to the Palestinians.

Sharon: A Solution for Future Generations
Before the vote Sharon said: A Palestinian State is not my life dream, but looking ahead, it is not right for Israel to rule three and a half million Palestinians. As one who knows every mountain and hill, I am familiar with the ideology, but we must seek a solution for future generations. Sharon clarified in the outset of the deliberations, that lasted six hours, that the fourteen reservations Israel submitted to the American administration are 'red-lines' in realizing the plan. He added that as we progress in the political path, the economic situation would improve.

President Bush Praised the Decision
The American administration praised the Israeli decision. The spokesperson of President bush, who vacationed in his Texas ranch, said that this was an important move forward. The spokesperson added that "they were expecting to work with all parties in the region to realize the vision of peace President bush presented in his June 24 speech".

Version 3: The anti-state text

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will meet Abu Maazen the Palestinian Prime Minister, to discuss the implementation of the first phase of the Road Map, which means an Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian State and the freezing of settlements.

Almost Half the Government did not Support the Decision
The government ratified the Road Map yesterday with a 12 to 7 majority. Four ministers abstained. Against the Road Map were ministers Landau, Katz and Scheransky and all the NRP and National Unity ministers. Netanyahu, Livnat, Naveh and Hanegbi abstained.

Sharon: Not My Life Dream
Before the vote Sharon said: A Palestinian State is not my life dream, but looking ahead, it is not right for Israel to rule three and a half million Palestinians. As one who knows every mountain and hill, I am familiar with the ideology, but we must seek a solution for future generations. Sharon clarified in the outset of the deliberations, that lasted six hours, that the fourteen reservations Israel submitted to the American administration are 'red-lines' in realizing the plan. He added that as we progress in the political path, the economic situation would improve.

Abu Maazen: Israel's Reservations Irrelevant
Abu Maazen said that the ratification of the Road Map is an important and positive first step but the real test is the implementation of the entire plan. He added that the Israeli reservations are not part of the Map and therefore, irrelevant to its implementation. In addition, they were unacceptable to the Palestinians.

President Bush Vacationing In Texas
The American administration praised the Israeli decision. The spokesperson of President bush, who vacationed in his Texas ranch, said that this was an important move forward. The spokesperson added that they were expecting to work with all parties in the region to realize the vision of peace President bush presented in his June 24 speech.

The impact of political news on German students' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

That the media are capable of influencing public opinion was recognized very early in media history, and the history of propaganda is as old as the history of the press. Nonetheless, there is still no agreement as to whether or not media can exert influence, and if they can, in what ways.

While early empirical studies attributed great influencing power to the media (Lasswell 1927), later studies portrayed the media as exerting little influence on recipients' views (Klapper 1960). In the meantime, a consensus has arisen that mass media and their audiences interactively affect each other in a wide variety of ways (Früh & Schönbach 1982). After more than seventy years of media effects research, there is a strong trend to not attribute media effects solely to the facts reported in the media, but rather to assume that there are various ways that media can influence public social constructions of reality (Berger & Luckmann 1969). In this process, media serve not only as mediators, but also as constructors of social realities (Tuchman 1978, Cohen & Wolfsfeld 1993). News reports merely provide raw material for recipients' reality constructions. Presented in de- and re-contextualized form, they reflect the reporters' reality constructions. Through cognitive processing by recipients, these constructions are then integrated into recipients' subjective realities. To maintain their cognitive balance (Heider 1946, 1958; Festinger 1957), people accept parts of offered reality constructions, while they discount, suppress and/or reject others. With regard to conflict coverage, this process is affected by a number of interrelated factors.

1.1 Level of conflict escalation

One of these factors is the level of conflict escalation, which progresses from self-centered divergence of perspectives via competition to struggle and climaxes in open warfare (Glasl 1992). Inter-group conflict strengthens intra-group solidarity. Group members can thereby hope to increase their social status by taking a strong stance in opposing the enemy. Group members tend to identify more strongly with

their own group and its positions, and the more escalated the conflict, the more strongly they do so.

Thus Blake & Mouton (1961, 1962) already showed that group competition encourages increased solidarity within groups, greater group identification and a shift toward conflict-oriented leadership. At the same time, competition encourages people to increasingly see the other group as unlike themselves and stimulates an increase in blanket negative judgments of the others. Where group competition is high, negotiations to resolve conflict are characterized by (1) a tendency to overrate proposals by one's own group and to reject those of the opponent, (2) a tendency to mutual misunderstandings, whereby shared values are ignored and differences overemphasized, (3) a tendency to focus more on gaining advantages than on making progress toward agreement, so that negotiating partners who display a willingness to compromise are treated as disloyal, and inflexible negotiating partners are admired as brilliant statesmen, (4) a tendency to discount neutral third parties whose recommendations would not benefit one's group, as well as (5) a tendency to frequently block negotiations instead of trying to develop proposals satisfactory to both sides. In experimental psychological negotiation research these findings have very frequently been confirmed, fine-tuned and differentiated.

Conflict parties tend toward the mistaken assumption that their interests are incompatible with their opponents' (Thompson & Hastie 1990, Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Negative framing of a conflict situation reduces the willingness of conflict parties to compromise (Bazerman et al. 1985, Bottom & Studt 1993, Lim & Carnevale 1995, De Dreu & McCusker 1997, Olekalns 1997), and because conflict parties are obsessed with their relative gains and losses, they pass up opportunities to end their conflict to the advantage of both sides (Bazerman et al. 1985, Thompson & Hastie 1990, Thompson & DeHarpport 1994, Fukuno & Ohbuchi 1997).

Conflict parties tend to overestimate the probability of their winning a conflict settlement more favorable to themselves (Bazerman & Neale 1982, Kramer et al. 1993, Lim 1997, Bazerman et al. 1999) and are likely to persist in following a confrontational conflict strategy even when a cooperative strategy would be more advantageous to both sides (Bazerman & Neale 1983, Bizman & Hoffman 1993, Keltner & Robinson 1993, Bazerman 1998, Diekmann et al. 1999). The opponent's perspective is typically disregarded (Samuelson & Bazerman 1985, Bazerman & Carrol 1987, Carrol et al. 1988, Valley et al. 1998) and his concessions minimized (Ross & Stillinger 1991, Curhan et al. 1998).

Facts that strengthen one's own position are usually the ones remembered more vividly (Thompson & Loewenstein 1992), and ethical standards for the evaluation of conflict behavior are subordinated to group interests (Messick & Sentis 1979, Babcock & Olson 1992, De Dreu 1996, Dieckmann 1997, Diekmann et al. 1997). Conflict parties often consider themselves as more just than the other side (Tenbrunsel 1998) and defend the use of unethical tactics as necessitated by the threat to their very survival (Shapiro 1991).

They tend to overestimate their own success chances and attribute any failures to the opponent's unfairness (Kramer 1994). Ideological differences are overestimated, and the opponent's views are perceived as more extreme than they really are (Robinson & Keltner 1997). Even the mere attempt to reach a negotiated settlement is rejected as unethical as soon as hallowed values seem threatened (Tetlock et al. 1996).

Asymmetric conceptualizations of a conflict situation begin to coalesce after even just a little interaction (Thompson & Hastie 1990, Pinkley 1990, Messick 1999) in a collective script with interlocking roles (Pruitt & Carnevale 1993), and this creates a social reality that seemingly confirms conflict parties' expectations. Conflict parties treat their assessment of the opponent as obviously true, and opponents' reactions seem to confirm this.

1.2 Mental models and societal beliefs

Although rarely mentioned in the most recent negotiation research, a theoretical perspective that can integrate these findings was already offered by Deutsch (1973). Based on his understanding that people do not react to the (objective) properties of things in their environment *per se*, but rather to the (subjective) meanings they attribute to them (Blumer 1973), Deutsch saw that conflict escalation and the accompanying group processes are not inevitable, but rather result from the cognitive-emotional framework within which conflict is interpreted. According to Deutsch's theory, which has gained great influence in the field of conflict management (cf. Fisher & Brown 1989, Glasl 1992), conflict is open to interpretation as either a competitive or a cooperative process, depending on whether it is respectively framed within a win-lose or a win-win model. Although Deutsch himself doesn't yet use the term *mental model*, he regards this interpretive framework and the resulting misperceptions as the motors of conflict escalation and de-escalation.

Combining Deutsch's theoretical approach with Glasl's escalation model (1992), Kempf (1996, 2002a) has developed a typology of mental conflict models which describes them in terms of the dimensions of (a) the conceptualization of conflict as a win-win, win-lose or lose-lose process, (b) the assessment of parties' rights and aims, (c) the evaluation of their actions and behavior, and (d) the emotional consequences of these interpretations, which ultimately transform outrage at war into outrage at the enemy.

Translating this typology into content analytical methodologies (Kempf et al. 1996, Bläsi et al. 2004), Kempf's cognitive escalation/de-escalation model has been confirmed by numerous cross-national studies of media coverage during the Gulf War (Kempf & Reimann 2002), the post-Yugoslavian civil wars (Bosnia, Kosovo and the aftermath) (Kempf 2002b, Sabellek 2001; Jaeger & Möckel 2004, Annabring & Jaeger 2005a, Bläsi et al. 2005), German-French relations after World War II (Jaeger 2005b) and the German-French conflict over the presidency of the European Cen-

tral Bank (Plontz 2006). Based on these findings, finally, the influence of escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented media frames on recipients' assessments of reported events has been investigated in experimental studies by Annabring et al. (2005), Kempf (2005), Schaefer (2006) and Spohrs (2006).

Summarizing the results, it can be said that (a) journalists tend to frame conflict reports using the same types of mental models that predominate in the respective society and/or conform with its political agenda. (b) Journalists adapt the mental models with which they interpret conflict to changing political conditions and, in turn, (c) the escalation vs. de-escalation oriented framing of conflict coverage affects the public assessment of conflict in the same direction.

According to Entman's (1993, 52) definition: "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". When it comes to framing effects, however, the literature portrays a rather complex range of possibilities (cf. Tuchman 1978, Entman 1993, Nelson et al. 1997, Scheufele 1999 Druckman 2001a). Although there is still disagreement on the precise action mechanisms, and although conceptual differences make it hard to achieve a unified theory, a few main tendencies can nevertheless be identified. Not everyone reacts to a given frame in the same way, and the offered frames are not simply adopted by recipients, but rather are judged in terms of their presuppositions, the perceived trustworthiness of the source and/or the availability of alternative frames.

With respect to conflict coverage, it can also be assumed that the effects of news and its framing depend on audience involvement in a conflict, which will be greater the more the public is outraged by enemy atrocities and the more it feels committed to one of the conflict parties in historical, political and cultural terms. The more it feels affected, the more an audience will tend to identify with one of the parties, and the more it will tend to interpret the conflict according to the mental model accepted by the party it favors.

According to Bar-Tal (1996), it is especially likely that in long-term, intractable conflicts such mental models will harden into *societal beliefs* shared by (nearly) all members of a society, become part of the society's ethos and contribute to society members' sense of identity. Intractable conflicts impose heavy burdens, cause great psychological and social stress, and are painful, exhausting and costly, in both human and material terms. They force society to develop psychological mechanisms to facilitate successful coping, and societal beliefs fulfill an important role in creating these mechanisms.

Since they are both part of a society's ethos and a crucial factor in enduring the burdens of war, they tend to persist in post-war society, and, moreover, the transition from war to peace arouses increased feelings of insecurity in a new situation to which society members have not yet adjusted.

Although in wartime countries try to create and maintain these beliefs by means of propaganda, they are not just an ideology imposed on society members by outsiders or their political leaders, nor do they merely result from deceptive propaganda. They arise from a long history of experiences with conflict events at a high level of escalation and constitute themselves as a generalized interpretation of these events. Once such beliefs have emerged in a society, they provide a framework that literally interprets every interaction with the opponent as still another episode in a grand historical drama where the "good" struggle against the forces of "evil". And once a conflict event has been interpreted in this way, it seemingly confirms the very stereotypes and prejudices that initially created this interpretation.

The influence exerted by media coverage, in general (hypothesis 1), and media frames, in particular (hypothesis 2), on the public's assessment of conflict can therefore be expected to be weaker the more the public has committed itself and the more societal beliefs have hardened.

The effects of political news and its framing are not the same for all recipients (hypothesis 3), however, but can be expected to correlate with recipients' political views, their political knowledge, etc. (hypotheses 4a-d).

If the effects of news coverage arise from an interpretive process where recipients integrate information into their mental model of a respective topic, it can be further expected that their a priori mental models will be even more powerful predictors (hypothesis 5).

We regard mental models as complex networks of elements balanced somewhat like iron filings in a magnetic field. Any change in the position of one of the elements will upset the balance, unless there are compensatory changes in the positions of all other elements. Consequently, it can be assumed that information integrated into recipients' mental models not only affects their assessments of issues directly relevant to the information, but also their assessments of other issues related only via the structure of the model (hypothesis 6).

2. Method

2.1 Experimental design

This paper describes a pilot study for a forthcoming cross-cultural project based on the design of an experiment by Peleg & Alimi (chapter 12). They showed that pro- vs. anti-Palestinian state framing of a news article about the Knesset's approval of the Road Map influenced Israeli students' assessments of whether or not they saw Palestinian territorial continuity as a threat to Israel. While the majority of participants who read a *pro-state* text were divided between "approval" and "approval/disapproval" of a statement claiming that continuity was non-threatening, the category "disapproval" dominated among participants who had read an *anti-state* text.

Adopting the experimental design used by Peleg & Alimi, the experiment was structured in three phases:

1. Pre-test
2. Reading the text
3. Post-test

The pre-test consisted of two questionnaires:

1.1 A general questionnaire requesting information such as the participants' age, gender, citizenship and religion, as well as their political orientation and personal views, etc.
1.2 An attitude scale asking for the participants' assessments of issues like whether the right of return was the crucial hurdle in resolving the conflict, or whether a comprehensive solution was preferable to an interim solution, etc.

The text material consisted of three different versions of the same news article.

2.1 A non-framed (neutral) report about the Knesset's approval of the Road Map.
2.2 A (pro-state) version of the same text framed by a headline and subheadings that underlined those contents of the following paragraphs, which argued for establishing a Palestinian state.
2.3 An (anti-state) version of the same text framed by a headline and subheadings that underlined those contents of the following paragraphs, which argued against establishing a Palestinian state.

The post-test consisted of four instruments.

3.1 A memory test which asked the participants to repeat as literally as possible what they remembered from the text they had read.
3.2 A categorization test asking the participants to group a number of issues mentioned in the text into meaningful categories.
3.3 A text assessment questionnaire asking the participants to indicate whether the events were reported accurately, etc.
3.4 An attitude scale asking for the participants' assessments of issues like whether a moratorium on founding new settlements would improve the prospects for further negotiations and whether the vision of peace was realistic, etc.

The text material and most of the pre- and post-test instruments were the same as in the Israeli study and are documented in Peleg & Alimi (2005). The general pre-test questionnaire was adapted to the German situation, and the post-test text-assessment questionnaire, which dates back to a study by Bläsi et al. (2005), was not included in the original experiment.

2.2 Hypotheses

The aim of the study was to investigate the influence of the experimental proce-

dure on German readers' assessments of the conflict and to test the following hypotheses:

1. The influence of a report about the Knesset's approval of the Road Map on Israeli participants' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will also be found in a German sample.
2. The influence exerted by different media frames on Israeli participants' assessments of the conflict will also be found in a German sample.
3. The influence of the reports will not be uniform.
4. The influence will depend on inter-subject factors such as:
   a. participants' political orientations with respect to foreign policy (left vs. right),
   b. participants' personal views in general (liberal vs. conservative),
   c. the relevance participants think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have for German foreign policy,
   d. participants' self-estimated knowledge of the conflict,
5. but participants' a priori mental models, into which reported information is integrated, will be even more powerful predictors.
6. The reports will affect more than just assessments of issues directly touched on by the information.

2.3 Operationalizations

In order to test how the experimental procedure affected participants' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the present paper focuses on two issues. The first issue – whether Palestinian territorial continuity threatens Israel – is more or less directly relevant to the Road Map: For the Knesset to approve a peace plan leading to the creation of a Palestinian state, the threat must be calculable. In contrast, the second issue – whether or not the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is religious – is not directly relevant to approval of the Road Map, but is linked to it only via the structures of the recipients' mental models, which may foresee better or worse chances of achieving a political settlement of the conflict.

These two issues were included in both the pre-test and the post-test attitude scales and thus allow a direct measurement of the influence exerted by the experimental procedures on participants' assessments. The exact wording of the respective statements in the two questionnaires is shown in table 1.

	Pre-test	Post-test
Religious conflict	The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is religious in essence	In essence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about religious issues
No threat to Israel	Palestinian territorial continuity is not a threat to Israel	A continuous Palestinian territory is no essential threat to Israel

Table 1: Wording of the analyzed items

Two other statements, included only in the pre-test attitude scale, were used as indicators for the participants' *a priori* mental models:

1.   The conflict can only be resolved by a political settlement, and
2.   Palestinians are incapable of managing their own affairs.

These statements are far from sufficient to enable us to reconstruct participants' mental models in detail. Nevertheless, they at least suggest whether or not participants frame the conflict with a de-escalation oriented model (political settlement needed and Palestinians as possible partners in this process).

Each of the above statements was to be evaluated on a 5-point scale with the categories "agree", "rather agree", "undecided", "rather disagree" and "disagree". Since some participants did not respond to the items, a sixth response category, "no answer", was added.

2.4 Statistical methods

In order to test our hypotheses, both classical statistical methods and latent class analysis (LCA) were applied to the participants' responses to the respective items of the pre- and post-test questionnaires.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested with a t-test for repeated measurement and Analyses of Variance, with the experimental factors *pre-post* and *text version* and the responses to the *religious conflict* and *no threat* statements used as dependent variables. For these analyses, the "no-answer" responses were treated as "undecided", producing a five-point scale with the endpoints "agree" and "disagree".

Hypothesis 3 was tested by entering the pre- and post-test responses to the *religious conflict* and *no threat* statements into a LCA, thus identifying different types of change between the pre- and post-test assessments of these issues.

Hypotheses 4a-d were tested using contingency analysis, relating these types of change to the respective questions from the general questionnaire. As well, the questions were correlated with the direction of pre-post change in agreement with the *religious conflict* and *no threat* statements (0 = change towards disagreement, 1 = no change, 2 = change towards agreement).

Hypothesis 5 was tested by classifying the participants' a priori mental models with an LCA of the responses to the *political settlement* and *Palestinians incapable* items and relating the resulting classes via contingency analysis to the types and direction of pre-post change.

In the LCAs, the "no answer" responses were treated as a response category of its own, and – due to the rather small size of our sample – model selection was based on the AIC Index rather than using BIC or CAIC, which are suitable for large samples only, where AIC bears the risk of choosing over-parameterized models.

2.5 Complexity of the experimental procedure

The remaining items included in the attitude scales were not used as data for the present study, but mainly served to conceal the fact that the participants had to respond twice (during pre- and during post-test) to the same (*religious conflict* and *no threat*) statements.

Moreover, these items and the other instruments not used as data stimulated participants to think in various ways about the information presented in the text and to integrate it into their mental models. Already during the pre-test they had to respond to questions about their political and personal views, about their position regarding Israel and about their understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After reading the texts, they had to recollect and recontextualize the information, evaluate its quality, and again give some indication of their understanding of the conflict. All these activities stimulated the integration of the information into the participants' mental models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and may have influenced how and to what extent they did so.

Consequently, we were measuring not just the influence of the texts and their framing, but also the influence of a complex process of coming to terms with how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be understood.

3.   Results

3.1 Sample characteristics

The experiment was conducted between February 15 and December 6, 2005. The study participants were 227 students from the University of Konstanz who were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions.

The students' ages ranged between 18 and 47 years (M = 23.03; SD = 4.95). They had been enrolled for between 1 and 14 semesters (M = 3.11; SD = 2.97). 70.5% were female; 29.1% male; 0.4% did not specify. 89.4% were German citizens; 8.8% other nationality, 1.8% did not specify. 40.5% were Catholic; 30.4% Protestant; 4.0% other; 22.5% no religion; 1.8% did not specify. 79.3% were psychology students; 19.8% other; 0.9% did not specify.

The majority of the participants described their personal views as in general liberal (14.1%) or rather liberal (55.1%), and their political orientation with respect to foreign policy as located in a range between left (5.3%), rather left (35.9%) and moderate (34.2%), 13.7% felt indifferent to foreign policy.

95.6% had never visited Israel or the Palestinian territories, and the majority of the participants described their knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as moderate (32.5%) or limited (36.8%).

Not surprisingly, several of the students had never heard of "Eretz Israel" before and didn't understand the term, which is rarely used in German discourse. The

students' general political knowledge seemed rather limited, as several also admitted to being unfamiliar with the term "interim solution". Nonetheless, the majority of the students affirmed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have moderate (53.4%), high (27.4%) or even very high (5.65) relevance for German foreign policy.

During the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to the experimental groups, and the comparison of the participants' pre-test responses to the variables "Religious conflict" (F = 0.518, df = 2, p = 0.597) and "No threat to Israel" (F = 0.086, df = 2, p = 0.918) confirmed that there were no significant *a priori* differences between the experimental groups with respect to the participants' assessments of these issues (cf. table 2).

Pre-test responses					
Text framing		Religious conflict		No threat to Israel	
	n	M	SD	M	SD
Neutral	77	1.73	1.108	1.81	0.932
Pro-state	75	1.60	1.053	1.80	0.944
Anti-state	75	1.56	1.017	1.75	1.001
Total	227	1.63	1.058	1.78	0.956

Table 2: *A priori* differences between the experimental groups

3.2 Over-all influence of the experimental procedures

In order to form an initial picture of the influence exerted by the experimental procedures on participants' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the pre- and post-test scores on the two items were compared. The results showed that:

- participants' agreement with interpreting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as essentially religious declined significantly (t = -3.599, df = 226, p < 0.001), and
- participants' agreement with the *no threat* statement significantly increased (t = 4.101, df = 226, p < 0.001)

after reading the text about the Knesset's approval of the Road Map (cf. table 3). Hypotheses 1 and 6 were thus confirmed.

		Religious conflict		No threat to Israel	
	n	M	SD	M	SD
Pre-test	227	1.63	1.058	1.78	0.956
Post-test	227	1.81	1.124	1.56	0.964

Table 3: Mean differences between pre- and post-test scores

3.3 Framing effects

In contrast to the Israeli study (Peleg & Alimi, 2005), which demonstrated a clear effect of text frames on participants' attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such an effect was not found among the German students.

Differences between pre- and post-test responses					
Text framing	n	Religious conflic		No threat to Israel	
		M	SD	M	SD
Neutral	77	-0.18	0.790	0.36	0.826
Pro-state	75	-0.15	0.672	0.15	0.849
Anti-state	75	-0.20	0.753	0.17	0.844
Total	227	-0.18	0.738	0.23	0.842

Table 4: Differences between the experimental groups

There were no significant differences between the experimental groups with respect to how they changed their response to the two items from pre- to post-test (*Religious conflict:* F = 0.101, df = 2, p = 0.904; *No threat:* F = 1.515, df = 2, p = 0.222) (cf. table 4). Accordingly, hypothesis 2 must be rejected.

Relating this result to those reported in sections 3.1 and 3.2, we can thus conclude that there is a significant main effect between pre- and post-test, but neither a significant main effect of the text version nor a significant interaction between the two experimental factors. This conclusion is also confirmed by two-way ANOVA (cf. table 5).

Factor	Religious conflict			No threat		
	F	df	p	F	df	p
Pre-Post	11.173	1	p = 0.001	22,006	1	p < 0.001
Text version	0.691	2	p = 0.502	0.152	2	p = 0.859
Interaction	0.252	2	p = 0.777	0.559	2	p = 0.211

Table 5: Two-way analysis of variance

3.4 Types of response patterns

Since it cannot be assumed that the experimental procedure affected all participants in the same linear way, LCA was used to analyze the participants' response patterns in a more detailed way. According to the AIC criterion, this analysis made possible the identification of five latent classes or types of response patterns (cf. table 6) which correlate with the participants' (self-estimated) knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (χ^2 = 22.94, df = 12, p < 0.05) (cf. figure 1). Both hy-

potheses 3 and 4d are thus confirmed. The mean membership probability with which the participants could be assigned to the latent classes was p = 0.91.

Number of classes	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC
1	-1324.09	20	2688.18
2	-1240.98	41	2563.97
3	-1193.03	62	2510.07
4	-1167.94	83	2501.87
5	-1139.17	104	2486.33
6	-1121.16	125	2492.32

Table 6: Goodness-of-fit statistics for the latent class models

Figure 1: Class sizes within knowledge groups

Figure 2: Frequency of "no answer" responses

Describing the classes in terms of their (mean) response tendencies and the ambivalence of the responses (standard deviations), we observe that *type 2* (27.3% of the Ss) and *type 5* (8.6%) tend to disagree *a priori* with the religious character of the conflict and to see no threat in Palestinian territorial continuity. After reading the texts, both these tendencies were strengthened (cf. figure 3).

Figure 3: Mean and standard deviation of the latent distributions of type 2 and type 5

- Type 5, which is over-represented among participants who estimated their knowledge as moderate, however, is *a priori* more ambivalent about both issues than type 2, which is over-represented among those participants who estimated their knowledge as limited.
- Although this ambivalence declined after reading the texts, type 5 also remained *a posteriori* ambivalent about the *no threat* issue.

Type 1 (28.6%) and *type 4* (16.8%) both tend to agree *a priori* with the religious character of the conflict (cf. figure 4).

Figure 4: Mean and standard deviation of the latent distributions of type 1 and type 4

- While for type 4 this tendency declines after reading the texts, this is not the case for type 1, which is over-represented among the participants who estimated their knowledge as very limited or didn't answer the question at all.
- Moreover, type 1 shows a weak *a priori* tendency to disagree with the no threat claim, whereas this is not the case with type 4, which is over-represented among those participants who estimated their knowledge as moderate. Although type 4 is *a priori* more ambivalent about this issue, it clearly tends to agree with it.
- While type 1 becomes more undecided and ambivalent about this issue *a posteriori*, type 4 increases its tendency to see no threat and becomes less ambivalent about it.

Type 3 (18.7%), finally, is over-represented among those participants who didn't answer the question on their knowledge about the conflict and also shows a high frequency of "no answer" responses on the *religious conflict* and *no threat* issues (cf. figure 2). While this type shows some tendency to interpret the conflict as religious, it is undecided about the *no threat* issue (cf. figure 5).

Figure 5: Mean and standard deviation of the latent distribution of type 3

- *A posteriori*, the frequency of "no answer" responses declines on both issues, and the tendency to interpret the conflict as religious also declines.
- With respect to the *no threat* issue, however, this type – which is the least ambivalent about both issues during pre- and post-tests – remains as undecided as before.

Summarizing these results, we may conclude that reading texts about the approval of the Road Map influenced not only participants' response tendencies, but also the ambivalence of their responses. Moreover, not all types shifted towards interpreting the essence of the conflict as less religious and Palestinian territorial continuity as less threatening to Israel.

- Type 1 did *not* reduce its tendency to interpret the conflict as religious, and
- Type 3 did *not* shift towards more support for the *no threat* statement, but instead remained as undecided as before.

Relating these types of response patterns to the experimental groups did not demonstrate a significant correlation between the participants' class membership and the experimental groups to which they belonged, however (χ^2 = 8.98; df = 8, p > 0.25). Hypothesis 2, therefore, must also be rejected on the basis of this more detailed analysis: text frames affected neither the pre-post differences among participants' responses, nor the various classes into which they could be grouped according to their response patterns.

3.5 Effects of inter-subject factors

Moreover, membership in the various classes is also independent of the participants' estimates:

- of their political orientation with respect to foreign policy (grouped into "left or rather left", "in-between", "right or rather right" and "indifferent or no answer": χ^2 = 22.82, df = 24, p > 0.5),
- of their personal views (grouped into "liberal", "rather liberal", "neither liberal nor conservative" and "rather conservative, conservative or no answer": χ^2= 7.55, df = 20, p > 0.99), and
- of the relevance they think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have for German foreign policy (grouped into "very high or high", "medium" and "low, very low or no answer": χ^2 = 22.71, df = 20, p > 0.25).

Hypotheses 4a-c, therefore, must be rejected.

3.6 Grouping of participants with respect to their mental models

Latent class analysis of the responses to the pre-test *political settlement* and *Palestinians incapable* items produced three latent classes (cf. table 7), two of which indicate that the participants framed the conflict with a de-escalation oriented mental model. The mean membership probability with which the participants could be assigned to the latent classes was p = 83.

Number of classes	ln(L)	n(P)	AIC
1	-612.53	10	1245.07
2	-588.21	21	1218.41
3	-576.80	32	1217.61

Table 7: Goodness-of-fit statistics for the latent class models

Class 1 (62.05%) and class 2 (33.34%) tend to agree that conflict resolution can come about only via political settlement and to disagree with the Palestinians' inability to manage their own affairs (cf. figure 6).

- While class 1 is relatively more uncertain about the need for a political settlement, however,

- Class 2 is more uncertain about Palestinian (in)ability.

Class 3, finally, is a very small class of participants (4.61%) who obviously lack a stable mental model with which to interpret the conflict.

- Many of the participants in this class leave the respective questions unanswered (cf. figure 7),
- and the rest are undecided about the need for a political settlement and extremely undecided about Palestinian (in)ability (cf. figure 6).

Figure 6: Mean and standard deviation of the latent distributions

Figure 7: Frequency of "no answer" responses

3.7 Influence of mental models on pre-post response patterns

Cross-tabulating these classes with the types of pre-post response patterns identified in section 3.4 revealed a significant correlation ($\chi^2 = 16.757$; df = 4, p = 0.002) (cf. figure 8). Since the number of participants in class 3 was too small, however, the Pearson χ^2-statistic was only computed for the first two classes (n = 217).

- The response pattern which strengthened tendencies to both interpret the conflict as *non*-religious and Palestinian territorial continuity as *not* threatening (type 2) was over-represented among participants who interpreted the conflict within a de-escalation oriented mental model (class 1 and class 2).
- Among these, the response pattern which strengthened its tendency to interpret the conflict as *not* religious but stayed ambivalent about the *no threat* issue (type 5) was over-represented among participants more undecided about Palestinian (in)ability (class 2), whereas
- the response pattern which did not reduce the religious interpretation of the conflict and became undecided and more ambivalent about the *no threat* issue during the post-test (type 1) was over-represented among those participants who were more ambivalent about the need for a political settlement (class 1), and
- the response pattern which reduced its acceptance of the religious interpretation of the conflict and strengthened its tendency to see no threat (type 4) was over-represented among those participants who were relatively less undecided about the need for a political settlement (class 2).
- The response pattern that gave many "no answer" responses and was undecided about the threat during both pre- and post-test (type 3), finally, was over-represented among the participants lacking a stable mental model with which to interpret the conflict (class 3).

Figure 8: Response types within classes

3.8 Influence of mental models on the direction of pre-post change

Cross-tabulating the mental models with the direction of pre-post change produced significant results only for the religious interpretation of the conflict ($\chi^2 = 17.46$, df = 4, $p < 0.005$) (cf. figure 9).

- While the majority of the participants who framed the conflict within a de-escalation oriented model didn't change their assessment of this issue (class

2: 67.7%; class 1: 64.7%), or changed it towards *less* religious (class 2: 25.4%; class 1: 24.2%),
- the effect was quite the opposite with participants who lacked a stable mental model (class 3). While only 32.2% of these participants didn't change their assessments, 52.3% shifted towards *more* religious.

Figure 9: Change of religious interpretation within classes

Examining the participants' post-test interpretation of this issue (cf. figure 10), however, shows that this was mainly a shift from (rather) religious towards undecided or no answer (67.6%). During the pre-test, 73.8% of the participants lacking a stable mental model had (rather) disagreed with the religious interpretation of the conflict. Now they became confused about this issue as well.

Figure 10: Post-test religious interpretation within classes

With respect to the perceived threat, there was no significant correlation between pre-post change and the participants' mental models ($\chi^2 = 8.91$, df = 4, p > 0.05).

Wilhelm Kempf

3.9 Influence of inter-subject factors on the direction of pre-post change

Correlating the direction of change with the participants' political orientation toward foreign policy, their personal views in general, the relevance they think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have for German foreign policy and their self-estimated knowledge of the conflict produced no significant results for either the *religious conflict* or the *no threat* issues (cf. table 8). Hypotheses 4a–d can thus be rejected.

	Political orientation	Personal views	Relevance	Knowledge
Religious conflict	r = -0.051 p = 0.443	r = -0.041 p = 0.535	r = 0.116 p = 0.082	r = 0.070 p = 0.293
No threat	r = 0.006 p = 0,930	r = -0.019 p = 0.777	r = -0.019 p = 0.777	r = 0.041 p = 0.537

Table 8: Correlation of the direction of pre-post change with the inter-subject factors

Relating these results to those in sections 3.7 and 3.8, we conclude that hypothesis 5 is confirmed with respect to the participants' response patterns, but only partially confirmed with respect to the direction of pre-post change.

4. Discussion

Because it repeated an experiment whose design and instruments were not open for modification and used as subjects German students, who are traditionally rather peace-oriented and similar in their political views, the limitations of the present pilot study cannot be ignored. In particular the assessment of the participants' a priori mental models by means of only two items can create doubts about the reliability of the results. Due to the reasonably high membership probabilities with which the participants could be assigned to the latent classes, these doubts can be dispelled, however.

Moreover, since the data from the Israeli study were not available to the author, this is not a cross-cultural study in the true sense of the word, and the possibilities for cross-cultural comparison are limited to comparing the results with the earlier work by Peleg & Alimi (chapter 12). Nonetheless, the results confirmed some of our theoretical assumptions and suggested a number of further hypotheses which should be addressed in the forthcoming project.

1. The results confirm the hypotheses that if participants read texts and integrate the presented information into their mental models, this will affect (hypothesis 1) their assessment of both issues directly touched on by the information presented in the texts (*no threat*) and issues related to it only via the structure of the participants' mental models (*religious conflict*) (hypothesis 6).

2. As expected, this effect is not uniform (hypothesis 3), but depends on the participants' a priori mental models, which, therefore, prove to be more powerful predictors of how participants change their assessments than inter-subject variables such as their political orientation, personal views, relevance attribution and knowledge of the conflict (hypothesis 5).
3. Participants' political orientations, their personal views and the relevance they think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should have for German foreign policy did not prove useful as predictors (lack of support for hypotheses 4a-c), but this may be due to the relative homogeneity of the sample with respect to these variables.
4. With respect to the participants' (self-estimated) knowledge of the conflict (hypothesis 4d), the results are not unequivocal. Nonetheless, knowledge of the conflict seems to be a crucial factor in determining whether or not participants have a mental model of the conflict.
5. In contrast to the Israeli study by Peleg & Alimi (chapter 12), the present study failed to demonstrate any effect of text framing, however (lack of support for hypothesis 3).

There may be various reasons for the differences. One might be that the text framing was too weak. The texts themselves were neutral and (nearly) identical. Only the headlines and subheadings anticipated some of the information in the following paragraphs and thus underlined its relevance.

But if the framing was too weak, how could Peleg & Alimi have demonstrated framing effects using the same material we used in the present study? One possible explanation is that the participants in our study – mainly psychology students – had too little political knowledge, both in general and about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

The previous state of research on the links between political sophistication and susceptibility to being influenced by media frames is, however, complex. While some studies find that less well-informed participants are more strongly influenced by media frames (e.g., Haider-Markel & Jocelyn 2002, Haack 2007a), others reach the opposite conclusion (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997).

Another possibility might be that – in contrast to Peleg & Alimi, who worked with Israeli students – our participants were too remote from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their mental models of the conflict were therefore less flexible. This explanation would be in accordance with a finding of Bläsi et al. (2005) that presumably less personally involved German and Greek journalists modified the mental models with which they interpreted the conflicts in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević much less than did Serbian journalists.

If this explains why we failed to demonstrate framing effects in the present study, we will have to reconsider our basic theoretical assumptions, drawing on the work of Bar-Tal (1998). Instead of postulating a linear negative relationship between the degree of involvement and the flexibility of the mental models with which conflict is interpreted, we would have to assume that the relationship is non-linear,

with the highest degree of flexibility among moderately involved subjects. There would be less flexibility when the subject is disinterested or when involvement is high.

This explanation is not very plausible, however. At least in the most violent stage of a war, we would expect that those most directly involved and affected will be the most rigid and their mental models the least flexible.

But the situation is different in Israel (as it was also different in Serbia after the fall of Milošević). Regardless of its failings, Israel has been engaged in a peace process for a dozen years, and it can be assumed that (like many Israelis) the Israeli participants experienced a sort of inner conflict between competing mental models, interpreting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as either a win-lose or a win-win process.

Both of these models are associated with positive and negative emotions, with emotions of security and threat. The escalation-oriented (win-lose) model permits holding onto the behavioral strategies that preserved the Israeli state during past decades (security), but implies continuing war and violence (threat). The de-escalation oriented (win-win) model promises an end to war and violence (security), but implies a change in behavioral strategies whose effectiveness in guaranteeing the survival of Israel has not yet been demonstrated (threat).

Taking this into account, we may assume that the framing effects observed in the Israeli study were due to the selective activation of these different mental models by different frames.

To the German Ss, on the other hand, only one (if any) mental model was available. Since they are not directly affected by the conflict, they simply tried to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one way or another and – due to the lessons of the Third Reich ("No more war, no more fascism") – they tended to interpret the conflict within a de-escalation oriented (win-win) model.

In the author's opinion, this is the most plausible explanation of the differences between the Israeli and the German findings, and we may summarize the results of our study by formulating two further hypotheses that should be addressed in a cross-cultural study:

1. News recipients do not always have a mental model. Consequently the influence of political news is not solely dependent on their having a particular kind of mental model, but also on whether they have such a model at all.
2. The influence of framing is mediated by the activation of different mental models and, therefore, should be the strongest in cases where competing mental models are available to recipients.

If we proceed from these assumptions, we arrive at similar prognoses as Zaller (1992), who explains contradictory findings on the linkage between political sophistication and susceptibility to being influenced by media frames with a two-step model of attitude change: While information absorption (step 1) is a positive func-

tion of prior knowledge, dissonant frames are only rejected (step 2) if the subject disposes of sufficient prior knowledge to recognize dissonance. Consequently, subjects with the greatest previous knowledge are simultaneously both those most likely to absorb information and those least likely to be influenced by it, so that a curvilinear relationship arises between prior knowledge and attitude change: Subjects with moderate prior knowledge will be the most strongly influenced, because they are more likely to absorb information than those with little prior knowledge and also because they are more likely to be persuaded than subjects with more prior knowledge.

The above-formulated hypotheses make Zaller's model more specific, in the sense that: (1) information is only absorbed to the extent that it is meaningful, which requires, on one side, a certain amount of prior knowledge, and, on the other side, the availability of a mental model in the light of which information can be interpreted. (2) While the same preconditions also apply for the rejection of dissonant frames incompatible with the respective mental model, an additional presupposition is also added for susceptibility to being influenced by dissonant frames: the availability of an alternative mental model which is congruent with this frame. (3) The availability of alternative models is inversely proportional to how strongly the respective model is both supported by knowledge and emotionally anchored.

Recipients' susceptibility to being influenced is therefore a function of not only their previous knowledge, but also their emotional ambivalence regarding the issue of concern.

On the interaction between media frames and individual frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[1]

Wilhelm Kempf & Stephanie Thiel

1. Introduction

The Middle East conflict may very well be the conflict that has been reported on the longest and most often in the German media. Nevertheless, previously we knew little about the effects of this reportage on media recipients. How are various media frames received? To what extent are various forms of reportage suitable for convincing readers to take a position for or against one of the parties? What factors play important roles on the recipient side, which on the media side?

In a recent study, Kempf (2011a) established a connection between self-estimated knowledge of the Middle East conflict and concern for the conflict parties. The better people judge their knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be, the more the conflict will be important to them, the less often they will feel that they do *not* solidarize with either of the two parties, and the more they will express solidarity with the Palestinians. Kempf points out, however, that the data for this study was collected in the months after the 31 May 2010 Ship-to-Gaza incident, during which the Israeli army killed nine persons while taking control of the *Mavi Marmara*. Thus, it is possible that public sympathy could have changed specifically at that time.

However, Anti-Defamation League reports presented similar conclusions already in 2002a or respectively, 2004, on the basis of surveys made in Germany, as well as in four (2002) and respectively nine (2004) other European countries. In all these countries, the persons surveyed sympathized more with the Palestinians the more intensively they followed media reportage on the conflict.

On the basis of a discourse analysis of reportage of four events that occurred during the Second Intifada, Jäger & Jäger (2003) concluded that the reportage was suitable to reproduce and strengthen any anti-Semitism present in Germany. While both sides were viewed critically, the Palestinians were unambiguously represented as victims facing a superior Israeli army.

Wistrich (2004) states that he has recognized a pro-Palestinian bias in the reportage. Israel is represented as the aggressor, and Israeli military operations are con-

demned, while at the same time that there were victims on the Israeli side is not mentioned, and Palestinian terror is minimized or even justified. In a 17 May 2010 *Focus* interview, Stephan Kramer, General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, accuses the media of one-sided reportage on the Middle East conflict and uncompromising partisanship for the Palestinian position.

However, on the basis of a quantitative content analysis of reportage on the Second Intifada and the Gaza War, Maurer & Kempf (chapter 10) conclude that German media reportage is more differentiated than indicated by these criticisms. In many regards, they find that German media actually take a balanced stance toward both parties. Due to the predominance of negative news reports, both sides appear in a negative light, but this is "counteracted by a certain measure of understanding for the Israeli manner of acting" (ibid., 185). The media have balanced the shift in focus from Palestinian violence (Second Intifada) to Israeli violence (Gaza War) with increased pro-Israeli reportage (e.g., offering justifications for Israeli actions and representing its position as defensive).

We still do not know much about what influence this conflict reportage has on the recipients' opinion formation and partisanship. Maurer & Kempf even suspect that precisely this pro-Israeli reportage can offer openings for traditional anti-Semitic prejudices.

Building on earlier studies of the modes of reception of peace journalism versus war journalism (Annabring et al. 2005, Bläsi et al. 2005, Kempf 2005, Möckel 2007, Schäfer 2006, Spohrs 2006), we made an experimental study of the cognitive processing of the representation, condemnation and/or justification of Israeli and Palestinian violence in the media. This study's goals were, on the one side, to acquire information on how recipients respond to different media frames, and, on the other, to determine how media frames influence recipients' conflict perceptions and their potential partisanship. This paper reports on the findings concerning the first of these two aspects of the experiment.

2.   Theory

According to the current state of media effects research, media contribute to the social construction of reality, for one thing, by introducing specific topics into public discourse (agenda setting) and, for another, by the way they treat these topics (framing).

Agenda-setting theory was developed by McCombs & Shaw in 1972 and attributes the influence of the media to decisions about what stories are newsworthy and what importance and how much space should be assigned to them. Among others, *negativism*, *personalization* and *elite orientations* are regarded as important news factors that make events worth reporting (Eilders 1997). But at the same time, they already form a cognitive frame in which an image of reality arises that divides the world into elite and peripheral countries – and at the same time into good and

evil (Galtung 2002). *Simplicity* is another news factor that is no less fateful. The widespread belief among journalists and media producers in the necessity of simplification literally makes a norm of the black-and-white stereotypes promulgated by polarizing "we against them" journalism.

The concept of *framing* was originally introduced by Goffman in 1974. According to Entman (1993 52), this means "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". Essential is the manner in which information is presented, which aspects are emphasized, which are not dealt with, and in addition, in what category they are presented, what words, concepts, and metaphors are employed, which rhetorical and stylistic means are used, and what narrative form is chosen, etc. (cf. Cappella & Jamieson 1997, 39). Framing a situation differently can strongly change its appearance.

According to Morton Deutsch (1973), the escalation dynamics of conflicts are decisively influenced by whether a conflict is interpreted as a competitive (win-lose model) or a cooperative process (win-win model). Competitive conflicts have a tendency to expand and escalate and go together with typical misperceptions that become motors of conflict escalation and – in the long run (Kempf 2003) – harden into societal beliefs. These beliefs include, among others, the justness of one's cause, one's victim role, the delegitimation of the enemy and the defense of personal and national security through a policy of strength (Bar-Tal 1998).

In order to work toward a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one must overcome these misperceptions and replace the above-named societal beliefs (war frame) with a different interpretative frame (peace frame). This must acknowledge the justification (of at least some) of the other side's interests, recognize mutual victim roles, end the delegitimation of the opponent and strive to achieve personal and national security through a peaceful solution (Kempf 2011a).

The media are not inextricably tied to news factors like negativism or simplicity. Using the example of German post-war reportage on France, Jaeger shows that positive and differentiated reportage is possible, if "rapprochement and peace are on the political agenda" (Jaeger 2009, 136). Thus, news factors can be managed quite flexibly.

Conflict reportage in a de-escalation oriented peace frame is, however, necessarily more complex than simplifying, polarizing and stereotypifying reportage. It avoids black-and-white stereotypes and instead tries to create an understanding of the situations of all participants and to respect their individual rights, aims and needs. The resulting increased complexity does not mean, however, that peace frames are less comprehensible. Prior studies have shown that de-escalation oriented texts are judged to be at least as comprehensible as their escalation-oriented counterparts. As well in regard to other factors, such as the balance of representation and neutrality, peace frames are at least as effective as escalation-oriented war

frames (Bläsi et al. 2005, Kempf 2005, Spohrs 2006), and in part even better (Möckel 2007, Schaefer 2006).

However, Möckel (2007) concluded that a peace frame can also be perceived as partisan. She compared evaluations made of two features on a suicide attack in Israel, by means of which Lynch & McGoldrick (2004), in their instructional film "News from the Holy Land", illustrate the difference between war journalism and peace journalism. The escalation-oriented feature expressed a pro-Israeli bias, while the peace-oriented version pointed to the structural conditions that contribute to continuing violence. To be sure, while more than half the subjects evaluated the de-escalation oriented version as impartial, almost a third perceived this version as pro-Palestinian. The author of the study offers two possible explanations: a) the de-escalation oriented film could actually be slightly partisan, or b) the evaluation could have been made on the basis of rejecting the usual polarizing, pro-Israeli manner of representation, so that this contrast creates a pro-Palestinian impression.

However, there were also evaluations that considered the de-escalation oriented film to be pro-Israeli. This points to a further possible explanation, namely that it is not the frame alone that determines what picture recipients form of a conflict and its parties, but rather that recipients also bring their own preconceptions to the frames presented to them.

The literature on framing effects is relatively heterogeneous (cf., among others, Tuchman 1978, Entman 1993, Nelson et al. 1997, Scheufele 1999, Druckman 2001a). But even if there is still disagreement on the precise mechanisms, and although conceptual differences make it hard to develop a unified theory (cf., among others, Entman 1993, Nelson et al. 1997), a few major tendencies can nevertheless be identified.

While some authors think the framing effect occurs because frames manipulate the accessibility of information (e.g., Capella & Jamieson 1997, Sniderman et al. 1991), this view has come under criticism in more recent literature (cf. Chong & Druckman 2007, Druckman 2001b, c, 2004; Druckman & Nelson 2003, Nelson 2004, Shen 2004, Shen & Edwards 2005, Sniderman & Theriault 2004). In fact, a range of studies (e.g., Brewer 2001, Druckman 2001b, Nelson et al. 1997) supports the view that the recipient is not a passive receiver, but rather a "final arbiter, who chooses which of the available considerations are relevant and who *decides* how important each consideration should be" (Kinder 2003, 378; emphasis in original). Thus Nelson et al. (Nelson 2004; Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997, Nelson & Garst 2005, Nelson & Oxley 1999 Nelson, Oxley & Clawson 1997) argue that framing can also exert influence through the accentuation of already available information. Accordingly, various studies indicate that frames are not simply adopted by recipients, but rather evaluated in the light of their presuppositions (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001). In some cases they are rejected if recipients mistrust the information source (Druckman 2001a, b), if various different frames are offered to them (Sniderman & Theriault 2004) or if they have an opportunity to discuss

the topic with others to whom a different frame has been offered (Druckman & Nelson 2003). Other studies have demonstrated the influence of education (Hiscox 2006) and motivation (Chong & Druckman 2007) on the effectiveness of framing.

Common to all these studies is that they attribute the effects of framing to the *interaction* between information and its framing, on the one side, and specific characteristics of the recipient, on the other. This interactionist conception also underlies the present research, which distinguishes, in agreement with Kinder & Sanders (1996) and Scheufele (1999), between the frames offered by the media (media frames) and the mental models (individual frames) with which recipients interpret a respective topic.

We thereby assume that media frames exert a direct, linear effect only to the extent that they are congruent with the recipients' *a priori* mental models. If they are not congruent, cognitive dissonance results, and recipients reject the offered frame.

As a consequence of this assumption, which is based on Festinger's dissonance theory (1957) and has proved itself in earlier studies by our working group (Haack 2007b), we can assume that the effects of the framing of reports on Israeli and/ or Palestinian use of violence will not be the same for all study participants, but rather will be determined by their a priori positioning with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A further influencing factor – not only for the acceptance of the offered frame (Kempf 2005), but also for information processing – was found by earlier studies (Sniderman & Bullok 2004, Kempf [chapter 13]). This is the previous political knowledge of the study participants, whereby the results are not entirely uniform. While some studies find that less well-informed study participants are more strongly influenced by media frames (cf., e.g., Haider-Markel & Jocelyn 2001, Haack 2007b), others reach the opposite conclusion (e.g., Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997). As Zaller (1992) shows, based on his two-step model of attitude change, these results do not necessarily have to be treated as contradictory. While the reception of information (step 1) is a positive function of previous knowledge, subjects only reject dissonant information (step 2) if they dispose of sufficient previous information to be able to recognize the dissonance. Consequently, the subjects with the greatest previous knowledge are simultaneously those who receive information the earliest and those who let themselves be the least influenced by it. There is thus a curvilinear relationship between previous knowledge and attitude change: Subjects with average previous knowledge let themselves be the most strongly influenced. This is because they are more likely to receive information than those with little previous knowledge, and because they are more likely to let themselves be convinced by it than subjects with greater previous knowledge.

Kempf (chapter 13) reaches a similar conclusion, as he regards media effects to work by integrating new information into recipients' already existing mental models. A precondition for such integration and thereby modification of the a priori existing model is that subjects must first have formed such a model, which requires

a certain minimum of previous knowledge. Moreover, Kempf understands the effect of framing as the activation of alternative models, whereby he assumes that alternative models are less available, the more strongly the respective model is based on knowledge and the more it is emotionally anchored.

According to Kempf (2011b), the mental models according to which recipients interpret the Middle East conflict not only represent cognitive patterns, but also have emotional dimensions – and indeed in an ambivalent way because both frames (war and peace frames) promise security, yet simultaneously also create insecurity. The war frame offers security because familiar, tried-and-true action patterns can be continued, but it also creates insecurity, because it poses the threat of continued antagonism and violence. The peace frame also offers security, because it promises an end to violence, but at the same time creates insecurity, because new behavioral patterns must be adopted whose efficacy is still unknown.

Accordingly, we assume that the effects of media frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will depend not only (1) on the recipients' previous *knowledge* of the conflict, but also (2) on the way they *position* themselves to the conflict, and (3) on the extent to which they recognize the *ambivalence* of the media-offered frame.

3.   Method

In order to test these hypotheses, we designed an experiment in which participants in six experimental groups were asked to read differently framed reports on either Israeli or Palestinian violence.

3.1 Procedure

During a pre-test, participants filled out a questionnaire which encompassed (1) socio-economic data, (2) participants' human rights orientations and pacifistic attitudes, (3) their concern about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (4) their knowledge of the conflict, (5) their sensitivity to the emotional ambivalence of war and peace, and (6) the way they position themselves to the conflict.

After filling out the pretest questionnaire, participants read a news article that reported about either an April 2006 Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv, or an Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip at the end of February/beginning of March 2008. Using original material from the German quality press, and based on Kempf's (2003) model of escalation vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage, each of these scenarios was framed either (1) according to an escalation oriented pro-Israeli war frame which condemns Palestinian violence and/or justifies Israeli violence, (2) according to an escalation oriented pro-Palestinian war frame which condemns Israeli violence and/or justifies Palestinian violence, or (3) according to a de-escalation oriented peace frame which focuses on the burdens of war for both parties (cf. table 1). Each article was accompanied by a picture underlining the central statement.

		Scenario	
Frame	Partisan-ship	Palestinian terror attack/ Israeli victims	Israeli military operation/ Palestinien victims
War frame	Pro-Israeli	"Suicide Attack: Terror Shakes Tel Aviv"	"Offensive in Gaza: Israel Cracks Down on Constant Fire by Militant Palestinians"
	Pro-Palestinian	"Suicide Attack in Tel Aviv: Israel Announces Retaliation"	"Gaza: Israel Kills Dozens of Palestinians: Peace Talks Canceled"
Peace frame	Neutral	"Suicide Attack Shakes Tel Aviv"	"Gaza Strip: Dozens of Dead and Injured in Battles"

Table 1: Scenarios, frames and partisanship of the news articles

After reading an article, participants were asked (1) to write an essay on their own view of the events reported in the article, (2) to evaluate the article on a 15-item text assessment scale and (3) to fill out a questionnaire including scales on anti-Semitic, anti-Zionistic, anti-Palestinian and anti-Islamic attitudes.

3.2 Pretest

The participants' human rights orientation was measured with an 8-item scale that encompasses the human rights principles of (1) right to life and physical integrity, (2) right to the inviolability of dignity, (3) right of self-determination of peoples and (4) protection of minorities along the two dimensions of (a) justifiability of human rights restrictions during crises and/or for purposes of (national) self-defense, and (b) imperative to defend the victims of human rights violations (cf. Kempf 2014). Pacifistic attitudes were measured by means of the 6-item version of the Cohrs et al. (2002) PacifismScale. Concern about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace and the participants' positioning to the conflict were assessed using questionnaires from Kempf (2011a, b). To measure participants' knowledge of the conflict, we designed a knowledge test, which is documented in Kempf & Thiel (2012, 16).

3.3 Treatment

Each experimental group read one of six news articles that differed with respect to the scenario portrayed and the way it was framed. The procedure used in the construction of the texts is documented in detail in Thiel (2011).

The goal of the text construction was to produce articles similar in style and qualitatively comparable to those in the German quality press. For one thing, the escalation orientation of the war frames had to be equally strong, independently of the scenario and partisanship, and for another, the (neutral) peace frames had to

be equally strongly de-escalation oriented. Moreover, the articles had to be equally attractive to the participants.

In order to achieve this goal, the articles were composed of original quotations taken from the German quality press. We made a content analysis in accord with Kempf's (2003) escalation-de-escalation scheme and where necessary adjusted the texts to ensure their comparability. We analyzed the pictures using criteria such as motif, composition, emotional content, etc. A short description of the resulting texts is included in the appendix (cf. p. 287-290).

A concluding content analysis of the articles and their empirical evaluation by means of the text evaluation scale used in the post-test showed that we largely accomplished our construction aims (cf. Thiel 2011). We achieved the desired comparability of the frames in regard to their escalation versus de-escalation orientation, and the texts do not differ in regard to their evaluation by the participants. Although they could hardly present any new aspects and were rather not able to stimulate interest in further information, they were rated as altogether reasonably informative, interesting and not boring, and the participants found them reasonably credible, comprehensible and well-balanced.

3.4 Posttest

The participants' *evaluations of the articles* were measured with a slightly modified version of the Bläsi et al. (2005) text assessment scale. The instructions for participants' *essays* read as follows: "Now please try to describe the events you have just read about and their background from your own viewpoint. Take into account thereby especially the aspects of this conflict that appear important to you. If there is not enough space, you can continue writing on the next page."

The resulting essays were analyzed by applying quantitative content analysis and LCAs (cf. chapter 15).

Anti-Semitic, anti-Zionistic, anti-Palestinian and anti-Islamic attitudes were measured using the homogeneous scales MA1 (Manifest anti-Semitism: Dislike of Jews), SA1 (Secondary anti-Semitism: Closing the books on the past), LA (Latent anti-Semitism), IA1 (Generalizing criticism of Israel), AP (Devaluation of Palestinians) and IK (Demonizing Islam) by Kempf (2013), and an additional item that relates Muslims to terrorism.

3.5 Sample

A total of N=394 participants were randomly assigned to the six experimental groups. About half of the data (51.3%) were collected in Thuringia (former GDR), the other half (48.7%) in Baden-Wuerttemberg (former FRG). The participants' ages ranged from 13 to 89 years (M=41.01 and SD=17.03); 50.3% of the participants were female, 49.7% male; 21.6% of the participants were Protestants, 21.1% were Catholics, 4.3% belonged to other Christian denominations; 2.8%

were Muslims, 1% belonged to some other religion, and 48.7% professed to no religion. The general educational level of the sample was higher than the overall average of the German population.

The experimental groups differed neither with respect to the location of data collection ($\chi^2 = 0.544$. df = 5, p = 0.990), nor with respect to participants' age ($F_{71,322} = 0,932$, p = 0.631), gender ($\chi^2 = .686$, df=5, p = 0.984), religious affiliation ($\chi^2 = 14.691$, df = 25, p = 0.948) and educational level ($\chi^2 = 12.931$, df = 20, p = 0.880), nor with respect to any of the pretest scales for the assessment of the participants' human rights orientation ($\chi^2 = 20.069$, df = 20, p = 0.454), pacifistic attitudes ($F_{5,388} = 1.314$, p = 0.257), concern about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ($\chi^2 = 8.498$, df = 15, p = 0.902), knowledge about the conflict ($F_{5,388} = 1.467$, p = 0.200), ambivalence of war and peace ($\chi^2 = 7.435$, df = 15, p = 0.944), and positioning to the conflict ($\chi^2 = 9.107$, df = 15, p = 0.872).

3.6 Hypotheses and data analysis

The data analysis employed one-way and two-way ANOVAs and proceeded in seven steps, for which the participants were classified into four knowledge groups (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4), four positioning groups (Non POSI, POSI Peace, POSI Palest and POSI Israel) and four ambivalence groups (NP, SP, AB and IS).

The classification of the participants according to their prior knowledge of the conflict was based on the knowledge scale and grouped them along the quartiles of the score distribution within the experimental sample.

The classification of the participants with respect to their positioning to the conflict was based on a latent class analysis (LCA) of their response patterns on the positioning scale (cf. Kempf 2011b) and grouped them into participants who were not sufficiently familiar with the conflict and unable to form an opinion about it (Non POSI)[2], participants who interpreted the conflict according to a peace frame (POSI Peace)[3], participants who interpreted it according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) and a group of participants who interpreted it either according to a pro-Palestinian war frame or according to a pro-Palestinian frame which is right on the edge of a war frame (POSI Palest).

The classification of the participants with respect to their sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace was based on a LCA of their response patterns on the ambivalence scale (cf. Kempf 2011b) and grouped them into naïve pacifists (NP), who interpreted the conflict according to the simple pattern "peace is good, war is evil", skeptical pacifists (SP), who favored peace as well, but were uncertain about whether it could offer Israel security or whether war was really so threatening for the Palestinians, participants who recognized the ambivalence of peace

---

2   These participants neither agree nor disagree with the statements in the items, or they mainly respond in the „Don't know" category, and/or they mainly do not respond to the items at all.
3   These participants are not completely neutral, however, but display either sympathy for Israel or for the Palestinians and/or put the blame on Israel.

for both sides (AB), and participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma and/or agreed that the perpetuation of the status quo is bad for the Palestinians, while – in contrast – for Israel it is to be sure ambivalent, but still the lesser evil (IS).

Hypothesis 1: As a first step, we tested whether prior findings on audience preferences for peace journalism also hold in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although a peace frame disregards the news factor of simplicity, it is more person-oriented than a war frame and should therefore be more comprehensible (H1.1). Although it deviates from mainstream coverage, readers should view it as quality journalism that is less biased (H1.2), better balanced (H1.3), and less partisan than a war frame (H1.4).

Hypothesis 2: As a second step we studied the effects of the participants' prior knowledge of the conflict. The better the participants' knowledge of the conflict, the more they should already know about the reported events (H2.1). Since participants with too little knowledge can absorb, process and classify the information in the articles only to a limited extent, they will judge the articles as less comprehensible (H2.2) and less informative (H2.3). Moreover, they should recognize fewer new aspects in the articles (H2.4), and the articles should stimulate less interest in them for further information (H2.5). On the other hand, for participants whose knowledge is very good, the articles will (objectively) bring only a few new aspects into play (H2.4) and, therefore, they can also be expected to have less interest in further information (of this kind), with which they are already quite familiar (H2.5).

Hypothesis 3: As a third step, we analyzed the relationship between the participants' positioning to the conflict and their (objective) knowledge (H3.1) of it, on the one hand, and the (subjective) self-estimation of their knowledge, on the other (H3.2). Since the results of a recent survey (cf. Kempf 2011a) revealed that both pressure to take a position and the tendency to take a position in favor of the Palestinians increased with the participants' subjective knowledge of the conflict, we expected that this would also hold for their objective knowledge.

Hypothesis 4: As a fourth step, we analyzed the effects of the participants' positioning on their assessment of the reported events as already known (H4.1) and of the articles as comprehensible (H4.2), informative (H4.3), bringing new aspects into play (H4.4) and stimulating interest in further information (H4.5). Due to the correlation between knowledge and positioning, we expected effects that are analogous to those in Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 5: As a fifth step, we investigated the effects of participants' positioning to the conflict on their evaluation of the various frames. Our assumption was that media frames incompatible with participants' positioning will be rejected as less comprehensible (H5.1), more biased (H5.2), and partisan (H5.3) for the opposing party (H5.4).

Hypothesis 6: As a sixth step, we analyzed the effects of participants' positioning on their evaluation of the partisanship of two scenarios (H6.1). Our assumption

was that participants will be sensitive to the typical use of reports about violence and victims for propaganda purposes (cf. Herman & Chomsky 1988). Accordingly, the more they position themselves in favor of one side, the more they should regard reports about this side's violence as partisan for the opponent.

Hypothesis 7: As a seventh step, we analyzed the effects of participants' sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace on their evaluation of the articles as comprehensible (H7.1), biased (H7.2), and partisan (H7.3) for the opposing party (H7.4). Our assumption was that both naïve pacifists and skeptical pacifists would evaluate the peace frames as more comprehensible, less biased and less partisan than the war frames. For participants who recognize the Israeli security dilemma and/or regard the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel, we assumed that they would prefer the pro-Israeli war frame as more comprehensible, less biased and less partisan than the pro-Palestinian war frame. Due to reservations about a peaceful resolution of the conflict, they should also regard the peace frames as somewhat partial for the Palestinians. For participants who are sensitive to both parties' ambivalence we had no a priori prognosis.

Hypothesis 8: As a last step we analyzed the effects of participants' sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace on their evaluation of the partisanship of the two scenarios (H8.1). Our assumption was that participants who were sensitive to both parties' ambivalence would also be most sensitive to the propaganda function of both scenarios. Accordingly, they should regard both scenarios as strongly partisan for the victim side. Regarding skeptical pacifists, we expected that they would be equally sensitive to the propaganda function of both scenarios as well, but to a lesser degree. Regarding naïve pacifists, we expected that they would display some sympathy for the Palestinian cause and, therefore, be particularly sensitive to the propaganda function of reports about Palestinian violence. And regarding participants who recognized the Israeli security dilemma and/or regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel, we expected that they would *not* be sensitive to the propaganda function of reports about Palestinian violence.

4.   Results

While most of our hypotheses were supported by the data, some were refuted or were only partially supported and suggested further hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 was supported (cf. table 2). Media peace frames were evaluated as *more comprehensible* (H1.1: Peace Frame > War Frames), *less biased* (H1.2: Peace Frame < War Frames), *more balanced* (H1.3: Peace Frame > War Frames) and *more impartial* than the media war frames (H1.4: Peace Frame > War Frames).

Hypothesis 2 was also mostly supported (cf. table 3). The better the participants' knowledge of the conflict was, the more they regarded the reported events as *already known* (H2.1: Q1 < Q2 < Q3 < Q4). Participants whose knowledge of the

conflict was very limited judged the articles as *less comprehensible* (H2.2: Q1 < Q2 ~ Q3 ~ Q4) and (however by trend only) as *less informative* (H2.3: Q1 < Q2 ~ Q3 ~ Q4; not significant). Both participants with little knowledge and participants with good knowledge of the conflict saw *fewer new aspects* in the articles (H2.4: Q1 < Q2 ~ Q3 > Q4), and the articles stimulated *less interest in further information* for them than they did for participants with medium knowledge (H2.5: Q1 < Q2 ~ Q3 > Q4).

	Mean scores within			Significance		
	War frame pro		Peace frame			
	Israel	Palest.		F	df	p
H1.1: comprehensible	3.98	3.85	4.23	4.947	2.357	0.008
H1.2: biased	2.92	2.73	2.37	8.561	2.327	<0.001
H1.3: well-balanced	3.16	3.09	3.42	3.301	2.343	0.038
H1.4: impartial	2.87	2.79	3.48	13.491	2.350	<0.001

Table 2: Main effect of the media frames on the evaluation of the articles as comprehensible, biased, well-balanced and impartial

	Mean scores within				Significance		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	F	df	p
H2.1 already known	2.49	2.75	2.96	3.17	9.554	3.383	<0.001
H2.2 comprehensible	3.73	4.08	4.16	4.13	4.409	3.356	0.005
H2.3 informative	3.69	3.85	3.89	3.90	0.936	3.364	0.423
H2.4 new aspects	1.43	1.59	1.52	1.28	3.625	3.382	0.013
H2.5 interest	1.63	1.85	1.96	1.80	3.321	3.381	0.020

Table 3: Main effects of the participants' knowledge of the conflict on the evaluation of the reported events as already known, and the articles as comprehensible, informative, bringing new aspects into play and stimulating interest in further information. Q1-Q4 = Knowledge groups (quartiles)

Hypothesis 3 was partially refuted (cf. table 4). Not fully supported was our assumption that participants' *objective knowledge* of the conflict should be greater the more they take a position and the more they position themselves in favor of the Palestinians (H3.1: Non POSI < POSI Peace < POSI Israel < POSI Palest).

Contrary to our expectations, participants who positioned themselves in favor of Israel (POSI Israel) had more knowledge of the conflict than ones who positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians (POSI Palest) (H3.1*: Non POSI < POSI Peace < POSI Palest < POSI Israel). If we take into account that the POSI Palest group consisted only in part of pro-Palestinian hard-liners who positioned themselves according to a clear-cut war frame, this means that the participants' conflict

knowledge was greater the more clearly they positioned themselves *in favor one of the two parties.*

This linkage between knowledge and positioning presumably does not act just in one direction, but is rather more to be understood as mutual: The more the participants knew about the conflict, the greater was the positioning pressure; and the more clearly they positioned themselves in favor of one of the two parties, the better they informed themselves about the conflict.

At the same time, this result is also a reason for assuming either that those who positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians *over*estimated their knowledge or that those who positioned themselves in favor of Israel *under*estimated it. In this case, the relationship POSI Palest < POSI Israel should likewise *not* hold for the participants' *subjective knowledge.* Our data confirmed this assumption (H3.2: Non POSI < POSI Peace < POSI Palest = POSI Israel).

	Mean scores within				Significance		
	Non	POSI	POSI	POSI			
	POSI	Peace	Israel	Palest.	F	df	p
H3.1 Knowledge scale	4.32	6.46	11.71	10.63	23.419	3.390	<0.001
H3.2 Self estimation	2.13	2.43	3.09	3.09	24.012	3.384	<0.001

Table 4: Main effects of the participants' positioning to the conflict on their objective and self-estimated knowledge of the conflict

Hypothesis 4 was also partially confirmed (cf. table 5). Due to the correlation between knowledge and positioning (see H3.1*), we expected effects analogous to those in hypotheses H2.1-H2.5.

	Mean scores within				Significance		
	Non	POSI	POSI	POSI			
	POSI	Peace	Palest.	Israel	F	df	p
H4.1 already known	2.31	2.80	2.97	3.26	8.913	3.383	<0.001
H4.2 comprehensible	3.50	4.01	4.26	3.91	7.921	3.356	<0.001
H4.3 informative	3.56	3.94	3.87	3.50	2.991	3.364	0.031
H4.4 new aspects	1.56	1.55	1.35	1.23	4.010	3.382	0.008
H4.5 interest	1.53	1.86	1.84	1.86	2.724	3.381	0.044

Table 5: Main effects of the participants' positioning to the conflict on the evaluation of the reported events as already known, and the articles as comprehensible, informative, bringing new aspects into play and stimulating interest in further information

For the evaluation of the reported events as *already known*, this assumption was confirmed. The more they took a position, and the more they positioned them-

selves in favor of Israel, the more participants regarded the reported events as already known (H4.1: Non POSI < POSI Peace < POSI Palest < POSI Israel).

For the evaluation of the articles as *comprehensible*, however, our assumption (H4.2: Non POSI < POSI Peace ~ POSI Palest ~ POSI Israel) was not confirmed. Participants who took a position according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) regarded the articles as more comprehensible than the ones who positioned themselves according to a peace frame or according to a pro-Israeli war frame (H4.2*: Non POSI < POSI Peace < POSI Palest > POSI Israel).

Taking into account that the POSI Palest group consisted only in part of pro-Palestinian hard-liners who positioned themselves in accord with a clear-cut war frame, this can be explained in that the devaluation of an article as incomprehensible could be due not just to the participants' knowledge, but also to the rejection of information and/or frames that are incompatible with their individual frames (see H5.1 which was confirmed by trend only, however).

For the evaluation of the articles as *informative*, our hypothesis was confirmed. Since they had little knowledge of the conflict and were quite unconcerned about it,[4] participants who did not take a position to the conflict regarded the articles as less informative than those who did. Participants who took a position according to a pro-Israeli war frame, on the other hand, had the best knowledge of the conflict and, therefore, the content of the articles was not as new for them. Accordingly, they also regarded the articles as less informative than the participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame or according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (H4.3: Non POSI < POSI Peace ~ POSI Palest > POSI Israel).

With respect to the question of whether the articles brought *new aspects* into play, an analogous interrelationship (H4.4: Non POSI < POSI Peace ~ POSI Palest > POSI Israel) could not be confirmed, however. Participants who did not take a position or who positioned themselves according to a peace frame regarded the articles as bringing more new aspects into play than those who positioned themselves according to a war frame (H4.4*: Non POSI ~ POSI Peace > POSI Palest > POSI Israel).

A possible explanation for this may be that the evaluation of an article as bringing *no* new aspects into play can be due not only to the participants' prior knowledge about these aspects, but also to the rejection of information and/or frames that are incompatible with the recipients' individual frames.

Since Non POSI is not affected by such a defensive tendency, the difference between Non POSI and POSI Peace disappears, and since the defensive tendency is

stronger the more clearly participants position themselves in favor of one of the two parties, POSI Palest reveals fewer new aspects than POSI Peace.

For the evaluation of the articles as stimulating *interest in further information*, our hypothesis was supported. Since they were less concerned (see H4.3), participants who did not take a position also tended to show less interest in further information than those who did (H4.5: Non POSI < POSI Peace ~ POSI Palest ~ POSI Israel).

Hypothesis 5 was mostly supported (cf. table 6).

		Mean scores within				Significance		
		Non	POSI	POSI	POSI			
		POSI	Peace	Palest.	Israel	F	df	p
H5.1 comprehensible	WF-I	3.83	3.89	4.18	3.92			
	WF-P.	3.00	3.85	4.27	3.78	2.904	2.348	0.056
	PF	3.67	4.33	4.31	4.00			
H5.2 biased	WF-I	2.73	2.98	3.08	2.56			
	WF-P.	2.80	2.72	2.65	2.75	4.760	2.318	0.009
	PF	2.17	2.53	2.20	2.45			
H5.3 impartial	WF-I	2.78	2.81	2.77	3.42			
	WF-P.	2.25	2.82	2.97	2.67	7.829	2.341	<0.001
	PF	3.42	3.51	3.65	3.00			
H5.4 partisanship	WF-I	1.44	1.21	1.13	1.00			
	WF-P.	1.75	1.85	1.75	1.83	22.753	2.164	<0.001
	PF	1.00	1.50	1.36	2.00			

Table 6: Interaction effects between media frames and participants' positioning to the conflict on the evaluation of the articles as comprehensible, informative, impartial and partisan in favor of Israel (= 1) or the Palestinians (= 2). WF-I = pro-Israeli war frame; WF-P = pro-Palestinian war frame; PF = peace frame

H5.1: Media frames incompatible with participants' individual frames were rejected as *less comprehensible*, however, by trend only (not significant). Participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame (POSI Peace) regarded media war frames as less comprehensible. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as less comprehensible. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) regarded the pro-Palestinian media frames as less comprehensible.

H5.2: Media frames incompatible with participants' individual frames were evaluated as *more biased*. Accordingly, participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame (POSI Peace) regarded the media war frames as more biased. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded the pro-Israeli media frames

as more biased. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) regarded the pro-Palestinian media frames as more biased.

H5.3: Media frames incompatible with participants' individual frames were evaluated as *less impartial*. Accordingly, participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame (POSI Peace) regarded the media war frames as less impartial than the media peace frames. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded the pro-Palestinian media frames as more impartial than the pro-Israeli media frames. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as more impartial than the pro-Palestinian media frames.

Moreover, the stronger their position was in favor of one party or the other, the more participants also tended to regard media peace frames as partisan. While participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded the media peace frames as *more impartial* than the pro-Palestinian media frames, participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) evaluated the media peace frames as *less* impartial than the pro-Israeli media frames.

H5.4: As far as the perceived *direction of partisanship* is concerned, our hypothesis was only in part confirmed: If they evaluated the articles as partisan, participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame (POSI Peace) regarded the pro-Israeli media frame as partisan for Israel and the pro-Palestinian media frame as partisan for the Palestinians. Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded the pro-Israeli media frame as more partisan for Israel than the pro-Palestinian media frame for the Palestinians.

If participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) evaluated the articles as partisan, however, they *unequivocally* regarded the pro-Israeli media frame as partisan for Israel. A possible explanation for this may be that these participants were hard-liners who inclined toward black-and-white stereotypes and for whom partisanship for their own party, therefore, did not have a negative connotation.

The assumption that these participants were pro-Israeli hard-liners is also supported by the results with respect to the perceived partisanship of the media peace frames. While participants who positioned themselves according a peace frame (POSI Peace) regarded the media peace frames as equally partisan for Israel and/or for the Palestinians, and while participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) regarded them as *slightly* partisan for Israel, participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) regarded them as *totally* partisan for the Palestinians.

Hypothesis 6 was consistently confirmed (cf. table 7).

		Mean scores within				Significance		
		Non POSI	POSI Peace	POSI Palest.	POSI Israel	F	df	p
H6.1 partisanship	PA	1.40	1.43	1.32	1.44	7.364	1.168	0.007
	IM	1.54	1.56	1.52	2.00			

Table 7: Interaction effects between the scenario and participants' positioning to the conflict on the evaluation of the articles as partisan in favor of Israel (= 1) or the Palestinians (= 2); PA = Palestinian attack; IM = Israeli military operation

Participants who positioned themselves according to a peace frame (POSI Peace) evaluated articles about the Palestinian attack as slightly partisan for Israel and those about the Israeli military operation as slightly partisan for the Palestinians.

Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (or right on the edge of one) (POSI Palest) evaluated articles about the Palestinian attack as most partisan for Israel, and those about the Israeli military operation as least partisan for the Palestinians.

Participants who positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (POSI Israel) evaluated articles about the Palestinian attack as slightly partisan for Israel, and those about the Israeli military operation as totally partisan for the Palestinians.

Hypothesis 7 was consistently supported (cf. table 8).

		Mean scores within				Significance		
		NP	SP	BA	IS	F	df	p
H7.1 comprehensible	WF-I	4.11	3.91	3.70	4.00			
	WF-P.	4.14	3.76	3.93	3.50	3.147	2.348	0.044
	PF	4.32	4.33	3.91	4.08			
H7.2 biased	WF-I	3.00	3.21	2.85	2.43			
	WF-P.	2.67	2.72	2.42	2.95	3.910	2.318	0.021
	PF	2.20	2.31	2.60	2.69			
H7.3 impartial	WF-I	2.87	2.65	2.90	3.11			
	WF-P.	3.00	2.59	3.00	2.48	7.684	2.341	0.001
	PF	3.65	3.66	3.43	2.71			
H7.4 partisanship	WF-I	1.17	1.20	1.30	1.20			
	WF-P.	1.75	1.82	1.86	1.83	25.780	2.164	<0.001
	PF	1.25	1.44	1.57	1.56			

Table 8: Interaction effects between media frames and participants' sensitivity for the ambivalence of war and peace on the evaluation of the articles as comprehensible, biased, impartial and partisan in favor of Israel (= 1) or the Palestinians (= 2). NP = naive pacifist; SP = skeptical pacifist; BA = both sides' ambivalence; IS = Israel's security dilemma; WF-I = pro-Israeli war frame; WF-P = pro-Palestinian war frame; PF = peace frame

H7.1: Both naïve pacifists (NP) and skeptical pacifists (SP) regarded the media peace frames as *more comprehensible* than the media war frames. Participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS), on the other hand, regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as more comprehensible than the pro-Palestinian media frames.

While naïve pacifists (NP) regarded both media frames as more or less equally comprehensible, skeptical pacifists (SP) tended to evaluate the pro-Israeli media frame as more comprehensible than the pro-Palestinian one. A possible explanation for this could be that the skeptical pacifists tended to sympathize with Israel (see H7.2).

Moreover, participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS) proved not to be pro-Israeli hard-liners and regarded the media peace frames as more or less equally comprehensible as the pro-Israeli media frames (see H7.2).

H7.2: Both the naïve pacifists (NP) and the skeptical pacifists (SP) regarded the media war frames as *more biased* than the media peace frames. Participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS), on the other hand, regarded the pro-Palestinian media frames as more biased than the pro-Israeli ones.

Naïve pacifists (NP) regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as more biased than the pro-Palestinian ones. We could not find support for the assumption that the skeptical pacifists (SP) rather sympathized with Israel, however. Participants in this group also regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as more biased than the pro-Palestinian ones.

Although participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS) can be assumed to not be pro-Israeli hard-liners (see H7.1), they sympathized with Israel's policy and regarded the media peace frames as more biased than the pro-Israeli media frames.

H7.3: Naïve pacifists (NP) and skeptical pacifists (SP) regarded the media peace frames as *more impartial* than the media war frames.

In accordance with the above assumption that participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS) sympathized with Israel's policy, they regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as more impartial than the media peace frames, and the pro-Palestinian media frames as least impartial.

H7.4: Naive pacifists (NP) regarded the pro-Palestinian media frames as least partisan for the Palestinians, the pro-Israeli media frames as most partisan for Israel, and the media peace frames as also partisan for Israel. The skeptical pacifists (SP) proved to be less naive and more moderate. They regarded the media peace frames as slightly partisan for Israel only, and the media war frames as equally partisan for the respective side. In accordance with the above assumption that

they sympathized with Israel's policy, finally, participants who were sensitive to Israel's security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS) regarded the media peace frames as slightly partisan for the Palestinians.

For participants who were sensitive to both parties' ambivalence (BA) we had no a priori prognosis. The results indicate, however, that to some extent they also sympathized with the Palestinians. They regarded the pro-Israeli media frames as less comprehensible than the other frames, and evaluated the pro-Israeli media frames as more biased than the media peace frames, and the media peace frames as more biased than the pro-Palestinian media frames. Although they regarded the media peace frames as more impartial than the pro-Palestinian media frames, they saw the latter as more impartial than the pro-Israeli media frames. Although they sympathized with the Palestinians, however, their sensitivity for both sides' ambivalence about war and peace made them regard the pro-Israeli media frames as not as partisan for Israel, and the media peace frames as only slightly partisan for the Palestinians.

Hypothesis 8 was also mostly confirmed (cf. table 9).

		Mean scores within				Significance		
		NP	SP	BA	IS	F	df	p
H8.1 partisanship	PA	1.29	1.52	1.33	1.50	4.482	1.168	0.036
	IM	1.56	1.43	1.75	1.59			

Table 9: Interaction effects between the scenario and participants' sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace on the evaluation of the articles as partisan in favor of Israel (= 1) or the Palestinians (= 2). NP = naive pacifist; SP = skeptical pacifist; BA = both sides' ambivalence; IS = Israel's security dilemma; PA = Palestinian attack; IM = Israeli military operation

As we expected, participants who were sensitive to both parties' ambivalence (BA) also proved to be the most sensitive to the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims. They regarded reports about the Israeli military operation as most partial for the Palestinians, and reports about the Palestinian attack as only a little less partial for Israel than did the naïve pacifists.

The naive pacifists (NP) evaluated reports about the Palestinian attack as most partial for Israel and reports about the Israeli military operation as least partial for the Palestinians.

Participants who recognized the Israeli security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel (IS) proved to be insensitive to the propaganda function of reports about Palestinian violence and did *not* regard the report about the Palestinian attack as partial for Israel. At the same time, however, they again proved not to be pro-Israeli hard-liners (see H7.1 and H7.2) and regarded reports about the Israeli military operation as only slightly partial for the Palestinians.

The skeptical pacifists (SP), however, evaluated the partisanship of the scenarios in a completely unexpected way: Although their evaluations were weak, they rath-

er regarded reports about the Palestinian attack as partial for the Palestinians and reports about the Israeli military operation as partial for Israel. A convincing interpretation of this result is still lacking and further research is needed.

4.   Discussion

In summary, the results of our experiment support the hypothesis that the German public generally accepts media *peace* frames of violent events during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as more comprehensible, less biased, more balanced and less partisan than media *war* frames of the same events. The particular way recipients respond to the frames depends, however, on their prior knowledge of the conflict, on their positioning to the conflict, and on their sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace.

Recipients whose knowledge of the conflict was very limited judged the articles as less comprehensible. The better informed the recipients were and the more they took a position, the more they were familiar with the reported events. Recipients with little knowledge and recipients with good knowledge saw fewer new aspects in the articles and showed less interest in obtaining more information, and recipients who did not take a position to the conflict regarded the articles as less informative than those who did.

Recipients tended to devaluate information and/or frames that were incompatible with their individual frames as "incomprehensible" and/or "nothing new". Media frames that were incompatible with recipients' individual frames were rejected as less comprehensible, more biased and less impartial, and the stronger their position was in favor of one party or the other, the more recipients tended to regard even media peace frames as partisan.

Moreover, recipients were sensitive to the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims, and the more they positioned themselves in favor of one side, the more they regarded reports about this side's violence as partisan for the opponent.

Whether or not they rejected the articles as partisan, finally, also depended on their sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace. Recipients who were sensitive to both sides' ambivalence sympathized with the Palestinians to some extent and regarded pro-Israeli frames as more biased and less impartial. Nonetheless, they were especially sensitive to the propaganda function of reports about *both* sides' violence. Recipients who recognized the Israeli security dilemma or who regarded the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel, on the other hand, were insensitive to the propaganda function of reports about Palestinian violence and regarded pro-Israeli media frames as more comprehensible, less biased and less partisan than pro-Palestinian ones.

Knowledge about the conflict, positioning to the conflict and sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace are not independent factors, however. The better the

recipients were informed, the stronger the pressure was to take a position on the conflict, and the more and more one-sidedly they positioned themselves, the better they informed themselves about the conflict. The better the recipients were informed about it, the stronger the pressure was to take a position on the conflict, and the more and more one-sidedly they positioned themselves, the better they informed themselves about it.

From a methodological point of view, it would have been desirable to also analyze the interactions between these factors. Due to the limited size of our sample (N = 394 divided into 6 experimental groups), such an analysis was not possible, however.

Nonetheless, our results provide a detailed impression of how the individual frames and media frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict interact with each other and give considerable evidence for the assumption that neither news selection nor framing have uniform effects on public opinion. Particularly in an antagonistic situation where society members have already made up their minds about who is good and who is evil, we must expect that recipients who already side with one party or the other may rather reject peace frames than be influenced by them in a moderating way. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that media frames remain entirely without effects on recipients' conflict perceptions. We hope to acquire information about the nature and strength of these effects from the essays the participants were asked to write after reading the articles (cf. chapter 15).

Appendix: Description of the news articles

1. Suicide attack in Tel Aviv, pro-Israeli war frame

The article entitled *Suicide Attack: Terror Shakes Tel Aviv* is strongly characterized by a demonization of Hamas and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the Palestinians in general. It begins with a rather emotional description of a Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv. The victims and witnesses are thereby strongly humanized, which is also strongly emphasized by a highly emotionalizing photo of a screaming woman and by the picture caption.

The reactions of various Palestinian groups to the attack draw a clearly negative picture. The Palestinians are dehumanized: "thousands take to the street to express their joy at the attack". The Palestinians' behavior is marked by antagonism; their goal is "total defeat of Israel". Thereby anti-Islamic stereotypes are also invoked ("radical Islamic", "we bless the attack", Hamas "enjoys the victim role and the martyrdom of its people").

Worldwide, politicians express their horror and their solidarity with Israel, which gives an impression of unanimity. Before this background and in view of the lack of any possibilities to negotiate with Hamas and other radical groups, even the construction of the wall intended to seal Israel off from the Palestinian areas appears completely justified.

2.   Suicide attack in Tel Aviv, pro-Palestinian war frame

This variant bears the title *Suicide Attack in Tel Aviv: Israel Announces Retaliation*. It begins with a relatively short, rather objective description of the attack. The picture shows a group of people sitting on the ground, and from the picture caption, it is clear that there have been dead and wounded. The photo itself, however, carries no unambiguous emotional message and could also stem from other non-conflict contexts.

The international community does indeed condemn the attack, but it also condemns violence in general. Before this background, a UN human rights expert appears who assigns part of the blame to Israel. Such attacks are "a painful but unavoidable consequence" of the Israeli occupation.

Israel also immediately plans a "reprisal". All political groups appear to agree on this, "not only the Zionist left, but also the right". Perfidiously, however, the text places value on not gambling with "the international support for Israel's policy". Here the text is full of concepts and allusions that can be linked up with anti-Semitic prejudice ("revenge", a certain craftiness, with which he attempts to avoid squandering the international support).

Suicide attacks increasingly appear as justified acts of resistance, in view of "crimes against women and children". The article also reinforces this with a critique of states that have concluded a peace treaty with Israel. "Constant humiliations" of the Palestinians by Israelis are ultimately triggers. It substantively underlines this with a picture of a Palestinian woman being manhandled by several soldiers, as well as a description of harassment by border guards, who are in this manner dehumanized.

3.   Suicide attack in Tel Aviv, de-escalation oriented peace frame

The de-escalation oriented variant with the heading *Suicide Attack Shakes Tel Aviv* likewise begins with a rather short and objective description of the attack. The picture is the same as the first of the two described under 2. The reactions of various Palestinian groups are not evaluated. The only thing that becomes clear from them is that in the case of the attack it is a matter of a "reaction to Israeli military actions in the Gaza Strip".

Following this, the article turns to the conflict in itself. It illuminates the underlying logic according to which each side believes it is only defending itself, and the dynamics that triggers this. Thereby the article evaluates the actions of both parties in a quite critical, but also unbiased manner. It analyzes the win-lose perspective and shows the negative effects of violence for both sides. It indicates what the conflict means for the civilian population and how erosive it is for both societies. It humanizes the victims and the civilian population on both sides. It also makes it clear that they have had enough of this long-lasting conflict and the "political free-for-all".

4. Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, pro-Israeli war frame

Under the heading *Offensive in Gaza: Israel Cracks Down on Constant Fire by Militant Palestinians*, the article reports on an Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, which occurs "after long hesitation", and above all has the goal of destroying workshops where "the notorious Kassam rockets are produced". The photo harbors relatively little potential for emotionalization and could also be employed in other, e.g., accident-related contexts. It shows a street from which a column of smoke is rising, while two people are running away. Only the picture caption indicates that there have been dead and wounded in the fighting.

The Palestinians cancel the peace talks that would apparently otherwise take place, which the Israeli government regrets, especially as this decision "plays into Hamas's hands". In fact, Hamas appears in the following as an absolutely malicious opponent that despite the attack continues to fire rockets at Israeli territory. This is expanded to "radical Palestinians", who also dispose of definitely more accurate weapons and thereby threaten thousands of Israelis. The Palestinians are thoroughly dehumanized, especially because they misuse "Palestinian women and children as living shields". This implicitly also justifies the high victim statistics, because the Israelis actually targeted "militant Palestinians" and "members of the radical Palestinian organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad". Thereby the text draws on anti-Islamic stereotypes ("radical Islamic", "radical organization").

Internationally violence is indeed condemned, but is above all mixed with critique of the Palestinians. They represent not only a danger for the Israelis, but also for their own population. Israel's violence appears justified. This is also underlined by the second picture, in which a woman attempts to protect her two children against a rocket attack. The following section makes it very clear that Israel has made concessions and withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and in spite of everything is increasingly the target of attacks. The Israelis suffer from this, but above all, their children do. Here a strong tendency becomes clear toward the humanization of the Israeli civilian population.

5. Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, pro-Palestinian war frame

Under the heading *Gaza: Israel Kills Dozens of Palestinians: Peace Talks Canceled,* this variant begins with a somewhat more detailed description, from which it appears that half of the ca. 60 dead are "civilians, among them several children". To be sure, it becomes clear that the Israelis are reacting to Palestinian violence, but their shelling is almost ineffectual with the "home-made rockets" that have killed one Israeli, which is again the justification for the massive deployment.

A strongly emotionalizing picture, whose caption refers to "Grief and Horror", humanizes the Palestinian population. It shows two mourning women. The international community expresses relatively consistent horror and critique, which appears, however, not to impress the Israeli leadership. "Nobody has the right to

preach moral standards to Israel". To the contrary, it is foreseeable that in the future the Israelis will show even less consideration for the civilian population. The Israelis are demonized and dehumanized, whereby words and passages are used that are also capable of being tied to anti-Semitism ("harsh reprisal", "to preach moral standards").

The Palestinians and their leadership groups (in the Gaza Strip and West Bank) are humanized. It becomes clear that the peace talks were canceled because there were so many funerals, and the situation was so catastrophic. Besides the many wounded, who in themselves represent an excessive demand on the Palestinians, above all the lack of the barest necessities is a problem. Blame for this is placed on the Israelis, who have cordoned off the Gaza Strip and even interfered with UN humanitarian missions.

6.   Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, de-escalation oriented peace frame

This text is entitled *Gaza Strip: Dozens of Dead and Injured in Battles*. It is largely identical with the de-escalation oriented variant of the suicide attack (cf. 3). It likewise begins with a rather short and objective description of the events. The picture is identical with the first of the two described under 4. It becomes clear that the military operation was undertaken against "the continuing rocket shelling by Hamas". An evaluation is not attempted, however.

After this beginning, the article turns to the conflict, illuminates its inherent logic according to which both sides are caught up in a spiral of reprisals, feels itself in the right and thereby helps to perpetuate the conflict. The current and topical events are situated in this context. The article evaluates the actions of both parties critically, but also in an unbiased manner. A clarification of the negative effects of the violence for both sides goes together with an examination of the win-lose perspective. Empathy is expressed for the victims and the civilian populations on both sides, and the erosive effects of the continuing violence on both societies are made clear. This (the largest) part of the article is largely identical with the one described under 3. and is only adapted where the course of the conflict or other developments seemed to require this.

Audience reactions to peace journalism: How supporters and critics of the Israeli policy process escalation and de-escalation oriented media frames[1]

Stephanie Thiel & Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

1.1 Models of peace journalism

Despite the countless studies that critically examine the exploitation of the media for war propaganda, it was only toward the end of the Twentieth Century that peace researchers, media scholars and journalists focused their attention on the question of how the media could be used as a catalyst for conflict transformation and constructive conflict resolution. In order to accomplish this, models of peace journalism (PJ) concentrate on two processes by which the media contribute to the social construction of reality: agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw 1972) and framing (Goffman 1974).

Agenda setting theory deals with the question of which topics are introduced into public discourse, and attributes the influence of the media to decisions about which stories are newsworthy and what importance and how much space should be assigned to them. Since prominent news factors – like simplification, negativism, personalization, and elite orientations – contribute to the escalation prone bias of traditional war reporting (cf. Galtung 2002), it is above all the news selection process that Galtung places at the center of his PJ-model which confronts traditional war reporting with an alternative form of conflict and peace coverage that is guided by a general win-win orientation, gives voice to all parties, exposes falsehoods on all sides, identifies all evil-doers, highlights peace initiatives and focuses on creatively dealing with conflict and on people as peacemakers, etc.

Framing means "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993, 52). Depending on how it is framed, the same situation can be placed in a completely different light.

According to Deutsch (1973), the escalation dynamics of conflicts are decisively influenced by whether a conflict is interpreted as a competitive or a cooperative process. Competitive conflicts have a tendency to expand and escalate and go together with typical misperceptions that become a motor of conflict escalation. Such perceptual distortions are found on all sides of conflicts, and particularly in long-lasting intractable conflicts they use to harden into societal beliefs that include, among others, belief in the justice of one's own cause and one's own victim status, the delegitimization of the enemy, and belief in maintaining personal and national security through a policy of strength (Bar-Tal 1998). Furthermore, virtually everyone who tries to make sense of an escalated conflict will do so in one of two ways. He may either adopt a *war frame* that endorses the beliefs of one of the parties, or he may try to understand the conflict according to a *peace frame* that overcomes these perceptual distortions and accepts the justification (of at least some) of the opposing side's demands, recognizes shared victim roles, refrains from delegitimizing the opponent and has confidence in achieving personal and national security through a peace solution (Kempf 2011).

Consequently, it is this cognitive-emotional framework that Kempf (2003) placed at the center of his PJ-model, which contrasts escalation oriented media war frames with an alternative framing that is de-escalation oriented with respect to each of the five dimensions: conceptualizing the conflict (win-win vs. win-lose), assessment of the conflict parties' rights and aims (balance vs. antagonism), evaluation of their actions and behavior (cooperation vs. confrontation), emotional involvement in the conflict (constructive vs. destructive emotions) and incentives for social identification (cooperative vs. confrontational social commitment).

During the years since Galtung (1998) and Kempf (1996) published the first drafts of their PJ-models, the very concept of peace journalism has entailed a large body of empirical research and theoretical debate. Two of the critical arguments arising from this are relevant for the present paper. (1) The criticism that "the mainstream media can ill afford to abandon news values, as this would jeopardize the economic base on which they are forced to operate" (Hanitzsch 2007, 5) and (2) the speculation that the concept of peace journalism is based on the obsolete assumption of strong, causal and linear media effects (Hanitzsch 2004, 186).

Both these viewpoints have been challenged by a number of empirical and experimental studies, whose results speak in favor of peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage.

1.2 Audience acceptance of de-escalation oriented framing

Even if one assumes that news factors are "selection structures of public communication whose scope includes not only journalism, but also its public" (Hanitzsch 2004, 188), this does not imply that news factors are rigid entities that cannot be changed or undermined. Empirical studies indicate that both the media and the public are much more flexible than news factors theory claims. Content analyses

of news coverage on the Middle East conflict during the Oslo Process (Annabring 2000, Kempf 2003) and of German press coverage of France after the Second World War (Jaeger 2004, 2005, 2009) have shown that news factors like simplification, negativism and personalization are dealt with by the media in quite flexible ways. Also in its preferences the public is much less oriented to news factors than is commonly assumed. Thus Wolling (2002) found that information quality is an essential factor for the evaluation of news coverage programs, and as Eilders (1997) has shown, the more political knowledge readers have, the less they will be influenced by traditional news factors. The better informed they are, the more they will have formed their own views about which aspects of an issue are relevant to them.

More directly related to the PJ-project, a series of experimental studies has demonstrated that traditional escalation oriented conflict coverage is in fact *not* better suited to awakening reader interest, but rather de-escalation oriented peace journalism has the same potential. Peace journalism *does* have a public, and recipients are more competent and more interested in differentiated conflict representation than is commonly assumed.

- Although the findings of Bläsi et al. (2005) and Sparr (2004) indicate that traditional news factors like negativity and personalization do have an effect on readers' interest in further information, they also show that this effect is not homogeneous, but depends on the complexity of the articles. Simplification has no news value of its own, quite to the contrary, and more complex reporting can attract audience interest even for issues which – in terms of traditional news factors – have less news value (Kempf 2005, Möckel 2009).
- As regards the evaluation of the articles as comprehensible, unbiased, balanced and impartial, etc., de-escalation oriented articles were never accepted less than the other text versions (Bläsi et al. 2005, Sparr 2004, Kempf 2008 [cf. chapter 13], Möckel 2009, Schaefer 2006, Stuntebeck 2007, Kempf & Thiel 2012 [cf. chapter 14])[2]. In most of the experiments (Bläsi et al. 2005, Schaefer 2006, Stuntebeck 2007, Kempf & Thiel 2012), de-escalation oriented texts were even better accepted, and Bläsi et al. (2005) found that lack of interest, in combination with a negative evaluation of the articles, decreased steadily the less escalation oriented and the more de-escalation oriented the articles were.

Experimenting with different types of media and presenting differently framed news stories about a variety of conflicts to various types of audiences (cf. table 1), these experiments also reveal certain limitations that PJ should take into account.

---

2 The experiments by Peleg & Alimi (2005), Haack (2007) and Nerad (2009) did not include an evaluation of the articles, and the experiment by Jackson (2006) did not use articles that apply a de-escalation oriented media frame.

Authors	Bläsi et al. (2005) Annabring et al. (2005)	Sparr (2004) Kempf (2005)
Conflict context	Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević	
Issues	1. Violent conflict in Southern Serbia 2. Handover of Milošević	

	3. State contract Serbia-
	   Montenegro
		3. Kostunica's offer of dialogue
		   to Rugova

Type of media	Quality press	Regional press
Text genre	News articles	
Average text length	453 words	230 words
Text versions (frames)	1. Escalation oriented 2. Original text (moderately escalation oriented) 3. Moderately de-escalation oriented	

	4. More determinedly
	   de-escalation oriented
		4. Escalation oriented with
		   reversed partiality (pro Serbia)

Targeted audience	Readership of the German qual- ity press	Readership of an Austrian pro- vincial paper
Sample size	384	378

Authors	Schaefer (2006)	Jackson (2006)
Conflict context	War on terror	
Issues	Terrorist attacks by 1. Al Quaida in NY and Madrid 2. The Indonesian army in East Timor 3. The Aum sect in Tokyo	History of the conflict between Russia and Chechnya
Type of media	Quality press	
Text genre	Commentaries	Background articles
Average text length	1155 words	695 words

Text versions
(frames)
	1. Escalation oriented, in favour
	   of military measures
	2. De-escalation oriented,
	   against military measures
		1. Neutral text
		2. Same text, enhanced by ele-
		   ments of moral disengagement
		3. Same text, enhanced by
		   arguments against
		   moral disengagement

Targeted audience	German students	
Sample size	163	132

Table 1: Experimental studies on the acceptance and effects of peace journalism and de-escalation ori-
ented conflict coverage (part 1)

- The acceptance of de-escalation oriented news articles is greater if they re-
  frain from interpreting the situation within a radically reversed framework
  (Bläsi et al. 2005, Kempf 2005). Editorializing articles that are not limited to
  a de-escalation oriented frame, but rather explicitly argue against the main-
  stream framing, are regarded as more partisan than articles which follow this
  line (Jackson 2006).

- Whether de-escalation oriented media frames are accepted depends on the nature of the audience as well: A difference in the acceptance of the various text versions was *not* found among the readership of provincial papers (Sparr 2004), which is generally less interested in the topic (Kempf 2005), and Schaefer (2006) found a significant interaction between gender and the text version. Women are more likely than men to accept de-escalation oriented articles, and men are more likely than women to accept escalation oriented articles.
- Media frames incompatible with recipients' individual frames are rejected as less comprehensible, more biased and less impartial. The stronger their position in favor of one of the parties, the more recipients tend to regard even media peace frames as partisan, and the more they position themselves in favor of one side, the more they regard reports about this side's violence as biased in favor of the opponent (Kempf & Thiel 2012).

Authors	Peleg & Alimi (2005)	Kempf (2008)
Conflict context	Israeli-Palestinian conflict	
Issues	Ratification of the Road Map by the Israeli government	
Type of media	Quality press	
Text genre	News articles	
Average text length	319 words	338 words
Text versions (frames)	1. Neutral 2. Focus on pro Palestinian state contents 3. Focus on contra Palestinian state contents	
Targeted audience	Israeli students	German students
Sample size	26	227
Authors	Möckel (2009)	Kempf & Thiel (2012)
Conflict context	Israeli-Palestinian conflict	
Issues	Outbreaks of violence and attempts to reanimate the peace process during the Second Intifada	1. Palestinian Suicide attack in Tel Aviv 2. Israeli military operation "Hot Winter" in Gaza
Type of media	TV news	Quality press
Text genre	Feature	News articles with illustration and caption
Average text length	2:39 minutes	616 words
Text versions (frames)	1. War journalistic framing as defined by Galtung 2. Peace journalistic framing as defined by Galtung	1. De-escalation oriented peace frame 2. Pro Israeli war frame 3. Pro-Palestinian war frame
Targeted audience	German students and adults	German population
Sample size	146	394

Table 1: Experimental studies on the acceptance and effects of peace journalism and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (part 2)

Authors	Haack (2007)	Stuntebeck (2007, 2009)
Conflict context	Foreign deployment of the German military	
Issues	Fictitious extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon	Misbehaviour of German soldiers in Afghanistan (so-called "Skull-scandal")
Type of media	Quality press	
Text genre	News articles with illustration and caption	
Average text length	503 words	393 words
Text versions (frames)	1. Responsibility frame, in favour of foreign deployment 2. Risk frame, against foreign deployment of the German military	
	3. Neutral frame	——
Targeted audience	German students	
Sample size	799	267
Authors	Nerad (2009)	
Conflict context	Integration of Muslim immigrants in Germany	
Issues	Planned construction of a mosque in Munich	
Type of media	Quality press	
Text genre	News articles	
Average text length	441 words	
Text versions (frames)	1. Win-win frame 2. Win-lose frame	
Targeted audience	German secondary school pupils	
Sample size	336	

Table 1: Experimental studies on the acceptance and effects of peace journalism and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (part 3)

1.3 Effects on participants' attitudes and cognition

According to the present state of media effects research, the audience is no passive receiver of information, but rather a "final arbiter, who chooses which of the available considerations are relevant and who decides how important each consideration should be" (Kinder 2003, 378). From this we should not conclude that peace journalism is condemned to be ineffective, but rather that we need an exact study of the conditions and factors under which it becomes effective. The experiments outlined in table 2 are a first step in this direction.

Experiments by Peleg & Alimi (2005 [cf. chapter 12]) and Annabring et al. (2005) have shown a definite effect of a peace journalistic framing on short-term memory and text comprehension, as well as on the manner in which recipients interpret the reported issues.

• Peleg & Alimi (2005) presented three groups of Israeli students with differently framed news articles about the ratification of the Road Map by the Israeli government: an (unstructured) neutral article, and two structured arti-

cles that accentuated either contents that speak in favor of or respectively against the creation of a Palestinian state. They found that participants who read a structured text recalled more items than those who read a non-structured text, and participants who read a pro-state text recalled more pro-state items, while participants who read an anti-state text recalled more anti-state items. Moreover, the structured text readers categorized the items in a more concise and concentrated fashion, and structured frames favoring a Palestinian state led to a more consistent understanding of the text than the other text versions.

- Annabring et al. (2005) presented four groups of participants with differently framed news articles about conflict events in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milosevic and measured how participants made sense of the articles through a content analysis of essays in which they depicted the respective events in their own words. The results show that appreciation of the new beginning in Serbia, an unbiased assessment of present Serbian positions and appreciation of democratic change in Serbia were found most frequently among participants who had read a de-escalation oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation oriented the article was. On the other hand, criticism of the Serbian past, a continuation of the old enemy image and a refusal to acknowledge democratic change were found most frequently among participants who read an escalation oriented article. Criticism of the Serbian past and the persistence of the old enemy image were also least frequent when the article was de-escalation oriented, and their frequency decreased steadily the less escalation oriented the article was.

Authors	Bläsi et al. (2005) Annabring et al. (2005)	Sparr (2004) Kempf (2005)
Design	Post-test comparison of experimental groups	None
Focus	Effects of media frames on recipients' a posteriori framing of the reported events	None
Measurement instruments	Content analysis of essays	None
Methods of data aggregation	Construction of typical response patterns via LCA	None

Table 2: Measurement of the effects of peace journalism and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (part 1)

With regard to the influence of peace frames on the attitudes of recipients, the results are uneven, and a positive framing effect could only be shown in studies by Peleg & Alimi (2005), Schaefer (2006) and Haack (2007), but not in studies by Jackson (2007), Möckel (2009), Kempf (2008) and Nerad (2009).

- Peleg & Alimi (2005) found that the majority of the participants who had read a pro-state text were afterwards divided between "approval" and "approval/

disapproval" of the statement that "a Palestinian territorial continuity is *not* an existential threat to Israel", while "disapproval" dominated among those participants who had read an anti-state text.

- Schaefer (2006) presented two groups of participants with differently framed commentaries about terrorist attacks, and found that de-escalation oriented texts induced a lesser tendency to moral disengagement (Bandura 1986, 1990) and less acceptance of concrete military measures.
- Haack (2007) presented three groups of students with differently framed news stories about a fictitious extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon and found that risk framing (against foreign deployment of the German military) reduced participants' support.

Authors	Schaefer (2006)	Jackson (2006)
Design	Post-test comparison of experimental groups	Repeated measurement
Focus	Effects of media frames on recipients' 1. Tendency to moral disengagement	
	2. Approval of concrete military measures	——
Measurement instruments	1. Terrorism scale	
	2. Attitude scale (4 items)	——
Methods of data aggregation	1. Score construction	
	2. Score construction	——
Authors	Peleg & Alimi (2005)	Kempf (2008)
Design	Post-test comparison of experimental groups	Repeated measurement
Focus	Effects of media frames on recipients' 1. Short term memory 2. Comprehension 3. Threat perception	Effects of media frames and recipients' a priori mental models on their a posteriori evaluation, whether 1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essentially religious 2. A continuous Palestinian territory is a threat to Israel
Measurement instruments	1. Memory test 2. Categorization test 3. Meaning test	Paired items
Methods of data aggregation	1. Number of recalled items 2. Co-occurencies matrices 3. Cross-tabulation	Item score differences and construction of typical response patterns via LCA

Table 2: Measurement of the effects of peace journalism and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (part 2)

Other experiments have shown that already news selection has an influence on the conflict perception and/or on the conflict-relevant attitudes of the recipients, and to be sure dependent on recipients' *a priori* attitudes and/or the mental models

(individual frames) according to which they interpret the conflict, and independent of the respective media frames.

Authors	Möckel (2009)	Thiel & Kempf (present study)
Design	Post-test comparison of experimental groups	Post-test comparison of experimental groups
Focus	Effects of media frames on recipients' tendency to moral disengagement	Effects of media frames and recipients' a priori mental models on their a posteriori framing of the reported events
Measurement instruments	Terrorism scale	Content analysis of essays
Methods of data aggregation	Score construction	Construction of typical response patterns via LCA

Authors	Haack (2007)	Stuntebeck (2007, 2009)
Design	Post-test comparison of experimental groups	Repeated measurement
Focus	Effects of framung on a posteriori attitudes toward foreign deployment of the German military 1. In the specific case 2. More generally	Effects of framing and a priori mental models on a posteriori attitudes toward foreign deployment of the German military
Measurement instruments	1. Single item. 2. Attitude scale	Paired items
Methods of data aggregation	1. Item-scores 2. Score construction	Item score differences and construction of typical response patterns via LCA

Authors	Nerad (2009)
Design	Repeated measurement
Focus	Effects of media frames and recipients' a priori mental models on their a posteriori 1. criminality threat perception, and 2. social disturbances threat perception
Measurement instruments	Paired items
Methods of data aggregation	Item score differences

Table 2: Measurement of the effects of peace journalism and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (part 3)

- Stuntebeck (2009) presented two groups of students with differently framed news articles about serious misconduct on the part of German soldiers in Afghanistan (so-called "Skull-scandal") and found a negative shift in their attitudes toward the foreign deployment of the German military after they had read the article; and

- Jackson (2007) found a steady decline in moral disengagement after she presented three groups of students with differently framed background articles about the history of the conflict between Russia and Chechnya.

The assumption that these effects are due to a dominant peace orientation among German students is supported by the absence of any framing effects in Jackson's (2007) study, and by Stuntebeck's (2009) results. According to the latter study, participants who were presented with a responsibility frame (in favor of foreign deployment) changed their attitudes even more in a negative direction than those who were presented with a risk frame (against foreign deployment of the German military). The results of Haack (2007), Kempf (2008), Möckel (2009) and Nerad (2009) also support the assumption that framing effects are limited by participants' *a priori* attitudes:

- Haack (2007) found that a 'responsibility' framing (in favor of foreign deployment of the German military) was largely ineffective and did not lead to higher support rates.
- A repetition of Peleg & Alimi's (2005) experiment with German students (Kempf 2008) did not find a framing effect on participants' assessment of whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essentially religious and/or whether a continuous Palestinian territory was an essential threat to Israel.
- Möckel (2009) presented two groups of participants with Lynch & McGoldrick's (2004) paradigmatic (war- vs. peace journalism) TV features on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and found no framing effect of the film versions on participants' moral disengagement; and also
- Nerad (2009), who presented two groups of secondary school pupils with differently framed news articles about the planned construction of a mosque in Munich, found no general effect of win-win vs. win-lose framing on the degree to which participants perceived Muslim immigrants as a threat.

The conjecture that the limitation and/or lack of framing effects in the studies by Haack (2007), Jackson (2007), Möckel (2009), and Stuntebeck (2009) was due to a dominant peace orientation among German participants is derived from Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance and based on the assumption that recipients may devaluate, suppress or reject issues and frames that are inconsistent with their *a priori* mental models (Kempf 2008). Since these experiments did not measure participants' peace orientation and its interaction with the news stories they had read, the assumption nonetheless remains somewhat speculative. However, empirical evidence for the effects of participants' mental models is provided by the results of Kempf's (2008) and Nerad's (2009) experiments.

- Kempf (2008) captured participants' *a priori* mental models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via typical response patterns to the questions of (1) whether the conflict can only be resolved by a political settlement, and (2) whether Palestinians are (in)capable of managing their own affairs. He found a decisive effect, which was independent of the respective media frame, however. After reading an article about the ratification of the Road Map by the Israeli

government, participants' agreement with interpreting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as essentially religious decreased, and their assessment of Palestinian territorial continuity as *no threat* to Israel increased, particularly among those participants who interpreted the conflict within a de-escalation oriented mental model.

- Nerad (2009) also found a clear and frame-independent effect of participants' *a priori* mental models on how they changed their immigration-related threat perception after they read an article about the planned construction of a mosque in Munich. Assessing participants' mental models via a selection of items from van Dick et al.'s (1997) acculturation-scale, Nerad found that the perceived threat increased among participants with a low acculturation-score (which speaks for an assimilation/segregation model), while it decreased among participants with a high acculturation-score (which speaks for an integration-model).

Summarizing these results, it seems that the selection of news has a stronger effect on recipients' attitudes than their framing. Merely devoting attention to a topic can be enough to bring about an (at least short-term) change in attitude (Jackson 2007, Kempf 2008, Stuntebeck 2009, Nerad 2009), which is, however, largely independent of the media frame and is instead dependent on recipients' *a priori* mental models (Kempf 2008, Nerad 2009). An effect in the direction of the media frames could, however, only be found by Peleg & Alimi (2005) and Schaefer (2006), as well as also by Haack (2007), but only when the media frame was congruent with the recipients' (suspected) previous attitudes and biases. However, if it is incompatible with the participants' actual (Kempf 2008, Nerad, 2009) or suspected (Haack 2007, Jackson 2007, Möckel 2009, Stuntebeck 2009) attitudes and biases (or prejudices), it remains either ineffective or even causes a contrary effect (Stuntebeck 2009).

1.4 Towards a theory of media effects

An explanation of these results is provided by Kempf's (2008) theoretical model, according to which short-term media effects are due to the (selective) activation of the *a priori* mental models according to which recipients interpret the respective conflict.

The concept of mental model, which is rather infrequently used in media effects research, originally stems from cognitive psychology and was first used by Kenneth Craik (1943) in his book *The Nature of Explanation*. According to van Dijk & Kintsch (1983), mental models are dynamic representations of situations, events or objects which offer a cognitive-emotional interpretation frame (Kempf 2008) that functions to assimilate, organize and understand information in detail, take social judgments, make predictions and draw conclusions, or to describe and explain how a system operates (Stuntebeck 2009).

According to Kempf (2008), the mental models with which participants make sense of a conflict have both an emotional and a cognitive component. The emotional component is constituted by participants' *concern* about the conflict, and their sensitivity for the *ambivalence* of its prospects. The cognitive component is constituted by the frame according to which the conflict is interpreted and manifests itself in the way participants *position* themselves to the conflict. In many cases, there is not just one mental model available to the recipients, however, but rather there are competing mental models according to which the context of information can be organized (Kempf 2008, Nerad 2009, Stuntebeck 2009). The influence of political news on the recipients' conflict perception can then be understood as a two-step process. In a first step, the media frame guides which mental model is actualized. In a second step the information is integrated into this model and aligned with existing attitudes (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001, Nerad 2009, Stuntebeck 2009), whereby also the model itself undergoes a gradual modification (Kempf 2008).

Since recipients do not always have a mental model of a given conflict, media effects are not only dependent on their having a particular kind of mental model, however, but also on whether they have any such a model at all. When just one mental model is available to them, (positive) framing effects will occur if the media frame is compatible with recipients' individual frame (i.e., the way they position themselves to the conflict), while otherwise the media frame will be either ineffective or even produce a negative effect (in the direction contrary to the media frame). If competing mental models are available to the recipients, the media frame will activate the model that is in accord with the media frame and produce a positive effect (in the direction of the media frame).

Even though the assumption of framing effects of single news stories on recipients' attitudes is implausible, it can nevertheless be expected that – in the long run – peace journalism will have an effect on recipients' attitudes towards the respective conflict (and maybe even towards conflicts in general). As experiments by Annabring et al. (2005) and Peleg & Alimi (2005) have demonstrated, media frames have a clear positive effect on recipients' text comprehension, and since it is not the information provided by the text but the sense that recipients make of it, which is integrated into their mental models, it can be assumed that a consistent peace framing will gradually transform their mental models in the same direction.

Neither of these experiments controlled for participants' *a priori* mental models, however, and despite the extensive literature on influencing factors (cf. Dahinden 2006) the way how media frames and individual frames interact in the process of meaning making still needs further research. Contributing to fill this gap is the aim of the present article, which uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a natural laboratory for studying the complex interplay between media contents and media frames and recipients' mental models in the broader context of the mainstream media landscape and the societal climate. For a study of German participants the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is particularly suitable, not only because of its media

presence over several decades, but also because, as does scarcely any other conflict, it challenges the German public to take a position.

In the center of our study, which uses data from the same experiment as Kempf & Thiel (chapter 14), is the question of how escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented media frames, on one hand, and individual frames (*a priori* mental models), on the other, have effects on the understanding of newspaper reports on Israeli vs. Palestinian violence with Palestinian vs. Israeli victims and bring about an escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented understanding of the reported events. In order to measure the participant's text understanding, we used the method of Annabring et al. (2005), who asked their participants to read a newspaper article and then write essays describing the reported events in their own words. These essays were then content-analyzed in regard to escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented aspects.

How German participants make sense of news articles about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be understood without taking into account Germany's mainstream media landscape and societal climate. More than 60 years after the Holocaust, there is still a notable potential for anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2011, Kempf 2013), and even for those who have learned the World War II lesson of "never again fascism, never again war", this lesson is quite ambivalent with regard to positioning oneself to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While "never again war" implies a tendency toward adopting a peace frame, "never again fascism" can be interpreted in two ways; (1) as support for the *victims of National Socialism*, which implies a tendency toward unconditional solidarity with Israeli policy and a weakening of the peace frame, and (2) as support for *human rights worldwide*, which implies a tendency to refrain from supporting at least some aspects of Israeli policy and includes expressing solidarity with the Israeli peace movement and at least a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side. Although this implies strengthening the peace frame, it creates the dangers of shifting to a war frame and siding with the Palestinians (Kempf 2011a).

Using a slightly modified version of Kempf's (2011b) positioning scale, the results of the *Anti-Semitism and the Criticism of Israel* (ASCI) survey (Kempf 2013) reveal that this ambivalence is real: A majority of Germans are critical of Israeli policies, and both pacifism and human rights orientation play a constitutive role for the way they position themselves to the conflict. Although a relatively large group of participants (15.4% of the representative quota sample) took no position at all, the overwhelming majority (45.1%) interpreted the conflict in a peace frame with a partly pro-Israeli (12.1%) and a partly pro-Palestinian tendency (33%). A large group (20.8%) interpreted the conflict in a pro-Palestinian frame that is already very clearly polarized and so-to-speak "on the edge of a war frame". Pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian hardliners who interpret the conflict in a war frame were, with 9.8% and respectively 8.7%, approximately equally large minorities. With the exception of the pro-Israeli hardliners, all these groups (even those who sympathize with Israel) share the view that the aim of Israeli policy is the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, they condemn Palestin-

ian terror attacks (almost throughout) more severely than Israeli military operations. The latter are condemned more strongly only by pro-Palestinian hardliners, but they also do not justify terror attacks.

In contrast to German public opinion, which is predominantly critical of Israeli policies, criticism of Israel is often branded by politicians and the media as anti-Semitic,[3] whereby a public climate arises that creates a certain reserve with regard to remarks critical of Israel. This also has effects on the mainstream coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the German press which counteracts a reporting situation unfavorable to Israel with framing supportive of Israel (cf. chapters 10 and 11), while at the same time, however, positions critical of Israel are suggested by accompanying photographs that make Israel appear overly powerful (Hagemann 2011).

In connection with the recurring stereotypical reports on Palestinian or Israeli violence and Israeli or Palestinian victims this contradiction can lead to satiation on the basis of which the reports tend rather to cause annoyance (hypothesis 1), part of the audience does not even think about the relevant news items (hypothesis 2) and/or it refrains from forming its own opinion about the reported events (hypothesis 3).

It they think about the newspaper articles and attempt to understand them, it can be expected on the basis of the results of the ASCI survey that a relevant group of German recipients is peace-oriented and avoids an escalation oriented interpretation of the reported events in favor of a de-escalation oriented understanding (hypothesis 4).

Among those recipients whose interpretation of the events is escalation oriented, partisanship for Israel will be less commonly found than partisanship for the Palestinians (hypothesis 5), whereby, however, because of the above-named reserve, as a long-term effect of mainstream reportage and also as a result of the ambivalence of the World War II lesson we can expect that a pro-Palestinian interpretation will be less radical and contain fewer anti-Israeli moments than conversely (hypothesis 6).

This expectation is also supported by the fact that critique of Israel is only accompanied with anti-Semitic attitudes among a minority of the Germans and is qualified among the majority by a human rights commitment (Kempf 2012a). Results of the ASCI survey indicate that a human rights commitment reduces anti-Semitic as well as anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic attitudes and exerts pressure to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Why participants tend rather to position themselves according to a pro-Palestinian than according to a pro-Israeli frame is *not* a function of their human rights orientation *per se*, however. It is the interac-

---

3   The parliamentary debate on the alleged anti-Semitism of the small leftist political party Die Linke (cf. Melzer 2011), the media uproar on the (doubtlessly quite naive) poem by Günther Grass (cf. Krell & Müller 2012) and the debate over Jakob Augstein, the publisher of the leftist weekly newspaper *Der Freitag*, are dramatic examples of this.

tion between participants' human rights orientation and their beliefs about whether Israeli policy aims at the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians that determines the direction of partisanship (Kempf 2014).

Taking this into account, we assume that both media frames (hypothesis 7) and individual frames (hypothesis 8) have a direct effect on how participants interpret the depicted issues. These effects are not linear-additive, however, and particularly the effect of media war frames diminishes if they are incompatible with participants' individual frames (hypothesis 9).

If participants do not have an *a priori* mental model of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the other hand, their ability to make sense of the articles they read will be limited (hypothesis 10).

Due to recipients' sensitivity to the propaganda function of reports about violence and its victims (cf. chapter 14), we further assume that the effect of the scenario depicted in the articles (Israeli vs. Palestinian violence) will be limited: Since the majority of Germans are more negative about Palestinian attacks than about Israeli military operations, we assume that the propaganda effect of reports about Israeli violence will be weaker and result in less escalation oriented framing of the essays (hypothesis 11).

Nonetheless, the propaganda effect of reports about violence should be highly visible: it reduces partisanship for the perpetrator and promotes a text understanding in favor of the victim side, especially when the participants have already *a priori* positioned themselves in their favor, and the media frame has the same bias (hypothesis 12).

If recipients' *a priori* positioning in favor of a conflict party is reinforced by a similarly oriented media frame, reports on the victimization of the opponent remain ineffective, however. Instead, the recipients continue to interpret the article in the sense of their *a priori* positioning (hypothesis 13).

If recipients' *a priori* positioning in favor of a conflict party is reinforced by reports on the victimization of this party, deviant media frames (ones incompatible with the *a priori* positioning) remain ineffective. Instead, the recipients interpret the article *a fortiori* in the sense of their *a priori* positioning (hypothesis 14).

2. Method

2.1 Experimental design

After filling in a pre-test questionnaire, n = 394 participants were randomly assigned to six experimental groups which differed neither with respect to participants' age, nor with respect to gender, religious affiliation, educational level, or with respect to the participants' human rights orientation, pacifistic attitudes, concern about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, knowledge about the conflict, sensitivity

Stephanie Thiel & Wilhelm Kempf

for the ambivalence of war and peace and/or positioning to the conflict (cf. chapter 14).

Each of the experimental groups read a news article that reported about either an April 2006 Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv, or an Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip at the end of February/beginning of March 2008, and each of these scenarios was framed either (1) according to an escalation oriented pro-Israeli war frame, (2) according to an escalation oriented pro-Palestinian war frame, or (3) according to a de-escalation oriented peace frame which focuses on the burdens of war for both parties (cf. table 3).

Frame	Partisanship	Scenario	
		Palestinian terror attack / Israeli victims	Israeli military operation / Palestinien victims
War frame	Pro-Israeli	"Suicide Attack: Terror Shakes Tel Aviv"	"Offensive in Gaza: Israel Cracks Down on Constant Fire by Militant Palestinians"
	Pro-Palestinian	"Suicide Attack in Tel Aviv: Israel Announces Retaliation"	"Gaza: Israel Kills Dozens of Palestinians: Peace Talks Canceled"
Peace frame	Neutral	"Suicide Attack Shakes Tel Aviv"	"Gaza Strip: Dozens of Dead and Injured in Battles"

Table 3: Scenarios, frames and partisanship of the news articles (from Kempf & Thiel 2012)

The articles were composed of original quotations taken from the German quality press, and the framing of the articles was constructed according to Kempf's (2003) model of escalation versus de-escalation oriented conflict coverage. A content analysis of the articles ensured the comparability of the frames in regard to their escalation and/or de-escalation orientation, and their empirical evaluation by means of the text assessment scale ensured that they did not differ in regard to their ability to stimulate interest in further information, nor did they differ with respect to their evaluation as reasonably informative, interesting, credible, comprehensible and well-balanced (cf. Thiel 2011).

After reading the articles, participants were asked to evaluate them on a slightly modified version of the text assessment scale by Bläsi et al. (2005), and to write an essay on their own view of the events reported in the article.

The instructions for participants' *essays* read as follows:

Now please try to describe the events you have just read about and their background from your own viewpoint. Take into account thereby especially the aspects of this conflict that appear important to you. If there is not enough space, you can continue writing on the next page.

In order to control for anti-Semitic, anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic attitudes,

the post-test also included the scales AP (Devaluation of Palestinians), IK (Demonizing Islam) and MA1 (Dislike of Jews) from the ASCI survey (Kempf 2013).

2.2 Individual frames

In order to reconstruct the *a priori* individual frames according to which participants interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the pre-test included the *Positioning-Scale* (POSI) of the ASCI survey (Kempf 2013), which classifies participants into nine classes according to the way they make sense of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Figure 1: Pro-Israeli war frame

Figure 2: Peace frame(s)

Figure 3: Pro-Palestinian frame "on the edge"

Figure 4: Pro-Palestinian war frame

A   Solution by negotiation
B   Violence deepens gap
C   Account of both sides' needs
D   Accentuation of own side's needs
E   Need to force the opponent

F   Criticism of opponent's policy
G   Delegitimation of the opponent
H   Legitimation of own side's warfare
I   Condemnation of opponent's violence

- Three of these classes are not sufficiently familiar with the conflict to be able to form an opinion. These classes are made up of participants who neither agree nor disagree with the statements in the items (class 9), who mainly respond in the "Don't know" category (class 8), and/or who mainly do not respond to the items at all (class 7).

- Three classes interpret the conflict according to a peace frame that is not completely neutral, however, but displays sympathy either for Israel (class 6) or for the Palestinians (class 2) and/or puts the blame on Israel (class 4).
- Two classes interpret the conflict according to either a pro-Israeli (class 5) or a pro-Palestinian war frame (class 3), and another class interprets it according to a pro-Palestinian frame that is close to the edge of a war frame (class 1).

For the purpose of the present study we aggregated these nine classes into four groups of participants who either do not position themselves to the conflict (classes 7, 8 and 9) or interpret the conflict according to a pro-Israeli war frame (class 5; cf. figure 1), according to a pro-Palestinian frame that is at least "on the edge" of a war frame (classes 1 and 3; cf. figures 3 and 4) or according to a peace frame (classes 2, 4 and 6; cf. figure 2).

2.3 Content analysis of the essays

The content analysis of the essays included a classification of the ways participants dealt with the article they had read as (a) (almost) not dealing with the text at all, (b) taking up only one or two aspects, or (c) dealing with the reported incident in a more detailed way; and four content analytical dimensions,

1. Reactions to the text;
2. Reference to external factors;
3. Escalation-oriented statements; and
4. De-escalation-oriented statements,

each of which was operationalized by a set of five to nine binary variables (cf. table 4). The coding of the essays by two independent raters resulted in good to very good inter-coder reliabilities (M_κ = .83; SD_κ = .10).

Reactions to the text
• Dealing with the logic of conflict
• Expressing resentment or mistrust against the article and/or the media in general
• Lacking interest in the conflict and/or the conflict parties
• Expressions of concern
• Anger, rage and/or resentment at the conflict in general
• Resignation towards violence
• Plattitudes like "Violence breeds counter-violence"
Reference to external factors
• Positive reference to third party interventions
• Negative reference to third party interventions
• Attributing the conflict causes to global interests
• Attributing the conflict causes to religion
• Attributing the conflict causes to human nature

Escalation-oriented statements
• Antagonistic reasoning • Pro-Israeli statements • Pro-Palestinian statements • Anti-Israeli statements • Anti-Palestinian statements
De-escalation-oriented statements
• Rejection of war and violence • Call for and/or approval of a peaceful conflict resolution • Call for a fair balance of the resolution and/or the process by which it is approached • Questioning of the win-lose model and/or putting the negative effects of violence on record • Critical evaluation of both sides' rights and intentions • Critical evaluation of both sides' behavior • Alienation from the escalation-oriented leadership on both sides • Referring to victims and/or the civil society on both sides • Emphasizing shared perspectives

Table 4: Content analytical variables

2.4 Data analysis and interpretation strategy

The statistical analysis of the content analytical data proceeded in three steps (cf. figure 5). As a first step, Latent-Class-Analysis (LCA) was applied to each of the content-analytical dimensions in order to identify the typical patterns into which the respective variables combine. As a second step, the essays were assigned to the identified (first-order) classes, and the reliability of the assignment was measured by mean membership probabilities (MEM). As a third step, finally, a second-order LCA was computed in order to identify the ways these classes combine (1) with each other, (2) with participants' *a priori* positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (3) with the characteristics (scenario and framing) of the articles the participants read.

Due to the rather small sample sizes, LCA-model selection was based on CIC-Index (Reunanen & Suikkanen 1999). The fit of the selected model was evaluated relative to the *a priori* distribution using the Proportional Reduction in Error Index (PRE; Goodman 1972), and (where applicable) relative to the Pure-Random-Model using the Explanatory Power Index (EP; Kempf 2012b).

The interpretation of the second-order LCA was split into two processes, the first of which focuses on the content analytical classification of the essays and describes the meta-patterns into which the various content analytical (first-order) classes combine. The second process, finally, focuses on the interaction between media frames and individual frames and analyzes (a) the frequency of these patterns within media frames, scenarios, and participants' *a priori* positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as (b) the frequency of media frames, scenarios, and participants' *a priori* positions within the second-order classes.

In order to control for anti-Semitic, anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic factors, finally, Analysis of Variance was used to compare the identified classes with respect to their mean scores on the respective post-test scales.

Figure 5: Experimental design, data analysis and interpretation strategy

3.   Results

3.1 Handling of and reactions to the text

The classification of the essays with respect to the participants' handling of the article they had read confirmed our assumption that the recurring stereotypical reports on Palestinian and/or Israeli violence lead to satiation. Part of the audience does not even reflect on the relevant news articles (hypothesis 2). The results are much more dramatic, however, than we would have expected (cf. figure 6): 50% of the participants did not deal with the text in their essays (A); another 36% touched on only one or two aspects (B), and only 15% dealt with the reported incident in a more detailed way (C).

Also confirmed was that reports on Palestinian and/or Israeli violence tend rather to elicit annoyance (hypothesis 1): Participants' reactions to the text (cf. figure 7) were occasionally marked by a very general reference to the logic of conflict (D: 15.2%), expressions of resignation towards violence (I: 12.4%), lack of interest in the conflict and/or the conflict parties (F: 12.2%), and resentment or mistrust

of the article and/or the media in general (E: 9.4%); less frequently by expressions of concern (G: 7.9%), and/or of anger, rage and/or resentment at the conflict in general (H: 7.4%); and in some cases by platitudes like "Violence breeds counter-violence" (J: 5.8%).

Figure 6: Handling of the text

Figure 7: Reactions to the text

A (Almost) no dealing with the text
B Picking up of one or two aspects only
C Dealing with the reported incident

D Dealing with the logic of conflict
E Expressing resentment or mistrust against the article and/or the media in general
F Lacking interest in the conflict and/or the conflict parties
G Expressions of concern
H Anger, rage and/or resentment at the conflict in general
I Resignation towards violence
J Platitudes like "Violence breeds counter-violence"

Surprisingly, an LCA of these variables resulted in a 1-class solution (cf. table 5), which indicates that the distribution of these variables expresses a general mind-set which constitutes a homogeneous undertone that is likewise typical for all of the essays and does not differentiate between them.[4]

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC	CIC
PR	-899.21	1	126	92.89	n.s.	1800.43	1804.40	1800.21
LC1	-884.57	7	120	63.60	n.s.	1783.14	1810.97	1781.65
LC2	-879.75	15	112	53.96	n.s.	1789.50	1849.15	1786.32
LC3	-875.12	23	104	44.70	n.s.	1796.24	1887.70	1791.36
Sat.	-852.77	127				1959.54	2464.54	1932.59

Table 5: Reactions to the text. Goodness-of-fit statistics of the first-order LCA

---

4 Accordingly, the dimension of participants' reaction to the text was not further considered in the second-order LCA (cf. figure 5).

3.2 Reference to external factors

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC	CIC
PR	-532.90	1	30	74.33	< 0.001	1067.81	1071.78	1067.60
LC1	-520.95	5	26	50.42	< 0.01	1051.90	1071.78	1050.84
LC2	-506.28	11	20	21.08	n.s	1034.56	1078.30	1032.23
LC3	-500.83	17	14	10.18	n.s	1035.66	1103.26	1032.05
LC4	-500.14	23	8	8.80	n.s	1046.28	1137.74	1041.40
LC5	-499.48	29	2	7.48	< 0.05	1056.96	1172.27	1050.81
Sat.	-495.74	31				1053.48	1176.75	1046.90

Table 6: Reference to external factors. Goodness-of-fit statistics of the first-order LCA

Figure 8: Class 1 (80.6%)
Almost no reference to external factors

Figure 9: Class 2 (11.1%)
Approval of third party interventions

Figure 10: Class 3 (8.3%)
Reference to global interests

A Positive reference to third party interventions   D Attributing the conflict causes to religion
B Negative reference to third party interventions   E Attributing the conflict causes to human nature
C Attributing the conflict causes to global interests

LCA of participants' reference to external factors resulted in a 3-class solution (cf. table 6; PRE = 99.41%; EP = 86.30%; MEM = 0.97):

- Class 1 (cf. figure 8) is characteristic for 80.6% of the essays, which (almost) do not refer to any external factors at all.
- Class 2 (cf. figure 9) is characteristic for 11.1% of the essays, which are marked by approval of third party interventions (A: 78.9%).
- Class 3 (cf. figure 10) is characteristic for 8.3% of the essays, which are marked by references to global interests (C: 99.8%) and often reject third party interventions (B: 39.6%).

3.3 Escalation oriented statements

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC	CIC
PR	-701.86	1	30	241.48	< 0.001	1405.72	1409.69	1405.50
LC1	-668.67	5	26	175.10	< 0.001	1347.34	1367.22	1346.28
LC2	-630.26	11	20	98.28	< 0.001	1282.52	1326.26	1280.19
LC3	-586.41	17	14	10.58	n.s	1206.82	1274.42	1203.21
LC4	-586.35	23	8	10.46	n.s	1218.70	1310.16	1213.82
LC5	-582.23	29	2	2.22	n.s	1222.46	1337.77	1216.31
Sat.	-581.12	31				1224.24	1347.51	1217.66

Table 7: Escalation oriented statements: Goodness-of-fit statistics of the first-order LCA

An LCA of the escalation oriented statements that were included in the essays resulted in a 3-class solution (cf. table 7; PRE = 99.33%; EP = 95.62%; MEM = 0.96).

- Class 1 (cf. figure 11, p. 314) is characteristic for 73.0% of the essays, which (almost) do not contain any escalation oriented statements at all.
- Class 2 (cf. figure 12, p. 314) is characteristic for 19.9% of the essays, which are marked by pro-Palestinian (C: 83.2%) and anti-Israeli statements (D: 53.6%).
- Class 3 (cf. figure 13, p. 314) is characteristic for 7.1% of the essays, which are marked by pro-Israeli (B: 83.5%) and anti-Palestinian statements (E: 99.8%).

Comparison of class 2 and class 3 confirms our assumptions that a pro-Palestinian interpretation of the articles would be more frequent (hypothesis 5), but less radical than a pro-Israeli one (hypothesis 6): Class 2 is nearly three times as frequent as class 3, and with comparably strong pro-Palestinian or respectively pro-Israeli framing of the essays, anti-Israeli statements are less frequent in class 2 than anti-Palestinian statements in class 3.

Figure 11: Class 1 (73.0%)
Almost no escalation oriented statements

Figure 12: Class 2 (19.9%)
Pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli statements

Figure 13: Class 3 (7.1%)
Pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian statements

A   Antagonistic reasoning   D   Anti-Israeli statements
B   Pro-Israeli statements   E   Anti-Palestinian statements
C   Pro-Palestinian statements

3.4 De-escalation oriented statements

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC	CIC
PR	-1641.97	1	510	819.08	< 0.001	3285.94	3289.91	3285.72
LC1	-1571.39	9	502	677.92	< 0.001	3160.78	3196.57	3158.87
LC2	-1430.45	19	492	396.04	n.s.	2898.90	2974.45	2894.87
LC3	-1393.13	29	482	321.40	n.s.	2844.26	2959.57	2838.11
LC4	-1368.00	39	472	271.14	n.s.	2814.00	2969.08	2805.72
LC5	-1349.66	49	462	234.46	n.s.	2797.32	2992.16	2786.92
LC6	-1347.01	59	452	229.16	n.s.	2812.02	3046.62	2799.50
LC7	-1328.93	69	442	193.00	n.s.	2795.86	3070.23	2781.22
Sat.	-1232.43	511				3486.86	5518.78	3378.43

Table 8: De-escalation oriented statements. Goodness-of-fit statistics of the first-order LCA

An LCA of the de-escalation oriented statements that were included in the essays resulted in a 5-class solution (cf. table 8; PRE = 90.43%; EP = 71.38%; MEM = 0.90).

- Class 1 (cf. figure 14, p. 316) is characteristic for 49.2% of the essays, which (almost) do not contain any de-escalation oriented statements at all.
- Class 2 (cf. figure 15, p. 316) is characteristic for 16.8% of the essays, which are marked by a focus on peaceful conflict resolution (B: 95.2%) and a rejection of violence (A: 49.2%).
- Class 3 (cf. figure 16, p. 316) is characteristic for 12.8% of the essays, which are marked by a focus on both sides' victims (H: 68.1%) and the denial of win-lose and/or putting the negative effects of violence on record (D: 36.8%) (cf. figure 16).
- Class 4 (cf. figure 17, p. 316) is characteristic for 12.6% of the essays, which are marked by a critical evaluation of both sides' behavior (F: 81.9%) and/ or intentions (E: 80.0%).
- Class 5 is characteristic for 8.6% of the essays, which are marked by a comprehensive de-escalation orientation which includes all of the relevant variables (cf. figure 18, p. 316): Critical evaluation of both sides' behavior (F: 86.9%) and/or rights and intentions (E: 77.5%), call for and/or approval of peaceful conflict resolution (B: 77.7%), questioning the win-lose model and/ or putting the negative effects of violence on record (D: 71.6%), referring to victims and/or civil society on both sides (H: 62.6%), call for a fair balance of conflict resolution and/or the process by which it is approached (C: 60.7%); rejection of war and violence (A: 50.5%), alienation from escalation oriented leadership on both sides (G: 41.6%), and emphasizing shared perspectives (I: 33.0%).

Figure 14: Class 1 (49.2%)
No de-escalation oriented statements

Figure 15: Class 2 (16.8%)
Focus on peaceful conflict resolution

Figure 16: Class 3 (12.8%)
Focus on both sides' victims

Figure 17: Class 4 (12.6%)
Critical evaluation of both sides' behavior

Figure 18: Class 5 (8.6%)
Comprehensive de-escalation orientation

A   Rejection of war and violence
B   Call for and/or approval of a peaceful conflict resolution
C   Call for a fair balance of the resolution and/or the process by which it is approached
D   Questioning of the win-lose model and/or putting the negative effects of violence on record
E   Critical evaluation of both sides' rights and intentions
F   Critical evaluation of both sides' behavior
G   Alienation from the escalation-oriented leadership on both sides
H   Referring to victims and/or to the civil society on both sides
I   Emphasizing shared perspectives

3.5 Second-order LCA

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC	CIC
LC1	-2611.96	16	3223	998.88	n < df	5255.92	5319.54	5252.52
LC2	-2577.67	33	3206	930.30	n < df	5221.34	5352.56	5214.34
LC3	-2549.70	50	3189	874.36	n < df	5199.40	5398.22	5188.79
LC4	-2523.87	67	3172	822.70	n < df	5181.74	5448.16	5167.52
LC5	-2505.09	84	3155	785.14	n < df	5178.18	5512.19	5160.36
LC6	-2486.24	101	3138	747.44	n < df	5174.48	5576.09	5153.05
LC7	-2472.61	118	3121	720.18	n < df	5181.22	5650.43	5156.18
LC8	-2461.26	135	3104	697.48	n < df	5192.52	5729.33	5163.87
Sat.	-2112.52	3239				10703.04	23582.44	10015.76

Table 9: Goodness-of-fit statistics of the second-order LCA

A second-order LCA resulted in a 6-class solution (cf. table 9; PRE = 65.15%; MEM = 0.87) which identifies different ways of making sense of the articles that the participants had read and relates them to the interaction between the textual characteristics (scenario and framing) of the articles and the participants' *a priori* positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3.5.1 Content analytical classification of the essays

Characteristic for participants who avoid dealing with the article they read (class1) and/or avoid any framing of the conflict in their essays (class 3), two of the identified classes confirm our assumption, according to which satiation with media reports on Palestinian and/or Israeli violence led to the result that part of the audience does not think about it at all (hypothesis 2) and/or refrains from forming an opinion on the reported events (hypothesis 3).

- Class 1 (Avoidance of dealing with the text; cf. figure 19, p. 318) is characteristic for 31.4% of the essays. Participants who wrote these essays do not deal with the article they had read (A = 1: 100%), and most of them neither refer to external factors (B= 1: 88.4%) nor make any escalation oriented (C = 1: 83.5%) or de-escalation oriented statements (D = 1: 69.7%). Only occasionally do they reject violence and call for peaceful conflict resolution (D = 2: 14.5%) and/or criticize both sides' behavior and intentions (D = 4: 13.2%).
- Class 3 (Avoidance of framing the conflict; cf. figure 21, p. 318) is characteristic for 19.6% of the essays. Although the participants who wrote these essays deal with the reported incident (A = 3: 61.6%) or take up at least one or two aspects of the article they had read (A = 2: 37.7%), they almost completely avoid framing the conflict: 94.7% of their essays do not contain any reference to external factors (B = 1), 92.0% do not contain any escalation oriented statements (C = 1), and 81.0% do not contain any de-escalation oriented statements either (D = 1). Only occasionally do they criticize both sides' behavior and intentions (D = 4: 18.9%).

Figure 19: Class 1 (31.4%)
Avoidance of dealing with the text

Figure 20: Class 2 (26.8%)
De-escalation oriented framing of the conflict

Figure 21: Class 3 (19.6%)
Avoidance of framing the conflict

Figure 22: Class 4 (9.1%)
Conflict-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict

Figure 23: Class 5 (8.2%)
Text-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict

Figure 24: Class 6 (4.9%)
Pro-Israeli and/or anti-Palestinian framing of the conflict

A   Handling of the text:
1 = (Almost) no dealing with the text; 2 = Picking up of one or two aspects only; 3 = Dealing with the reported incident

B   Reference to external factors:
1 = (Almost) no reference at all; 2 = Approval of third party interventions; 3 = Reference to global interests and rejection of third party interventions

C   Escalation oriented statements:
1 = (Almost) none; 2 = Pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian statements; 3 = Pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli statements

D   De-escalation oriented statements:
1 = (Almost) none; 2 = Focus on peaceful resolution and refusal of violence; 3 = Focus on both sides' victims and denial of win-lose; 4 = Critical evaluation of both sides' behaviour and intentions; 5 = Comprehensive de-escalation orientation

In accordance with hypothesis 4, a relevant group of participants (class 2) framed the essays in a de-escalation oriented way.

- Class 2 (De-escalation oriented framing of the conflict; cf. figure 20) is characteristic for 26.8% of the essays. While many of the participants who wrote these essays did not deal with the article they had read (A = 1: 44.4%) or took up only one or two of its aspects (A = 2: 47.5%), and while most of them did not refer to any external factors (B = 1: 80.0%), the characteristic features of these essays are the avoidance of any escalation oriented statements (C = 1: 89.5%) and a consistent emphasis on de-escalation oriented aspects. This includes a focus on both sides' victims and the rejection of win-lose (D = 3: 41.5%), a focus on peaceful conflict resolution and a rejection of violence (D = 2: 28.7%), a comprehensive de-escalation orientation (D = 5: 22.0%) and/or at least a critical evaluation of both sides' behavior and intentions (D = 4: 7.6%).

Three of the identified classes (class 4, 5 and 6) confirm our expectation that among the participants who understand the reported events in an escalation oriented manner, a pro-Palestinian framing of the essays is more common (hypothesis 5), but is, however, less radically pronounced (hypothesis 6) than a pro-Israeli framing.

Two of these classes are characteristic for participants who framed their essays in an escalation oriented way that is partisan for the Palestinians (cf. figures 22 and 23). Both of these classes are characterized by both a high proportion of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli statements (C = 2) (class 4: 58.7%; class 5: 46.8%) and a complete lack of any pro-Israeli and/or anti-Palestinian statements (C = 3).

- Class 4 (Conflict-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict; cf. figure 22) is characteristic for 9.1%) of the essays. The participants who wrote these essays focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict *per se* rather than on the article they had read: 53.9% did not deal with the article (A = 1), and another 46.1% took up only one or two of its aspects (A = 2). In contrast to all other classes, the majority took external factors into account as well (B = 2-3: 69.0%), and in spite of the strong emphasis on escalation oriented aspects in favor of the Palestinians (C = 2: 58.7%), many of their essays (52.1%) also contained de-escalation oriented statements: 26.9% rejected violence and focused on peaceful conflict resolution (D = 2), 9.7% rejected the win-lose model and focused on both sides' victims (D = 3), and another 15.4% gave a comprehensive account of de-escalation oriented aspects (D = 5).
- Class 5 (Text-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict; cf. figure 23) is characteristic for 8.2% of the essays. As compared with class 4, the participants who wrote these essays referred to the text they had read more strongly, and only a few of them (A = 1: 7.7%) did not deal with the article they had read. At the same time, they brought fewer external factors into play (B = 2-3: only 5.2%), and their essays contained fewer de-escalation oriented statements (D = 2-5: only 32.3%).

One of the identified classes (class 6) is characteristic for participants who framed their essays in an escalation oriented way that is partisan for Israel in a quite radical way (cf. figure 22, p. 318): 100% of these essays are dominated by pro-Israeli and/or anti-Palestinian statements (C = 3).

- Class 6 (Pro-Israeli and/or anti-Palestinian framing of the conflict; cf. figure 24, p. 317) is characteristic for 4.8% of the essays. Similar to class 5, only a few of the participants who wrote these essays avoided dealing with the article they had read (A = 1: 14.5%), most of them did not bring external factors into play (B = 1: 84.3%), and rather few of their essays included de-escalation oriented statements as well (D = 2-5: 28.0%).

3.5.2 Interaction between media frames and individual frames

In accordance with prior studies by Annabring et al. (2005), the results in figure 25 indicate that media frames have a direct effect on the ways participants make sense of the news stories they read in the study (hypothesis 7).

Media frames:
A   Pro-Israeli war frame; B   Pro-Palestinian war frame; C   Peace frame
Scenarios:
D   Palestinian violence / Israeli victims; E   Israeli violence / Palestinian victims
Positioning:
F   Pro-Israeli war frame; G   Pro-Palestinian war frame or "on the edge" of a war frame;
H   Peace frame; I   No position
Content analytical classification of the essays:
: 1 = Avoidance of dealing with the text; 3 = Avoidance of framing the conflict; 2 = De escalation-oriented framing of the conflict; 4 = Conflict-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict; 5 = Text-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict; 6 = Pro-Israeli and/or anti-Palestinian framing of the conflict

Figure 25: Frequency of content-analytical patterns within media frames, scenarios and participants' *a priori* positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[5]

---

5   Attention: The sequence of the second-order classes 2 and 3 is reversed in figures 25-28.

- A pro-Palestinian framing of the essays (class 4 and 5) is most frequent (20.6%) among participants who read an article that was framed according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (B), and least frequent (14.6%) among participants who read an article that was framed according to a pro-Israeli war frame (A).
- A pro-Israeli framing of the essays (class 6) is most frequent (7.9%) among participants who read an article that was framed according to a pro-Israeli war frame (A), and least frequent (2.3%) among participants who read an article that was framed according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (B).
- A de-escalation oriented framing of the essays (class 2) is most frequent (36.0%) among participants who had read an article that was framed according to a peace frame (C) and much less frequent among participants who had read an article that was framed according to a war frame (pro-Israeli war frame: A = 18.9%; pro-Palestinian war frame: B = 25.7%).

At the same time, the results in figure 25 show that individual frames also have a direct effect (hypothesis 8).

- A pro-Palestinian framing of the essays (class 4 and 5) is most frequent (40.3%) among participants who had already *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians (G).
- A pro-Israeli framing of the essays (class 6) is most frequent (35.3%) among participants who had already *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of Israel (F).
- A de-escalation oriented framing of the essays (class 2) is most frequent (37.7%) among participants who had already *a priori* positioned themselves according to a peace frame (H).

In accordance with hypothesis 9, the effects of media frames and individual frames are not linear-additive, however, and particularly the effect of media war frames diminishes if they are incongruent with participants' individual frames (cf. figure 25).

Regardless of how the news articles were framed,

- none (0.0%) of the participants who had *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of Israel (F), and very few (3.0%) of those who had positioned themselves according to a peace frame (H), framed their essays according to a pro-Palestinian frame (class 4 and 5), and
- very few of the participants who had *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians (G: 2.6%) and/or according to a peace frame (H: 1.9%), framed their essays according to a pro-Israeli frame (class 6).

In accordance with hypothesis 10, the majority of the participants who had no *a priori* position to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (I) either avoided dealing with the article they had read (class 1: 50.3%) or avoided framing their essays (class 3: 15.6%) (cf. figure 25). The rest of them (34.1%) framed their essays either in a de-escalation oriented way (class 2: 19.0%) or according to the text-related variant of a pro-Palestinian frame (class 5: 15.1%), but never (0.0%) according to a

conflict-related pro-Palestinian frame (class 4) and/or according to a pro-Israeli frame (class 6) (cf. figure 25).

- Avoidance of dealing with the text (class 1) was slightly more frequent among participants who had read an article framed according to a peace frame (C: 34.1%) or according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (B: 32.5%), than among participants who had read an article that was framed according to a pro-Israeli war-frame (A: 27.9%).
- Avoidance of framing their essays (class 3), on the other hand, was least frequent among participants who had read an article framed according to a peace frame (C: 8.9%) and most frequent in reaction to articles that were framed according to a pro-Israeli war frame (A: 30.6%).

In accordance with hypothesis 11, the propaganda effect of reports about Israeli violence was weaker and resulted in less escalation oriented framing of the essays than reports about Palestinian violence (cf. figure 25).

- De-escalation oriented framing of the essays (class 2) was more frequent among participants who had read an article about Israeli violence (E: 33.6%) and less frequent among participants who had read an article about Palestinian violence (D: 20.1%).
- Escalation oriented framing of the essays (class 4, 5 and 6), on the other hand, was more frequent among participants who had read an article about Palestinian violence (D: 31.6%) and much less frequent among those who had read an article about Israeli violence (E: 12.7%).

Hypothesis 12, according to which the propaganda function of reports on violence is neutralized in favor of a de-escalation oriented text understanding, if a media peace frame coincides with an *a priori* individual frame in agreement with it, could be confirmed for Israeli violence, but not, however, for Palestinian violence.

- The majority of the participants who framed their essays according to a de-escalation oriented frame (class 2) had *a priori* positioned themselves according to a peace frame (H: 59.6%; cf. figure 28) and had read an article about Israeli violence (E: 62.6%; cf. figure 27) that was framed according to a peace frame (C: 45.0%; cf. figure 26).

The same holds for hypothesis 12, according to which the propaganda effect of reports about violence further a text understanding in favor of the victim side, if the participants had already positioned themselves *a priori* in their favor and the media frame has the same bias.

- Only 15.0% (cf. figure 27) of the participants who framed their essays according to a pro-Israeli frame (class 6) had read an article about Israeli violence (E).
- The majority of the participants who framed their essays according to a pro-Israeli frame (class 6) had already *a priori* positioned themselves according to a pro-Israeli war frame (F: 64.7%; cf. figure 28) and had read an article about Palestinian violence (D: 85.0%, cf. figure 27) that was framed accord-

ing to a pro-Israeli war frame (A: 56.4%, cf. figure 26).

• Among the participants who framed their essays according to a pro-Palestin-
ian frame, the share of those who had read an article about Palestinian vio-
lence (D) – quite to the contrary – is extremely high (class 5: 99.9%) or only
declined to a marginal extent (class 4: 38.5%).

Figure 26: Frequency of media frames within the
second-order classes)

Figure 27: Frequency of scenarios within the
second-order classes

Figure 28: Frequency of *a priori* positions within the second-order classes

Media frames:
A   Pro-Israeli war frame; B   Pro-Palestinian war frame; C   Peace frame
Scenarios:
D   Palestinian violence / Israeli victims; E   Israeli violence / Palestinian victims
Positioning:
F   Pro-Israeli war frame; G   Pro-Palestinian war frame or "on the edge" of a war frame;
H   Peace frame; I   No position
Class numbers:
1 = Avoidance of dealing with the text; 3 = Avoidance of framing the conflict; 2 = De escalation-oriented
framing of the conflict; 4 = Conflict-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict;
5 = Text-related pro-Palestinian and/or anti-Israeli framing of the conflict; 6 = Pro-Israeli and/or anti-
Palestinian framing of the conflict

Conversely, the reactance postulated in hypotheses 13 and 14 could be shown only
for those participants who framed their essays according to a pro-Palestinian
frame. In agreement with hypothesis 13, reports about Israeli victims remained
not only ineffective, but rather evoked a pro-Palestinian interpretation, if partici-

pants' *a priori* positioning in favor of the Palestinians was reinforced by a pro-Pal-estinian media war frame.

- 58.4% of the participants who framed their essays according to a text-related pro-Palestinian frame (class 5) had already *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians (G: 58.4%; cf. figure 28), and had read an article about Palestinian violence (D: 99.9%; cf. figure 27) that was rather framed according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (B: 67.4%; cf. figure 26).

The reactance was even more strongly pronounced if participants' *a priori* posi-tioning in favor of the Palestinians was reinforced by reports about Palestinian vic-tims (hypothesis 14). If this was the case, the deviant (incompatible with the *a priori* positioning) media frames remained ineffective, and the participants inter-preted the articles more than ever in the sense of their *a priori* positioning.

- All of the participants who framed their essays according to a conflict-related pro-Palestinian frame (class 4) had already *a priori* positioned themselves ac-cording to a pro-Palestinian war frame (G: 100%; cf. figure 28), and the ma-jority of them had read an article about Israeli violence (E: 61.5%; cf. figure 27) that was rather framed according to a peace frame (C: 62.3%; cf. figure 26) or to a pro-Israeli war frame (A: 26.2%; cf. figure 26).

That this reactance is displayed particularly as a response to media peace frames is an unexpected result that highlights the barriers that peace journalism needs to surmount if conflicts are highly escalated and the polarization of the conflict parties has hardened.

3.5.3 Class differences with respect to anti-Semitic, anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic attitudes

Anti-Semitic attitudes do not come into question as an explanation for this. Table 10 shows that the members of class 4 who frame their essays according to a con-flict-related pro-Palestinian frame reject not only anti-Semitic, but also anti-Pales-tinian and Islamophobic statements the most strongly and thereby are the least burdened with prejudices. Class 5, which frames the essays according to a text-related pro-Palestinian frame, to the contrary, displays the least rejection of anti-Semitic statements, and class 6, which frames the essays according to a pro-Israeli frame, displays the least rejection of anti-Palestinian statements and even displays a tendency to agree with Islamophobic statements.

Scale	Class 1	Class 3	Class 2	Class 4	Class 5	Class 6	F	df	p
AP	2.05	1.90	2.03	1.57	1.97	2.19	3.650	5. 377	0.003
IK	2.66	2.49	2.61	2.17	2.69	3.32	4.835	5. 379	< 0.001
MA1	1.80	1.47	1.52	1.31	1.59	1.51	3.514	5. 377	0.004

Table 10: Analysis of variance: Comparison of second-order classes with respect to anti-Semitic, anti-Palestin-ian and Islamophobic attitudes. AP = Devaluation of Palestinians; IK = Demonizing Islam; MA1 = Dislike of Jews. Scale points: 1 = Prejudice; 2 = Rather prejudice; 3 = Partly both; 3 = Rather justifiable; 4 = Justifiable

4. Summary and discussion

The aim of the present research project was to study how German recipients make sense of differently framed news articles about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how media contents, media frames and recipients' *a priori* mental models of the conflict interact in this process. For this purpose, six groups of participants were presented with news articles that reported about either a Palestinian suicide attack or an Israeli military operation. Each of these scenarios was framed either according to a pro-Israeli war frame, a pro-Palestinian war frame or a de-escalation oriented peace frame. After reading the articles, participants wrote essays on their own view of the events reported in the article, and their text understanding was assessed using a content analysis of their essays.

The findings of the study speak in favor of the peace journalism project and confirm results found by Annabring et al. (2005), according to which escalation vs. de-escalation oriented media frames have a direct effect on how recipients make sense of the news stories they read. This effect is limited, however, by recipients' individual frames (*a priori* mental models), which show both a direct effect and a complex interaction with media frames and media contents. Particularly the effect of media war frames diminishes if they are incongruent with recipients' individual frames, and the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims (cf. Herman & Chomsky 1988) can be neutralized if framed according to a media peace frame. Contrary to the widely held assumption of many journalists and media researchers that "violence sells" (cf. Kunczik 1990, Hanitzsch 2007), the recurring stereotypical reports of Israeli and/or Palestinian violence tend rather to annoy German recipients. As a result, part of the audience does not even deal with the relevant news items and refrains from forming a personal opinion about the reported events.

At the same time, however, the results also show the effectiveness of war journalism sensu Galtung (2002) and limits of the peace journalism project that advise to dismiss any schematic application of Galtung's (2003) widely cited table of war/violence vs. peace/conflict journalism and/or Kempf's (2003) checklist for escalation vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage. They point to the necessity of taking into consideration mainstream media discourses and the over-all societal climate in which peace journalism operates. Thus Kempf (2003) has already pointed out that the transformation of a war discourse into a peace or reconciliation discourse must be a gradual process that takes into account the degree of escalation of the respective conflict, and Bläsi (2009) has argued that a society is much more likely to be prepared to accept the ideas and practices of peace journalism in a non-violent conflict stage than in wartime.

If participants had already *a priori* positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians, reports about an Israeli military operation with casualties on the Palestinian side promoted a text understanding in favor of the Palestinians, even if the article was framed according to a peace frame. Furthermore, if supported by a pro-Palestinian media war frame, reports about a Palestinian attack with Israeli victims

also did not reduce partisanship for the Palestinians, but instead produced reactance and definitely led to a text understanding in favor of the Palestinians. Thereby the participants in this case dealt in particular detail with the text in order to support and maintain their *a priori* position.

The resounding impact of the recipients' *a priori* mental models that comes to expression thereby is found only with participants who had positioned themselves in favor of the Palestinians, and appears to contradict the findings according to which (1) pro-Israeli hardliners interpret the newspaper articles relatively more radically in favor of Israel than pro-Palestinian ones, and (2) the propaganda effect of reports about Israeli military operations and Palestinian victims is in all weaker than that of reports about Palestinian attacks and Israeli victims. This contradiction can, however, be resolved if one takes into account the mainstream media discourse and the societal climate in Germany.

Thus the relatively weaker propaganda effect of reports about Israeli violence and Palestinian victims can be attributed to the fact that Palestinian attacks are generally more strongly condemned than Israeli military operations; and the resounding impact of an a priori positioning in favour of the Palestinians can be understood as a counter-reaction to the contradiction between the mainstream coverage which counteracts reportage situations unfavorable to Israel by a pro-Israeli framing (cf. chapters 10 and 11) and the accompanying photographs that paint the picture of an overwhelmingly superior Israeli power (Hagemann 2011) which – according to readers' beliefs – aims at the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians.

Conversely, we can assume that the stronger negative perception of the other side by pro-Israeli hardliners is due to long-term effects of the pro-Israeli framing of the German mainstream reportage. That pro-Palestinian hardliners are more reserved in this regard can, however, also be attributed to the ambivalence of the World War II lesson and/or to the reluctance to expose themselves to accusations of anti-Semitism. This mixture of sympathy for the Palestinians and the effort to avoid exposing oneself to accusations of anti-Semitism could also explain the reluctance to form one's own opinion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which was found with those participants who had already *a priori* avoided taking a position on the conflict. That is, however, not an alternative interpretation. Rather, one can assume that all these factors are at work simultaneously.

References

Abbas, M. (1995). Through secret channels: The road to Oslo. Reading: Garnet.

ABC NEWS (1988). Israelis and Palestinians. Nightline.

Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. & Turner, B. (1994). Dictionary of sociology. 3rd ed. London: Penguin.

Abu-Lughod, L. (1991). Writing against culture. In: Fox, R.F. (Ed.), Recapturing anthropology: Working in the present. Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 137-162.

Aburaiya, I., Avraham, E. & Wolfsfeld, G. (1998). The Arabs in Israel in the eyes of the Hebrew press: Media and delegitimization. Givat Haviva: The Institute for Israeli Arab Studies and the Institute for Peace Research (in Hebrew).

Akaike, H. (1987). Factor analysis and AIC. Psychometrika 52(3), 314-332.

Al-Haj, M. (2000). Identity and orientation in the Israeli Arab: A situation of double periphery. In: Gabizon, R. & Haker, D. (Eds.), The Jewish-Arab cleavage: A reader. Jerusalem: IDI (in Hebrew).

Althaus, S. L. & Tewskbury, D. (2002). Agenda setting and the "new" news: Patterns of issue importance among readers of the paper and online versions of the *New York Times*. Communication Research, 29(2), 180-208.

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities. London: Verso (revised edition).

Andersen, R. (2006). A century of media, a century of war. New York: Lang.

Angus, I. & Cook, P. G. (1984). The media, Cold War and the disarmament movement: Reflections on the Canadian situation (Working paper 84-3) Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares. Cited in: Hackett, R. A. (1991), News and dissent, the press and the politics of peace in Canada. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Annabring, U. (2000). Protagonisten und Konfliktkonstellationen im israelisch-palästinensischen Friedensprozeß. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Annabring, U., Ditlmann, R. & Kempf, W. (2005). Die kognitive Repräsentation von Nachkriegskonflikten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Mainstream-Diskurs und abweichender Berichterstattung. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 235-254.

Annabring, U. & Jaeger, S. (2005). Der Wandel des Feindbilds Serbien nach dem Machtwechsel. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 129-148.

Anti-Defamation League (2002a). European attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. New York: Anti-Defamation League.
http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/european_attitudes.pdf

Anti-Defamation League (2002b). European attitudes toward Jews: A five country survey. New York: Anti-Defamation League.
http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/EuropeanAttitudesPoll-10-02.pdf

Anti-Defamation League (2004). Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in ten European countries. New York: Anti-Defamation League.
http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/european_attitudes_april_2004.pdf

Arian, A. (1997). The second Israeli republic. Tel Aviv: Haifa University Press and Zemora Bittan (in Hebrew).

Arian, A. (1995). Security threatened. Cambridge Studies in Political Psychology and Public Opinion. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Cambridge University Press.

Arnett, P. (1991). Why I stayed in Iraq and how I got that interview with Saddam. Washington Post, March 17.

Asia, I. (2000). The coverage of the Israeli Arabs during the Intifada. Kesher 27 (in Hebrew).

Avnery, U. (1986). My friend, the enemy. London: Zed Books.

Avraham, E. (2001). The hidden Israel: Kibbutz, Jewish settlements, development cities and Arab towns in the Israeli press. Jerusalem: Akademon (in Hebrew).

Avraham, E. (2002). Social-political environment, journalism practice and coverage of minorities: The case of the marginal cities in Israel. Media, Culture and Society 24(1), 69-86.

Avraham, E. (2003). Behind media marginality: Coverage of social groups and places in the Israeli press. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Avraham, E., First, A. & Elephant-Lefler, N. (2004). The absent and the present in prime-time: Multi-cultural diversity in TV commercial broadcasting in Israel. Jerusalem: The Second Authority for Television and Local Radio (in Hebrew).

Avraham, E., Wolfsfeld, G. & Aburaiya I. (2000). Dynamics in the news coverage of minorities: The case of the Arab citizens of Israel. Journal of Communication Inquiry 24(2), 117-133.

Azar, E. & Cohen S. (1979). Peace as crisis and war as status quo: The Arab-Israeli conflict environment. International Interactions 6, 159-184.

Babcock, L. & Olson, C. (1992). The causes of impasses in labor disputes. Industrial Relations 31, 348-60.

Baer, D., Grabb, E. & Johnston, W. A. (1990). The values of Canadians and Americans: A critical analysis and reassessment. Social Forces 68(3), 693-713.

Baker, R. (2011). Demonizing the enemy: Preparing Americans and the world for an all out attack against Iran. Global Research, December 27. http://www.globalresearch.ca

Baker, W. D. & O'Neal, J. R. (2001). Patriotism or opinion leadership? The nature and origins of the 'rally round the flag' effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(5), 661-87.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bandura, A. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral control. Journal of Social Issues 46, 27-46.

Barber, B. R. (1992). Jihad vs. McWorld. Atlantic Monthly Review, March.

Barber, B. R. (1995). Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books.

Barnea, N. (2002). Dancing with Arafat. The Seventh Eye 36, 5-7 (in Hebrew).

Barstow, D. & Stein, R. (2005). Under Bush, a new age of prepackaged TV news. *New York Times*, March 13, 8-15.

Bar-Tal, D. (1989). Delegitimization: The extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice. In: Bar-Tal, D., Graumann, C., Kulanski, A. W. & Strobe, W. (Eds.), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions. New York: Springer, 633-645.

Bar-Tal, D. (1995). Introduction. In: Ophaz, H. (Ed.), When peace comes. Jerusalem: Israel Information Center, 5-10.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. International Journal of Conflict Management 9(1), 22-50.

Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Barthes, R. (1977). The rhetoric of the image. In: Heath, S. (translation and ed.), Image-Music-Text. Glasgow: Fontana, 32-51.

Barthes, R. (1993). Mythologies. London: Vintage.

Baudrillard, J. (1972). Pour une critique de l'economie politique du signe. Paris: Gallimard.

Baudrillard, J. (2001a). The Gulf War did not take place. In: Poster, M. (Ed.), Jean Baudrillard: Selected writings. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Baudrillard, J. (2001b). The masses: The implosion of the social in the media. In: Poster, M. (Ed.), Jean Baudrillard: Selected writings. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bazerman, M. H. (1998[4]). Judgment in managerial decision making. New York: Wiley.

Bazerman, M. H. & Carroll, J. S. (1987). Negotiator cognition. Research in Organizational Behavior 9, 247-88.

Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi, T. & Neale, M. A. (1985). The acquisition of an integrative response in a competitive market. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 34, 294-313.

Bazerman, M. H., Moore, D. A. & Gillespie, J. J. (1999). The human mind as a barrier to wiser environmental agreements. American Behavioral Scientist 42, 1254-76.

Bazerman, M. H. & Neale, M. A. (1982). Improving negotiation effectiveness under final offer arbitration: The role of selection and training. Journal of Applied Psychology 67, 543-48.

Bazerman, M. H. & Neale, M. A. (1983). Heuristics in negotiation: Limitations to effective dispute resolution. In: Bazerman, M. H. & Lewicki, R. J. (Eds.), Negotiating in organizations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 51-67.

Bechor, G. (1995). A lexicon of the PLO. Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Defense.

Beede, B. R. (1994). The war of 1898 and the U.S. interventions, 1898-1934: An encyclopedia. New York: Garland.

Bell, M. (1996). In harm's way: Reflections of a war-zone thug. London: Penguin, revised edition.

Ben-Ami, S. (1991). Árabes y judíos: realidades imaginadas e imágenes reales. Cuenta y Razón 54, 29-36.

Ben-Ami, S. (2013). El incierto mapa futuro del mundo árabe. El Pais, January 21st.

Benhabib, S. (1996). The democratic moment and the problem of difference. In: Benhabib, S. (Ed.), Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 3-18.

Bennett, W. L. (1983). News: The politics of illusion (3rd ed.). New York: Longman Publishers.

Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.

Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1969). Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer.

Bergmann, W. (2002). Geschichte des Antisemitismus. München: Beck.

Bergmann, W. & Erb, R. (1991a). 'Mir ist das Thema Juden irgendwie unangenehm.' Kommunikationslatenz und die Wahrnehmung des Meinungsklimas im Fall des Antisemitismus. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 43(3), 502-519.

Bergmann, W. & Erb, R. (1991b). Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946-1989. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Berinski, A. & Kinder, D. (1999). Understanding Cosovo: Framing news and meanings. Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Atlanta.

Bernstein, A. (2002). Representation, identity and the media. In: Newbold, C., Boyd-Barrett, O. & Van Den Bulck, H. (Eds.), The media book. London: Edward Arnold, 259-317.

Bhabha, H.K. (1994). The location of culture. London: Routledge.

Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage.

Bird, S. E. & Dardenne, R. W. (1988). Myth, chronicle and story: Exploring the narrative qualities of news. In: Carey, J. W. (Ed.), Media, myths and narratives. Television and the press. Sage Annual Reviews of Communication Research 15, 67-83.

Bizman, A. & Hoffman, M. (1993). Expectations, emotions, and preferred responses regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict: An attributional analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 139-59.

Blake, R. R. & Mouton, J. S. (1961). Comprehension of own and outgroup positions under intergroup competition. Journal of Conflict Resolution 5, 304-310.

Blake, R. R. & Mouton, J. S. (1962). Overevaluation of own group's product in intergroup competition. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 64, 237-238.

Bläsi, B. (2006). Peace journalism and the news production process. conflict &conflict & communication online 3(1 & 2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Bläsi, B. (2009). Implementing peace journalism: The role of conflict stages. conflict & communication online 8(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W., Kondopolou, M., & Paskoski, D. (2005). Konstruktive Aspekte des serbischen, deutschen und griechischen Nachkriegsdiskurses – qualitative Vergleichsstudien. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 149-200.

Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W. & Möckel, J. (2004). A catalog of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented aspects of conflict coverage. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 53. Berlin: regener.

Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W. & Spohrs, M. (2005). Glaubwürdigkeit und Attraktivität von eskalations- und deeskalationsorientierten Nachrichtentexten. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 203-234.

Bloom, W. (1990). Personal identity, national identity and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blumer, H. (1973). Der methodologische Standpunkt des symbolischen Interaktionismus. In: Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen (Hrsg.), Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesell-schaftliche Wirklichkeit. Band I. Reinbek: rororo, 80-146.

Bottom, W. P. & Studt, A. (1993). Framing effects and the distributive aspect of integrative bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 56, 459-74.

Bregman, A. & El-Tahri, J. (1998). The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. London: Penguin and BBC.

Brewer, P. R. (2001). Value words and lizard brains: Do citizens deliberate about appeals to their core values? Political Psychology 22, 45-64.

Brody, R. A. (1984). International crises: A rallying point for the president? Public Opinion 6, 41-43.

Bruck, P. A. (1989). Strategies for peace, strategies for news research. Journal of Communication 39(1).

Burgess, H. & Burgess, G. (1996). Constructive confrontation: A transformative approach to intractable conflicts. Mediation Quarterly 13(4), 305-322.

Burgess, H. & Burgess, G. with Glaser, T. & Yevsyukova, M. (1997). Transformative approaches to conflict. University of Colorado: Conflict Research Consortium. http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/index.html

Browne, N. (1984). The political economy of television's supertext. Quarterly Review of Film Studies 9(3).

Bruck, P. A. (Ed.) (1988). A proxy for knowledge: The news media as agents in arms control and verification. Ottawa: The Centre for Culture and Society at Carleton University.

Bruck, P. A. (1989). Strategies for peace, strategies for news research. Journal of Communication 39(1).

Bunting, M. (2004). Reasons for being cheerless. The Guardian, March 1.

Capella, J. N. & Jamieson, K. H. (1997). The spiral of cynicism. The press and the public good. New York: Oxford University Press.

Carpentier, N. & Terzis, G. (Eds.) (2005). Media representations of war and conflict. Workshop organized by the KUB-Center Communication for Social Change, Communications Department of the Vesalius College (VUB) and the Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism, Brussels March 18. http://www.warandmedia.org/documents/war&media.finalreport.pdf

Carroll, M. P. (2005). Who owns democracy? Explaining the long-running debate over Canadian/American value differences. The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 42(3), 267-80.

Carroll, J. S., Bazerman, M. H. & Maury, R. (1988). Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 41, 352-70.

Carruthers, S. (2000). The media at war: Communication and conflict in the XX century. London: Basingstoke.

Caspi, D. & Limor, Y. (1992). The mediators: The mass media in Israel 1948-1990. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (in Hebrew).

Charland, M. (1987). Constitutive rhetoric: The case of the 'peuple Quebecois'. The Quarterly Journal of Speech 73(2), 133-150.

Chomsky, D. (2000). Advance agent of the Truman doctrine: The United States, The *New York Times*, and the Greek civil war. Political Communication 17(4).

Chong, D. & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Theory of framing and opinion formation in competitive elite environments. Journal of Communication 57, 99-118.

Cohen, A. A., Adoni, H. & Bantz, C. R. (1990). Social conflicts and television news. London: Sage.

Cohen, A. A. & Wolfsfeld, G. (Eds.) (1993). Framing the Intifada: Media and people. New York: Ablex.

Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological Measurement 20(1), 37-46.

Cohen, S. (2001). States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering. Boston: Polity Press.

Cohrs, J. C., Kielmann, S. O., Moschner, B. & Maes, J. (2002). Befragung zum 11. September 2001 und den Folgen: Grundideen, Operationalisierungen und deskriptive Ergebnisse der ersten Erhebungsphase. Berichte aus der Arbeitsgruppe "Verantwortung, Gerechtigkeit, Moral", Nr. 148. http://psydok.sulb.uni-saarland.de/volltexte/2004/103/pdf/beri148.pdf

Connelly, J. (2004). In the northwest: U.S.-Canadian relations troubled by many gremlins. Seattle Post Intelligencer, Nov. 22.

Connor, W. (1978). A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a … Ethnic and Racial Studies 1(4), 377-400.

Corbett, J. (2012a). Media manipulation and the drums of war: How media is used to whip the nation into wartime frenzy. Global Research, January 3. http://www.globalresearch.ca

Corbett, J. (2012b). YouTube video faking it: How the media manipulates the world into war. Global Research TV (GRTV), Centre for Research on Globalization January, 2nd. http://www.globalresearch.ca

Corbin, J. (1994). Gaza first: The secret channel to peace between Israel and the PLO. London: Bloomsbury.

Cotler, I. (2002). New anti-Jewishness. Alert Paper (Vol. 1). Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute.

Coxon, A. (1999). Sorting data: Collection and analysis. Sage University Papers on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-127. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Christison, K. (1997). U.S. policy and the Palestinians: Bound by a frame of reference. Journal of Palestine Studies 26(4), 46-59.

Christison, K. (1998a). Bound by a frame of reference, Part II: U.S. policy and the Palestinians, 1948-88. Journal of Palestine Studies 27(3), 20-34.

Christison, K. (1998b). Bound by a frame of reference, Part III: U.S. policy and the Palestinians, 1988-98. Journal of Palestine Studies 27(4), 53-64.

Craik, K. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cronkite, W. (1996). A reporter's life. New York: Random House.

Curhan, J. R., Neale, M. A. & Ross, L. (1998). Dynamic valuation: Preference change in the context of active face-to-face negotiations. Paper presented at Annual Stanford/Berkeley talks, Stanford, CA.

Dahinden, U. (2006). Framing: Eine integrative Theorie der Massenkommunikation. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.

Dahlgren, P. & Chakrapani, S. (1982). The Third World on t.v. news: Western way of seeing the "other". In: Adams, W. (Ed.), Television coverage of international affairs. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Dalton, R. (1988). Citizen politics in Western democracies. New Jersey: Chatham House.

Daugherty, D. & Warden, M. (1979). Prestige press editorial treatment of the Middle East during 11 crisis years. Journalism Quarterly 56, 776-82.

Dayan, D. & Katz, E. (1992). Media events: The live broadcasting of history. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

De Dreu, C. K. W. (1996). Gain-loss frame in outcome-interdependence: Does it influence equality or equity considerations? European Journal of Social Psychology 26, 315-24.

De Dreu, C. K. W. & McCusker, C. (1997). Gain-loss frames and cooperation in two-person social dilemmas: A transformational analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72, 1093-106.

Delwiche, A. (n.d.) Propaganda. http://www.propagandacritic.com/

Demick, B. (2013). North Korea tried to ship gas masks to Syria, report says. LA Times, August 27. http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-north-korea-syria-gas-masks-20130827,0,5415

Dennis, E. E. (1991). Images of the Soviet Union in the United States: Some impressions and agenda for research. In: Dennis, E. E., Gerbner, G. & Zassoursky, Y. N. (Eds.), Beyond the Cold War: Soviet and American media images. London: Sage, 46-54.

Dente Ross, S. (2002). An American frame: New York Times discourse on Palestine and Israel. Paper presented at the 23rd Conference and General Assembly of IAMCR, Barcelona, July.

Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deutscher Bundestag (2011). Bericht des unabhängigen Expertenkreises Antisemitismus. Antisemitismus in Deutschland – Erscheinungsformen, Bedingungen, Präventionsansätze. Drucksache 17/7700.

Dick, R. van, Wagner, U., Adams, C. & Petzel, T. (1997). Einstellung zur Akkulturation: Erste Evaluation eines Fragebogens an sechs deutschen Stichproben. Gruppendynamik 28(1), 83-92.

Diekmann, K. A. (1997). 'Implicit justifications' and self-serving group allocations. Journal of Organizational Behavior 18, 3-16.

Diekmann, K. A., Samuels, S. M., Ross, L. & Bazerman, M. H. (1997). Self-interest and fairness in problems of resource allocation: Allocators versus recipients. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72, 1061-74.

Diekmann, K. A., Tenbrunsel, A. E. & Bazerman, M. H. (1999). Escalation and negotiation: Two central themes in the work of Jeffrey Z. Rubin. In: Kolb, D. (Ed.), Negotiation ethics: Essays in memory of Jeffrey Z. Rubin. Cambridge, MA: PON Books.

Dijk, T. A. van (1988). News as discourse. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Dijk, T. A. van (1991). Racism and the press. London: Routledge.

Dijk, T. A. van (1996). Power and the news media. In: Paletz, D. L. (Ed.), Political communication in action. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Dijk, T. A. van & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. New York: Academic Press.

Domke, D. (1997). Journalists, framing, and discourse about race relations. Journalism & Mass Communication Monographs 164, 5-55.

Dor, D. (2001). Newspapers under the influence. Tel Aviv: Babel (in Hebrew).

Dor, D. (2003). Behind "defensive shield". Tel Aviv: Babel.

Dowler, K. (2004). Comparing American and Canadian local television crime stories: A content analysis. Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 46(5), 573-597.

Druckman, J. N. (2001a). Evaluating framing effects. Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 91-101.

Druckman, J. N. (2001b). On the limits of framing effects: Who can frame? The Journal of Politics 63, 1041-1066.

Druckman, J. N. (2001c). The implications of framing effects for citizen competence. Political Behavior 23, 225-256.

Druckman, J. N. (2004). Political preference formation: Competition, deliberation, and the (ir)relevance of framing effects. American Political Science Review 98, 671-686.

Druckman, J. N. & Nelson, K. R. (2003). Framing and deliberation: How citizens' conversations limit elite influence. American Journal of Political Science 47, 729-745.

Duff-Brown, B. (2006). Will U.S.-Canada relations thaw? Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 25.

Dunmire, P. L. (1997). Naturalizing the future in factual discourse: A critical linguistic analysis of a projected event. Written Communication 14(2), 221-264.

Dunmire, P. L. (2005). Preempting the future rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse. Discourse & Society 16(4), 481-513.

Dunn, R. (1998). Identity crisis: A social critique of post-modernity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Eno, B. (2003). Lessons of how to lie about Iraq. The Observer/Guardian, August 17.

Eban, A. (1983). The new diplomacy: International affairs in the modern age. New York: Random House.

Eilders, C. (1997). Nachrichtenfaktoren und Rezeption. Eine empirische Analyse zur Auswahl und Verarbeitung politischer Information. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Elizur, J. N. (1984). Images in situations of protracted conflicts. Paper presented at a seminar of the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University, June 1984. Published as: Thinking about conflict, Jerusalem Post, 24 September 1984.

Elizur, J. N. (1993). National images: Rehabilitation and change in the post-Cold War. Paper presented at a seminar on mutual German-Israeli images, May 1993, Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute.

Entman, R. M. (1991). Framing U.S. coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran Air incidents. Journal of Communication 41(4), 6-27.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication 43(4), 51-58.

Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion & U.S. foreign policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of Communication 57(1), 163-173.

Erjavik, K. & Volcic. Z. (2007). Recontextualizing traumatic pasts: Croatian justification of war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Global Media Journal Mediterranean Edition 2(1).

Evans, H. (n.d.). Reporting in the time of conflict. Newseum war stories. Washington D.C.: Newseum.

Ezrachi, Y. (2002). Israeli mythology. The Seventh Eye 36, 8-9 (in Hebrew).

Fay, B. (1996). Contemporary philosophy of social science: A multicultural approach.Oxford: Blackwell, 55-60.

Federman, R. (1997). Remembering the best television show of 1991. Letter to a Friend.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row & Peterson.

Filc, D. & Ram, U. (2004). Introduction. In: Filc, D. & Ram, U. (Eds.), The power of property: Israel society in the global age. Tel Aviv: The van Leer Jerusalem Institution/Hakibutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 7-16 (in Hebrew).

First, A. (1997). Television and the construction of reality: The Israel case study. In: McCombs, M., Shaw, D.L. & Weaver, D. (Eds.), Communication and democracy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 41-50.

First, A. (1998). Who is the enemy? The portrayal of Arabs in Israeli-television news. Gazette 60(3), 239-251.

First, A. (2001). The good, the bad and the absent. Panim 17, 86-94 (in Hebrew).

First, A. (2002). The transitional nature of representation: The coverage of Arabs in the Israeli news. Howard Journal of Communication 13, 173-191.

First, A. & Avraham, E. (2004). Coverage of Israeli Arabs in Israeli media. Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (in Hebrew).

First, A. &. Avraham, E. (2010). Combining the representation approach with the framing concept: Television news coverage of the Arab population in Israel during conflict. Journalism 11(4), 481-499.

Fisher, R. & Brown, S. (1989). Gute Beziehungen. Die Kunst der Konfliktvermeidung, Konfliktlösung und Kooperation. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

Focus (17.05.2010). "Besser ins Gesicht als hintenrum". Interview mit Stephan Kramer.

Foucault, M. (1967). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason. London: Tavistock Publications.

Fowler, R. (1991). Language in the news: Discourse and ideology in the press. London: Routledge.

Frindte, W. (2006). Inszenierter Antisemitismus. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Frindte, W., Wettig, S. & Wammetsberger, D. (2005). Old and new anti-Semitic attitudes in the context of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Two studies in Germany. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11(3), 239-266.

Frosh, F. & Wolfsfeld, G. (2007). ImagiNation: News discourse, nationhood and civil society. Media, Culture and Society 29(1), 105-129.

Früh, W. & Schönbach, K. (1982). Der dynamisch-transaktionale Ansatz. Ein neues Paradigma der Medienwirkungen. Publizistik 1-2, 74-88.

Fukuno, M. & Ohbuchi, K. (1997). Cognitive biases in negotiation: the determinants of fixed-pie assumption and fairness bias. Japanese Journal of Social Psychology 13, 43-52.

Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civiliza-
    tion. London: Sage.

Galtung, J. (1998). Friedensjournalismus: Warum, was, wer, wo, wann? In: Kempf, W. &
    Schmidt-Regener, I. (Hrsg.), Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien. Münster:
    LIT, 3-20.

Galtung, J. (2002). Peace journalism – A challenge. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (Eds.),
    Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. II. Göteborg: Nordicom, 259-272.

Galtung, J. & Ruge, H. M. (1970). The structure of foreign news. In: Tunstall, J. (Ed.), Media
    Sociology. London: Constable.

Gamer, M., Lemon, J., Fellows, I. & Singh, P. (2010). Various coefficients of interrater reli-
    ability and agreement (Version 0.83).
    http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/irr/index.html

Gamson, W. A. (1988). Political discourse and collective action. International Social Move-
    ment Journal 1.

Gamson, W. A. (1989). News as framing. American Behavioral Scientist 32(2), 157-161.

Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, W. A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W. & Sasson, T. (1992). Media images and the social
    construction of reality. Annual Review of Sociology 18, 373-393.

Gamson, W. A. & Lasch, K. E. (1983). The political culture of social welfare policy. In: Spiro,
    S. E. & Yuchtman-Yaar, E. (Ed.), Evaluating the welfare state: Social and political per-
    spectives. New York: Academic Press, 397-415.

Gamson, W. & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. In:
    Braumgart, R. (Ed.), Research in political sociology, vol. 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Gamson, W. A. & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power:
    A constructionist approach. The American Journal of Sociology 95(1), 1-37.

Gans, H. J. (1979). Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news,
    Newsweek and Time. New York: Random House.

Gavriely-Nuri, D. (2008). The 'metaphorical annihilation' of the Second Lebanon War (2006)
    from the Israeli political discourse. Discourse & Society 19(1), 5-20.

Geertz, C. (1973, 1977). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.

Ghanem, S. (1996). Media coverage of crime and public opinion: An exploration of the second
    level of agenda setting. Austin University of Texas: Doctoral dissertation.

Ghanem, A. & Osatski-Lazar, S. (2001). One year to October events – what changed? Givat
    Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research (in Hebrew).

Gilboa, E. (1987). American public opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lex-
    ington, MA: Lexington Books.

Gilboa, E. (1988). Media diplomacy: Conceptual divergence and applications. Harvard Inter-
    national Journal of Press/Politics 3(3).

Gilin, T. (1980). Media sociology: The dominant paradigm. Theory and Society 6, 205-235.

Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of
    the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Glasl, F. (1992). Konfliktmanagement. Ein Handbuch zur Diagnose und Behandlung von Kon-
    flikten für Organisationen und ihre Berater. Bern: Haupt.

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. An essay on the organization of experience. New York: Harper & Row.

Goodman, H. & Cummings, J. (2003). Military-media relations: Embedding as a case study. In: Feldman, S. (Ed.), After the war in Iraq: Defining the new strategic balance. Brighton UK: Sussex Academic Press, 84-96.

Goodman, L. A. (1972). A modified multiple regression approach to the analysis of dichotomous variables. American Sociological Review 37, 28-46.

Greenberg, B. S. & Brand, J. E. (1994). Minorities and the mass media. In: Bryant, J. & Zillman, D. (Eds.), Media effect: Advance in theory and research. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Grabb, E., Curtis, J. & Baer, D. (2000). Defining moments and recurring myths: Comparing Canadians and Americans after the American revolution. The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 37(4), 373-420.

Gross, L. (1991). Out of the mainstream: Sexual and the mass media. In: Wolf, M. A. & Kielwasser, A. P. (Eds.), Gay people, sex and the media. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press.

Gurevitch, M. & Levy, M. R. (Eds.) (1985). Mass communication review yearbook 5. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Gutierrez, M. (2004). The 'prop-agenda' at war. Inter Press Service, June 27. http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/06/special-report-the-prop-agenda-at-war/

Haack, P. (2007a). Talking intervention. Attitudes towards German foreign policy and the conditional influence of emphasis frames. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Haack, P. (2007b). Talking intervention. Foreign policy frames and their conditional impact on individual attitudes. Saarbrücken: VDM.

Hackett, R. A. (1991). News and dissent, the press and the politics of peace in Canada. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Hackett, R. & Zhao, Y. (Eds.) (with J. Galtung) (2005). Democratizing global media: One world many struggles. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hagen, L. M. (1992). Die opportunen Zeugen. Publizistik 37, 444-460.

Hagemann, C. (2011). Bilder eines Konfliktes. Analyse der Bilder, die in der Berichterstattung über Israel und die palästinensischen Gebiete verwendet werden. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Haider-Markel, D. P. & Joslyn, M. R. (2001). Gun policy, opinion, tragedy, and blame attribution: The conditional influence of issue frames. Journal of Politics 63, 520-543.

Hall, S. (1980). Culture, media, language. London: Hutchinson.

Hall, S. (1986). Media power and class power. In: Curran, J., Ecclestone, J., Oakley, G. & Richardson, A. (Eds.), Bending reality: The state of the media. London: Pluto, 5-14.

Hall, S. (1997a). The work of representation. In: Hall, S. (Ed.), Representation. Cultural representations and signifying practices. London: The Open University, 13-74.

Hall, S. (1997b). The spectacle of the 'other'. In: Hall, S. (Ed.), Representation. Cultural representations and signifying practices. London: The Open University, 223-290.

Hallin, D. C. (1986). The uncensored war: The media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hallin, D. C. (1984). The media, the war in Vietnam, and political support: A critique of the thesis of an oppositional media. The Journal of Politics 46, 1-24.

Hammock, R. (2010). Content that works: Contextual content, in context. Posted on Wednesday, March 24. http://www.rexblog.com/2010/03/24/20644

Hanitzsch, T. (2004a). Journalists as peacekeeping force?: Peace journalism and mass communication theory. Journalism Studies 5(4), 483-495.

Hanitzsch, T. (2004b). The peace journalism problem: Failure of news people – or failure on analysis. In: Hanitzsch, T., Löffelholz, M. & Mustamu, R. (Eds.) (2004), Agents of peace: Public communication and conflict resolution in an Asian setting. Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 185-206.

Hanitzsch, T. (2004c). Journalisten zwischen Friedensdienst und Kampfeinsatz. In: Löffelholz, M. (Hrsg.), Krieg als Medienereignis II. Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 169-193.

Hanitzsch, T. (2007). Situating peace journalism in journalism studies: A critical appraisal. conflict & communication online 6(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Hanitzsch, T. (2008). Situating peace journalism in journalism studies. A critical appraisal. In: Kempf, W. (Ed.), The peace journalism controversy. Berlin: regener, 69-80.

Hannerz, U. (1999). Reflections of varieties of culturespeak. European Journal of Cultural Studies 2(3), 393-407.

Harris, S. (2012). Lessons from corporate media's role in promoting U.S. war: Nest target: Iran. Between the Lines Radio News Magazine, April 30. http://btlonline.org. http://Facebook.com/BetweenTheLinesRadioNewsmagazine

Hartley, J. (1982). Understanding news. London: Methuen.

Hebdige, D. (1993) Training some thoughts on the future. In: Bird, J., Curtis, B., Putnam, T., Robertson, G. & Tickner, L. (Eds.), Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change. London: Routledge.

Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. Journal of Psychology 21, 107-112.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

Henry III, W. (1991). History as it happens. TIME, January 6.

Herbert, T. B. & Dunkel-Schetter, C. (1992). Negative social reactions to victims: An overview of responses and their determinants. In: L. Montada, Filipp, S. H. & Lerner, M. J. (Eds.), Life crises and experiences of loss in adulthood. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 497-518.

Herman, E. S. & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent. The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hermann, T., Lebel, Y. & H. Tzaban (2008). Anti politics. http://www.idi.org.il/Pages/Home_Page.aspx

Heyder, A., Iser, J. & Schmidt, P. (2005). Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbild zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus. In: Heitmeyer, W. (Hrsg.), Deutsche Zustände Bd. 3. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 144-165.

Hiro, D. (1996). Sharing the promised land: An interwoven tale of Israelis and Palestinians. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Hiscox, M. J. (2006). Through a glass and darkly: Attitudes toward international trade and the curious effects of issue framing. International Organization 60, 755-780.

Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (1983). The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hofstetter, R. (1976). Bias in the news. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Holquin, L. M. (1998). The media in modern peacemaking. Peace Review 10(4), 639-45.

Holzner, B. (1968). Reality construction in society. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Howard, R. R., van de Veen, F. & Verhoeven, H. (Eds.) (2003). The power of the media: A handbook for peacebuilders.
http://reliefweb.int/report/world/power-media-handbook-peacebuilders

Hume, M. (1997). Whose war is it anyway? The dangers of the journalism of attachment. LM Special, InformInc.

Husselbee, L.P. & Stempel, G.H. III. (1997). Contrast in U.S. media coverage of two major Canadian elections. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 74(3), 591-601.

Hutcheson, J. S. (2003). Affirming a nation: The construction of U.S. national identity during the Persian Gulf War and the War on Terrorism. University of Washington: Master's thesis.

Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

InfoRefuge (2003). How the U.S. media promotes war as entertainment.
http://www.inforefuge.com/media-promotes-war-as-entertainment

Ignatieff, M.(1993). Blood and belonging. Toronto: Penguin.

Ignatius, D. (2010). The dangers of embedded journalism, in war and politics. The Washington Post, May 2.

Ismael, T. Y. & Measor, J. (2003). Racism and the North American media following 11 September: The Canadian setting. Arab Studies Quarterly 25(1/2), 101.

Itule, B. & Anderson, D. (1997). News writing and reporting for today's media (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Jackson, L.E . (2006). Moral disengagement. How media use can affect the support of war. Berlin: VDM.

Jaeger, S. (2004). The German press coverage on France after World War II. conflict & communication online 3(1&2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Jaeger, S. (2005a). Themenauswahl in der Nachkriegsberichterstattung. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 51-80.

Jaeger, S. (2005b). Von Nachhall und Überwindung deutsch-französischer Gegnerschaft. Qualitative Fallstudien. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.), Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 81-126.

Jaeger, S. (2009). Nachrichtenmedien als Ressource für Frieden und Versöhnung. Inhaltsanalytische Pressestudien zur westdeutschen Berichterstattung über Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin: regener.

Jaeger, S. & Möckel, J. (2004). Die Berichterstattung in der Frankfurter Rundschau über Jugoslawien nach dem Sturz von Slobodan Milošević. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 57. Berlin: regener.

Jäger, S. & Jäger, M. (2003). Medienbild Israel. Zwischen Solidarität und Antisemitismus. In: Medien: Forschung und Wissenschaft, Band 3. Münster/Hamburg/London: LIT.

Jakobsen, P. V. (2000). Focus on the CNN effect misses the point: The real media impact on conflict management is invisible and indirect. Journal of Peace Research 37(2), 131-43.

Jakubowicz, A., Goodall, H., Marin, J., Mitchell, T., Randall, L. & Seneviratne, K. (1994). Racism, ethnicity and the media. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin Pty.

Jalbert, L. P. (1983). Some constructs for analyzing news. In: Davis, H. & Walton, P. (Eds.), Language, image, media. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 282-299.

Jordan, D. L. (1993). Newspaper effects on policy preferences. Public Opinion Quarterly, 57(2), 191-205.

Karim, K. H. (2000). Islamic peril: Media and global violence. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Kuzio, T. (2001). Identity and nation-building in Ukraine: Defining the 'other'. Ethnicities 1(3), 343-365.

Katz, E. & Dayan, D. (1985). Media events: On the experience of 'not being there'. Religion 15(3).

Kellner, D. (1995). Media culture. London: Routledge.

Keltner, D. & Robinson, R. J. (1993). Imagined ideological differences in conflict escalation and resolution. International Journal of Conflict Management 4, 249-62.

Kempf, W. (1996). Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Eskalation und Deeskalation. Ein sozialpsychologisches Modell. Wissenschaft und Frieden 14, 51-54.

Kempf, W. (1997). Latent styles of German newspaper coverage of allied prisoners of war during the Gulf War. In: Rost, J. & Langenheine, R. (Eds.), Applications of latent trait and latent class models in the social sciences. Münster: Waxmann, 233-254.

Kempf, W. (1998). Media contribution to peace building in war-torn society. Presented at the 48th Annual Conference of the International Communications Association, 20-24 July, Jerusalem.

Kempf, W. (2002a). Conflict coverage and conflict escalation. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (Eds.), Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 59-72.

Kempf, W. (2002b). Escalating and deescalating aspects in the coverage of the Bosnia conflict. A comparative study. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (Eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Göteborg: Nordicom, 227-255

Kempf, W. (2003). Constructive conflict coverage. A social psychological approach (edited by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution). Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. (2005).Two experiments focusing on de-escalation oriented coverage of post-war conflicts. conflict & communication online 4(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Kempf, W. (2006). The impact of text framing on the understanding of political conflict. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 59. Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. (2008). The impact of political news on German students' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. conflict & communication online 7(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Kempf, W. (2010). Patterns of criticizing Israel and their relationship to modern anti-Semitism. conflict & communication online 9(1), 1-20. http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Kempf, W. (2011a). Criticism of Israel, modern anti-Semitism and the media. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 70. Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. (2011b). Mental models of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 3(2), 507-542.

Kempf, W. (2012a): Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: A methodological challenge for peace research. Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 4/2, 515-532.

Kempf, W. (2012b). Scorebildung, klassische Testtheorie und Item-Response-Modelle in der Einstellungsmessung. In: Kempf, W. & Langeheine, R. (Hrsg.), Item-Response-Modelle in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. (2013). Documentation of the anti-Semitism and the criticism of Israel (ASCI) survey. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 75. Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. (2014). Human rights orientation and the assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 77. Berlin: regener.

Kempf, W. & Reimann, M. (1993). Worthy victims. Die Berichterstattung über alliierte Kriegsgefangene und ihre Nutzbarmachung für die Eskalation der Kriegsziele im 2. Golfkrieg. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 22. http//www.ub.uni-konstanz.de/serials/kempf.htm

Kempf, W. & Reimann, M. (2002). The presentation of alternative ways of settling the Gulf Conflict in German, Norwegian and Finnish media. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (Eds.), Journalism and the New World Order. Göteborg: Nordicom, 203-226.

Kempf, W. & Thiel, S. (2012). On the interaction between media frames and individual frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. conflict & communication online 11(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Kempf, W., Reimann, M. & Luostarinen, H. (1996). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse von Kriegspropaganda und kritischem Friedensjournalismus. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 32. Konstanz: KOPS.

Keshev (2007). War until the last moment, Israeli media in the Second Lebanon War. The Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel.

Kimerling, B. (1999). Palestinian, a nation in creation. Jerusalem: Keter (in Hebrew).

Kimerling, B. & Migdal, J. (2001). The end of the former elite. Jerusalem: Keter (in Hebrew).

Kimmerling, B. (2004). Immigrants, settlers, natives: The Israeli state and society between cultural pluralism and cultural wars. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (in Hebrew).

Kinder, D. R. (2003). Communication and politics in the age of information. In: Sears, D., Huddy, L. & Jervis, R. (Eds.), Oxford handbook of political psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kinder, D. R. & Sanders, L. M. (1996). Divided by color: Radical politics and democratic ideals. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kintsch, W. (1998) Comprehension: A paradigm for cognition. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kissinger, H. (1995). Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone.

Klapper, J. T. (1960). The effects of mass communications. New York: Free Press.

Klug, B. (2003). The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism. Patterns of Prejudice 37(2), 117-138.

Knightley, P. (2000a). Fighting dirty. The Guardian, March 20. http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2000/mar/20/mondaymediasection.pressandpublishing

Knightley, P, (2000b). The first casualty. London: Prion Books.

Koren, A. (1994). Coverage of Land Day (1976) in the Israeli press. Patuach 2, 3-16 (in Hebrew).

Kracauer, S. (1952). The challenge of qualitative content analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly 16, 631-642.

Kramer, R. M. (1994). The sinister attribution error: Paranoid cognition and collective distrust in organizations. Motivation and Emotion 18, 199-230.

Kramer, R. M., Newton, E. & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993). Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of self-esteem and mood. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 56, 110-33.

Krämer, S. (2010). Interview in the news magazine *Focus* on 17 May 2010.

Kraybill, R. (1995). The cycle of reconciliation. Conciliation Quarterly 14(3), 7-8.

Krell, G. & Müller, H. (2012). Noch ein Krieg im Nahen Osten? Zum misslungenen Anstoß von Günter Grass zu einer überfälligen öffentlichen Debatte. HSFK Report 2.

Kuhn, A. (1996). The power of the image. In: Marris, P. & Thornham, S. (Eds.), Media studies. A reader. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 62-67.

Kull, S., Ramsay, C. & Lewis, E. (2003-4). Misperceptions, the media, and the Iraq war. Political Science Quarterly 118 (4), Winter, 569-598.

Kunczik, M. (1990). Die manipulierte Meinung. Nationale Image-Politik und internationale Public Relations. Köln: Böhlau.

Kurspahic, K. (2003). Balkan media in war and peace. Washington DC: USIP Press.

Lakoff, R. (2000). The language war. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lancaster, K. (2008). News media coverage of the Iraq war in Basra: A case study in "spinning" news for the state. International Journal of Communication 2. http.ijoc.org

Langenbucher, W. R. & Yasin, G. (2009). Produziert die Logik des Journalismus Anti-Israelismus? Von den Schwierigkeiten, aus Israel zu berichten. In: Holtz-Bacha, C., Reus, G. R. & Becker, L. B. (Hrsg.), Wissenschaft mit Wirkung. Beiträge zur Journalismus- und Medienwirkungsforschung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 257-278.

La'or, N., Elephant-Lefler N. & Inbar-Lankeri H. (2006). The absent and the present in prime-time: Multi-cultural diversity in TV commercial broadcasting in Israel. Jerusalem: The Second Authority for Television and Local Radio (in Hebrew).

Larson, J. F. (1986). Television and US foreign policy: The case of the Iran hostage crisis. Journal of Communication 36, 108-130.

Larson, J. F. (1988). Television reporting on Asian affairs: The case of South Korea. In: Desbarats, P. & Henderson, R. (Eds.), Encounter 87: Media, democracy and development. London, Ontario: Graduate School of Journalism, University of Western Ontario, 47-50.

Lasn, K. (1999). Media carta. Peace Review 11(1), 121-125.

Lasswell, H. D. (1927). Propaganda technique in the World War. London: Kegan Paul.

Lazar, A. & Lazar, M. M. (2004). The discourse of the New World Order: 'Out-casting' the double face of threat. Discourse & Society 15(2/3), 223-242.

Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Lederach, J. P. (1998). Journey towards reconciliation. Chapter 8: The Meeting Place. Scottsdale: Herald Press.

Lee, S.T. & Maslog, C. C. (2005). War or peace journalism in Asian newspapers? Journal of Communication 55 (2), 311-329.

Leff, L. (2000). When the facts didn't speak for themselves. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5(2), 52-73.

Leudar, I., Marsland, V. & Nekvapil, J. (2004). On membership categorization: 'Us', 'them'and 'doing violence' in political discourse. Discourse & Society 15(2-3), 243-266.

Levi-Strauss, C. (1995). Myth and meaning. New York: Schocken.

Liebes, T. (1992). Our war/their war: Comparing the "Intifadeh" and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israeli television. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 9(1), 44-55.

Liebes, T. (1997). Reporting the Arab-Israeli conflict. London: Routledge.

Liebes, T. (2000). Inside a news item: A dispute over framing. Political Communication 17(3), 295-305.

Liebes, T. (2003). American dreams, Hebrew subtitles: Globalization at the receiving end. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc.

Liebes, T. & Kampf, T. (2006). From spider webs to fortified fighting and back: Coverage of the home front during the Second Lebanon War. Tel Aviv: The Haim Herzog Institute.

Lim, R. G. (1997). Overconfidence in negotiation revisited. International Journal of Conflict Management 8, 52-79.

Lim, R. G. & Carnevale, P. J. (1995). Influencing mediator behavior through bargainer framing. International Journal of Conflict Management 6, 349-68.

Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Linzer, D. A. & Lewis, J. B. (2011). poLCA: An R package for polytomous variable latent class analysis. Journal of Statistical Software 42(10), 1-29.

Lipset, S. M. (1986). Historical traditions and national characteristics: A comparative analysis of Canada and the United States. Canadian Journal of Sociology 11(2), 113-55.

Lipset, S. M. (1990). The values of Canadians and Americans: A reply to Baer, Grab and Johnston. Social Forces 69(1), 267-272.

Lipsky, M. (1970). Protest in city politics. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J. & Bracken, C. C. (2002). Content analysis in mass communication. Assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. Human Communication Research 28(4), 587-604.

Loyn, D. (2008). Good journalism or pace journalism? In: Kempf, W. (Ed.), The peace journalism controversy. Berlin: regener, 53-68.

Lynch, J. (1998). The peace journalism option. Conflict & peace forums. http://www.transcend.org

Lynch, J. (2003). Journalists need to think: A response to David Loyn. Open Democracy, March 12.

Lynch J. (2010). Peace journalism. In: Allan, S. (Ed.), Companion to news and journalism. London: Routledge, 542-554.

Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2004). News from the Holy Land: Options and consequences. Stroud: Hawthorn Press & Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities & Sciences.

Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2005). Peace journalism. London: Hawthorn Press.

Macarthur, J. R. (1992). Second front: Censorship and propaganda in the Gulf War. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press.

Mandelzis, L. (2002). The image of the enemy. Paper presented at the 23rd Conference and General Assembly of IAMCR, Barcelona, July.

Mandelzis, L. (2007). Representations of peace in news discourse: Viewpoint and opportunity for peace journalism. In: Shinar, D. & Kempf, W. (Eds.), Peace journalism: The state of the art. Berlin: regener, 97-110.

Marthoz, J. P. (2005). Untitled statement. In: Carpentier, N. & Terzis, G. (Eds.), Media representations of war and conflict. Workshop organized by the KUB-Center Communication for Social Change, Communications Department of the Vesalius College (VUB) and the Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism, Brussels March 18, 29-31. http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~ncarpent/war&media_finalreport.pdf

Martin-Baró, I. (1991). Die psychischen Wunden der Gewalt. In: Kempf, W. (ed.). Verdeckte Gewalt. Psychosoziale Folgen der Kriegsführung niedriger Intensität in Zentralamerika. Hamburg: Argument.

Matthes, J. & Kohring, M. (2008). The content analysis of media frames: Toward improving reliability and validity. Journal of Communication 58(2), 258-279.

Mc Chesney, R. (2000). Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times. New York: The New Press.

McCombs, M. E. & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36, 176-187.

McGoldrick, A. (2007). War journalism and 'objectivity'. In: Shinar, D. & Kempf, W. (Eds.), Peace journalism: The state of the art. Berlin: regener, 17-25.

McHoul A. W. (1993). Discourse. In: McHoul, A. W. & Grace, W. (Eds.), A Foucault Primer: Discourse, power and the subject. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 26-56.

McLaughlin, E. (2001). Television coverage of the Vietnam War and the Vietnam. Veteran, December 3.

McQuail, D. (1994). Mass communication theory: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Melone, S., Terzis, G., & Beleli, O. (2002). Using the media for conflict transformation: The Comon Ground experience. In: Fischer, M., Giesmann, H. J. & Schmelzle, B. (Eds.), Berghof handbook for conflict transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. http://www.berghof-handbook.net

Melzer, A. (2011). Eine Debatte, die keine war, über Antisemitismus, der keiner ist. Protokoll einer Hexenjagd im Deutschen Bundestag. Der Semit 3/Sondernummer 1, 4-31.

Mendelberg, T. (1997). Executing Hortons: Racial crime in 1988 presidential campaign. Public Opinion Quarterly 61, 134-157.

Merskin, D. (2004). The construction of Arabs as enemies: Post-September 11 discourse of George W. Bush. Mass Communication & Society 7(2), 157-175.

Messick, D. M. (1999). Alternative logics for decision making in social settings. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39, 11-28.

Messick, D. M. & Sentis, K. P. (1979). Fairness and preference. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 15, 418-34.

Messman, T. (2001). Justice journalism: Journalist as agent of social change. Media File 20(4). http://www.media-alliance.org/mediafile/20-4/justice.html

Meyer, D. S. (1995). Framing national security: Elite public discourse on nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Political Communication 12.

Miller, L. & Rampton, S. (2001). The Pentagon's information warrior: Rendon to the rescue. PRWatch 8(4).

Minorities at Risk (2002). http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar

Möckel, J. (2007). News from the Holy Land. Akzeptanz und Wirkung von Konfliktberichter-stattung im Fernsehen. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Möckel, J. (2009). News from the Holy Land. Akzeptanz und Wirkung von Konfliktberichter-stattung im Fernsehen. conflict & communication online 8(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, presidents, and public opinion. New York: Wiley.

Nelson, T. E. (2004). Policy goals, public rhetoric, and political attitudes. The Journal of Politics 66, 581-605.

Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A. & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. American Political Science Review 91, 567-583.

Nelson, T. E. & Garst, J. (2005). Values-based political messages and persuasion: Relationships among speaker, recipient and evoked values. Political Psychology 26, 489-515.

Nelson, T. & Kinder, D. (1996). Issue frames and group centrism in American public opinion. Journal of Politics 58, 1055-1078.

Nelson, T. E. & Oxley, Z. M. (1999). Issue framing effects and belief importance and opinion. The Journal of Politics 61, 1040-1067.

Nelson, T. E., Oxley, Z. M. & Clawson, R. A. (1997). Toward a theory of framing effects. Political Behavior 19, 221-246.

Nelson, T. E., Zoe, M. O. & Clawson, R.A. (1997). Toward a psychology of framing effects. Political Behavior 19(3), 221-246.

Nerad, M. (2009). Integration, Textframing und Konfliktwahrnehmung. conflict & communication online 8(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Niger, M., Zandberg, E. & Aburaiya, I. (2001). Jewish or Israeli media: The role of the Israeli media in the coverage of the October 2000 events. Keshev report (in Hebrew).

Noakes, J. A. & Wilkins, K. G. (2002). Shifting frames of the Palestinian movement in U.S. news. Media, Culture & Society 24(5), 649-71.

Nohrstedt, S. A. (2009). New war journalism: Trends and challenges. Nordicom Review 30(1), 95-112.

Nohrstedt, S. A., Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R. et al. (2000). From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo – War journalism and propaganda. European Journal of Communication 15(3), 383-404.

Nossek, H. (1994). The narrative role of the Holocaust and the state of Israel in the coverage of salient terrorist events in the Israeli press. Journal of Narrative and Life History 4(1 & 2), 119-34.

Olekalns, M. (1997). Situational cues as moderators of the frame-outcome relationship. British Journal of Social Psychology 36, 191-209.

Orbe, M. (1998). From the standpoint(s) of traditionally muted groups: Explicating a co-cultural communication theoretical model. Communication Theory 8(1), 1-27.

O'Sullivan, T., Hartley, J., Saunders, D., Montgomery, M. & Fiske, J. (1994). Key concepts in communication and cultural studies. London: Routledge.

Ottosen, R. (1995). Enemy images and the journalistic process. Journal of Peace Research 32(1), 97-112.

Ottosen, R. (2005). Untitled statement. In: Carpentier, N. & Terzis, G. (Eds.), Media representations of war and conflict. Workshop organized by the KUB-Center Communication for Social Change, Communications Department of the Vesalius College (VUB) and the Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism, Brussels March 18, 12. http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~ncarpent/war&media_finalreport.pdf

Paletz, D. (1982). The IRA, the Red Brigades and the F.A.L.N. in the *New York Times*. Journal of Communication 32. In: Steuter, E. (1990), Understanding the media/terrorism relationship: An analysis of ideology and the news in Time magazine. Political Communication and Persuasion 7, 268.

Paletz, D. & Entman, R. M. (1981). Media, power, politics. New York: Free Press.

Pan, Z. & Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. Political Communication 10(1), 59-79.

Pappe, I. (1997). Post-Zionist critique on Israel and Palestinians, part 2: The media. Journal of Palestine Studies 26(3), 37-43.

Parenti, M. (1993). Inventing reality: The politics of news media (2nd ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Parenti, M. (2001). Monopoly media manipulation. http://www.michaelparenti.org/

Pauly, J. (1991). A beginner's guide to doing qualitative research in mass communication. Journalism Monographs, 125, 1-29.

Pekusic, B. (2012). Media war crimes under investigation in Serbia. Southeast European Times, January 10. http://www.SETimes.com

Peled, Y. & Shafir, G. (2005). Being Israeli. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press (in Hebrew).

Peleg, S. (2002). If words could kill: The peace process and the failure of the Israeli political discourse. State and society 2(3), 421-444 (in Hebrew).

Peleg, S. & Alimi, E. (2005). A Palestinian state – yes or no? Constructing political discourse in Israeli print news media. An experimental design. conflict & communication online 4(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Pennington, N. & Hastie, R. (1992). Examining the evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62(2), 189-206.

Pennington, N. & Hastie, R. (1988). Explanation-based decision-making: Effects of memory structure on judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology 14(3), 521-33.

Pilger, J. (2010). Why are wars not being reported honestly? The Guardian, December 10. http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/10/war-media-propaganda-iraq-lies

Pinkley, R. L. (1990). Dimensions of conflict frame: Disputant interpretations of conflict. Journal of Applied Psychology 75, 117-26.

Plontz, A. (2006). Der deutsch-französische Konflikt um die Präsidentschaft der Europäischen Zentralbank in der deutschen und französischen Presse. conflict & communication online 5(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Polit, D. (1996). Data analysis and statistics. Stamford, Connecticut: Appleton and Lange.

Provalis Research (2011). QDA Miner 4. User's guide. (Version 4.0): Provalis Research.

Pruitt, D. G. & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

R Development Core Team (2011). R: A language and environment for statistical computing (Version 2.14.0). Wien: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.

Rabinowitz, D. & Abu-Baker, H. (2002). The proud generation. Jerusalem: Keter (in Hebrew).

Raimondo, J. (2005). Payola pundits for war? Antiwar.com, January 29. http://www.antiwar.com

Rampton, S. & Stauber, J. (2003). How to sell a war. In These Times, August 4. http://www.inthesetimes.com

Reagan, R. (1978). Quoted in: Noriega, R. F., Remarks to Canadian/American border trade alliance: Challenges and opportunities in U.S.-Canada relations (Sept. 14, 2004). http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/36341.htm

Reunanen, E. & Suikkanen, R. (1999). Latent class analysis: Wandering in latent space. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 44. Konstanz: KOPS.

Ricchiardi, S. (2008). Whatever happened to Iraq? How the media lost interest in a long-running war with no end in sight. American Journalism Review, June/July.

Riffe, D., Lacy, S. & Fico, F. (2005). Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content analysis in research (2 ed.). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Rivenburgh, N. (2009). Seeking discursive spaces for peace in media-sport narratives. conflict & communicaltion online 8(2). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Roach, C. (1993). Information and culture in war and peace: Overview. In: Roach, C. (Ed.), Communication and culture in war and peace. London: Sage, 1-40.

Robinson, G. J. (1988). Here be dragons: Problems in charting the U.S. History of Communication Studies. Communication 10.

Robinson, P. (2000). The policy-media interaction model: Measuring media power during humanitarian crisis. Journal of Peace Research 37(5), 613-33.

Robinson, R. J. & Keltner, D. (1997). Defending the status quo: Power and bias in social conflict. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, 1066-1077.

Roeh, I. (1994). Communications, differently. Even Yehuda Israel: Reches (in Hebrew).

Rolef, S. H. (1997). Israel's policy towards the PLO: From rejection to recognition. In: Sela, A. & Maoz, M. (Eds.), The PLO and Israel. New York: St. Martin's Press, 254-72.

Rosaldo, R. (1993). Culture and truth: The remaking of social analysis. Boston: Bacon Press.

Rosen, J. (2010). News without the narrative needed to make sense of the news: What I will say at south by southwest, March 7. http://pressthink.org

Ross, L. & Stillinger, C. (1991). Barriers to conflict resolution. Negotiation Journal 7, 389-404.

Rowland, W. (1983). The politics of TV violence: Policy uses of communication research. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Rubinstein, D. (1995). The mystery of Arafat. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth.

Sabellek, C. (2001). Die Entwicklung des Kosovokonflikts und die Wahrnehmung durch die Medien. In: Richter, J. (Hrsg), Deutschland: (un)bewältigte Vergangenheiten. Tübingen: dgvt-Verlag.

Sachar, H. M. (1996). A history of Israel: From the rise of zionism to our time. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.

Said, E. (1997). Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world. New York: Vintage Books.

Said, E. (2000). The end of the peace process – Oslo and After. London: Granata Books.

Said, E. (2002). Impossible histories: Why the many Islams cannot be simplified. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/crisis/said.htm

Samuelson, W. F. & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). Negotiation under the winner's curse. In: Smith, V. (Ed.), Research in experimental economics 3, 105-38. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Schacter, H. (2003). Ideology and the media. Inroads 12, 60-74.

Schafer, M. (1999). Cooperative and conflictual policy preferences: The effect of identity, security, and image of the other. Political Psychology 20(4), 829-844.

Schaefer, C. D. (2006). The effects of escalation vs. de-escalation-orientated conflict coverage on the evaluation of military measures. conflict & communication online 5(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Schechter, D. (2006). When news lies: Media complicity and the Iraq war. New York: Select Books.

Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication 49(1), 103-122.

Scheufele, D. A. & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda-setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. Journal of Communication 57(1), 9-20.

Schlesinger, P., Elliot, P. & Murdock, G. (1984). Televising terrorism: Political violence in popular culture. New York: Scribner.

Schudson, M. (1995). The power of news. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schudson, M. (2002). What's unusual about covering politics as usual? In: Zelizer, B. & Allan, S. (Eds.), Journalism after September 11. New York: Routledge, 44-54.

Servaes, J. (1991). Was Grenada a test case for the 'disinformation war'? Media Development, Special Issue.

Shah, A. (2006). Media manipulation. Global Issues. April 17. http://www.globalissues.org/article/532/media-manipulation

Shah, A. (2005). War, propaganda and the media. Global Issues. March 25. http://www.globalissues.org/article/157/war-propaganda-and-the-media

Shaheen, J. (1997). Arab and Muslim stereotyping. Washington: Georgetown Univ. Press.

Shaheen, J. (1984). The TV Arab. Bowling Green: Bowling Green State Univ. Press.

Shamir, J. & Shamir, M. (1993). The dynamics of Israeli public opinion on peace and the territories. Tel Aviv University: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.

Shapiro, D. L. (1991). The effects of explanation on negative reactions to deceit. Administrative Science Quaterly 36, 614-30.

Shavit, A. (1997). The hatred of Netanyahu. Haaretz, 26 December (in Hebrew).

Shelah, O. & Limmor, Y. (2207). Captives of Lebanon. Tel Aviv: Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books.

Shen, F. (2004). Effects of news frames and schemas on individual's issue interpretations and attitudes. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 81, 400-416.

Shen, F. & Edwards, H. H. (2005). Economic individualism, humanitarianism, and welfare reform: A value-based account of framing effects. Journal of Communication 55, 795-809.

Shinar, D. (1983). The myth of the mighty media: Alternate and parallel communication networks in processes of social change. In: Graff, R. D. (Ed.), Communications for national development: Lessons from experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain.

Shinar, D. (1987). Palestinian voices: Communication and nation-building in the West Bank. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Shinar, D. (2000). Media diplomacy and 'peace talk': The Middle East and Northern Ireland. Gazette 62(2).

Shinar, D. (2003). Peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media. conflict & communication online 2(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Shinar, D. (2008). Ecologia e midia em situacoes de guerra e paz. In: Marques de Melo, J. (Ed.), Midia, ecologia e sociedade. Sao Paulo: Intercom, 17-34.

Shinar, D. (2009). How can peace journalism make progress? The coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War in Canadian and Israeli media. International Communication Gazette 71(6), 451-471.

Shinar, D. (2011). On media, war and peace: An agenda for thought, reflection, and action. SGI Quarterly Magazine, 64, April, 14-15.

Shinar, D. & Bratič, V. (2010). Asymmetric war and asymmetric peace: Real realities and media realities in the Middle East and the Western Balkans. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 3(2), 125-142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2010.531034

Shinar, D., Olsthoorn, J. & Yalden, C. (1990). Dis-membering and re-membering: An improved conceptual framework for the analysis of communications in socio-cultural change. Montreal: Concordia University.

Shinar, D. & Stoiciu, G. (1992). Media representations of socio-political conflict: The Romanian revolution and the Gulf War. Gazette 50, 243-257.

Shoemaker, P. J. & Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media content. White Plains, N.Y.: Longman.

Simon, B. (1992). Forty days. New York: Putnam.

Simpson, C. (1994). Science of coercion: Communication research and psychological warfare. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. D. (1991). National identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Smith, A. D. (2003). The nation in history. Jerusalem: The Israeli Historical Society.

Smith, H. (2000). Bad, mad, sad or rational actor? Why the 'securitization' paradigm makes for poor policy analysis of North Korea. International affairs 76(3), 593-617.

Smooha, S. (1999). Autonomy for Arabs in Israel? Raanana: The Institute for Israeli Arab Studies (in Hebrew).

Smooha, S. (2006). The Arab-Israeli citizens and the Second Lebanon War. http://www.peacengo.org/hebrew/article.asp?ID=18 (in Hebrew).

Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A. & Tetlock, P. E. (1991). Reasoning and choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sniderman, P. M. & Bullok, J. B. (2004). A consistency theory of public opinion and political change. The hypothesis of menu dependence. In: Saris, W. E. & Sniderman, P. M. (Eds.), Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Sniderman, P. M. & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. In: Saris, W. E. & Sniderman, P. M. (Eds.), Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Snow, D. & Benford, R. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance and participant mobilization. In: Klandermans, B., Kriesi, H. & Tarrow, S. (Eds.), From structure to action. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Snow, D. A. & Benford, R. D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In: Morris, A. D. & Mueller, C. M. (Eds.), Frontiers of social movement theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Snow, D., Burke, E., Worden, S. & Benford, R. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micro-bilization and movement participation. American Sociological Review 51, 464-81.

Sparr, J. (2004). Konfliktberichterstattung! Wer mag's konstruktiv? Zur Akzeptanz konstruktiver Konfliktberichterstattung durch die Leserschaft. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Spägele, M. (2011). Eskalations- vs. Deeskalationsorientierung in der Presseberichterstattung über den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.

Spohrs, M. (2006). Über den Nachrichtenwert von Friedensjournalismus. conflict & communication online 5(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Steuter, E. (1990). Understanding the media/terrorism relationship: An analysis of ideology and the news in Time magazine. Political Communication and Persuasion 7, 257-278.

Stevenson, L. R. & Greene, M. T. (1980). A reconsideration of bias in the news. Journalism Quarterly 57(1), 115-121.

Stillar, G. F. (1998). Analyzing everyday texts: Discourse, rhetoric and social perspectives. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Stuntebeck, M. (2007). Bundeswehreinsätze im Ausland – der Einfluss von Medienframes auf die Einstellung der Rezipienten und die Rolle der mentalen Modelle. Universität Leipzig: Diplomarbeit.

Stuntebeck, M. (2009). Bundeswehreinsätze im Ausland – der Einfluss von Medienframes auf die Einstellung der Rezipienten und die Rolle der mentalen Modelle. conflict & communication online 8(1). http://www.cco.regener-online.de

Suleiman, M. W. (2000). Arabs in America. Temple Univ. Press.

Tayeebwa, W. (2012). (Re)framing mass media values: The prospects and challenges of peace media in Uganda. Concordia University, Montreal: Ph.D. dissertation.

Tehranian, M. (2002). Peace journalism: Negotiating global media ethics. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 7, 58-83.
http://hij.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/7/2/58

Tenbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation. Academy of Management Journal 41, 330-39.

Tetlock, P. E, Peterson, R. S. & Lerner, J. S. (1996). Revising the value pluralism model: Incorporating social content and context postulates. In: Seligman, C., Olson, J. & Zanna,

M. (Eds.), Values: 8th Annual Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 25-51.

Thiel, S. (2010). The influence of framing on the reduction of anti-Semitic attitudes. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung, Nr. 67. Berlin: regener.

Thiel, S. (2011). Konstruktion und Evaluation des Untersuchungsmaterials für eine experimentelle Studie der Interaktion zwischen mentalen Modellen und Medienframes des Israelisch-Palestinensischen Konflikts. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 71. Berlin: regener.

Thompson, A. (Ed.) (2007). The media and the Rwanda genocide. London: Pluto.

Thompson, L. & DeHarpport, T. (1994). Social judgment, feedback, and interpersonal learning in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 58, 327-45.

Thompson, L. & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 47, 98-123.

Thompson, L. & Hrebec, D. (1996). Lose-lose agreements in interdependent decision making. Psychological Bulletin 120, 396-409.

Thompson, L. & Loewenstein, G. (1992). Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, 176-97.

Tichenor, P.J., Donohue, G.A., & Olien, C.N. (1980). Community conflict & the press. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Timm, A. (2001). Israeli civil society facing new challenges. Israel Studies Forum 17(1), 47-69.

Tomlin, R. S., Forrest, L., Pu, M. M. & Kim, M. H. (1997). Discourse semantics. In: Dijk, T. A. van (Ed.), Discourse as structure and process. London: Sage, 63-111.

Triandafyllidou, A. (1998). National identity and the 'other'. Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(4), 593-612.

Trice, R. H. (1979). The American elite press and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Middle East Journal 33, 308.

Tuchman, G. (1978). Making news: A study in the construction of reality. New York: Free Press.

Turner, V. (1977). Process, system and symbol: A new anthropological synthesis. Daedalus 106(3), 61-80.

Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211, 453-588.

U.S. Department of State (2006). Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, background Note: Canada. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm

Valley, K. L., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1998). A matter of trust: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 211-38.

Vallone, R. P., Ross, L. & Lapper, M. R. (1985). The hostile media phenomenon: Biased perception and perceptions of media bias in coverage of the Beirut Massacre. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49(3), 577-585.

Vayrynen, R. (Ed.) (1991). New directions in conflict theory: Conflict resolution and conflict transformation. London: Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage.

VERBI (2010). MAXQDA. Software für qualitative Datenanalyse (Version 10). Berlin: VERBI Software. Consult. Sozialforschung. GmbH.

Volcic, Z. (2006). Blaming the media: Serbian narratives of national(ist) identity. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 20(3), September, 313–330

Wagner, C. H. (1973). Elite newspaper opinion and the Middle East: Commitment vs. isolation. The Middle East: Quest for an American policy. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Weare, C., Levi, T. & Raphael, J. (2001). Media convergence and the chilling effect of broadcast licensing. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 6(3), 47-71.

Weimann, G. (2000). Communication unreality: Modern media and the reconstruction of reality. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Wilke, J. (1999). Leitmedien und Zielgruppenorgane. In: Wilke, J. (Hrsg.), Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Köln: Böhlau, 302-329.

Wirtz, M. & Caspar, F. (2002). Beurteilerübereinstimmung und Beurteilerreliabilität. Methoden zur Bestimmung und Verbesserung der Zuverlässigkeit von Einschätzungen mittels Kategoriensystemen und Ratingskalen. Göttingen: Hogrefe.

Wistrich, R. S. (2004). The politics of ressentiment: Israel, Jews, and the German media. Jerusalem: SICSA.

Wolfsfeld, G. (1997a). Fair weather friends: The varying role of the news media in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Political Communication 14(1), 29-48.

Wolfsfeld, G. (1997b). Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G. (2001a). The news media and peace processes, the Middle East and Northern Ireland. Peaceworks 37(2).

Wolfsfeld, G. (2001b). Political waves and democratic discourse: Terrorism waves during the Oslo peace process. In: Bennett, W. L. & Entman, R. M. (Eds.), Mediated politics: Communication in the future of democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G. (2004). Media and the path to peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolfsfeld, G. (2007). Where have they all gone? Studying an agenda for examining the representation of the Arab population in Israeli communications. Israel.

Wolfsfeld, G., Avraham, E. & Issam, A. (2000). When prophesy always fails: Israeli press coverage of the Arab minority's Land Day protests. Political Communication 17(2), 115-132.

Wolling, J. (2002). Aufmerksamkeit durch Qualität? Empirische Befunde zum Verhältnis von Nachrichtenqualität und Nachrichtennutzung. In: Baum, A. & Schmidt, S. J. (Hrsg.) Fakten und Fiktionen. Über den Umgang mit Medienwirklichkeiten. Konstanz: UVK, 202-216.

Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2012). Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. Harvard University Kennedy Center, March 10.

Yediot Aharonot, May 5, 1994.

Yep, G. A. (2001). Dialogue on the edges: Ferment in communication and culture. In: Collier, M. J. (Ed.), Transforming communication about culture: Critical new directions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 219-277.

Ylanne-McEwen, V. & Coupland, N. (2000). Accommodation theory: A conceptual resource for intercultural sociolinguistics. In: Spencer-Oatey, H. (Ed.), Culturally speaking: Managing rapport through talk across cultures. London: Continuum, 191-216.

Young, E. G. (1992). Keepers of the history. Athene Series. Columbia University, New York: Teachers College Press.

Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zandberg, E., Aburaiya, I. & Neiger, M. (2001). Jewish or Israeli media? Report on the Israeli media's coverage of the October 2000 violent events between the police and the Arab-Israeli citizens (in Hebrew).

Zandberg, E. & Neiger, M. (2005). Between the nation and the profession: Journalists as members of contradicting communities. Media, Culture & Society 27(1), 131–141.

Sources

Chapter 1
Dov Shinar: Reflections on media war coverage: Dissonance, dilemmas and the need for improvement. conflict & communication online 12/2 (2013).

Chapter 2
Wilhelm Kempf: Peace Journalism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the German press and the German public. Bulletin du Centre de Recherche Français à Jérusalem, 23 (2012). http://bcrfj.revues.org/6788

Chapter 3
Dov Shinar: Media peace discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks. conflict & communication online 3(1/2) (2004).

Chapter 4
Dov Shinar: Peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media. conflict & communication online 2/1 (2003).

Chapter 5
Lea Mandelzis: The changing image of the enemy in the news discourse of Israeli newspapers, 1993-1994. conflict & communication online 2/1 (2003).

Chapter 6
Anat First & Eli Avraham: Changes in the political, social, and media environments and their impact on the coverage of conflict: The case of the Arab citizens of Israel. conflict & communication online 2/1 (2003).

Chapter 7
Anat First: Enemies, fellow victims, or the forgotten? News coverage of Israeli Arabs in the 21st century. conflict & communication online 9/2 (2010).

Chapter 8
Susan Dente Ross: Framing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in thirteen months of *New York Times* editorials surrounding the attack of September 11, 2001. conflict & communication online 2/2 (2003).

Chapter 9
Bruno Baltodano, Jared Bishop, Jay Hmielowski, Jezreel Kang-Graham, Andrew Morozov, Brion White & Susan Dente Ross: Discourses of blame and responsibility: U.S./Canadian media representations of Palestinian/Israeli relations. conflict & communication online 6 /1 (2007).

Chapter 10
Markus Maurer & Wilhelm Kempf: Coverage of the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in the German quality press. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 69 (2011).

Chapter 11
Felix Gaisbauer: Representations of victimization and responsibility during the Second Intifada and the Gaza War in German quality newspapers. conflict & communication online 11/2 (2012).

Chapter 12
Samuel Peleg & Eithan Alimi: A Palestinian state – Yes or no? Constructing political discourse in the Israeli print news media: An experimental design. conflict & communication online 4/2 (2005).

Chapter 13
Wilhelm Kempf: The impact of political news on German students' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. conflict & communication online 7/2 (2008).

Chapter 14
Wilhelm Kempf & Stephanie Thiel: On the interaction between media frames and individual frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. conflict & communication online 11/2 (2012).

Chapter 15
Stephanie Thiel & Wilhelm Kempf: Audience reactions to peace journalism: How supporters and critics of the Israeli policy process escalation and de-escalation oriented media frames. conflict & communication online 13/1 (2014).

Eitan Y. Alimi is Senior Lecturer of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. His research interests include contentious politics and social movements; radicalization and political violence; and conflict resolution. Recent research projects include the role of cultural elements in influencing the dynamics and trajectories of contention; the role of the news media in peace-building efforts; the relational dynamics of political radicalization and de-radicalization; and applying theories and models of social movements in highly repressive settings.

eMail: alimien@012.net.il

Eli Avraham is the Head of the Public Relations Program in the Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Israel. He has published many papers and is the author and co-author of eight award-winning books. Prof. Avraham's research fields include framing political and social conflicts; place branding; and public diplomacy.

eMail: eavraham@com.haifa.ac.il

Bruno Baltodano is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Washington State University, USA, from which he also earned his Master's degree. A native of Nicaragua, he currently is an Adjunct Instructor in the Social Science Departmentat Clarendon College, located in Pampa, Texas. His research interests include political psychology, insurgency, indigenous rights, political autonomy and intercommunal conflict.

eMail: bruno.baltodano@clarendoncollege.edu

Jared Bishop graduated with a Master's degree in Communication from the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University, USA. Currently a doctoral candidate at the Department of Speech Communication at the Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Ill., his research interests embrace the intersection of cultural studies, communication studies, and critical pedagogy.

eMail: jbishop@siu.edu

Anat First is Professor of Media Studies at the School of Communication in Netanya Academic College, Israel. Her main fields of research include: Mediated representations of minority groups, particularly women and Arabs; multiculturalism as reflected in various genres on prime-time television. She also was the academic advisor for research on the representation of minority groups, for the Second

Television and Radio Authority in 2011 (Israel).

eMail: d_first@netvision.net.il

Felix Gaisbauer, Dipl.Psych., studied Psychology and Political Science at the University of Konstanz, Germany, and Tel Aviv University, Israel. A former member of the Peace Research Group (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung) at the University of Konstanz, he currently works at the German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; DEval).

eMail: felix.gaisbauer@DEval.org

Jay Hmielowski earned his MA from the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication at Washington State University, and Ph.D. from Ohio State University, USA. Presently he is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Arizona. His research interests include political and environmental communication.

eMail: jayhmielowski@email.arizona.edu

Jezreel Kang-Graham earned his Ph.D. in Communication from the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication at Washington State University, USA. Presently he is an Assistant Professor in the Mass Communication and Journalism Department at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, South Korea. His research interests include globalization, technology in higher education, and professional communication.

eMail: kanggraham@skku.edu

Wilhelm Kempf is Professor emeritus of Psychological Methodology and Head of the Peace Research Group (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung) at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Since 2002 he is the editor of conflict & communication online (www.cco.regener-online.de). His fields of research include quantitative and qualitative research methodology, nonviolent conflict resolution, peace journalism and the construction of social reality by the mass media. He currently works on a research project on "Criticizing Israel, coming to terms with German history and differentiating aspects of modern anti-Semitism".

eMail: cco@regener-online.de

Lea Mandelzis is Head of the communication department at Kinneret Academic College in Israel. She is a former professional journalist and peace activist, her fields of interest include news discourse in security and peace; conflict discourse in the media; media representations and images; socio-political communication; international communication; and public diplomacy.

eMail: mandelzis@hotmail.com

Markus Maurer earned his Diploma in Psychology from the University of Konstanz, Germany. A former member of the Peace Research Group (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung) at the University of Konstanz, he presently works as an instructor and course leader in the field of nonviolent communication. His special areas of interest include nonviolent communication; conflict resolution; and mediation.

eMail: markus_maurer@gmx.ch

Andrew Morozov is a former Ph.D. student at the University of Washington, USA.

Samuel M. Peleg is a faculty member at the Columbia University MA program for Negotiations and Conflict Resolution and a research fellow at the Stanford Center for International Conflict Resolution and Negotiation (SCICN), USA. A political sociologist specializing in conflict analysis and conflict resolution processes, negotiation processes and sustainability, Prof. Peleg has been a top advisor on leadership and negotiations for the Peres Center for Peace in which capacity he took part in several rounds of peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians as well as Israelis and Jordanians. He has also counseled the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign Office and the National Security Council (Israel).

eMail: sp2997@columbia.edu

Susan Dente Ross is director of the Graduate Group on Peace Communication (GGPC) at Washington State University, USA. Associate Professor of Communication and Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Dr. Ross is an expert in media law and peace journalism and a Fulbright Scholar who has published widely in communication and law journals including Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Communication Law and Policy, conflict & communication online, and Mass Communication and Society.

eMail: Suross@wsu.edu

Dov Shinar, Head of FAIR MEDIA: Center for the Study of Conflict, War, and Peace Coverage at the School of Communication, Netanya Academic College, Israel, is Professor emeritus at Ben Gurion University, Israel, and Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. His areas of interest include international communication; media in war and peace; media education; media and development. He worked as a communication consultant and lecturer in South and North America, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. A former professional and member of the task force that established Israel's TV Channel 1, he is still active as free-lance documentary TV producer.

eMail: dov.shinar@gmail.com

Stephanie Thiel earned her Diploma in Psychology and Master's degree in Criminology from the University of Hamburg, Germany. A Ph.D. candidate in the Peace Research Group (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung) at the University of Konstanz, she currently works as a psychologist at the university hospital in Giessen. Her fields of interest include anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiments, anomie, corruption, white-collar crime and political economy.

eMail: stephanie.thiel@uni-konstanz.de

Brion White earned his Master's degree in Communication from Washington State University, USA. Currently a Ph.D. candidate in Media and Communication at Bowling Green State University, he studies the mainstream media coverage of U.S. drone strikes for his dissertation.

eMail: brionw@bgsu.edu

Index

Miriam Rieck (Ed.)

Traumatic effects of the Holocaust and other persecutions
Theoretical interpretations and reflections in the arts

The chapters included in the book are the lectures presented at a conference held at the Haifa University entitled: *The Holocaust, its traumatic and intergenerational effects in comparison to other persecutions, and its presentation in the arts*.

In the first chapter Ely Barent and Hila Hever examine the effects on 3rd generation of Holocaust Survivors, traveling to Auschwitz and other camps on a wide range of variables, including the subjects emotional well-benign and their relations with their mother (second generation of Holocaust survivors).

Carol Kidron's chapter (the second), explains how anthropology and sociology approach the problem. They start from the institutions and their brokers who submit the reality to the subjects. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that reactions to victimization are not universal but culture dependent.

In the third chapter, Barbara Preitler reports about Hemayat, an Austrian institution that helps the refugees in Austria.

In the fourth chapter, Wolfgang Frindte delineates over-time changing representations of the Holocaust in general and in German films. These changes reflect differing attitudes towards the survivors. At the same time the relations are reciprocal: Films and society's attitudes affect each other.

In chapter five, the composer Arie Shapira, maintaining that after Auschwitz a new era starts, and he expresses his view in his composition (a disc with the composition is attached to the book).

The attachment contains Gideon Greifs chapter, his thoughts about his encounter with children of Sonderkommando men.

Wilhelm Kempf
Human rights orientation and the assessment of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Nr. 77, 2014.

Based on a concept of human rights commitment that includes both a cognitive (rejection of human rights restrictions) and an affective component (concern for the victims of human rights violations), the present paper uses Latent-Class Analysis in order to differentiate different forms of consistent and inconsistent human rights orientations, and relates them to participants' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The results of the study indicate that a consistent human rights commitment promotes pacifism, reduces moral disengagement and counteracts anti-Palestinian as well as anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic attitudes. At the same time, however, it exerts pressure to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it supports partisanship for the Palestinians, and it strengthens the tendency to dramatize foreign affairs and to call for action against Israeli policy. Nonetheless, it reduces the tendency to a one-sided attribution of guilt to Israel and decreases anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews.