

Readings in Peace Journalism

Friedens- und Demokratiepsychologie

Band 9

herausgegeben von

Wolfgang Frindte & Wilhelm Kempf

Wilhelm Kempf (ed.)

Readings in Peace Journalism

Foundations – Studies – Perspectives

verlag irena regener berlin

© 2010 by verlag irena regener
ostseestr. 109, d – 10409 berlin
<http://www.regener-online.de>

Alle Rechte vorbehalten, auch die der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Speicherung in elektronischen Medien.

Printed in Germany

ISBN 978-3-936014-22-8

Contents

Preface	7
---------------	---

Part I: Foundations

1	War propaganda versus peace journalism Wilhelm Kempf	13
2	Conflict prevention and the media Wilhelm Kempf	27
3	Information structures as barriers to civilian conflict management Wilhelm Kempf	38

Part II: Studies

4	Media representations of conflicts as catalysts of peace processes Susanne Jaeger & Wilhelm Kempf	55
5	The German press coverage of France after World War II Susanne Jaeger	63
6	Acceptance and impact of de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage Wilhelm Kempf	100
7	Peace journalism and the news production process Burkhard Bläsi	120

Part III: Perspectives

8	Compatibility of peace and news media Susanne Jaeger	139
9	Media effects during violent conflict Vladimir Bratić	144
10	Implementing peace journalism: The role of conflict stages Burkhard Bläsi	158

11	The media and the implementation of a European peace policy Wilhelm Kempf	171
	References	184
	Sources	197
Appendix		
	Training materials	
	Part A: Introduction to constructive conflict coverage – An eLearning module	
	Part B: A catalog of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented aspects of conflict coverage	
	Free Download from http://www.regener-online.de , entrance area "Bücher"	
	About the authors	199
	Index.	201

Preface

All we are saying is give peace a chance.
John Lennon

There is no doubt that the developmental tendencies of conflicts are determined by the way, how the participants perceive the conflict. "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" is regarded as an axiom in political science since Thomas & Thomas (1928), and media reportage's essential influence on how conflicts are perceived was already recognized very early.

The history of war propaganda is as old as the history of the press, and that conventional war reportage can hardly be distinguished from propaganda has been demonstrated in countless studies ever since Lasswell's (1927) famous research on propaganda techniques in World War I. How an alternative to conventional conflict coverage could look like, that it could – and how it could – contribute to the de-escalation of conflicts is a question which peace studies has only focused on since the Gulf War and the wars in former Yugoslavia, however.

Since Galtung (1998) and Kempf (1996) outlined their first ideas of an alternative to conventional war reporting, their model(s) of "Peace Journalism" stimulated a broad debate among peace researchers and journalists,¹ practical thought about how to achieve this type of journalism,² and a large body of basic theoretical³ and empirical⁴ research. How the concept of peace journalism developed in the course of these studies is documented in the present book.

The book contains a collection of papers from the years 1997–2009 that previously were only available in German, in hard to find sources and/or in electronic form.

-
- 1 Cf., e.g., Wilhelm Kempf (ed.) (2008). The peace journalism controversy. Berlin: regener.
 - 2 Cf., e.g., Conflict & Peace, (1998). The peace journalism option. Taplow Court: Conflict & Peace Courses; Jake Lynch & Annabelle McGoldrick (2005). Peace journalism. Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press.
 - 3 Cf., e.g., Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.) (2003). Constructive conflict coverage. A social psychological approach. Berlin: regener; Dov Shinar & Wilhelm Kempf (eds.) (2007). Peace journalism: The state of the art. Berlin: regener.
 - 4 Cf., e.g., Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (ed.) (2005). Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener; Burkhard Bläsi (2006). Keine Zeit, kein Geld, kein Interesse ...? Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Berlin: regener; Susanne Jaeger (2009). Nachrichtenmedien als Ressource für Frieden und Versöhnung. Berlin: regener.

The first part of the book is devoted to the social-psychological foundations of peace journalism.

Building upon Heikki Luostarinen's propaganda theory, Paul Watzlawick's communication theory and Morton Deutsch's conflict theory, in Chapter 1 Wilhelm Kempf examines how war propaganda works, and derives from this a counter-model of critical peace journalism.

Chapter 2 discusses the privatization of propaganda and demarcates the peace journalism model from the journalism of attachment. Building upon Johan Galtung's four-factor model of news selection and Friedrich Glasl's model of conflict escalation, the possibilities and limits for early identification of conflicts are examined, and guidelines are developed for preventive conflict coverage.

Chapter 3, finally, relates peace journalism to the concepts of peace making, peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcement named in the 1992 UN *Agenda for Peace*. It analyzes some of the psychological barriers that impede a constructive media contribution to civil conflict management and summarizes a number of empirical studies that demonstrate how the media failed to give peace a chance during the Gulf War, during the wars in former Yugoslavia and – at least there was a tendency to this – even during the beginning stages of peace processes, such as in Northern Ireland and Israel.

The second part of the book takes these, at first not very encouraging, findings as a starting point in order to look for examples and facilitating conditions for constructive conflict coverage.

In Chapter 4 Susanne Jaeger & Wilhelm Kempf shift the focus of the discussion to the role of media in post-conflict processes and derive three approaches for extensive empirical studies, the results of which are presented in Chapters 5-7: What can be learned from the way media function during successful peace processes? How do recipients react to peace-oriented reportage deviating from the mainstream? How can peace-journalistic models be implemented in the frame of everyday editorial decisions and journalistic routines?

As an example of a successful peace process, in Chapter 5 Susanne Jaeger analyzes German press reportage on France after World War II. The quantitative content analysis of reportage between 1946 and 1970 shows that the German press actively contributed to reconciliation with France, in that it diverged from the conventional routines of news selection and reported on French actors in a largely positive or at least neutral manner. With a qualitative content analysis of a partial sample of the articles, this picture is further differentiated. Although the reportage does not completely live up to the ideal of peace journalism, in the analyzed newspaper articles we find almost all the attributes of de-escalation oriented reportage, as well as further stylistic elements, by means of which a picture of France and the French was sketched that contributed to overcoming traditional biases and preoccupations.

In Chapter 6 Wilhelm Kempf reports on four experiments by means of which the acceptance and effects of de-escalation oriented conflict coverage were studied. The results speak in favor of peace journalism, but also show some limitations. Thus it appeared, among other things, that de-escalation oriented coverage is accepted by the audience at least as much as traditional reportage, and that it is at least as suitable to awaken interest in further information as is the escalation oriented dramatization of conflict. With regard to the perceived partisanship of the reportage, however, it can create a boomerang effect if it deviates too strongly from mainstream reportage.

Models of peace journalism can, however, only become attractive to a critical mass of journalists if realizable proposals are present for how to get around the impediments that journalists are exposed to in realizing such models in their daily work. In order to create the foundations for this, in Chapter 7 Burkhard Bläsi develops a model based on expert interviews with German journalists that represents the production process of conflict reportage as a result of the complex interaction of six factors: (1) the institutional and informal media structures; (2) the specific conflict situation on site; (3) the characteristics of the individual journalists; (4) the political climate in which the conflict reportage proceeds; (5) the lobbying of various interest groups and (6) the media recipients.

Finally, perspectives for the practical implementation of peace journalism occupy the center of attention in the third part of our book.

In Chapter 8 Susanne Jaeger discusses the limitations and chances of peace journalism in post-conflict societies. Since a distorted conflict perception represents an essential part of the psychological infrastructure by means of which the members of a society cope with the burdens of war, and since in the course of conflict it has become part of their social identity, the reduction of enemy images can only occur step-by-step. An orientation towards de-escalation and readiness for reconciliation will therefore at first remain minority positions, even after the conclusion of an armistice. In the long run, however, it can gain greater social influence, drive peace processes forward and contribute to reconciliation.

In Chapter 9 Vladimir Bratić deals with the fundamental media effects theories of the Twentieth Century and undertakes a synthesis of the media effects literature with the goal perspective of gaining a better understanding of how media influence political conflicts. After an examination of the various types of media messages, audiences and environmental conditions under which the media exert the strongest influence in conflicts, possible ways are proposed for how the media can be effectively employed to promote peace. In contrast to some critics of the peace journalistic project, the author concludes that the contemporary state of media effects research implies by no means an obstacle to the success chances of peace journalism, but instead opens up a great number of possibilities for the media to support peace processes.

As Burkhard Bläsi shows in Chapter 10, the chances of implementing peace journalism are, however, to be evaluated differently depending on the conflict phase

and escalation stage. Taking account of the model of influencing factors affecting the production of conflict reportage that was developed in Chapter 7, the author examines how the production conditions of conflict reportage exert influence (1) during non-violent conflicts, (2) during violently escalated conflicts or respectively wars, and (3) in post-war periods. In harmony with other research results that indicate that peace journalism is harder to realize if one's country is acutely involved in a war, the author pleads for focusing future implementation efforts on those conflict phases in which conflicts are (still) being conducted non-violently. The ideas of peace journalism must be firmly anchored in a society and in a media system in peacetime; only then will they have a real chance of unfolding enduring effects even in wartime.

Taking up on these thoughts, in the last chapter of the book, Wilhelm Kempf develops guidelines for an EU media policy whose task is seen in (1) transmitting European peace policy to EU citizens, (2) functioning as a critical regulative to EU policy and (3) so structuring the international media environment that it is able to exert a peace-furthering influence on national discourses in crisis regions. Accordingly the recommendations contain not only criteria for the structuring of the media landscape within the EU, but also ones for the reconstruction of the media landscape in post-war societies. The often-lamented heterogeneity of the EU is thereby viewed as an opportunity to recognize the complexity of the conflicts within and between societies in crisis regions and to create an international media environment that reminds the conflict parties (and also the EU itself) of the necessity of constructive conflict management.

The two electronic documents in the Appendix of the book are conceived of as training material for independent study and are available for free downloading at <http://www.regener-online.de>, entrance area "Bücher".

The eLearning module designed by Wilhelm Kempf, James Brice, Carsten A. Schulz and Michael Reimann deepens the social-psychological foundations of peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage, and the catalogue created by Burkhard Bläsi, Susanne Jaeger, Wilhelm Kempf and Jutta Möckel contains a collection of text examples for the aspects of escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage, which are listed in Chapter 2, Table 2.

Part I
Foundations

War propaganda versus peace journalism

Wilhelm Kempf

1.1 Foundations in propaganda research and (psychological) communication theory

In his famous study of World War I propaganda techniques, Lasswell (1927) concluded that psychological resistance against war is so great in modern societies that every war must appear to be a war of defence against a menacing, murderous aggressor. In order to create this image, a massive expenditure for propaganda is necessary to strengthen the willingness for war of a country's soldiers and civilian population and increase their identification with the nation's war aims.

In this persuasion process, according to Luostarinen (1986), not only restrictive (constraining), but also supportive information control measures are employed:

- *Restrictive* measures are intended to minimize all the information that could negatively influence the willingness for war.
- *Supportive* measures are intended to maximize all the information that has a positive effect.

The production of favorable information thereby employs the techniques of information *fabrication, selection and exaggeration*. Propaganda aims to restructure the public's value hierarchy: so that defeating the enemy becomes the highest aim, to which all other values – such as truth, ethical considerations and individual rights – are subordinated. For propaganda, truth is just a resource, and the need to lie is merely a technical, not a moral question. If it is unnecessary to lie – so much the better. The way modern mass media function accommodates this possibility.

Thereby it can be determined that it is less the reported facts that play a role in propaganda than the significance assigned to them. The significance of a report, again, depends on its contextualization, which is steered by how media present it.

As well mass communication is not simply a process of information transmission from a sender to a receiver, but rather an interactive process that develops its own dynamic, through which subjects communicating with each other become themselves entangled in the object of communication.

We can understand how this functions in terms of the Watzlawick et al. (1967) communication model. According to this, every communication can be understood

in terms of three different aspects and can be more or less ambiguous under each of the three aspects.

The *report* aspect answers the question: "What information is given?" If, for example, two people are going somewhere in an automobile, and one says, "The streetlight ahead is red" – the report aspect is simply the information given about the traffic situation.

The *parade* aspect answers the question: "What response is thereby elicited?" For example, to slow down or perhaps even to start a quarrel, e. g., to snap back, "I don't need your help!"

Thereby communication can be ambiguous under both these aspects. Which of the (possible) meanings is received by the addressee depends, on the one hand, on the *external* context in which the communication occurs (e. g., whether the two people are a couple that has just fallen in love and is returning from a vacation together, or a married couple experiencing stress on the way to work). It also depends on the *internal* context of the communication itself, i. e., on the one side, whether the two are already involved in a disagreement, and, on the other side, on how the communication is presented, i. e., on the *command* aspect of the communication.

The *command* aspect answers the question: "How should the communication be received?" and includes:

- "What the sender thereby says about himself" (*self-manifestation* aspect, according to Schulz von Thun, 1981), e. g., "I am attentive", and
- "What he thereby says about the relationship of the communication partners to each other" (*relationship* aspect), e. g., "You are dependent on my help".

Through its command and parade aspects, communication develops an interactive dynamic in which the partners in the communication become themselves involved in the object of the communication. This thereby becomes a medium in which the communicating partners perform their own self-understanding and their relationship to each other. A plastic example of this is communication between lovers in which it no longer really matters what they are saying.

While the communicating partners talk in such a way about some topic or other that so-to-speak represents the manifest content of the communication, they simultaneously negotiate their own identity as its latent content. This for its part again determines the perspective from which the communicating parties interpret the manifest content, i. e., take up specific meanings, while other meanings (and even facts) are blanked out and disappear from view.

With every form of interactive communication, thus,

- e. g., in a conversation between two people
- or in group discussions,

we can observe – or analyze – how this interactive dynamic often becomes more or less autonomous. In mass communication, however, there are only limited possibilities to do so. The interactive dynamics can be detected only by observing the discourse between the media and the public over a longer period of time. Mass communication is a form of one-sided or unidirectional communication (from the sender to the recipient) to which recipients cannot directly reply. Nevertheless, the manner in which the medium presents information steers the recipients' horizon of awareness in mass communication as well.

The parceling of reality, its breakdown into seemingly unrelated events and episodes is the characteristic feature of medium-steered manipulation. Thereby the manipulation does not consist in the direct falsification of facts in accord with the requirements of an ideological system, but rather in the selection and presentation of topics and images. Structures and connecting lines are screened out, and events are arbitrarily strung together (Seppmann, 1993).

Events torn out of their original context are recombined into a meaningful whole in the recipients' perception by a process of reducing them to the known and trusted. This recontextualization process is supported by propaganda through selective information presentation (Luostarinen, 1986):

- On the level of social identification, interpretive schemata are created that correspond to the command aspect of communication, subsume recipients' self-understanding under a collective political self-image and demarcate it from the enemy image. Recipients learn how their own group or society is structured, what it stands for, what distinguishes it from others (and especially from the enemy) and what it is striving to achieve in the future.
- On the level of the conflict context, interpretive schemata corresponding to the parade aspect of communication are created that challenge recipients to react. Recipients learn what caused the conflict, why it was unavoidable, what one's own side is defending in a conflict, and why the enemy attacked.
- On the level of everyday events, reports are prepared to translate these interpretive schemata into concrete stories and confirm their reality content: reports of combat operations and own heroism, reports of enemy atrocities and reports on the help one's side receives from third parties. Recipients learn that their own side is fighting with clean hands, that it has a criminal enemy and that it will win the war.
- On the mythical level, finally, interpretive schemata are designed that explain the logic of history, the meaning of life and the value of the individual, etc. and place the war in a comprehensive meaning context that makes it appear simultaneously a bulwark against the enemy's threat and a bridge to a better future.

1.2 Foundations in conflict theory

War propaganda produces a distorted perception of reality that polarizes the war parties and makes war appear as equally necessary and justified. It does this by

taking up and supporting the conflict parties' natural tendencies to perceptual distortion. These tendencies have their origins in the systematic divergence of perspectives between the conflict parties:

- Whereas people perceive their own actions from the internal standpoint of their awareness of the intentions they thereby pursued, they learn about others' actions from an external standpoint, i. e., from the consequences of the actions.
- Mutual understanding of the conflict parties' modes of action therefore requires an active process of perspective adoption.
- If one of the conflict parties remains caught in its perspective, the other will appear to it as an aggressor, which implies not only the necessity, but also the justification to defend itself against the aggression.
- The more the conflict parties become entangled in such aggressive interaction, the more each will simultaneously be bound to its own perspective, which leaves no room for empathy with the opposing party. Nor can it leave room, since this would destroy the foundation on which the conflict parties think they have the situation under control (Kempf, 1995).

In processes of competition, a tendency therefore arises for the conflict to become autonomous, while the antagonism between the groups simultaneously intensifies.

1. At the start of a conflict, groups hinder each other from achieving their aims.
2. At this point, the interpretation of the conflict as a competitive or as a cooperative process is still open.
3. Because of the divergence of perspectives between groups, there is a tendency on both sides to perceive conflict as a competitive situation, however.
4. This – actual or presumptive – competitive situation implies the necessity of imposing one's group goals against the opposing group.
5. Thereby the imposition of one's aims against the external group becomes a self-contained group aim that changes the internal structure of the group, increases the distance between the groups, disrupts communication between the groups and sabotages receptiveness to mediation proposals (Deutsch, 1973).

If this constellation of mutual threat with a simultaneous breaking-off of communication has come about, the conflict has become an autonomous process in which each of the competing groups no longer sees itself facing any choice except to defend its aims. Independently of whether their defensive actions succeed or not, the opposing group perceives them as aggression that threatens its own aims and against which it believes it must defend itself ... (cf. Figure 1).

The further this process proceeds, the more drastic will be the means adopted by the conflict parties to defend against the perceived threat to their aims, the more the struggle against the opponent in the conflict will become the dominant group aim, the more influence will be gained by group members who excel in the struggle, the more the opponent will be marked as an enemy and the more the group will distrust willingness to compromise and mediation efforts (Kempf, 1995).




Figure 1: The autonomous process

The aim of war propaganda is to tie the members of one's society to such a destructive conflict strategy and to ward off the possibility of pursuing the conflict in a constructive way.

What course a conflict takes essentially depends, according to Deutsch (1973), on whether the parties understand the conflict as a competitive or a cooperative process.

Destructive conflicts have a tendency to expand and escalate. They become autonomous and may continue after the originally disputed issues have become irrelevant or even been forgotten. Parallel to the expansion of the conflict, power strategies increasingly fixate on the tactics of threat, coercion and deception.

The tendency to escalate the conflict results from three interconnected processes:

- the competitive process that results from efforts to win the conflict,
- the process of misinterpreting the opposing side's action and its intentions (divergence of perspectives, construction of enemy images) and
- the process of social commitment that goes together with making victory over the opponent the primary aim of the in-group.

The competitive process impoverishes the communication between the conflict parties.

- The parties do not use existing communication possibilities, or they employ them to intimidate or mislead the opponent. They distrust the opponent's statements. This favors the misinterpretation of information in the sense of already

existing prejudices.

- The competitive process makes it seem that a conflict solution satisfactory for one's side can only be achieved at the expense of, and in opposition to, the enemy. Thereby parties favor the use of increasingly harsh and violent means to impose their own goals.
- The competitive process leads to a suspicious and hostile attitude toward the opponent that intensifies the perception of oppositions between the conflict parties and reduces the perception of commonalities among them.

The process of misinterpretation results at first from the conflict parties' divergence of perspectives and, due to the resulting asymmetry of trust and suspicion, ratchets up the level of conflict, so that

- the conflict parties increasingly become less willing to (also) see the opponents' actions from their perspective,
- the conflict parties have less and less ability to receive information that could correct their prejudicial interpretations of the opponent's actions, and
- the conflict parties tend to regard their own aims and actions as more appropriate and justifiable than those of the opposing side.

Through the sharpening of the conflict, increased tension arises which reduces the intellectual possibilities to take other paths of conflict resolution. Due to the process of social commitment to victory over the opponent, conflict-resolving competence is further limited in conflicts between groups: Group members who excel in the struggle gain influence; group members reject readiness to make compromises and attempts at mediation as betrayal, and the continuing entanglement in the conflict binds group members to the conflict strategy by justifying previous participation.

Constructive courses of conflict are facilitated by the following processes:

- the process of cooperative problem solving,
- the process of supportive misperception, and
- the process of cooperative commitment.

In a cooperative environment, conflict parties can view the conflict as a common problem in which they share an interest in finding a solution satisfactory to all parties. This favors productive conflict resolution in three regards:

- The cooperative process assists in achieving open and honest communication. The freedom to exchange information enables the conflict parties to move forward beyond their current, overt disputes to discover their underlying interests and thereby to develop a suitable definition of the problems they face together. At the same time, each party is placed in a position to profit from their partner's knowledge, so that their contributions to the solution of the conflict are optimized. Not least of all, open communication reduces the danger of misunderstandings that can lead to confusion and suspicion.

- The cooperative process encourages the recognition of the viewpoints and interests of the partners and the readiness to search for solutions that are just for both sides. It reduces defensive attitudes and enables partners to approach the problem so that their particular competencies are utilized.
- The cooperative process leads to a trusting, benevolent attitude of the partners to each other that increases their sensitivity for the recognition of commonalities and reduces the importance of differences. It stimulates the convergence of convictions and values.

Just as in competitive processes, characteristic forms of misunderstanding and misjudgment arise – however, with reversed signs. Cooperation tends to weaken the perception of contradictions and to strengthen the goodwill of the partners. According to Deutsch, these typical changes have the effect of containing conflict and making escalation less likely, but they also pose the danger that conflict issues may be overlooked, or that the partners may engage in "premature cooperation". They could therefore fail to reach a stable agreement, because they do not deal adequately with contradictions or do not work through their disputes with sufficient thoroughness (Keiffer, 1968).

The ties of a cooperative relationship can be stabilized not only by loyalty, commitment, adaptation, guilt or willingness to accommodate, but also by personal ties and personal gains. As well earlier experiences of relationships, already achieved successes, procedural modes, institutions and/or commitments to a third party can work as binding factors in cooperative relationships. This is the case even when the affective ties to the partner and the perceived utility of the relationship are no longer capable of guaranteeing the continuation of a relationship.

1.3 A model of war propaganda

War propaganda is the process through which reality is constructed (either intentionally or incidentally) in a way which makes people strongly and personally identify with the military logic rather than see the reality of war and/or perspectives for peaceful conflict resolution.

The basis of successful propaganda is that people do not immediately recognize it as propaganda. It succeeds because it does not simply construct its own propaganda reality, but rather takes up, carries forward and intensifies natural processes of perceptual distortion.

In every conflict there are one's own rights and intentions and the actions of others that interfere with them and are experienced as a threat. At the same time, there are the rights and intentions of the other party, with which one's own actions interfere and that the other perceives as threatening. There are also common rights and intentions and common benefits from a peaceful relationship between the parties that provide an opportunity for developing mutual trust (cf. Figure 2).




Figure 2: The conflict constellation

However, the systematic divergence of perspectives between the parties (Kempf, 1995) hinders such a comprehensive view of the conflict constellation. The perspective is narrowed to one's own rights and intentions and the threat to them by the opponent's actions which – at the same time – are perceived as a threat to shared rights and intentions, and to common benefit as well (cf. Figure 3).




Figure 3: Divergence of perspectives




Figure 4: Competition

If people interpret a conflict as a competitive situation, they lose sight of common rights, intentions and benefits. Mutual trust is lost. Parties can then only see their own rights and intentions and the threat to them by the opponent's actions (cf. Figure 4).




Figure 5: Struggle

If competition escalates into struggle, each party disputes the rights of the other and demonizes its intentions. Both parties justify their own actions that interfere with the opponent's rights and intentions and emphasize their own strengths. Besides emphasizing the threat posed by the opponent, both parties are confident of being able to win the struggle and realize their own rights and intentions.

Both parties idealize their own rights and intentions. They condemn the actions of the opponent that interfere with them and insist on the opponent's threatening intentions.

Both parties deny that their own actions pose a threat to the opponent's rights. They see the opponent's actions as unjust attacks, and this increases their distrust of the opponent (cf. Figure. 5).




Figure 6: War propaganda

With further escalation to war, conflict perception completely narrows to a military logic (cf. Figure 6). The object and aim of war propaganda are to support, activate and maintain this process.

Both parties reject the alternative of peaceful conflict resolution and fan mistrust of the opponent. They dispute the common interests that could lay the foundation for constructive conflict management and reject the possibility of cooperation with their opponent. They transform their justified outrage at war into (self-righteous) outrage at the enemy: They deny the common suffering that the war causes on both sides, just as they deny the common benefits that peaceful conflict resolution could bring.

1.4 Immanent contradictions of war propaganda

If journalism looks like propaganda, smells like propaganda and tastes like propaganda, it really is propaganda and not journalism. In that case we can say that journalists have not followed their ethical rules and professional guidelines.

War propaganda is characterized by three component processes:

1. Definition of the conflict as a competitive situation.
2. Production and support of the resulting perceptual distortions and false judgments.
3. Social commitments or respectively social identification with one's own side and personal entanglement.

The decisive point for maintaining war readiness is the simultaneous creation of feelings of being threatened by the enemy and confidence in the outcome of the war, in one's leadership, etc.

In order to achieve this, the enemy must seem as malevolent and dangerous as possible. But a party must not demonize the enemy so much that it demoralizes its own citizens and reduces their confidence in their ultimate victory.

- Thus, on the one hand, to legitimate Western nuclear armament, Cold War propaganda emphasized the Soviet Union's aggressiveness while, on the other hand, the Soviet Union's goodwill was sought as the (sole) guarantee that a nuclear war could be avoided (cf. Kempf, 1986).
- Examples that are just as impressive can be found in *The Times* of 22 January 1991, where, on the one hand, the anticipated use of war prisoners as human shields was offered as proof of Saddam Hussein's malevolence while, on the other, it was argued that the captured pilots had nothing to fear.

Attributing positive characteristics to the enemy, as shown above, is not counter-productive for effective propaganda. For to the contrary:

- It keeps propaganda from beginning to 'stink'.
- It prevents demoralization and strengthens confidence in the outcome of the war in general and/or in specific situations arising out of the war.
- It produces logical contradictions and thereby places the public in a double bind situation that reduces its judgmental capacity and makes it susceptible to accepting the official conclusions.

The concept of the double bind describes a communication pathology which clinical psychology first became aware of in connection with the rise of schizophrenic mental disorders (Bateson et al., 1956). Definitional attributes of the double bind are:

1. A relationship to another person or institution so extensive that it becomes especially important to precisely understand their communications in order to react appropriately to them.

2. Statements of this person or institution convey two contradictory messages.
3. The affected person can neither take a position to the opposing messages nor withdraw from the situation.

Studies of the long-term effects of psychological torture have shown that the destruction of a person's reference system through double binds causes a process of dehumanization whose symptoms can be regarded as completely intended in the frame of psychological warfare: selective inattentiveness and clinging to prejudices, absolute claims and idealizations, evasive skepticism and paranoid defensive attitudes which, among others, reduce the ability to think clearly and make people insensitive to the suffering of others (cf. Samayoa, 1987; Martín-Baró, 1991).

The appearance of double binds in war propaganda is conditioned by three factors:

1. the information monopoly of the media that disseminates the propaganda,
2. the contradictoriness of the propaganda message,
3. the social identification and personal entanglement of the public produced by the propaganda.

The double bind works through the psychological destabilization of the public, i. e., in the destruction of autonomous judgmental ability that can only be regained by freeing oneself from social identification and personal entanglement in the events and observing the logic of the war from the outside.

If propaganda is not to begin to smell, it should never totally idealize its side. A striking example of this was the ineffectiveness of the Cold War propaganda disseminated in East bloc countries that people eventually stopped trusting even when it contained accurate information on the capitalist system. As well, criticizing one's own side, such as was, e. g., expressed in *The Times* of 22 January 1991 on the Ministry of Defense's information policy, is therefore not counter-productive for successful propaganda, but rather even has efficacy-increasing psychological side-effects:

- By engaging with (or anticipating) (possible) critique on one's side (two-sided propaganda presentation), propaganda can be immunized against counter-propaganda (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953).
- Public confidence in its side can be strengthened by showing that although it has indeed made mistakes, it can nevertheless be trusted, that it is correcting its mistakes and doing its best to avoid future ones (Reimann, 2002).

1.5 A model of peace journalism

Well-crafted propaganda should not smell like propaganda and has the best chances of not doing so, because the processes of perceptual distortion that propaganda supports in conflicts occur even without propaganda – as it were naturally.

If one understands these processes, one can already see, smell and taste propaganda before it starts to stink.

But how would journalism in a war appear that was not propagandistic (intentionally or through negligence)? It can only escape the propaganda trap if it can prove itself resistant to the natural processes of perceptual distortion in escalating conflicts without turning into counter-propaganda.

A critical peace journalism so understood means neither accepting the opponent's propaganda (which is subject to the same sorts of perceptual distortion and misjudgment as propaganda on one's own side), nor does it mean peace propaganda (which is characterized by perceptual distortions and misjudgments with reversed signs).

It means putting in question war and military logic, showing respect for the rights of the opponent and a non-distorted representation of its intentions, as well as a self-critical and realistic evaluation of one's own rights and intentions. It means the recognition that the opponent also feels threatened and in a defensive position, and it demands critical evaluation of one's own actions that interfere with the common rights. It means an unprejudiced judgment of the opponent's actions that interfere with one's own rights. It means reducing own feelings of being threatened by the opponent and communicating insight into the price that must be paid for military victory.




Figure 7: Critical peace journalism

Critical peace journalism ultimately requires calling for peaceful alternatives. It distances itself from all conflict parties and criticizes their modes of action. It puts

common rights in the foreground and looks for signs of readiness for peace on both sides (e. g., among societal actors). It reports on the common suffering that war causes on both sides and examines the common benefits that both sides could gain from ending their war. It pays attention to opposition to the war on both sides and opens perspectives of reconciliation (cf. Figure 7).

Unlike war propaganda, which tries to create partisanship and one-sided conflict perception, critical peace journalism aims at a differentiated assessment of pro and contra arguments. As well, critical peace journalism thereby contains contradictory information that, however, has neither the form of two-sided messages nor of double binds, but is instead characterized by critical distance from both sides. The decisive point for the differentiation between double binds, two-sided messages and critical distance can be seen in the form and function of the social identification and personal involvement of the recipients.

- Double binds rest on emotional involvement with both of two contradictory messages. Emotional involvement makes it difficult to question either of the contradictory messages.
- With two-sided messages, social identification performs the function of emotionally discounting subversive information which could cast doubt on the viewpoint of one's side. Emotional involvement binds people to one of the contradictory messages: to the one advantageous to one's own side.
- With critical distance, to the contrary, a social identification with the process of non-violent conflict resolution takes place that commits people to a perspective located outside of the conflict. Emotional involvement permits or respectively furthers a critical consideration of both messages.

Conflict prevention and the media

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Peace journalism vs. the journalism of attachment

For a long time the media were chiefly treated as news channels. Only more recently has this viewpoint changed. The role that media play in foreign policy is now viewed as more complex: The media are not just channels for news transmission, but rather make an essential contribution to the construction of the environment in which foreign policy is implemented. "The media set moods and agendas, and create atmospheres or environments which influence the foreign policy decision-makers, but at the same time compel them to relate to this environment and to try to affect it" (Naveh, 1998, 2). Decision-makers and politicians listen to public opinion more than is commonly assumed, and they use the media to learn about it.

The conception that journalists are not mere neutral reporters, but rather exert influence on political events, has also lastingly affected the self-understanding of journalism and led to the rise of two contrasting tendencies that attempt to face journalistic responsibility in different ways.

The first of these tendencies is (still) chiefly an academic project. Influenced by the Gulf war and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peace researchers and media scholars began to think about how media influence could be employed for conflict prevention and the constructive transformation of conflicts (Galtung, 1998; Kempf, 1998a). In the form of training courses for journalists (e.g., Conflict & Peace, 1998), the attempt is being undertaken to pass the results of peace studies on to journalists and make them fruitful for journalistic work. This "peace journalism" project deals critically not only with the role of the media as catalysts of violence (cf. Knightley, 1976; Kempf, 1994; Kempf & Schmidt-Regener, 1998; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001), but also with the professional-ethical norms of journalism (Luostarinen & Kempf, 2000). A second new school of journalism, the "journalism of attachment" (Bell, 1997), has already become established. It likewise assumes that the media are not simply reporters on war and peace, but that they play an active role on the political stage. Common to both approaches is also the insight that journalists, in view of the atrocities committed in modern wars, should not remain detached from the events they report on. Journalists should take the side of the victims of war and give expression to the demand that something be done.

While "peace journalism" draws on conflict analyses, searches for the victims of war on all sides and strives for de-escalation and constructive conflict management, the "journalism of attachment", in contrast, thinks it can get by without analysis and reflection, and treats war as a moral antagonism between "good" and "evil". The "journalism of attachment ... is aware of its responsibilities; and will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor" (Bell, 1997). Insofar as journalists assume the role of judges over good and evil and see their task as exerting moral pressure on the international community of states to take sides and intervene with military means, the "journalism of attachment" turns into something that can be called the second stage of the "privatization of propaganda".

The first stage of the privatization of propaganda could be observed during the Gulf War. The role of PR agencies (especially Hill & Knowlton; cf. MacArthur, 1993) was so enormous – for the first time in history – and the filters to separate out virtual PR realities were so weak that it proved to be extremely hard for journalists to understand the situation correctly without knowing what part of the "news" was actually produced by PR agencies. It has also been shown that PR agencies (especially Ruder & Finn; cf. Beham, 1996) similarly exerted influence during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The second step of the privatization of propaganda reached by the journalism of attachment goes beyond this. It has journalists themselves abandon their professional rules and standards of objectivity in the name of a higher moral responsibility. The coverage of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is full of examples of how journalists tried to achieve their grand moral aims through information control and/or the fabrication of news.

Journalists suppressed reports that met all the conventional criteria of high news value but did not fit with the accepted enemy image (cf. Hume, 1997). They falsified empirical evidence by producing, e.g., TV images that did not show what they claimed (cf. Deichmann, 1997), but put in the picture the clichés and stereotypes that propaganda had already established in the public consciousness before. Journalists dismissed the falsification accusations as irrelevant because the pictures only showed what the public "knew" anyway, and they justified the deceptive maneuver by claiming that they had thereby opened the eyes of the public (cf. Kempf, 1998b).

In that journalists themselves dissolved the boundaries between news and propaganda, the relationship between conflict prevention and the media presents itself as still more problematic than it has otherwise always been. Previously one could assume that the media were at fault for not making the (international) public aware of escalating conflicts early enough and thereby reducing the chances to constructively transform conflicts before the threshold of violence was overstepped. Now the question poses itself of whether early media awareness does not carry the danger of heating the escalation dynamic and beyond this more than ever sabotaging the chances of non-violent conflict resolution.

2. Escalation dynamic and early detection of conflicts

Conflicts usually gain (international) media attention only after they have already reached a high level of escalation or have crossed the threshold of violence. This is due to a range of factors, which include among others the criteria for news selection, an inadequate understanding of conflict and the focusing of media attention on the conflict arena.

2.1 Criteria for of news selection

According to Galtung & Vincent (1992), the news value of a report is above all determined by four criteria: The ideal event that yields a major report is something *negative* (positive events are less interesting) that happens to a *person* (not to a structure or institution – too abstract and thus less interesting) who belongs to an *elite* (ordinary people are less interesting) in an *elite country* (countries of the second, third or fourth worlds are less interesting).

		Person		Structure	
		Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive
Elite country	Elite people	No problem: any rumors; however false (4)	Happy family events (3)	Cabinet falls (3)	Cabinet falls (3)
	Non-elite people	Accidents (3)	Prizes, lottery, wealth (2)	Economic crashes (2)	Economic growth (1)
Non-elite country	Elite people	Scandals (drugs) (3)	Prizes, lottery, wealth (2)	Coup d'état (2)	Elections, but major change (1)
	Non-elite people	Mega-accidents (2)	Miracles (1)	Revolutions, 'trouble', riots (1)	No chance: however true (0)

Table 1: Model of news selection (following Galtung, 1998, 12)

By far, most reported events are far from meeting the ideal. Depending on how many of these four criteria are fulfilled, they can be located on a scale from 0 to 4 (cf. Table 1). The rank positions 0 to 4 simultaneously evaluate the frame of the event, and the lower the evaluation, the more important the content must be in order to be newsworthy.

For elites in the rich countries, a little gossip suffices to get news coverage; for ordinary people in poor countries something has to happen comparable to an

earthquake or a war that costs thousands of lives. Even in elite countries that favor structural change by peaceful means, ordinary people or marginalized groups have only relatively little chance of attracting media attention.

If people continually speak of how, e.g., terrorists exploit the media to attract attention to their concerns through the use of violence, this accusation can also be turned on its head: It is namely media neglect of their concerns that forces minority groups to employ violent means to attract media attention to their problems. Thus, ten years of non-violent resistance by the Albanian civil rights movement in Kosovo hardly attracted any media attention. However, when the UCK started armed resistance, it quickly became a much-noted force for the media, while the importance of Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova was played down. He, it seemed, did not (any longer) have the entire Albanian population in Kosovo behind him.

As long as the media blindly follow this selection strategy, they should clearly understand that they not only fail to call public attention to looming conflicts early enough, but rather they also offer conflict parties still another incentive for violent forms of escalating conflicts.

A counter-argument is that the media have the job of providing information, and precisely these criteria determine the news value of a report. This argument does not hold insofar as the so-defined news value of a report is inversely proportional to its information content. Through the mechanisms of news selection, the news media actually reproduce a highly redundant picture of our world that constantly repeats itself in changing theaters. In the constellation between Israel and Palestine, in the Gulf War, in Somalia and in former Yugoslavia: "Something negative like violence occurs in ordinary countries; something positive like peace is brought to them through the patient and costly intervention of members of the elites in rich countries" (Galtung, 1998, 13).

2.2 Understanding conflict and focusing on conflict arenas

The early detection of conflicts is at the same time hampered by the media's inadequate understanding of conflict. Usually conflicts affect a large range of parties and include a large number of interests and disputed objects. And conflicts are basically open to taking either a constructive or a destructive course (Deutsch, 1973). What sort of course a conflict takes depends, however, essentially on whether the conflict is understood as a cooperative process in which all the parties can win (win-win orientation), or as a competitive process in which each party thinks it has to impose its will at the cost of the others (win-lose orientation).

Conventional journalism only all too often confuses conflicts with zero-sum games in which two parties fight for the same goal, namely to win. The coverage focuses on the conflict arena and seeks the causes and solutions of conflict on the battlefield. What interests the media is the question of war guilt ("Who cast the first stone?") and the question of who gains the upper hand in a war (Galtung, 1998, 7). The consequence of this is that conflicts usually only attract media attention

when they have already escalated so much that they can be interpreted in the sense of this model.

If the media are to contribute to the prevention of destructive courses of conflict, they must identify conflicts earlier. More precise knowledge of the dynamics of conflict escalation is necessary for this, as is shown in Figure 1, which integrates the escalation models of Creighton (1992), Glasl (1992) and Kempf (1996).




Figure 1: Escalation dynamic of conflicts

The first level of conflict escalation is reached, when the conflict is understood as a competitive process. In the first step of the escalation process, which represents the transition from a win-win to a win-lose orientation, the extent of the conflict is still relatively hard for the media to recognize. In particular in the first step of escalation, while the positions of the conflict parties harden, cooperation still dominates. To be sure, the viewpoints occasionally clash, but the privileging of the elites by the media has the effect that the seriousness of the opponent's concerns is often not recognized. The same also still holds in the second step, characterized by an unstable equilibrium between cooperative and competitive attitudes. In debates, the intentions, standpoints, cognitions and emotions of the conflict parties become increasingly polarized, but this polarization is all too easily overlooked as long as the media adopt the viewpoint of one of the parties (the ruling elite or majority position). Even in the third step, when competitive behavior gains the upper hand, and the conflict parties confront each other with accomplished facts, the empathy of journalists – even of the minority position – would find it hard to detect this polarization and to interpret it as an alarm signal.

If one of the parties feels harmed or fears being still more severely harmed, the conflict escalates into a struggle. Harming the opponent becomes an independent aim, no party wants to betray any weaknesses, and the parties start to demonize each other. Already in the first step of the process, which leads from competition to struggle, it should be relatively easy for the media to recognize the dynamic of conflict escalation. While the conflict parties force their opponent into negative roles, they strive to upgrade their own image and begin looking for supporters and coalition partners. Both here and in the next escalation step, in which the conflict parties try to make the opponent lose face, PR measures are central to conflict behavior. This means that the conflict parties themselves turn to the media with press releases, etc. Unlike the case in lower escalation steps, journalists themselves now do not even need to do research to become aware of the conflict: The conflict comes to them. It is a few minutes before 'high noon'. And if the media still do not give the conflict the attention it deserves, this is due to the usual media practice of focusing on negative events. Conflict only starts to become exciting to the media in the next step of conflict escalation. Here violence has, to be sure, not yet broken out, but the conflict parties consider the employment of violence to be a possible option, and they try to impose their will on each other through the threat of violence. In the meantime, the escalation process has, however, already gone so far that media attention comes too late to have a preventive effect.

In order to detect conflicts early enough, and to be able to contribute to the prevention of destructive conflict courses, the following guidelines for journalists are proposed:

1. Report before violent actions occur or violent measures are threatened.
2. The highest alarm step has already been reached if one or more parties resorts to PR measures to upgrade its own image and/or downgrade the opponent's.
3. Pay attention to even (apparently) trivial conflicts that the ruling elites (still) have under control.
4. Do not simply adopt the elite perspective, but rather do research on the concerns of all the groups affected by a conflict.
5. Show empathy for all parties without distinction of the person or the status of those affected by the conflict.

3. De-escalation oriented conflict coverage

When the media finally take note of a conflict, the usual pattern is to portray the conflict parties as irreconcilable antagonists and to assign the sole or at least the chief blame for the conflict to one of the parties. The perspective on the conflict is thereby largely made to conform to the perspective of those parties with whom the media can most easily identify – be it for historical, political or cultural reasons. Even without adopting the "journalism of attachment" as their program, journalists are all too prone to fall prey to the same distortions of conflict perception as the elites to whom they orient themselves and who serve as indispensable information

sources for them. Even without censoring and/or falsifying the news, the truth that the media report is mostly only a small segment of the truth that could be reported.

In every conflict, there are many truths. Each of the conflict parties thinks it is in the right and that its justified concerns are threatened by the actions of the other side. The conflict parties also have common interests that can serve as a starting point for a constructive transformation of the conflict and that they also employ for this as long as they understand the conflict as a cooperative process (cf. Chapter 1, Figure 2). However, cooperation depends on communication. One can only find a conflict solution that would satisfy all sides by taking into account the concerns of all parties. As escalation progresses, the cognitive representation of a conflict increasingly narrows, however. Already the basis of competition is that the parties are fixated on their own rights and intentions and attempt to implement these in opposition to the others. The other side's concerns, as well as common interests, thereby drop out of sight. Conflict perception focuses on own aims that are threatened by the opponent's actions. The more drastic the means employed to achieve own aims, the more they need justification. Thus with the escalation of conflict to struggle, parties increasingly idealize their own aims and condemn the opponent's actions. They emphasize the opponent's dangerousness, reject the rights he claims, and demonize his intentions. Through the unconditional justification of their own actions and the emphasis on their own strength, parties increase their side's confidence in being able to win the conflict.

The struggle finally escalates to war when the physical or psychological destruction of the opponent becomes an autonomous aim and/or the conflict parties resort to violent means to force the opponent to yield. On this level of conflict escalation, the parties no longer regard each other as human beings, but rather only as enemies. Mutual violence becomes the central conflict object. The original conflict objects recede into the background, the conflict parties finally begin to fight not so much to impose their aims at the expense of the opponent as to prevent the opponent from winning. The conflict becomes a zero-sum game in which the only aim left is to win, and to win means not to be the loser.

The escalation of the war into this lose-lose situation can again be described in three steps (cf. Figure 1). At first, the opponents' strategies are still to make limited destructive blows at each other, but in order to be able to bear their own losses the conflict parties already begin to reverse their values: They reinterpret low losses as winning. In the next step of escalation, stalemating the opponent becomes the central aim. Finally total war begins, which plunges the conflict parties together into the abyss. There is now no turning back; the opponent must be destroyed, even at the price of one's own destruction.

As struggle escalates into war, the cognitive representation of the conflict further sharpens. The opponent must in principle, and without exception, be mistrusted. Parties dispute common interests and possibilities for cooperation, reject mediation attempts by third parties and treat any possible readiness for negotiation expressed by the opponent as mere deception. Outrage at the suffering that the war

causes is transformed into outrage at the enemy. Precisely this image of the conflict (cf. Chapter 1, Figure 6) is what war-making elites not only themselves share, but also attempt to spread using propaganda.

The above-sketched processes of perceptual distortion in escalating conflicts are, however, not just the product of propaganda. They rest on social-psychological law-like regularities that are in like manner present in interpersonal, as in social, institutional and political conflicts. However limited and distorted the image of the conflict resulting from this may be, it therefore nevertheless has the highest plausibility. Even journalists can only withstand it if they know these processes and exercise a basic mistrust of the plausible. The aspects shown in Table 2 (2.1– 2.6) of escalation or de-escalation oriented conflict coverage can be of use for this.¹

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 1	Polarization (or respectively support of war) & confrontationist (or respectively military) logic	D 1	Query of polarization (or respectively warfare) & confrontationist (or respectively military) logic
E 1.1	Zero-sum or at least win-lose orientation (construction of conflict as a competitive process); conflict resolution is regarded as impossible; agreements are interpreted as "giving in", compromise is devalORIZED	D 1.1	Win-win orientation (or at least questioning win-lose) and/ or presentation of structures for possible cooperation (construction of the conflict as a cooperative process)
E 1.2	Emphasis on military values	D 1.2	Cooperative values and/or questioning militarism and military values
E 1.3	Designation of (military) force as an appropriate means of conflict resolution and/or downgrading of doubt in its appropriateness	D 1.3	Emphasis on negative effects of (military) force and/or questioning its appropriateness
E 1.4	Refutation, questioning or downgrading peaceful alternatives; focus on violence reduces the prospect of peace and/or obstacles to peace are emphasized or portrayed as overwhelming	D 1.4	Perspectives on, demands for and/or agreement with peaceful alternatives
E 1.5	Emphasis on antagonism	D 1.5	Emphasis on openness to all sides or at least abandonment of dividing the protagonists into two camps

Table 2.1: Conceptualization of the (conflict-) situation

1 Editor's note: A collection of examples how these aspects materialize in war reporting and post-war coverage is provided in the "Catalog of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented aspects of conflict coverage" in the appendix.

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 2	Antagonism	D 2	Balance
E 2.1	Demonization of the opponent, denial of his rights and/or demonization of his intentions	D 2.1	Respecting the opponent's rights and/or unbiased description of his intentions
E 2.2	Idealization of one's own rights and intentions	D 2.2	Realistic and self-critical evaluation of one's own rights and intentions
E 2.3	Denial of common interests or emphasis on incompatibility of interests, culture, etc.	D 2.3	Emphasis on common interests and/or description of the (concrete) benefits that both sides could gain from ending the war

Table 2.2: Evaluation of the war parties' rights and intentions

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 3	Confrontation	D 3	Cooperation
E 3.1	Justification of one's own side's actions and underlining of one's own rightness ----- demonstration of uniformity and /or downgrading differences within one's own party	D 3.1	Self-critical evaluation of one's own side's actions ----- focus on plurality of behavioral options within one's own party
E 3.2	Condemnation of the opponent's actions ----- disregarding plurality on "their" side	D 3.2	Less confrontationist or unbiased evaluation of the opponent's actions ----- focus on plurality of "their" behavioral options
E 3.3	Antagonistic behavior is emphasized, possibilities for cooperation or common gain from ending the war are denied, cooperation between conflict parties is not taken serious and/or ----- the role of third parties is interpreted more as exerting (moral, economic or military) pressure (win-lose) than as mediating (win-win)	D 3.3	(Supporting) description of cooperative behavior, of possibilities for cooperation or common gain from ending the war and/or ----- the role of third parties is interpreted as mediating (win-win) rather than exerting (moral, economic or military) pressure (win-lose)

Table 2.3: Evaluation of the war parties' actions

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 4	Destructive emotions	D 4	Constructive emotions
E 4.1	A focus on "their" viciousness and dangerousness & accentuation of "our" strength create a balance between threat and confidence which promotes willingness to engage in struggle (or war)	D 4.1	Unbiased assessment of "their" intentions & behavior and emphasis on the price of victory deconstruct threat and confidence and promote "our" willingness for peace
E 4.2	Mistrust of the opponent and/or neutral third parties who try to mediate in the conflict is encouraged (e.g., by depicting the party as untrustworthy, prone to violating treaties, etc.)	D 4.2	Respect for "their" rights and unbiased assessment of "their" behavior reduce mistrust
E 4.3	A focus on "their" atrocities and "our" justness transforms outrage at war into outrage at the enemy	D 4.3	Empathy with both sides' victims, emphasis on both sides' casualties and unbiased evaluation of both sides' behavior redirects outrage at the war
E 4.4	Interpunktuaton of the conflict, demonization of "their" intentions and/or justification of "our" behavior jeopardize empathy with "their" situation: if they behave well, they have nothing to fear	D 4.4	Empathy for "their" situation opens up a new perspective: if we can find a solution (together) that takes all sides' needs into account, reconciliation will become possible
E 4.5	Denial of possibilities for cooperation and/or blaming the opponent for the failure of cooperation jeopardizes rebuilding of trust	D 4.5	Emphasis on cooperative experiences (also in the past) rebuilds trust

Table 2.4: Emotional involvement in the conflict

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 5	Confrontationist social commitment	D 5	Cooperative social commitment
E 5.1	Humanizes "our" political or military leaders an/or dehumanizes "their" leaders	D 5.1	Refrains from identification with escalation-oriented political or military leaders on all sides
E 5.2	Humanizes "our" soldiers and/or dehumanizes "their" soldiers	D 5.2	Refrains from identification with military personnel on all sides
E 5.3	Humanizes "our" victims and/or ignores or dehumanizes "their" victims	D 5.3	Humanizes or at least respects victims of the war on all sides
E 5.4	Humanizes "our" civil population for its loyalty and sacrifice and/or ignores or dehumanizes "their" civil population for its nationalism, etc.	D 5.4	Humanizes or at least respects members of civil society and/or refrains from identification with supporters of the war on all sides

E 5.5	Humanizes "their" anti-war opposition and/or ignores or dehumanizes "our" anti-war opposition	D 5.5	Humanizes or at least respects those who strive for a peaceful conflict resolution on all sides
E 5.6	Devalorizes positive (emotional) reactions to the prospect of peace	D 5.6	Emphasizes positive (emotional) reactions to the prospect of peace

Table 2.5: Social identification and personal entanglement

Escalation-oriented-aspects:		De-escalation-oriented aspects:	
E 6	Motivation for war	D 6	Motivation for peace
E 6.1	War as a bulwark against de-struction and/or peace as a risk	D 6.1	Peace as an alternative to destruc-tion and/or war as a risk
E 6.2	War as a bridge to a brighter future and/or peace as a risk	D 6.2	Peace as a bridge to a brighter future and/or war as a risk

Table 2.6: Motivational logic

Table 2: Escalation and de-escalation oriented aspects of conflict coverage (based on Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996 – adapted)

If journalists are to do preventive conflict coverage, they must not only guard against adopting and furthering the limited perspective of one of the conflict parties. They must also exercise caution toward the conventional journalistic practice of dramatizing their reports and commentaries by representing conflict as more severe than the actual level of escalation. Even very normal democratic processes involving no rule violations are sometimes made "interesting" for the media public by representing them as bitter struggles over non-negotiable rights (cf. ASPR, 2003). Such a polarization of conflicts not only hinders constructive conflict resolution, it is also a rather unsuitable means to create drama and interest. All too often it serves as a substitute for factual information that could make the events far more dramatic and interesting by telling the public what the conflict involves and not just who has (allegedly) already made some more base accusations against whom, or will soon do so.

In order to be able to contribute to preventing destructive courses of conflict, the following guidelines for journalists are proposed:

1. Drama through factual information.
2. Refraining from polarization.
3. De-escalation oriented coverage.
4. Mistrust of the plausible.

As long as journalists cannot succeed in following these simple rules, or as long as they lack the necessary competence to do so, it might be better if conflicts were spared media attention. The escalation dynamics that conflicts display are dangerous enough, and there is no need for media that pour oil on the flames.

Information structures as barriers to civilian conflict management

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

While the end of the Cold War brought a decrease in interstate conflicts, the internationalization of intra-state, or domestic, conflicts is gaining ground for a number of reasons. These include, among others, the monopoly position of the sole remaining superpower, which has upset the accustomed (even if counterproductive) equilibrium in United Nations decision-making structures. Contrary to previous hopes, the United Nations has not been revitalized, but rather weakened by the end of Security Council stalemates between the competing power blocs. Under the leadership of the remaining superpower, defense alliances such as NATO began to intervene militarily in conflicts, even without a United Nations mandate. Simultaneously, the global economic, political, ecological and military interdependence of world society has led to an increasing amalgamation of the interests of intervening third parties with the interests of the conflict parties in crisis regions. Finally, as well, the increasing sensitivity of world society to deficiencies in material need satisfaction, democracy and the realization of human rights in affected crisis regions has weakened the principle of non-intervention in intra-state conflicts. Its place has been taken by a broad moral consensus with regard to the legitimacy of intervention in intra-state conflicts, which faces a clear lack of consensus on the permissible and promising forms of intervention, however. While the possible instruments of civilian conflict management cover the entire spectrum from preventive diplomacy to peace making and peace keeping to peace building, *de facto*, however, (already seen from the material resources made available), a clear dominance of military forms of intervention (peace enforcement) is apparent. This also requires corresponding diplomatic forms (ultimatum, building credible threat scenarios, etc.) that ultimately make unavoidable what was initially thought of as only the last resort.

For the use of information structures as instruments of civil conflict management, this has far-reaching consequences:

1. Measures for determining the facts and early warning that are named in the 1992 UN *Agenda for Peace* as components of preventive diplomacy likewise run the risk of being transformed into the opposite and functionalized for an inter-

nationalization of conflict.

2. Peace-making activities of mediation, negotiation, aid and sanctions can all too easily change into the partisanship of third parties and thus drive a further escalation of conflict.

The question of information offerings that can contribute to the de-escalation of conflicts, to reconciliation between conflict parties or to the reconstruction of war-devastated societies thus poses itself not only for the crisis regions themselves, but to the same extent also for the international state community, which only apparently finds itself in the role of a neutral third party, or at least constantly runs the risk of losing its neutrality.

2. Deconstruction of war discourse

Not only in the conflict regions themselves, but also in third countries, there arises the question of deconstructing the war discourse which became the dominant discourse form during the Cold War and has marked not only media discourse, but everyday culture overall (especially that of the Western world). As Whitfield (1996) points out, the blurring of the boundary between war and peace has promoted the penetration of military logic into journalism. Almost every news report could be functionalized in the interest of the Cold War, and all the products of the entertainment media, no matter how seemingly innocent, had a potential ideological background. War and violence became everyday consumer goods, and the logic of war a natural way to construct social reality and international relations (Luostarinen, 2002a).

War discourses construct social reality in a manner whose logical form already structurally implies the violent escalation of conflicts. Marked by the conceptualization of conflicts as zero-sum games, as well as by the justification and idealization of respectively own rights, needs and actions, along with the simultaneous condemnation and demonization of the opponent's, they create a climate of mistrust not only of the enemy, but also of third parties who try to mediate in the conflict. By focusing on the conflict arena, by neglecting conflict analysis and by differentiated identification offerings, they construct an opposition between good and evil on the basis of which the enemy must be forced to yield, until the use of force finally appears to be the only possible means of conflict resolution (Kempf, 1996).

The dominance of this form of discourse glaringly contrasts with models of constructive conflict management and the principles underlying it, such as the maintenance of communication between conflict parties, avoiding excessively high gains, avoiding time pressure, mutual respect, disclosure of interests, reduction of hostility and enemy images, strengthening constructive attitudes like security, optimism and self-confidence in one's own side and recognition of, respect for and empathy with the other side.

While civilian conflict management must thereby of necessity include deconstructing war discourse, realizing this proves to be an extremely complex problem, for whose solution the strengthening of independent media is of course a necessary, but by no means a sufficient precondition.

3. Propaganda and military media management

Already Lasswell (1927) concluded that in modern societies the psychological resistances to war are so strong that every war must be made to seem like a defensive struggle against a malevolent, murderous aggressor. Not only dictatorial regimes, but also democratic societies have inferred from this the necessity of psychological warfare oriented to their own populations and own soldiers, which should strengthen their fighting will and determination by means of propaganda.

The aim of propaganda is to so change the value hierarchy within one's own society so that victory becomes the highest aim, to which all other values – like truth, ethics and/or individual rights – are subordinate. The means employed in propaganda thereby range from polarized identification offerings (good versus evil) to the construction of a motivational logic (the war as a bulwark against destruction and/or a bridge to a better future) to the harmonization of the reference levels that align reported daily events, interpretations of conflict contexts, and societal myths (Luostarinen, 2002b).

Because it uses truth merely as a raw material, propaganda violates the professional-ethical principles of journalism and can be implemented over longer periods only through the limitation of press freedom. Just how important control of the media is considered can be seen from the fact they were the first institutions targeted by Slobodan Milošević when he took power in former Yugoslavia – even before co-opting the police and the military (Gredelj, 1998) – and likewise from the high value that information warfare assumes in the strategic concepts of the USA.

A difference between Western democracies and dictatorial regimes is merely to be noted in regard to the crudity of the measures taken to control the media and the crudity of the propaganda contents, which makes Western propaganda concepts much harder to see through than, e.g., Serbian propaganda during the war in Bosnia, which used much more traditional propaganda elements (Malevic, 1998). In contrast to totalitarian regimes that strive for almost total control of the media and media contents, military media management in Western democracies is much more differentiated and follows a flexible, graduated strategy – varying with the type and degree of escalation of conflict – which is described by Luostarinen & Ottosen (1998, 24) in four steps:

1. Preliminary step

- The target country appears in the news
- Revolution, chaos, poverty, dictatorship, rebellion
- Press conferences ("increasing concern"), etc.

2. Justification

- Major news reports are produced.
- Urgency, direct threat to neighbors, the West and one's own citizens.
- Threatening genocide in the target country.
- Set as aims: peace, freedom, democracy.
- Implementation
- News management, access control, censorship, etc.

3. Retroactive legitimization

- Special trips to the target country organized for journalists: peace, order, prosperity, democracy.
- Target country gradually disappears from the news.

Successful media management must balance the core problem of how much or how little access the media should have to conflict-relevant information and to the theater of war. The public's right of information about a conflict that could influence its future is thereby often contrary to what the political and military leadership defines as "in the national interest" or as the "security of journalists", which provides them with pseudo-arguments to justify censorship measures. In this regard the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Falkland conflict, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, as well as the Gulf War, offer various scenarios that both prove the learning ability of the system and test its integrating power.

4. Privatization of propaganda

Independent media represent a precondition for journalism to not simply subordinate itself to the aims of the political and military leadership, but rather in the given case to be able to affirm itself as the 'fourth estate'. However, the mutual interdependence of politics and journalism presents a scenario in which a variety of compromises are possible that prevent the media – aside from exceptional cases, such as perhaps the Vietnam War – from openly opposing the military conduct of conflicts. This makes it possible to maintain the myth of freedom of the press, while the truth is once again passed over or only sees the light of day in an extremely filtered form.

Thereby politics can quite well rely on the self-regulatory powers of the media that reproduce war discourse just on the basis of the criteria for news selection (cf. chapter 2). The privileging of negative news, the personalization of news and the orientation of the media to elites (not only elite persons, but also elite countries) regularly give rise to a picture of reality that divides the world into elite countries and peripheral countries – and at the same time into good and evil. In order for peripheral countries to appear in the media, something terrible must happen at the periphery: catastrophes, violence or war. Positive things like peace are most often reported when they are made possible by the patient and costly intervention of members of elites in prosperous countries (Galtung, 1998). In order to increase a report's news value, media have a tendency to focus on the conflict arena and

represent the reported events as dramatically as possible, whereby drama is all too often confused with sensation-mongering and antagonism.

Due to competition for edition sizes and viewer ratings, these tendencies, with which the media satisfy the reading and viewing preferences of their public (shaped by them over the decades), are further intensified. Public expectations are distorted in a direction in which prudent, balanced and truthful conflict coverage appears not to be "consistent with market trends". As a consequence, the privatization of the media does not prove to be a guarantee of its independence, but to the contrary creates a new dependency, at this stage on the law-like market regularities that reproduce war discourse.

In addition, due to media competition there is also a clear lowering of the threshold that blocks the utilization of PR material and - even worse - with the rise of the "journalism of attachment" – journalists have intentionally begun to discard the professional-ethical norms of journalism and to replace them by the rules of propaganda, for which everything is permitted (cf. chapter 2).

5. Early warning

In view of this suspension by journalists themselves of the boundary between news and propaganda, the relationship between conflict prevention and the media appears far more problematic than it has otherwise always been. One could previously assume that it was a failing of the media that it did not make the (international) public aware of escalating conflicts at a sufficiently early point in time, where the threshold of violence was not yet crossed and constructive conflict transformation was still possible. Now the question arises, whether early media awareness might – to the contrary – rather fan the escalation dynamics and sabotage the chances of non-violent conflict resolution (cf. chapter 2).

Alone due to the above-named mechanisms of news selection, ordinary people and marginalized groups working for structural changes by peaceful means have relatively little chance to attract media attention. Neglect of minority concerns by the media encourages minority groups to resort to violence to attract media attention, and as long as the media blindly follow this selection strategy, they must understand clearly that they do not only fail to direct public attention to threatening conflicts early enough, but they also provide the conflict parties with incentives for violent conflict escalation.

This is also intensified because as a rule conflicts only receive media attention relatively late, i.e., not until a fairly high level of escalation has already been reached. If the media finally do take note of a conflict, this usually means contrasting the conflict parties as irreconcilable adversaries and assigning one of the parties the sole or at least the main responsibility for the conflict. The perspective on the conflict is thereby largely made to coincide with the viewpoint of the party with whom the media are able to identify. Even without adopting the "journalism of attach-

ment" as their program, journalists are all too prone to the same distortions of conflict perception as the elites to whom they orient themselves and who serve them as indispensable information sources. Even without censoring and/or falsifying the news, the truth the media report is still only a small segment of the truth that could be reported.

In every conflict there is not just one, there are many truths and each of the conflict parties sees itself as in the right and believes that its legitimate interests are threatened by the opponent's actions. But the conflict parties also have common interests that could serve as a starting point for constructive conflict transformation, and as long as the parties trust each other enough to deal with their problems in a cooperative way, they actually employ them as a resource of conflict management.

Entering into cooperation with a conflict partner, however, always means to endure an inner conflict and to live with uncertainty: "Can I still trust the other, or am I giving him an advantage?"

And cooperative conflict management is also disadvantaged by a further factor: the systematic divergence of perspectives between the conflict parties (cf. chapter 2).

While we understand our own actions on the basis of our intentions, we learn about the actions of others primarily from their consequences. The intentions behind them must first be reconstructed or learned through communication. The inner conflict which parties experience is thereby further sharpened: "Can I reveal my aims to the others, or will I harm myself by doing this?"

The contribution to constructive conflict settlement that information offerings would have to make at this point consists in functioning as mediators between the parties and closing the gaps in their limited perspectives on the conflict by helping them to better understand those aspects of the conflict that have disappeared from their field of view: the rights and aims of the other side, the effects which the own side's actions exert on these rights and aims and the threat they represent for the other side.

If they try to do so, however, the bearers of information become caught up in the same inner conflict in which the parties find themselves. And, they will remain caught in this inner conflict as long as they do not take one side or the other. Insofar, the tendency of the news media to represent conflicts as zero-sum games between good and evil can also be understood as a flight reaction with which journalists evade this inner conflict.

6. Dynamics of conflict escalation

Constructive conflict management depends on communication. A conflict solution that satisfies all sides can only be achieved if the concerns of all parties are taken into consideration. With increasing conflict escalation, however, the parties' con-

flict perceptions become narrower and increasingly one-sided. The above-named divergence of perspectives represents a structural foundation of social-psychological processes that increasingly sharpen the cognitive representations (or mental models) of conflicts in the course of their escalation and thereby become motors of conflict escalation.

While from the viewpoint of civilian conflict management the task of information offerings must be to correct these natural perceptual distortions, we must on the other side assume that the bearers of information offerings (media, journalists, NGOs) are also subject to these social-psychological processes: and to be sure the more strongly the more they sympathize with one of the conflict parties and the less they consciously steer against these processes.

Competition already arises when the parties concentrate on their own rights and intentions and attempt to realize them against the will of the others. Beyond this, not only the opponent's concerns, but also the common interests are lost from view, and thereby the foundation of mutual trust is removed. Conflict perception focuses on own aims and the threat to them by the opponent's actions.

With the interpretation of the conflict as a competitive process, the inner conflict that the conflict parties previously experienced disappears. Insofar, the widespread tendency to carry on conflicts competitively can also be understood as an avoidance of the inner conflict which is inherent in cooperative conflict management. And because this tendency is so widespread, the inner conflict becomes even more intense. The sharper the inner conflict is, the greater is the temptation to flee from it by trying to impose one's own will against the opponent.

Information offerings could work against the powerful dynamic that conflicts develop by focusing on the common interests of the conflict parties and reminding them of the shared benefits they could obtain by maintaining a cooperative relationship. For the bearers of information offerings this means, however, that they remain entangled in the inner conflict from which the conflict parties have already freed themselves. The feverish search for good and evil in which the news media usually engage when they have first taken notice of conflicts can insofar also be understood as an act of liberation through which journalism seeks the same relief.

Two tendencies come into play here that make the national media of the conflict parties into motors of conflict escalation:

1. If one's country is involved in an international conflict, the question of good and evil is not hard to answer: Merely the fixation on own rights and aims and the threat to them by the other side's actions makes the opposing country the wrongdoer.
2. In escalating conflicts, media and journalists increasingly come under social pressure, whereby not only are their status and reputation at stake, but also their working conditions per se.

With the escalation of conflict from competition to struggle, harming the opponent becomes an autonomous aim. No longer is anyone willing to admit to any weaknesses, and the two sides start to demonize each other.

Parties emphasize their own rights and condemn their opponents' actions. They perceive their opponents as dangerous and increasingly mistrust them, rejecting their claimed rights and condemning their aims. They don't just lose sight of how the conflict also threatens the opponents' rights, rather they actively deny this: "If they did submit to our will, they would have nothing to fear".

The alleged justness of the parties' own aims, the justification of their actions and the emphasis on their own strength support the confidence that they can win the conflict. The resulting balance between confidence and threat heightens the readiness for struggle that, at the same time, however, is based on a logical contradiction.

- On the one side, the opponents must appear so dangerous that the struggle against them absolutely must be undertaken, and the course must be held to the end, and
- on the other side, the opponents must not appear too strong, so that hope of ultimate victory can be sustained.

While the conflict parties press their opponents into negative roles, they strive to upgrade their own image, seek to win supporters and try to cause their opponents to lose face. Accordingly, the conflict parties themselves approach the media with press releases. Unlike the lower escalation steps, journalists no longer have to do their own research in order to become aware of the conflict. The conflict comes to them.

7. War

Which of the conflict parties can now win the sympathy of the political elites and thereby also that of journalists depends on a wide range of factors, including not only the professionalism of their PR strategies, but also factors such as political, cultural and historical closeness.

The more drastic the means used to achieve their own aims, the more urgently do they need to be justified.

With the escalation of conflict to war, conflict parties increasingly idealize their own rights and aims, as well as their own actions. In contrast, they dispute the enemies' rights and demonize their intentions and actions. The distortion of conflict perceptions on both sides that was already omnipresent in the phase of struggle now radicalizes to such an extent that it is easy for them to brush aside the other side's claims as pure propaganda. On the other hand, however, it would also be easy for journalists to recognize these distortions, if they had preserved a residue of distance from the conflict.

War is, however, more than just the intensification of struggle. Whereas in the phase of struggle it was still a question of a variety of objective interests, and both parties attempted to impose their interests at the cost of the others (win-lose), the viewpoint now increasingly narrows to the sole aim of winning (zero-sum orientation). The balance between confidence in victory and threat perception can thereby often only be maintained by interpreting even fairly small losses as winning. And, in order to strengthen the will to stay the course, it becomes necessary now to actively reject the alternative of peaceful dispute settlement.

This happens, on the one side, through the denial of common interests and possibilities for cooperation, which intensifies mistrust of the enemy and hinders confidence building. On the other side, it is caused by an emphasis on common interests and cooperation possibilities that, however, cannot be realized due to the enemy's actions. Consequently, justified outrage at war is transformed into self-righteous outrage at the opponent.

To the logical contradiction between confidence in victory and a sense of being threatened are thus added similar contradictions between an emphasis on and a denial of the common interests and cooperation possibilities, and each of the war parties creates such a contradictory picture of the war.

At the latest these contradictions would have to make critical journalism aware that the truth about the conflict cannot be found by taking sides with one or the other of the parties and accepting its conflict perception as the only valid reality.

Logically viewed, however, any desired conclusion can be drawn from contradictory premises. And the conclusions that the conflict parties draw in the concrete case are the justification of the war, the justness of their own aims, the illegitimacy to the enemy, etc. The inner logic of the war is thereby completely circular and can only be refuted from a critical distance outside the conflict. Again, to take such a distanced position is, however, increasingly difficult the more one's own nation or society is entangled in the war.

8. Preventive conflict coverage

If journalists are to produce preventive conflict coverage, they must not only guard against adopting and propagating the limited perspective of any one of the conflict parties, they must also exercise caution toward the conventional journalistic practice of dramatizing reports and commentaries by representing conflicts as worse than the true escalation situation would warrant. Even quite normal democratic processes not involving any rule violation are sometimes made "interesting" for the media public by representing them as bitter struggles over inalienable rights. Such a polarization of conflict not only hinders constructive conflict resolution, it is also a rather unsuitable means to create drama and interest. All too often it serves as a substitute for factual information that could make the conflict far more dramatic and interesting by informing the public about what is at stake, what ben-

efits the participants could gain from a constructive transformation of the conflict, what resources could be employed for this, and which political and social actors could come into consideration as bearers of the transformation process.

Comparative studies of European and American media coverage on the Gulf War and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have made a dramatic deficit apparent in this regard. Thus the myth of a new world order promulgated by President Bush was quite uncritically adopted by the news media during the Gulf War. Through varying accentuations it was adapted to the respective national discourses so that it achieved maximal plausibility before the background of the national histories and cultures of different countries. The criticism of its plausibility was at most reported, but the media did not adopt this critique (Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 2001).

Western interests were concealed or opportunistically represented in different ways depending on the context. As long as it was a matter of getting the United Nations to legalize the war, they were largely hidden behind the declared aim of liberating Kuwait and the concern for world peace. When the goal was to obtain the consent of the US Congress, free access to resources was placed in the foreground as a national interest, and in order to avoid the impression that lives were being sacrificed for the control of oil, this motive again disappeared from the media after fighting began. It was gradually replaced – beyond the liberation of Kuwait – by the interest in weakening Iraqi military power (Kempf, 2001).

Before the outbreak of the war, the United Nations was portrayed as an instrument for securing world peace, and accordingly the Gulf War itself was still presented as a mission under United Nations auspices (Kempf, 2001). Before ground operations began, however, the 'mere liberation' of Kuwait was represented as an unacceptable compromise for the West (Kempf & Reimann, 2002).

During the pre-war period, the media focused their attention completely one-sidedly on those Security Council resolutions which brought military intervention in the Gulf a step closer. They employed them as news hooks in order to foreground the military options and to prepare for further escalation steps (Meder, 1994).

Iraqi willingness to negotiate was, particularly for the American media, a non-topic. For the American public, it was self-evident that America would not negotiate with Saddam (Kempf, 2001). But also in the German media the option of structuring the conflict in a non-military way was given little attention during the entire period between 17 November 1990 (start of the campaign for a UN ultimatum) and 16 January 1991 (start of the war) (Zehnle 1994). The peace initiatives of third parties were instrumentalized to make the war appear as the final resort. Although mediation initiatives and negotiation offerings received much attention in the European media, there was very little of the critical journalism that could have given peaceful dispute settlement a chance. The facts were of course reported, but the media placed them in the context of military logic and thereby undermined their de-escalating effect (Kempf & Reimann, 2002).

This circumvention of civilian conflict management mechanisms appeared perhaps even more clearly in Bosnia than in the Gulf War. After he annexed Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein mutated almost overnight from a sought-after partner of the West into the new Hitler (Palmbach & Kempf, 1994). In contrast, for a long time the media maintained a certain distance from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The wars were represented as internal conflicts among Serbians, Croats and Muslims, the fanning of the conflict by Western (especially German and Austrian) diplomacy was downplayed, and blatant identification with any one of the Bosnian war parties was largely avoided.

In the beginning, the press was rather ambivalent toward all three groups and identified with the international community of states, for which the war represented a regrettable problem. Thereby, however, they supported less the efforts for non-violent conflict management than the scenario of military intervention. The more international actors were drawn into the conflict, the more sympathy the media expressed for them (Kempf, 2002b). Leading media representatives are even today proud that they persuaded the public, facilitated NATO intervention in Bosnia and thereby contributed to ending the Bosnian war.

The enemy image necessary for this resulted from the construction of different roles for the Bosnian conflict parties and from a partisanship that occurred more between the lines. It punctuated the conflict in such a way that a dichotomy gradually developed between "good" and "evil" that could appear as a conclusion reluctantly drawn about violence lasting over many years. The Muslims were finally viewed as clearly the victims and deserving of sympathy, the Serbians as the perpetrators and the sole guilty parties (Jaeger, 2001). In the foreground of the Kosovo war, the media discourse was then already pre-formed through a clearly contoured enemy image (Sabellek, 2001).

Unlike the Gulf War, where military intervention was on the West's agenda from the very start, in case of Yugoslavia the peace policy failure of the international media was rather self-produced. The political agenda was pre-given by PR agencies – especially Ruder & Finn (cf. Beham, 1996) – and the entertainment industry – among others Michael Winterbottom's film *Welcome to Sarajevo* – which forced a moral dilemma on journalists.

In this dilemma, not only did the journalism of attachment see itself literally obligated to a position of one-sided partisanship and to demanding military intervention, but the arising opinion climate also made suffering on the Serbian side a non-topic or relativized it with references to the suffering of other conflict parties. Thus, e.g., a study of reportage on rape victims in the Bosnian war has shown that Serbian suffering during the war was simply not a media issue. If the suffering of Serbian women was mentioned at all, it was never mentioned without reminders of how many Croatian and Muslim women were victims of Serbian violence (Jaeger, 1998). As well, the above-cited study (Jaeger, 2001) showed that Serbian suffering (expulsion, rape, etc.) was consistently relativized with references to the suffering of other parties and less often tied to incentives for social identification with the

victims. To the contrary, Serbian war victims were consistently dehumanized, while at the same time an image was drawn of an alienated relationship between the Serbian population and political and military elites that could make suffering on the Serbian side appear as self-inflicted. Isolated publications – like Peter Handke's travel report *Justice for Serbia* (Gerechtigkeit für Serbien) – made it clear that Serbians were also human beings, but these were treated as scandalous, and their authors were harshly criticized.

9. Media in peace processes

Because such one-sided representations of conflicts exert so much moral pressure to take sides, they usually have enduring effects, even long after a war ends. Especially in long-lasting, intractable conflicts, the distorted conflict perception hardens into societal beliefs that, besides the delegitimation of the enemy, among others, include a positive self-image, belief in the justness of one's own aims and own victim role, (national) security needs resulting from the conflict, and belief in peace as the highest aim of one's society (Bar-Tal, 1998b).

A de-escalation oriented reduction of one-sidedly distorted conflict perceptions can therefore only occur in steps, even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, when peace is again on the political agenda.

As some first case studies of reportage on the peace process in Northern Ireland and Israel have shown, this need for a step-by-step reduction of enemy images and antagonisms is faced with great ineptitude on the side of the news media. Journalism finds it difficult to free itself from hardened perceptual patterns. Thus, e.g., Shinar (1998) found a continuing militant language used in the Israeli press to report on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as well as a trivialization and ritualization of the events surrounding the peace negotiations that discounts the political significance of the proceedings.

The escalation-oriented bias is of course less sharply contoured in reports on peace processes and takes more complex forms, but the option of non-violent transformation of conflict often remains suspect, even in reports about peace treaties that had been desired for a long time. Thus, e.g., the *Berliner Zeitung* at first reported very favorably on the conclusion of the Northern Ireland Peace Accord and at the end of the article even developed a positive motivational logic (peace as a path to a better future). In the main part of the report, however, the antagonism between the conflict parties dominated so strongly that it is very hard to regard this motivational logic – no matter how optimistic it may seem – as more than mere wishful thinking (Hamdorf, 2001).

Peace discourses thus run the risk of becoming negative. All the more so if the conflict – as in the above-mentioned case – is presented as (more or less) intractable, and the success of peace efforts is attributed to the intervention of third parties, while the accomplishments of the conflict parties themselves are scarcely

given credit. The danger of reversing to a negative view is even stronger, if the intervention of third parties – as in the case of the Bosnian conflict – remains unsuccessful.

This is in part prevented through neutrality, as can be shown for example in the coverage of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during 1993-1997 (Annabring, 2000). The main effects of Galtung's (1998) news selection model (cf. chapter 2) are in fact found there as well, but at the same time there are also a few signs of relative balance that became possible through a distanced-neutral, largely context-free coverage limited to the "hard facts".

This scarcely represented a suitable strategy to do justice to the peace process and to achieve a differentiated view of the events in the Middle East, however. For the less background information is given in reportage, the more it is open to interpretation and the more it can be interpreted by *each* of the conflict parties in the sense of their own respective societal beliefs and prejudices.

The occasional attempts of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* to contextualize its news reports through coverage that alternately granted one side or the other a chance to voice its escalation-oriented distorted perception of the conflict (cf. Fahrer, 2000) to be sure attests to its efforts to achieve balance, but in the end proves to be counterproductive as well. On the side whose perspective is adopted, it supports the dominant beliefs, but on the other side it is fended off in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). For third parties it confirms the futility of the peace efforts.

10. Conclusions

Although the state of research makes it clear that even already-started peace processes are not adequately followed by the media, the question arises of whether or not the media – despite all experience – could, in the same manner that they contribute to conflict escalation, also work as catalysts for constructive conflict management. Independent media represent a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for this. In order for media to function as mediators in conflicts, they must be able to recognize and deconstruct the dominant escalation-oriented realities. Since the societal beliefs that reproduce these realities also play an important role in psychologically coming to terms with the loss of lives and security (e.g., in Israel/Palestine, lasting over several generations), they are extremely resistant to change, however.

This raises the question of how information contrary to societal beliefs can even be communicated without being immediately rejected. How strong can the dissonance be if contrary information is to be received at all? How far can the deconstruction of the dominant societal reality go on each escalation step of the conflict? When can deconstruction respectively begin at the earliest? What abilities already present in the journalistic repertoire can be used for deconstruction?

Unlike research on the way propaganda works, however, there are scarcely any empirical research results and only limited relevant practical experiences. Thus, e.g., Zint (2000) describes promising radio projects in Burundi, Tanzania and Liberia, where engaged editors have tried to further reconciliation between population groups. Reimann (2001) reports on projects in Bosnia that used the Internet creatively to establish lasting contacts across ethnic boundaries by combining "real" and "virtual worlds". An example of this is a project initiated by *Kinderberg, Inc.* in Stuttgart: "Bosnian Kids online", in the course of which a virtual city, *Kidopolis*, was developed. It offers new identification possibilities to youths: In this game, they are first of all citizens of a city and only then Bosnians, Croats and Serbians.

Such projects naturally cannot be directly transferred to the information and news media, but the meta-perspectives that underlie them probably can be:

- The subjective life worlds of recipients must be respected and recognized as part of the comprehensive field of reality constructions present on all sides;
- the deconstruction of escalation-furthering aspects of social reality must occur gradually and in steps; and
- their reconstruction must be committed to a perspective that takes into account all the sides and their wishes, rights and aims in an egalitarian manner.

The realization of these principles requires, however, courageous journalists and engaged media that do not fear to give a voice to reconciliation-ready societal minorities and thereby also (initially) adopt a minority position.

The prospects of success are obvious. For, as Mass & Clark (1984) have empirically shown, there are above all five characteristics with which the influence of minorities is constituted: consistency, rigidity, autonomy, investment and fairness (cf. chapter 8).

Part II

Studies

Media representations of conflicts as catalysts of peace processes

Susanne Jaeger & Wilhelm Kempf

1. Peace building vs. peace enforcement

Although military interventions in the Gulf, in Somalia and in Yugoslavia have clearly shown that attempts to solve conflicts and prevent wars with armament and military measures tend to be counter-productive and to further escalation, we can still see a tendency to rely more on military conflict solutions rather than on civilian conflict management. For one thing, far more personnel and financial resources are available for military measures, and this underlines the long-term trend to continue favoring military solutions (Paffenholz, 2001).

Thus, the contemporary discussion concentrates more on the modernization of peace keeping and the military capabilities needed for it than on prevention and the possibilities of employing non-state civilian actors. For example, it turns around the construction of a European defense alliance or the expansion of "peace keeping", traditionally based on a consensus between the war parties and the UN, in the direction of "peace enforcement" interventions in intra-state conflicts (Truger, 2001). Thereby current press reports on the use of munitions containing uranium in the Gulf War and in Bosnia raise the question of the long-term consequences of highly armed military technology, as well as of the ecological, social and economic effects and costs of – in Kosovo even declared to be "humanitarian intervention" – peace enforcement measures (e.g., ami-info 7/99).

"Peace enforcement" can be defined here as a special case of peace-making measures that aim to lead hostile parties to agreement. In UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace* the concept of "peace making" was, after considerable criticism, limited to non-military activities. These should help to end militarily conducted conflicts or should be employed preventively even before military escalation. These civilian peace-making measures are clearly distinguished from the use of military force under the concept of "enforcement".

But as well with so-called "peace-keeping" measures, the threshold to "enforcement" is quickly crossed, and it is then called "robust" or "expanded" peace keeping (Meyer, 2000, 273). The original idea of peace keeping was that of a non-partisan instrument of the United Nations that referred to military and civilian efforts in-

tended, in consensus with the conflict parties, to help before and after the military conduct of conflict to prevent the conflict from (again) breaking out in military form. The examples of Bosnia and Somalia have shown that, given the great variety of task settings, the implementation of UN mandates is often very difficult. In the above-named cases, blue helmet troops were probably unprepared for how quickly the violent nature of the conflict activities escalated and got out of control.

In contrast, with the aim of civilian intervention intended to prevent violence, so-called "peace building" relies on peace-furthering approaches and activities based on supporting peace-relevant internal actors in a long-term process that will strengthen and enable them to make "peace from within". Thereby a long-term infrastructure for conflict management should be set up in the conflict country. The key difference compared to earlier approaches of civilian conflict management is the concentration in peace building on internal actors in the conflict country. This means to support these actors from an external position and not become active in mediating (Paffenholz, 2001). In the 1992/1995 *Agenda for Peace*, peace building is located in the stage of "preventive diplomacy" and also contributes to consolidating peace in the post-conflict phase, where it encompasses civilian efforts for the reconstruction of political, economic and social structures (Truger, 2001).

While Paffenholz, on the one side, positively notes strong support by state and non-state institutions for so-called action-oriented research in the area of civilian conflict management and peace studies, she also sees, on the other, that the knowledge produced by this research is inadequately applied. She criticizes the priority that continues to be given to work on the improvement and efficiency of military conflict solutions. Reasonable and appropriate measures fail repeatedly due to decision-makers' insufficient willingness to implement them. "Unfortunately it continues to be the case that as long as armed conflicts have not seen the light of the media public, preventive responses remain infrequent on the level of 'high' politics".

In order to deter or contain conflicts or to force conflict parties to conclude peace agreements, in the past leaders often resorted to ultimatums threatening military strikes. From the perspective of peace studies, however, military intervention represents less a "last resort" than an expression of maximal helplessness.

2. Role of the news media

At present, there is a wide range of publications dealing with the role that news media play in national, ethnic or societal conflicts (cf., e.g., Bußler, 1998). That media are more than just the communicators of bad news, but often even play an active role in escalating conflicts was already discussed after the First World War (e.g., by Lasswell, 1927) and is reflected in the content-analytical research that has literally experienced a boom since the Gulf War of 1990/1991.

A multiplicity of factors account for why it is particularly media reportage that makes available important material for research on the state and course of conflicts and why the media regularly (tend to) become catalysts of violence rather than mediators in conflicts. The tasks assigned to the media in democracies seem simultaneously both reasonable and harmless:

- In their function as information sources, mass media disseminate selected events of world affairs to a broad public that usually cannot itself be present to witness them.
- In their function as forums, mass media contribute to the public articulation of the diverse competing opinions and interests present in society. They make space available for interpretations of events and public reactions to the occurrences so that the recipients can form a picture of the contemporary state of the discussion.
- In their integrative function, the mass media stimulate public exchange in order to contribute to forming the political will and to reaching a societal consensus (according to Hug, 1997).

In all three functions, however, weak points and deficiencies can be identified that lift the mass media out of a passive role serving society and turn them into an active shaper of international events.

Choices must necessarily be made among the multiplicity of events that occur every day. Underlying this selection of communication-worthy news are interpretative procedures and editorial routines and pressures. To be sure, as "agenda setters", the media still have no influence on what people think about a specific topic, but they have a strong influence on which topics people should think about (Cohen, 1993, cited according to Naveh, 1998).

Through their thematizing function mass media attest to the very public existence of conflicts and thereby decisively shape the problem awareness of their recipients (Mathes, 1989). The selection criteria for the choice of news thereby regularly produce an image of reality that divides the world into elite and peripheral countries, into good and evil. Peripheral countries suffer catastrophes, violence, wars – elite countries bring them aid and peace (Galtung, 1998).

By analyzing which conflicts the media focus on, which they "forget", which the public should apparently be concerned about, which should be left alone, we can, *first*, make inferences as to their presumed value in daily political and societal affairs. *Second*, the question arises of whether and how to react to these conflicts.

By providing a forum for various different opinions and interests and through the manner in which it reports on conflict, journalism demarcates the frame of what is held to be possible, what is not, and thereby actively helps to influence the definition of the free space for political maneuver. How is a conflict conceptualized? Who gets a hearing? How are events interpreted; in what frames are they integrated? What public reactions are there to them? Which demands and impulses

find expression and which are considered irrelevant, so that they do not appear in the mass media?

To increase the news value of a report, media often tend to focus on conflict arenas and portray the reported events as maximally dramatic and polarized. Because drama can thereby all too easily be mistaken for antagonism, media run the risk of becoming outriders of conflict escalation that constantly run ahead of the actual conflict situation by a step of escalation (Galtung, 1998).

The danger is great that the media will be instrumentalized for publicity purposes. In the struggle to obtain any public attention at all through the media, and to be able to express their concerns before a broad public, minorities often see themselves forced to stage spectacular events that in turn further escalate conflicts (Wolfsfeld, 1997a). But already just the presence of media can have effects on the behavior of conflict parties or decision-makers and thereby poses, for example, risks for peace negotiations – another reason, e.g., for "closed door diplomacy" (Gilboa, 1998).

All the previously named aspects also affect the integration function. Which conflicts are placed on the public agenda, the way they are conceptualized, the way they are classified by the different conflict protagonists and by coverage itself creates the rough frame within which there is a public exchange about these conflicts.

The relationship between media and their recipients is thereby by no means unidirectional; we can to the contrary most accurately describe it as an interaction among media, politics and recipients. In the sense of para-feedback, the choice, e.g., of what ultimately appears as news (and the manner of coverage) is strongly shaped by what editors assume to be the interests of the recipients (e.g., Früh & Schönbach, 1982). By creating moods and setting agendas, media establish the atmosphere and surroundings in which political decision-makers must interact. On the one side, they try to control and influence these media environments; on the other side, however, they must also react to the constructions in these media landscapes (Naveh, 1998).

Naveh studied the role of the media in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and concluded that in times of relative political stability, the media presented quite controversial positions, but in periods of crisis, the Israeli press showed itself to be politically compliant and ready to let itself be mobilized by the state and the government.

This results from the simple fact that journalists are part of the processes they report on. As members of society, they are subject to the same perceptual distortions, and they necessarily also share the same societal beliefs as other societal actors (cf. Bar-Tal, 1998b; 2000b). A realistic (less distorted) cognitive representation of these conflicts by the media would likewise reduce the credibility of their reports.

Furthermore, international reportage on conflict often also bears traces of propaganda – not because journalists consciously and intentionally place themselves in

the service of propaganda, but rather because they become victims of the same social-psychological processes that affect the conflict parties themselves. Journalists are confronted with moral dilemmas by the all too immediate questions, above all in escalating conflicts, of right and wrong, good and evil, which makes it extremely hard for them to maintain a neutral distance, and also makes them susceptible to seeing only one side of the truth and regarding this as the whole truth. With increasing conflict escalation, these processes lead to an increasing distortion of conflict perception that for its part becomes a motor of conflict escalation (Kempf, 2000).

3. Cognitive representation in news media

How can news media contribute to peace building and/or peace enforcement through their representation of conflict?

3.1 Peace building

Peace building relies on supporting internal peace-relevant actors from outside to strengthen them so that they can build peace from within. In order for the international media to be able to contribute to peace building and to preventing destructive courses of conflict, they must know the dynamics of conflict escalation and be able to identify conflicts already at an early stage.

Even in the first steps of the escalation process, when the extent of a conflict is still relatively hard to recognize, a one-sided privileging of elites and the adoption of their perspective by the media often results in a failure to recognize the seriousness of the opponent's concerns. In the debate, the intentions, standpoints, cognitions and emotions of the conflict parties can thus polarize without constraints. Empathy on the part of journalists with all the groups affected by a conflict, as well as with minority positions, would be necessary in order to perceive and interpret this polarization as an alarm signal.

If one of the parties feels injured or fears further harm, the conflict escalates into a struggle in which it is at first (even before the use of force) a matter of strengthening one's own position. While forcing their opponent into a negative role, the conflict parties try to improve their own image and attract supporters and coalition partners. PR measures occupy the center of conflict behavior, so that journalists now do not even have to do research in order to become aware of the conflict: The conflict comes to them – and with it the implicit demand to take a position.

However, at this point, a representation of the conflict parties as irreconcilable antagonists and the question of who is chiefly to blame for the conflict provide a further push to escalation, because they conceal the common concerns of the conflict parties that could serve as the starting point for a constructive transformation of the conflict.

Media representations of conflict, usually, correspond to the conflict perception of that party with which the media can most easily identify. In order to support peace building processes (and not to additionally hinder them), however, it would be necessary to completely refrain from partisanship, to do research on all sides of the conflict and to give a hearing to those particular civilian actors who are striving to live together in peace and resolve the conflict in a constructive way (cf. chapter 2).

While it appears quite plausible to find more escalation-oriented conflict coverage in the news media during armed conflicts, one should expect to find de-escalation oriented coverage and support for peace building at the earliest when and where peace is on the political agenda, such as, e.g., in the Northern Ireland conflict or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Oslo process.

In fact, there was no hard propaganda in the international reportage on these two conflict fields (cf. Annabring, 2000; Fahrer, 2000; Hamdorf, 2000). However, the peace discourse displayed numerous deficiencies that again support Dov Shinar's (1998) finding that war is simply more compatible with media norms, current discourses and economic structures than is peace. De-escalation oriented journalistic approaches certainly are available in the journalistic repertoire. However, even in reports on long desired peace accords, such as in Northern Ireland, an escalation orientation tends to prevail (Hamdorf, 2000) and peace discourses are in danger of turning negative (cf. chapter 3).

3.2 Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement, that is achieving peace by military means, can also be regarded as failed or sabotaged civilian conflict management. As already shown above, the media actively help to structure the landscape of conflict-solving options where those with political responsibility ultimately make their choices.

Already in the analysis of reportage on peace processes, it is striking to note that the civil societal actors who do, and have done, essential work for reconciliation and the normalization of relationships between the conflict parties tend to be ignored rather than appreciated. Without civil societal actors, however, peace building would be nothing but peace decreed from above that could never spread through a society in its totality.

Neglecting those groups who are interested in peace and constructive conflict transformation and conceptualizing conflict as an insoluble antagonism opens the floodgates to the violent heightening of conflict already in the early phases of escalation – until it finally seems as though peace can only be imposed from outside. The antagonism corresponds to only part of the societal realities present in the conflict area and blocks the view of that part where peaceful coexistence is still possible and desired. Since they offer starting points for cooperation and constructive conflict solutions, precisely these forces would need international interest and support, however. Moreover, the antagonistic construction of conflict risks succumbing to the same perceptual distortions that also exist on the side of the con-

flict parties and moving into a vicious circle of military logic, where only victory or defeat are available as conflict-solving options, and where peaceful mediation efforts are not given any further chances.

As the example of the post-Yugoslavian civil wars shows, this situation becomes even more aggravated, if the media do not support third party mediation efforts, either. Already during the Bosnian conflict, the international media favored an international policy of strength that aimed at military intervention. Although the international press tried hard not to identify with any of the three internal war parties, they identified all the more strongly with the international community that had a problem with Bosnia (Kempf, 1999b).

With an entanglement like this, the risk is great that a further opposition will be constructed between "us" (the international community of states) and "them" (the actual conflict parties) who do not accept "our" solutions for their conflict. The more "we" are drawn into the conflict, the more the media identify with "us" (Kempf, 1999a), above all if third-party intervention (at first) proves unsuccessful.

Through the construction of such oppositions, media undermine the neutrality of third parties. And, if they construct differently "attractive" roles which the (internal) conflict parties play (Kempf, 1999b; Jaeger, 1998; 2000), this all too easily leads to the construction of antagonistic identification offerings that turn public opinion against one of the (internal) conflict parties and create sympathy for one of the others (Jaeger, 2000).

Compared with the Bosnian conflict, where the press was still ambivalent toward the Yugoslavian war parties, German coverage in the foreground of the Kosovo conflict (December 1995 to October 1998) displayed a clearly stronger partisanship to the disadvantage of the Serbian conflict party.

The Dayton Peace Accords were not used as an occasion for any de-escalation oriented coverage. The topic of Kosovo simply disappeared from the newspapers for two years and only became manifest again, when the conflict turned into a military struggle (Sabellek, 2001).

During the period between the wars, the enemy image of Serbia was even more sharply contoured, the conflict was increasingly portrayed as one between Serbia and the international community and the path was prepared for peace enforcement as the last possible resort. The phase in which civilian intervention would have had to occur and be supported was thereby so burdened that no room to maneuver was left for civilian conflict management, and in the end only ultimatums remained possible.

4. Conclusion

With Thania Paffenholz (2001), it is to be regretted that scientific research on the possibilities of civilian conflict management is still too unsystematic and lacking in

coherence, and there is still little interaction between scholarship and practice. In addition, there is little systematic comparative research on the "lessons learned" from armed conflicts.

On the other hand, however, there exist examples of long lasting – and in the view of the participants successful – peace processes (such as, e.g., German-French reconciliation after the Second World War) that could serve as a research field for studies of how the media can and actually have contributed to making European partners out of "hereditary enemies" (cf. chapter 5).

In addition, there is also a need to examine the realizability and effectiveness of peace journalism (cf. chapter 6). How would recipients react to a "different" journalism? Would it even be recognized and accepted? What social-psychological aspects play a role in the acceptance or rejection of peace journalism?

Third, the production side continues to be interesting (cf. chapter 7): How can we build peace journalistic models into everyday editorial work, journalistic roles and routines so that they do not stop with resignation or declarations of intent and goodwill?

Long overdue is a transformation of traditionally reactive journalism into a proactive type that sets for itself the challenges implied by conflicts in a time of globalization.

The German press coverage of France after World War II¹

Susanne Jaeger

1. Introduction

This case study of post-war coverage asks how news coverage in post-war societies can contribute to reconciliation, democratization and peace building. As the successful historical reconciliation process between Germany and France after World War II is an important example of two former enemies overcoming a long history of animosity and eventually becoming partners, it provides rich material for studying the characteristics of a more conciliatory media discourse. The focus of the study, though, is on the Western German press that after 1945 was gradually permitted by the Allied occupation authorities to resume publication. How did it explain to its readers that former enemies – and in the case of France a popular image of a "hereditary antagonism" had been widespread for nearly a century – were now partners who could be trusted and must be worked with? If there is evidence of press coverage of France that supported the reconciliation process between Germany and France, perhaps we can learn from the earlier journalists' skills and see whether and how these conciliatory style characteristics can in general be used for the coverage of post-war reconciliation processes in other countries.

The Cold War was among the major background factors that framed post-war coverage of France and the French in West German daily newspapers. Other factors can also be named, e.g. the need to reconstruct a ruined country and a devastated Europe, the reconstruction and democratization of the political and economic systems in Germany, as well as the redefinition of Germany's role in the international community and of its relationship with other nations. In any interpretation of the findings, these political and social framing conditions must be kept in mind.

2. Theory

As concerns the basic theoretical framework, we share the widespread conviction that the media do not just communicate events, they also play an active role in the social construction of reality and the constitution of meanings via communi-

1 Editor's note: For further results and a more detailed account of this study see: Susanne Jaeger (2009). *Nachrichtenmedien als Ressource für Frieden und Versöhnung*. Berlin: regener.

cation (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1969; Tuchman, 1978; Wolfsfeld, 1997a). News media provide a link between the various social segments of a society and are used by them in order to learn about the others, as well as about events happening somewhere "outside", in distant countries and societies (Kunczik, 1990). They inform a broader public about political decisions, as well as communicating public discourse to political decision-makers. Moreover, they process this information. They put certain issues on the public agenda and neglect others, provide information about facts and events and combine this information, emphasize some facts, ignore others and offer a cognitive frame for their interpretation (cf. Kempf, 2003a).

This "intermediate" role of the media is not the only factor that suggests they can never be comprehended as completely independent social actors. With regard to political decision-making, they can be seen in a two-fold role, serving both as input and as an output environment for policy-making and decision-making with complex feedback loops (Naveh, 1998; 2002).

Research on media during conflicts or post-conflict situations not only show political decision-makers' and interest groups' successful attempts to influence media coverage to their own advantage (cf. e.g. Kunczik, 1990; MacArthur, 1993; Shea, 2001), it also shows how media impact on political decisions, on the political and social climate, and on the way events are discussed. Media coverage does have an actual influence on this media-created reality, even though it is still not quite clear how "direct" this impact is (cf. e.g. Jakobsen, 2000, Schallenger, 1999).

3. Overall approach

The aim of this study is to determine whether there is evidence that West German post-war media coverage contributed to overcoming the differences between France and Germany. That means asking:

- Can we find specific style characteristics that possibly supported the reconciliation process,
- or can we at least find characteristics showing some reserve with regard to the continuance of antagonism?

To operationalize these questions, we asked how France, the French people and French interests and subjects were structured and portrayed in everyday German coverage.

The study has two parts. Each focuses on a different aspect of the coverage and therefore uses a different methodological approach:

Part 1: Quantitative content analysis

The basic model of this content analysis is the "Four-factor model of news communication" proposed by Galtung (1998; Galtung & Vincent, 1992). These factors provided the basis for a coding schedule designed for making a long-term evalu-

ation of the coverage of France and French concerns.

The questions in this section are: Is there evidence of a different routine for *selecting* news, topics and the focus? Were there different ways to develop the topics and portray the French actors? And can we find change over time?

Part 2: Qualitative content analysis

The bases of the subsequent qualitative content analysis are the model of "escalation vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage" (Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996; Kempf, 2002a) and the model of "peace/conflict journalism vs. war/violence journalism" (Galtung, 1998, 2002). Exemplary and at first glance particularly "constructive" looking articles from the quantitative sample were selected and evaluated in an in-depth analysis.

The questions of this section are: Can we identify *specific characteristics* (e.g. argumentation, introducing topics, writing style, way of situating events, etc.) of these articles, and what is their specific contribution to the reconciliation process?

4. Part 1: Quantitative content analysis²

4.1 Sample and sample characteristics

Coverage was studied that appeared in four nationwide and one regional daily German newspaper:

- *Süddeutsche Zeitung*
- *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
- *Frankfurter Rundschau*
- *WELT*³
- *Südkurier*⁴

The investigated period is from 1946 to 1970. The 25-year time-span of relatively peaceful interaction, stretching over nearly a generation, seems reasonably long to assess major changes and to be able to speak of consolidating friendly relations. The Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation, i.e. the formal establishment of both sides' willingness to cooperate, was signed in 1963, and, in addition, there is an examination of a period of several years subsequent to the signing of this treaty.⁵

2 The author wishes to thank her French co-worker Aude Plontz for all of her contributions and assistance in carrying out the quantitative study

3 All four papers are widely distributed in Western Germany and were licensed by the Allies in 1945. The exception is the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which first appeared in November 1949.

4 The *Südkurier* is distributed in the Lake Constance region on the Swiss border, which was occupied by France after the war. It was included in the study in order to study whether there were differences in reporting which could possibly be attributed to more direct contacts between the local population and the French troops.

5 Furthermore, Charles de Gaulle passed away in 1970, after his resignation in 1969. He and Konrad Adenauer are regarded as symbolic, representative figures of German-French friendship. Though coming from different political backgrounds and parties, they seemed to appreciate each other and cultivated French-German dialogue. With General de Gaulle, an era in French history ended, symbolizing the "old" days.

Since it was not possible to investigate the entire coverage of these years, a random sample was taken, with the strategy as follows:

- From each month of coverage in the 25 years, one weekend per month was randomly selected
→A sample of 300 randomly chosen dates
- The different newspapers were randomly assigned to the selected dates. One of the newspapers was assigned to each date
→Sample of 300 newspaper editions to investigate
- Basis for the collection of the articles was the entire newspaper edition
- The sample included articles dealing with France, the French and French topics, even if covered only as a secondary subject (i.e. among the topics were sports, reviews, travel, entertainment, etc.)
- Excluded were: letters to the editor, very small news flashes, reprints from other newspapers, pictures and subtitles incomprehensible without visual information, reprints of French literature, France only as a meeting place for delegations from other countries without French participants, etc.)

Applying this strategy, 1750 articles were included in the sample. In order to get a better overview, they were organized in blocs of five years (cf. Fig. 1).




Figure 1: Number of relevant articles

During the first post-war years, the amount of coverage is relatively low compared to the other years, especially for the time span from 1961 to 1965. As far as the early years are concerned, the newspapers were very thin (sometimes only four pages), due to paper shortages. The number of pages later increased dramatically, as did the number of relevant articles. In the early 60s, the relationship between Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle intensified, and these meetings led to the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation between France and Germany in 1963, which was widely and heatedly discussed. According to that agree-

ment, a cultural program for supporting and intensifying German-French youth exchanges was also set up (Franco-German Youth Office).

The rate of the number of relevant articles per studied issue also increases, and most of the newspapers reach a peak in the time span from 1961 to 1965 (cf. Fig. 2).




Figure 2: Rate of relevant articles per investigated edition

The *Südkurier*, though, differs from the others. Its rate rather decreases with time, which is possibly because it never expanded its coverage in terms of pages, extension of political coverage, adding extra pages for culture, travel, etc., as did the other newspapers.




Figure 3: Share of articles covering France as a main or as a secondary subject ($p < 0.01$, $\chi^2 = 15,294$; $df = 4$)

Over the years, the share of articles also increased in which France and the French are the main subject. This is partly because during the years of Allied occupation, France was often covered as part of the Allied forces, and the focus was on what the Allies as a whole were doing. The later the articles appear, the more specific is the coverage overall, e.g. there is more coverage of French cultural events, unilateral actions on the part of French politicians, events and processes specifically concerning France, etc., which is also a matter of the development of the newspapers themselves (cf. Fig. 3)




Figure 4: Number of articles of different text genres ($p < 0.01$, $\chi^2 = 21,014$; $df = 8$).

Text genres were also coded (cf. Fig. 4): Reviews of French books, movies and musical productions form one category. The other consists of commentaries (which had to be marked as such by placing, frame, subtitle, etc.). The rest are mainly news and news flashes, but also include articles from the sections on culture and other topics. Fig. 4 shows that in the first post-war period there are almost no commentaries or reviews (probably partly due to the lack of paper), while later on the number of the text genres increases, with the highest *number* of both occurring in the time span from 1961 to 1965. Nevertheless, there is almost no change in the number of reviews compared to the previous time span. The largest *share* of reviews with regard to the number of articles investigated is found in the late 1950s.

4.2 Theoretical framework of the analysis

The theoretical framework of the quantitative analysis is derived from the "Four-factor news communication model" proposed by Vincent & Galtung (1992; Galtung, 1998; cf. Chapter 2, Table 1), which makes specific predictions about how news are selected.

According to this model, the ideal top news event is:

- negative (not positive – this is less interesting)
- happens to a person (not structural/institutional, abstract – less interesting)
- belonging to an elite (not ordinary person – less interesting)
- in an elite country (not a second, third or fourth world country – less interesting)

If an event has low news value in one factor (e.g. concerns ordinary people), this can be compensated for by high news value in another factor (e.g. the event must be negative, or should be highly personalized).

A blindfold news-selection routine, based on these factors, could pose several risks for reconciliation processes, e.g.:

- **Negativism:** One has no chance to change one's impression of the other by getting to know his positive side.
- **Elite-Bias:** One does not really learn about ordinary people in the other country, about shared problems, about the other side in its entirety and variety – and peace seems to be something prescribed by handshaking elite persons.
- **Personalization:** One does not learn about long-lasting processes, because events are removed from their structural context and attributed to the unilateral actions of particular politicians. There is also a danger of trivializing events.

4.3 Variables and method of the content analysis

The coding process for the articles, as concerns German post-war coverage of France and the French, follows a two-step strategy (cf. Fig. 5)

Step 1: Identification of the general subject of the article

- What is the main event focused on in the article, and what part of French society is the chief focus?
- What kind of event is it, and what is the general mood of the article?

The results of step 1 should indicate the overall direction of the article.

Step 2: Identification of the actors and actions in the article

- Who are the actors referred to in the article, and how are they portrayed?

The results of step 2 should indicate how the subject was developed in general.




Figure 5: Overall procedure of quantitative analysis

Step 1: Variables of the general subject

The general subject was defined as *the main event focused on by the article*. If there are several subjects, the main event is the one with the highest amount, extension and intensity of coverage, measured by the number of paragraphs it receives.

There are three coding decisions, depending on the three relevant news communication factors.⁶

- Person vs. Structure?
- Elite vs. Non-Elite?
- Positive vs. negative vs. ambiguous?

With each variable, a choice of one of the possible categories was necessary.

Table 1 shows the definitions of the variables:

Person vs. Structure	Person	Structure
	<p>Event concerning only a single person, his/her private life or event is pictured as result of the personal character of the person etc.</p> <p>Examples: portraits, course of life, family events, personal scandals, achievements of a single person, luck, crime (no organization, not political), private life of statesmen, writers, movie makers, etc., state visits only, if the character of the person in centre, success of a politician, artist etc. only if due to his singular personality, etc</p>	<p>Event concerning a group/mass of people, an institution, or event is pictured as a result of social /political/economical forces, culture etc.</p> <p>Examples: elections, pol. relationships, meetings, treaties, negotiations, riots, war, revolutions, assassination, econom. events (e.g. reconstruction. fusions, crashes), crime (organized attacks), portraits of organizations, institutions, government, companies, system, population's living conditions, disasters, catastrophes (if more than a single person is concerned), literature, movies, art, music (if not focus on artist's life situation /lifework/ course of life, etc.</p>

⁶ France is regarded as an elite country, so this factor is not investigated. The variables were defined according to the examples given in the model and carefully supplemented by lists of examples. Nevertheless, as concerns the meaning of some variables, there still may be some interpretational differences between Galtung and the study presented here.

Elite vs. Non-Elite	Elite		Non-Elite
	<p>Event concerning mainly high-status people/groups (or at least depiction of event like that), ...</p> <p>Examples: Anything concerning system/ government/mighty and well-known organizations/companies/ structures <i>and not</i> focusing on the effects for the living conditions of the <i>French</i> population, portraits of and events concerning well-known persons, decisions of the occupation forces in Germany, etc.</p>		<p>Event concerning ordinary people, society in general, low-status people, their culture, their life ...</p> <p>Examples: focus on living conditions of the population, reconstruction in general (not focus on governmental decisions or debate about it), economy in general (if not well-known company in centre), music /art/theatre/literature (if not focus on lifework of the artist/artist group), marginalized oppositional groups, etc.</p>
Positive vs. negative vs. ambiguous	Positive	Negative	Ambiguous
	<p>Event is something mostly positive/neutral or depiction of event as something positive/ neutral</p> <p>Examples: state visits, neutral government devices, elections, administration decisions (any of them without negative undertone in the article), peace and reconciliation, growth of relationship, friendship between Germans and French, reviews of French cultural products without negative undertone in article, acknowledgement and acknowledging depiction of French achievements and success, luck of some French actor, inventions, etc.</p>	<p>Event is something mostly negative or depiction of event as something negative</p> <p>Examples: war, riots, revolts, attempted assassinations, accidents, disasters, catastrophes, terrorism, death penalty, economic crashes, miserable life conditions, query of the righteousness of some French action, negative/downgrading depictions of French persons, culture, lifestyle, clear accusations of the French, negotiation success for the French but construction of them as pigheaded hardliners, etc.</p>	<p>Event or depiction of it in a way, that decision for one of the other variables would give wrong impression</p> <p>Examples: governmental success (with slight allusions of negative outcome for Germany), military success (event positive for the French + neutral depiction, but event as such negative), not clearly classifiable econom. events (neutral depiction but event makes slightly worried and one can imagine both negative and positive outcome), good diplomatic relations with communist leaders (but no frank reproaches), reviews with equally positive and negative aspects, reviews not indicating whether the article is really meant in a positive way, etc.</p>

Table 1: Definitions of variables of the general subject

Step 2: Variables of the actors within the article

Actors are defined as:

- French persons or institutions/groups
- appearing in the article as
- actively doing something neutral/positive or something negative or
- as being the merely passive object of an action that can be either neutral/positive or negative for them.

Coding of non-French actors was excluded. Fictional persons are only coded if they symbolize real members of the French population.

The variables for actors are

- Elite-Person vs. Non-Elite-Person vs. Elite-Structure vs. Non-Elite-Structure
- Active positively/negatively vs. being passive positively/negatively

For the definitions, see Tables 2 and 3.

Elite-Person (EP)	Non-Elite-Person (NEP)	Elite-Structure (ES)	Non-Elite-Structure (NES)
Any single actor who is well-known, famous, mighty, has got a name, and is not defined within the article only by his function (e.g. the president of France does something = Elite-Structure, de Gaulle does something = Elite-Person)	Any single actor who is a member of the civil society, a small group of persons who are not organized and only accidentally together (e.g. playing children André and Elaine), (vs. single fictional persons representing the French population → Non-Elite-Structure)	Famous, well-known and/or mighty groups/ institutions/ companies that represent the Elite, politicians/ diplomats/ policemen only portrayed in their function (not with their name), e.g. "the French army", "army units"	Group of ordinary people with a common goal, the entire population of France, a group of dissidents (marginalized group), France as the entire country (vs. France as the governmental system → Elite-Structure), the ordinary soldiers on the battle field

Table 2: Definitions of actors

It was necessary to classify any French actors appearing in an article into one of the categories.

Being active is defined as:

- *actively doing something*, even including speaking (expressing oneself).

Being passive is defined as:

- *being the passive object of someone else's actions or of an event*, receiving something, perceiving something in a passive way (not *causing* something by expressing one's feelings), being the subject of others' conversation.

On this level, multiple coding for each of the classified actors was possible.

Positively active	Negatively active	Positively passive	Negatively passive
The actor is doing something positive/constructive/fair, building up something good (like friendship, economy, movie), inviting someone, receiving a visitor, praising someone (who earns it in the eyes of the journalist), criticizes injustice, has success caused by him, makes wise decisions, etc.	The actor is doing something negative/destructive/unfair, causes pain/misfortune on others, is fighting, criticizing others, blaming someone, makes a bad movie, writes a bad book, attacks, accuses, causes trouble, does illegal things, puts someone to death, is incapable in his actions (not by handicap), etc.	The actor is appreciated by others, receives some good message, is just fine, is delighted, has success, is greeted, visited, welcomed, perceives some happy events, has luck, has success (but is not the direct source of success), etc.	The actor is criticized by some others, suffers something bad for him, is not well, receives bad news, is being accused, treated badly, is put to death, has to die, etc.

Table 3: Definition of actions

Although the coding decisions were sometimes very hard, the reliability of the coding was enhanced because the coding table was developed in close cooperation with a French co-worker. Also, we carried out the coding procedure jointly. The reliability of the coding decisions was increased by intensive training sessions and controlled by Cohen's kappa (1960).⁷ The kappa values of the variables indicate sufficient inter-coder reliability (cf. Tab. 4).

Variable	κ
Person vs. structure	0.68
Elite vs. non-elite	0.68
Positive vs. negative vs. ambiguous	0.80

Table 4: Inter-coder reliability

Some brief remarks about the definitions presented thus far: These seem to reflect sometimes very conservative thinking. Acts such as eliminating a threat, revolting against an unjust legal system, fighting injustice, etc. are not necessarily to be au-

⁷ This statistic is used to assess inter-rater reliability. It gives a relatively strict statistical measure for the quality of inter-coder reliability compared to using % agreement by also taking the possibility of random coding into account. The coefficient can range from -1 (completely different ratings) to +1 (perfect accordance of the raters). In this study, the coefficients indicate good (0.60-0.75) to very good (0.75-1.00) inter-coder reliability (cf. Wirtz & Casper, 2002, 59). The statistics are based on 50 randomly selected articles and concern 24 variables. 7 other variables appeared in fewer than 5 cases (all of them concerning Non-Elite-Persons as actors), so the calculation of kappa was not reasonable there and was not included in the statistics shown in Table 4.

tomatically placed in the "negative" category, nor is "being friendly" automatically to be placed in the "positive" one. We kept this in mind while coding and responded to doubtful cases in a more flexible manner than the examples presented here suggest. The question remains of how we distinguish the "good" from the "bad". This decision is culturally biased and naturally reflects – beyond the model – our socialization, values and the ideology of our political systems. As we share the role of media consumers, we can assume that we reflect the ways audiences respond to articles. Moreover, we discussed doubtful coding decisions before agreeing on a final coding.

4.4 Results

General subject

Contrary to Galtung's predictions (cf. Fig. 6), there are far more articles covering structural than personal events or written in structural terms. There is a slight change over time, though: In the early post-war years, personalization had nearly no significance, and the share of subjects that were persons was only 3.2% (9 articles out of 279). Later it ranged between 8.6% (1956 to 1965) and 15.1% (1966 to 1970: 53 articles out of 351). This effect is probably partly due to the media development itself: The more pages available, the more space for covering trivial issues. Moreover, in the early post-war period it surely was more important to German audiences to know what the French, as the occupation force, had decided and how France as a whole had acted, than to read portrayals of or personal stories about individual French actors.




Figure 6: Share of structural vs. personal subjects ($p < 0.001$; $\chi^2 = 29,644$; $df = 4$).

The elite-bias prevails, but not as significantly as in the prediction, above all if we look at the variability of this bias over time (cf. Fig. 7). While from 1946 to 1950

there was an absolute dominance of subjects concerning the French elite (73.8%), this share decreases over time to 55.6% (1956 to 1960) and later recovers only slightly (61.8% from 1966 to 1970). These results suggest an extended interest in what ordinary French people were doing and how they lived after the occupation period, with its high dependency on Allied policies.




Figure 7: Share of elite- vs. non-elite-subjects ($p < 0.001$; $\chi^2 = 25,647$; $df = 4$)




Figure 8: Share of positive/neutral vs. negative vs. ambiguous general subjects ($p < 0.05$; $\chi^2 = 15,527$; $df = 8$)

There are more articles with a positive/neutral general subject and attitude than expected (cf. Fig. 8). The media tendency of negativism is not completely supported by the investigated material, although there is some variability over time. This can be seen as chiefly a result of the selected text material, which covers

events of a period when peace with France and the creation of a better relationship was actually on the political agenda⁸.

We find a relatively high share of positive/neutral coverage in the first period (61.6%), which can be partly explained by dependency on the Allies (press control, availability of independent information sources, compliance and good will of newspapers, etc.). Subsequently the share of this category goes down to around 53% and remains stable, except for the period from 1956 to 1960, when it is only 49.7%. In this period, the share of clearly negative subjects or moods is the highest (41.6%), while it normally hovers around 35%. In the early post-war years, though, this share is only 28%.

The share of ambiguously coded articles seems to compensate for the not overtly negative articles. Thus, if we view the data as distinguishing between neutral/positive subjects and negative/ambiguous subjects, the only major change of mood is between the early years of the occupation and the years after the occupation ($p < 0.05$; $\chi^2 = 9.6088$; $df = 4$), and even then there is no clear dominance of negative/ambiguous subjects.




Figure 9: Share of positive/neutral general subjects in the *Südkurier* compared to the other newspapers

A special case is coverage in the local newspaper *Südkurier* (cf. Fig. 9). This is the only one of the newspapers that displayed significant change over time in regard to this variable.⁹ None of the other newspapers showed significant change. The share of positive subjects in the *Südkurier* is exceedingly high during the occupation (1946 - 1950: 71.7%). At that time, the *difference between the Südkurier and the other newspapers* in the share of positive/neutral and negative/ambiguous

8 Moreover, the selection of articles was based on entire newspaper editions and didn't focus only on political news.

9 $\chi^2 = 11.4433$, $p < 0.05$; $df = 4$.

subjects is significant.¹⁰ Later on, the share of positive coverage is close to the average of the other newspapers, and variations in frequencies are insignificant.

Actors mentioned in articles

As expected, most of the actors in the articles belonged to the elite. Surprisingly high, though, is the number of institutions/groups/organizations compared to individual persons, both in terms of elite- and non-elite actors. According to Gal-tung's model, we would expect some personification of events, at least in the article, even when the subject is not an individual person. This seems to be more or less the case as far as the elite is concerned, since there are many elite-person actors, but there is a striking difference, with regard to non-elite actors, between abstract structures and individual persons. (cf. Fig. 10)




Figure 10: Absolute number of actors in the articles

As one would expect, the elite-actors who rule the world are more often depicted as active than as the objects of others' actions, while with non-elite actors the opposite is the case (cf. Fig. 11).

If we examine the relative frequencies of the actors portrayed as *active* (cf. Fig. 12), we find a remarkable share of elite-persons depicted as acting exclusively positively. In the active mode, when it is a matter of elite-actors, we also find a higher share of persons acting both positively and negatively, which also means showing a broader picture of their actions. If we compare the different actors depicted in the active mode, the differences between them are significant.¹¹

¹⁰ $\chi^2 = 6.5794$, $p < 0.05$, $df = 1$.

¹¹ $\chi^2 = 98.9271$; $df = 6$; $p < 0.01$




Figure 11: Absolute number of actors portrayed as being active or passive




Figure 12: Shares of actors' portrayed (active and passive) actions

If we concentrate on *actors portrayed as passive* (cf. Fig. 12), there is a lower probability of elite-persons being depicted as the "victims" of others. Instead, both positive and negative actions are attributed to them simultaneously. Non-elite persons have to suffer in order to get newspaper coverage – if they are merely participating positively, nobody seems to care very much. The differences among

protagonists depicted in the passive mode are also significant.¹²

Figure 13 shows the change over time of the different actors' rates of appearance in articles. Interrupted lines stand for non-significant changes. This is the case with non-elite actors. Non-elite structures occur in nearly every third article, no matter in what period. Non-elite persons occur in only about every tenth article.

We find significant changes, though, with elite-actors: The focus on elite-structures decreases, while the share of articles telling about elite-persons' actions increases. In the time span from 1961 to 1965, it nearly reaches the amount of coverage of elite-structures, which may be due in part to the personal relationship and repeated meetings between Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. However, it may also be a result of the high number of artists' portrayals, at that time, of political events having personal consequences (e.g. OAS terrorism and the trials of dissident military men), and many others. Major changes with regard to the coverage of both kinds of actors are found between the earliest period and that from 1951 to 1955.




Figure 13: Shares of actors' mention over time (df=4; EP: $\chi^2 = 19,081$; $p < 0.001$; ES: $\chi^2 = 15,852$; $p < 0.01$; NEP: $\chi^2 = 8,565$; n.s.; NES: $\chi^2 = 6,483$; n.s.)

If we take a closer look at the individual actor groups and investigate the manner of portraying them, elite-persons seem to be a very interesting sub-group, because there is a clear change over time (cf. Fig. 14).

Regardless of at what time elite-persons are mentioned in the text, they are mostly depicted as acting positively/neutrally. However, other ways of portraying them increase significantly over time, which signifies a trend towards a more diversified depiction compared to the more one-dimensional portrayals of the early post-war

12 $\chi^2 = 28.5796$; df = 6; $p < 0.01$

years. Although portrayals of them acting negatively increase almost monotonously, this kind of depiction remains the least common over the years. And if we only distinguish between descriptions of elite-persons' positive vs. negative actions/passive actions, this picture is confirmed again. Positive depiction remains stable and has a share of 90% of the respective articles, while negative depiction increases until 1965, then drops again slightly (cf. Fig. 15).




Figure 14: Shares of elite-persons' actions (Condition: elite-person mentioned) ($df = 4$; EPact+: $\chi^2 = 3,345$; n.s.; EPact-: $\chi^2 = 30,905$ $p < 0.001$; EPpass+: $\chi^2 = 22,445$; $p < 0.001$; EPpass-: $\chi^2 = 27,552$; $p < 0.001$)




Figure 15: Shares of elite-persons' actions (Condition: elite-person appears) ($df = 4$; EP+a/p: $\chi^2 = 1,162$; n.s.; EP-a/p: $\chi^2 = 33,409$; $p < 0.001$)

The depiction of elite-structures/institutions/groups' actions/passive actions is not so consistent (cf. Fig. 16).




Figure 16: Shares of elite-structures' actions (Condition: elite-structures appear) ($df = 4$; ESact+: $\chi^2 = 9,302$; n.s.; ESact-: $\chi^2 = 18,614$; $p < 0.001$; ESpass+: $\chi^2 = 17,371$; $p < 0.01$; ESpass-: $\chi^2 = 6,228$; n.s.)

Constant over 25 years is their depiction as mostly positively acting and (less often) as being the passive object of a negative action. Portrayals of them as positively passive increase slightly, above all after 1960. Portraying them as negatively active increases from a third of the articles mentioning elite-structures (1946 to 1950) up to over 50% of the articles (1956 to 1960). Afterwards the share decreases again and remains the least-used mode of portraying them. One has to keep in mind that in the 1950s, and in particular in the late 1950s, France was involved in several military actions and violent de-colonization processes (Indochina war, Suez crisis, liberation movements in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), which is partly reflected by the data.

Non-elite persons appear in only 145 articles over the entire 25-year span. Significant changes in coverage are found only if we distinguish between their actions/passive actions being depicted as positive or negative (cf. Fig. 17). The share of negative descriptions remains relatively stable, and variations are not statistically significant, while the share of positive descriptions decreases significantly from 100% in the first years to below 60% in the last time span. This supports the model's predictions that these actors have to suffer or do something negative in order to get media attention. This does not change over time. What does change is that in the early years the investigated newspapers showed slightly more flexibility with regard to depictions of non-elite persons than in the later years, and this is possibly also due to the development of the particular self-image of high-quality newspa-

pers: they try not to focus on human interest stories unless they involve really major issues.




Figure 17: Share of Non-Elite-persons' actions (Condition: non-elite-persons appear) (df = 4; NEP+a/p: $\chi^2 = 10,054$; $p < 0.05$; NEP-a/p: Chi-square = 3,727; n.s.)

The depiction of non-elite structures/institutions/groups does not change significantly over the years. Mostly they are portrayed in a passive mode, and less often as acting negatively.

4.5 Conclusions

The data from the quantitative study indicates that the German newspapers actively followed the ongoing reconciliation process.

The selection of subjects was less dominated by news values like negativism and personalization, as one would expect from Galtung's model. To some extent, the newspapers even managed to overcome elite-bias and made efforts to show a broader picture of France and the French lifestyle than only focusing on political issues.

The German newspapers showed their confidence in French actors by depicting them in a mostly positive/neutral way instead of emphasizing their negative actions. They also emphasized French cultural accomplishments. In the investigated material, we found current reviews and presentations of French art, literature, music, movies, etc., mostly in the late 50s and early 60s.

The German press also expressed confidence in French society and the ordinary French population by making them a subject of coverage and depicting them in a generally less negative way than would be expected according to Galtung's model.

The only exceptions are individual non-elite persons, who had almost no chance to get media attention except when suffering or doing something negative.

The newspaper coverage of France and the French changed over time. Major differences are found between the early post-war period and the time after the Allied occupation. This can be partly seen as a result of the newspapers' dependency on the Allied powers, the availability of information and the availability of paper and materials with which to print newspapers (cf. Dix, 1995). As well, it may be due to the newspapers' development (increase in number of pages, diversification of subjects, supplements, etc.) and the change in relevant subjects on the public agenda.

Over time, there is a tendency to a more diversified depiction of French elite actors, as well as a tendency for slightly more "negative" coverage. There is also a tendency to more non-elite coverage and to slightly more personalization of events.

Allied press control does not seem to have had overly severe implications, though. The only newspaper showing significant changes of mood over time is the local newspaper *Südkurier*. In the early post-war years, it offered highly positive coverage of France and French-related issues, but later, after the years of Allied press control, there were no significant differences compared to the other newspapers. If there were any lingering feelings of resentment because the French administration had placed restrictions on the *Südkurier*, there is no evidence that the paper later tried to retaliate by focusing more on the negative side of France than did the other newspapers.

With any interpretation of the results, though, the limitations of a quantitative approach should be taken into account. The results look promising with regard to press contributions to German reconciliation with France, but one should also consider the framing conditions: to name only a few, the situation of Germany's complete capitulation and the need for cooperation with France, as well as with the other occupation powers. Not only did an honest desire to overcome the effects of National Socialism influence the political agenda, but also German interests like regaining sovereignty, dependency on international support for reconstruction, as well as a desire to avoid a loss of face. These all surely contributed to the "cooperativeness" of the press, and it is hard to decide which of these motives predominated.

Moreover, there was surely a sense that German policy and public discourse were being monitored by the international environment. As the media are not only windows on the world (Tuchman, 1978), but also allow a look into the house itself, one had to be careful to keep one's affairs in order. Not least of all, a significant factor can be seen in the Cold War and the current framing of public discourse in terms of Western Cold War propaganda, where anything having to do with communism was suspect (including left-wing French art, literature, trade union movements, etc.).

In regard to French culture, one should remember that German admiration of French culture has a long tradition and continued even during the war (it mani-

fested itself for example in the looting of French artworks by the National Socialists). It is no surprise that this admiration was revived after the war and provided a reliable common basis for rapprochement with the French, for regarding them as equal human beings and as a highly civilized nation.

Nevertheless, the results indicate that some news values are not self-evident and that the media dispose of more free space in constructing realities than is often grasped or apologetically maintained.

5. Part 2: Qualitative content analysis

5.1 Aims, models, expectations

In addition to the quantitative content analysis, a qualitative study was made of several exemplary articles selected from the quantitative sample. It is based on already-existing models of peace journalism:

- "Escalation vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage" (Kempf, Reimann & Luostarinen, 1996; Kempf, 2002a)
- "Peace/conflict journalism vs. war/violence journalism" (Galtung, 1998, 2002)

Both models provide systematic approaches to the question of how peaceful and conciliatory conflict coverage could be and also offer ideas about how events can be covered by the media, e.g. coverage that does not fan the flames of conflict with biased presentations, that leaves free space for peaceful options, that supports peace initiatives and non-violent conflict resolution, etc.

Nevertheless, pure "peace journalism" is hard to find in media reality. In repeated analyses of war and conflict coverage, the thus-far theoretically deduced de-escalation oriented characteristics seldom could actually be identified. And even the analysis of the coverage of peace negotiations and treaties has shown a dominance of escalation orientation in articles (e.g. Hamdorf, 2000; Annabring, 2000).

Accordingly, the following qualitative study was, on one hand, motivated by theoretical interest. One of the aims of this study is:

- to look for de-escalation oriented aspects in post-war coverage and determine whether and which of these aspects appear, as well as how they are applied.
→Do the de-escalation oriented characteristics of the model correspond in any way to empirical media reality?

On the other hand, there is a very practical interest in learning from empirical examples, as well as transferring the acquired knowledge to a broader public. If suitable journalistic skills are already present, if there is an intuitive knowledge of how to cover events in a de-escalation oriented way, this can serve as evidence that peace journalism is not an abstract construction of researchers, but is already being regularly practiced and can be systematized and also taught. Other aims of the study, consequently, are

- to identify specific style characteristics of at first glance constructive and conciliatory articles that go *beyond* the model and can make coverage contribute to peace and reconciliation
 - to systematize those characteristics and – if possible – reintegrate the findings into existing models of peace journalism or de-escalation oriented conflict coverage
- What can researchers learn from journalists?

The above-presented quantitative part of the study has indicated some active German media contributions to the reconciliation process. So, by investigating the material in a more detailed way, we should be able to find articles dealing with the reconciliation process itself and even supporting and promoting it. There should also be texts covering other subjects and nevertheless presenting them in a way suitable to support the reconciliation process. Regardless of the topics, all of these articles are expected to contain some de-escalation characteristics, according to Kempf's model, as well as characteristics of Galtung's notion of peace journalism, but also other characteristics beyond the two models that enable the texts to contribute to reconciliation. Moreover, they are expected to contain several style characteristics making the articles exciting, interesting, credible, and thereby facilitating the acceptance of the message by the audience.

5.2 Method and procedure of qualitative content analysis

Figure 18 gives an overview of the procedure of analysis:




Figure 18: Overall procedure of the analysis

Selection of the articles

As the aim of the analysis of exemplary, conciliatory articles was to 1.) study their constructive power for reconciliation with regard to de-escalation oriented characteristics proposed by the models and 2.) find constructive characteristics in the

empirical material that go beyond the models, this had several implications for the selection of articles and led to the following selection strategies for the sample:

- *Formal characteristics*: Adequate length of the article (max. half a page but not too short because of lack of content) and articles from various newspapers, periods of time, text genres and writing styles.
- *Subject characteristics*: Articles dealing with a great variety of subjects.
- *Model characteristics*: Articles containing, at first glance, some of the de-escalation oriented characteristics from Kempf's model or the characteristics of Peace Journalism (Galtung).¹³
- *Characteristics beyond the models*: Articles containing at first glance eye-catching stylistic and subject characteristics going beyond the models, e.g. raising issues, selection of title, framing of topic, portrayal of actors, use of quotations, dealing with the past, flow of argumentation, writing style, symbols and allegories, etc.

Reading the text twice should confirm the impression of dealing with an article that is constructive with regard to reconciliation, or at least offers a sympathetic depiction of the French situation and should not leave a "foul taste" in the mouth. There should be no ambiguous hidden messages that are not clearly defined, cartoons beside the text that depreciate and detract from the positive content,¹⁴ too obviously supporting anti-communist ideology instead of dealing with French cinematic trends as claimed,¹⁵ etc.

So far, 22 articles have been selected for investigation (cf. Tab. 5)

Text code	Title	Source	Content
T16	<i>Die Straßensänger in Paris</i>	<i>Südkurier</i> , 8.2.1946, p. 3	Feature of the flourishing street life in Paris after the ending of the German occupation – The Nazis couldn't really affect the French joy of life.
T15	<i>Frankreichs wirtschaftlicher Aufbau</i> Viel ist schon getan, aber immer noch große Schwierigkeiten	<i>Südkurier</i> , 8.2.1946, p. 4	Detailed description of the war-caused damage in France and of the reconstruction efforts of both the French population and politicians

13 As the aim of the study is to empirically identify as many characteristics that can potentially contribute to peace and reconciliation as possible, and not simply to test a model, this selection approach serves to a priori exclude articles with no conciliatory potential.

14 E.g. "Kiesinger: Quite far ahead – de Gaulle emphasizes 'active friendship'/ dialogue on GDR" (*FR*, 14.1.1967) plus cartoon subtitled, "Monsieur Kiesinger – for once wouldn't you like to try wearing only one hat?" (Kurt Kiesinger was a conservative German Chancellor.)

15 E.g. "The intellectual France and the French movie" (*SZ*, 16.10.1948)

T4	<i>Die Stimme der Frau</i> Die politisch denkende Frau in Frankreich	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i> , 28.06.1946, p. 7	Enthusiastic report about the French women association "Union des Femmes Françaises"
T20	<i>Frankreich für einheitliches Deutschland</i> Reuters Parisbesuch – Verständnis für Eingliederung Berlins gewachsen	<i>Die Welt</i> , 12.2.1949, p. 1	Article about the successful visit of the mayor of Berlin in Paris. He was able to achieve concessions of the French with regards to the Berlin status by negotiation.
T1	<i>Der Prozeß gegen Otto Abetz</i>	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i> , 23.7.1949, p. 16	Detached report about the trial against the former German ambassador in Paris during the Nazi occupation
T2	<i>Das Gespräch ist im Gang</i> Deutsche und französische Jugend singt und wandert	<i>Südkurier</i> , 5.11.1949, p. 3	Report about German and French young people travelling in each other's country, the problems and perspectives of re-establishing a youth hostel movement
T6	<i>Was die Welt so über uns denkt</i> Echo des Mannes auf der Straße zur deutschen Wiederbewaffnung – von Madrid bis Kopenhagen "FRANKREICH BRAUCHT FELDGRAU NICHT ZU FÜRCHTEN"	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 28.10.1950, p. 3 [French part of a big article written by various correspondents in several European capitals, S.J.]	French statements with regards to the German rearmament suggest that there is less objection in France than expected.
T14	Ein französisch-deutsches Zwiegespräch <i>Deutschland – Frankreich – Europa</i> Vertrauen stärkt Verständigungswillen – Verzicht auf lähmende Vorurteile	<i>Südkurier</i> , 25.11.1950, p. 3	A French and a German author write about the mood in their countries with regard to the German rearmament – the newspaper emphasizes the need of a frank dialogue between the two countries.
T10	<i>Eine Träumerei von Robert Schuman</i>	<i>Südkurier</i> , 12.1.1952, p. 1 (commentary)	The European Coal and Steel Community is highly welcomed by the author. He explains structure and advantages of this union.
T12	<i>45 Todes-Urteile im Oradour-Prozeß</i> Auch Todesstrafe für Elsässer Boos	<i>Südkurier</i> , 14.2.1953, p. 2 (report and commentary)	The final sentences have been spoken in the trial of the Oradour massacre. The author condemns the crime and reflects about responsibilities.
T3	<i>Monsieur Lecompte frischt Erinnerungen auf</i> Ehemalige französische Kriegsgefangene besuchen die Moosburger Neustadt	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 4.9.1954, p. 12	Report about a meeting of former French and German war prisoners during a French visit of the former prison camp in Germany

T11	<i>Ein Brief aus Sombornon</i> "... daß mein Freund Ludwig Fabricius, Hamburg-Nienstedten, 70. Geburtstag hat"	<i>Die Welt</i> , 14.5.1955, p. 5, "Tagesbericht Hamburg"	A French old lady has saved a German officer during a Résistance fire. In reverse he has saved the village from destruction by SS-troops. After the war they have become friends.
T17	<i>Internationale Verständigung</i>	<i>Südkurier</i> , 26.5.1956, p. 11, "Konstanzer Zeitung"	Report about a German boy and a French soldier having become friends in Konstanz.
T19	<i>So reisen Jean und Jeanette</i> Ein französisches Mosaik	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i> , 28.7.1956, p. 12	Story about travelling in France framed by the portray of a fictional French couple, who don't have much money but know how to enjoy life and travelling nevertheless
T18	<i>Skeptisch</i>	<i>Frankfurter Rundschau</i> , 17.11.1956, p. 3 (commentary)	How the common people in Paris experience the Suez war
T8	<i>Colette lernt tanzen</i> Deutsch-französischer Schüleraustausch	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> , 22.8.1959, "Die Frau"	The author tells his experiences with the students' exchange and reflects about the French school system.
T9	<i>Der Algerien-Rapport des Reserveobersten Jules Roy</i> Ein französischer Schriftsteller beschwört seine Landsleute zum Verhandeln mit seinen Landsleuten	<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> , 4.2.1961, p. 6	Jules Roy has written a book condemning the Algerian war. His ideas and parts of his book are introduced.
T5	<i>Die Partner von Baden-Baden</i>	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> , 17.2.1962, p. 1 (commentary)	Adenauer and de Gaulle have different ideas about the political integration of Europe. The author argues towards seeing their common background, neutral evaluation of both sides' interests and finding a compromise.
T21	<i>Eine neue Generation in Frankreich</i>	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> , 21.4.1962, p. 7	Article about the changed economical culture in France since the Common Market has been established. The author is rather enthusiastic.

T22	<i>Fast alle 900 000 Algerien-flüchtlinge eingegliedert</i> Nur 4500 Arbeitslose / Erfolg der französischen Verwaltung und der Heim- kehrer	<i>Frankfurter Allge- meine Zeitung</i> , 16.11.1963, p. 3	Evaluation of the state of inte- grating Algerian Refugees in France. Both have been success- ful: Refugees as well as authori- ties.
T7	<i>Die dünne Decke</i>	<i>Südkurier</i> , 6.2.1965, p. 1 (commentary)	De Gaulle's press conference has revealed a still persisting mistrust against the Germans. The inner- German debate about the statute- barred prosecution of crimes dur- ing the Nazi regime fuels it even more and should be brought to an end.
T13	<i>Nur noch ein Rest alten Argwohns</i> Die Wahlkampf-Bundesre- publik in französischer Sicht / Anerkennung für unsere Sozial- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen	<i>Süddeutsche Zei- tung</i> , 20.9.1969, p. 4	Germany is at high risk that the nationalist party will gain consid- erable support during the next elections. How do the French per- ceive this situation? How has the German-French relationship developed anyway?

Table 5: List of investigated articles

Analyzing the articles

For the purpose of studying and evaluating *post*-conflict coverage, the model of "escalation vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage" (Kempf et al., 1996) had to be slightly adapted. Some variables were tailored explicitly to violent conflicts and were defined too specifically. So they had to be modified in order to be able to assess the characteristics of less violent processes.

The adapted model was transformed into a "Checklist for escalation and de-escalation oriented coverage" (cf. Kempf, 2003a; Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Möckel, 2004) that served as the basic guideline for a sentence-by-sentence-analysis of the articles. Any characteristic of the checklist that occurred in the text has been recorded.

Additionally, any other outstanding characteristic not yet in the checklist but potentially seeming to contribute to a more empathic understanding of the French, to reconciliation, to a cooperative comprehension of the situation, etc. was recorded. Special attention was given to elements like, e.g. raising the issue itself, selection of title, provision of background information, context of the article, flow of argumentation, dramaturgy of the article, framing of the article, use of a certain writing style, of expressions, symbols, ways of dealing with actors, with quotations, with topics like the German-French past, the war, etc. So, more general and sentence-overlapping constructive characteristics that are at risk of being overlooked with a simple application of the checklist to each individual sentence could be ascertained as well.

With ongoing analysis of the article, some of the elements of the checklist that were found turned out to be used or meant in a contrary sense, so the article and the sentences had to be reviewed again until the meaning of the article and the characteristics were sufficiently clear.

For a better comprehension of the article and a broader knowledge of the depicted events, a comparison of text information with external sources was also allowed. The underlying intention was not to find out whether the reported event was correctly depicted or not, but rather how the author of the article meant to depict it. External sources could be other articles in the relevant newspaper edition, history books, biographies, information provided by the Internet, e.g. about the author of the article, about the mentioned French organizations or institutions, etc. As much information was collected as was available and necessary to determine the meaning of the article. Contradictory information was evaluated in terms of the reliability of sources (e.g. official vs. personal reports).

After the first analysis, the article was reviewed again, a review was written, and a list was made of escalation and de-escalation oriented aspects, as well as a list of additional constructive elements.

5.3 First findings

At this point, the quantitative analysis is still not complete. Nevertheless, this paper presents the preliminary results:

1. Nearly all the de-escalation oriented characteristics described by the model could be found in the sample.
2. The articles also contain constructive stylistic elements going beyond the checklist: Not only do these elements have the power to contribute to reconciliation, beyond that, some of them contribute to making the articles highly attractive and credible to recipients.
3. Conciliatory elements could be found in the articles, no matter what topic was dealt with.

Other findings are less encouraging:

1. Even if the results of the preceding quantitative analysis indicate something else: Articles not explicitly dealing with the reconciliation process itself and at the same time containing predominantly constructive elements were especially rare and hard to find.
2. Even articles dominated by constructive elements often contain problematic phrases or aspects that are not only not conciliatory, but also express continuing distrust between Germany and France, or even an escalation orientation.

Options for conciliatory coverage in various contexts

The articles can be grouped by the contexts dealt with and how these could potentially contribute to reconciliation. The groups are not mutually exclusive. Often,

one and the same article contains elements fitting into more than one context.¹⁶

Reconciliation within the political context

Topics and opportunities:

These articles often deal with meetings between politicians (not only, but also French and German) where agreement could be reached or at least there was a less conflict-laden dialogue (e.g. T5, T20). In these articles recipients can learn about French intentions, learn to listen to French needs and fears and evaluate them in a less polarized manner (e.g. T5, T7). The articles sometimes try to deconstruct the distrust between France and Germany by emphasizing shared visions and possibilities for present and future cooperation (e.g. T5, T10, T14). They express confidence in French politicians, in their actions and intentions, their values and comprehension of democracy.

There are also articles dealing with the political behavior of the French people (e.g. T14, T18, T9). For example, one is about the political activities of Frenchwomen organized in the "Union des Femmes Françaises" in 1946 (T4). It praises their political consciousness, shows the compatibility of being a woman *and* being politically active and implicitly encourages German women to take French women as examples and become politically active.

Problematic aspects:

These issues are often raised in response to domestic events (e.g. forthcoming elections in Germany, states visits, meetings, domestic discourse about controversial subjects concerning German policy) (e.g. T13, T5, T7, T20, T14). This need not necessarily be a shortcoming. Often enough, though, the deeper meaning of the content can be understood by taking into account the overall situation at the time the article was written. By doing so, the article implicitly places an emphasis on promoting *German* needs and interests, even if French politicians and policy are superficially depicted in a correct, if not friendly fashion. Articles about meetings between French and German politicians often contain self-upgrading elements, and identification with one's own side's "wise" statesmen is supported. French statesmen, in contrast to the upgraded Germans, come off less well in the end (e.g. T5). In some articles, cooperation with the French seems not to be motivated by a stated desire to become friends or by honest appreciation of French policy (even if the article claims this). Instead, it is a result of rational calculation to make use of this externally praised collaboration in order to improve one's own situation or to achieve hidden goals (T7).

Reconciliation within the socio-cultural context

Topics and opportunities:

These articles portray French everyday life, problems ordinary French people have to face and how they cope with them. They investigate the social situation in France, as well as French culture and art.

16 The codes in brackets refer to the corresponding articles listed above (cf. Tab. 5).

The articles dealing with French problems after the Second World War express great empathy with these "brave" people: So much damage was done, but as wise and industrious as they are, the French are doing their best to reconstruct their country. (e.g. T15, T16, T4). Such a depiction of the French social situation does not overtly state, but it suggests implicit parallels between the problems the French *and* the German populations have to cope with, and it also gives examples of how to overcome them (e.g. T4, T22). The later the article appears, the less emphasis is placed on topics like post-war reconstruction. Instead, there is often a depiction of the French as just 'charming people in a beautiful country with a rich culture' that is worth getting to know better (e.g. T19).

Problematic aspects:

In the early years, there was still talk of a sort of "folk character", which suggests Nazi terminology and ways of viewing Germany and other nations (e.g. T4, T16). Even later, there was a danger of maintaining and projecting stereotypes about the French by celebrating merely the "l'art de vivre en France" in the articles (e.g. T19) and not reporting on the great variety of life styles and personalities found in the French population. In these kinds of reports, there often is a search for clues as to whether stereotypes of the "laissez faire" style of living, the "not so systematic" French working methods were still true or not (e.g. T21), which signifies a German interest in "how French people really are". But at the same time, this is still just *talking about* the other and not really *listening to* him/her. Even worse is that in some articles the German system (economy, education, etc.) is upgraded by negative comparisons with the "backward" French system (e.g. T8, T13). A sort of pseudo-empathy with the French people is expressed, while simultaneously pointing out how successful the German system is. All in all, this gives the impression that French social policy and the French educational system – instead of contributing to the welfare of the French people – are "leaving them in the lurch".

Reconciliation within the socio-economic context

Topics and opportunities:

Closely related to the socio-cultural context and already mentioned is the coverage of the French economy (e.g. T13, T21, T15). Many of these articles also deal with post-war reconstruction and contain above-mentioned characteristics like showing the good example of the industrious French people. Of course, economic pacts and international cooperative institutions like, e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community, European Currency Union, and Common Market are described constructively, if the agreement was beneficial to Germany in terms of regaining international acceptance and influence. In this case, we find coverage expressing confidence in French statesmen such as, e.g. Robert Schuman, praising them for their far-sightedness and wisdom (T10). There are also texts concerned with topics like how well the French people get along with an economically united Western Europe (e.g. T21) and how beneficial the Common Market is for the French.

Problematic aspects:

As time passed, more emphasis was put on the economic competition between

Germany and France. Or at least the articles offer a competitive frame with regard to the situation (T13). There is sometimes talk of a French "inferiority complex" in face of "German economic achievements" (T21) or of a "certain French envy" (T13). There is also a self-congratulatory tone in the articles: German achievements are enthusiastically praised, and there is a tone of affected sympathy for the French, which explicitly or implicitly downgrades French economic policy, as well as the traditionally important role and culture of the French trade union movement (T13).

Building a new relationship

Topics and opportunities:

In the investigated period, we can find numerous articles about programs or meetings between French and German groups (as in T8: student exchange, T2: youth hostel movement, T3: veterans meetings). There are also articles giving examples of existing friendships among the German and French peoples (e.g. T11, T17) or emphasizing the need for a frank dialogue in order to build friendship (T14). Some of these articles additionally provide implicit suggestions on how to participate in these programs. The overall message of the articles: If we only become friends, war will become impossible! Let us have confidence in the youth of both countries who want to be united and will not fight against each other in the future! Let us also have trust into the gradual passing away of an older generation burdened with war experiences and sometimes unable to overcome them! The problem will be solved over time ... (e.g. T2, T13). But there are also articles showing that the war generation could actively overcome some mutual mistrust (e.g. T3, T11). The articles are mostly upbeat. They combine enthusiastic anticipation of a united future and an emphasis on the similarity of the German and French peoples.

Problematic aspects:

The publication of these articles is often a matter of domestic and actual relevance (as e.g. T3: veterans meetings the week before somewhere in Bavaria, T11: a letter from a Frenchwoman to the editor). They are not published just because a German journalist finds this an important subject to write about, but seem to require an actual domestic event related to the topic (like most of the other contexts).

Moreover, the message "Just look forward, don't look back!" (e.g. T2) is ambiguous. On one hand, it seems to have been reasonable at that time to ascertain the status quo and take the present as a starting point instead of endlessly brooding over old wrongs and agonizing about the past. An emphasis on the structures of already-existing cooperation and friendships, as well as on perspectives of a new, now shared future can motivate, inspire and animate the audience to join in existing exchange programs or to build up friendships on their own. Nevertheless, the depiction of this "united world" and the glib dismissal of the emotional damage caused by the war seems somewhat naïve (e.g. T2, T11, T13). It implies the self-serving message, "... after all, we're harmless and well-meaning people". It tends to neglect the diversity of feelings left on both sides by the various and differing war-related experiences – above all *with* promising topics which could have offered

an opportunity to really learn about how the other had experienced the war, without stereotyped repetition of how bad it was for everyone and without the article losing its positive power.

Dealing with the hostile past

Topics

There are two types of articles dealing with the past: The first type focuses directly on this subject, and the major part of the article is concerned with the depiction of present events closely related to or caused by World War II. These articles cover war crimes trials of Germans (T1, T12), veterans meetings (T3), personal friendships formed during the war (T11), the background of the French stance towards German rearmament (T6, T14), etc. The other type does not appear to be concerned with such topics, but there are some allusions to the war in the articles, such as subordinate clauses, expressions, short summaries of how it was and how it is now, etc. (e.g. T16, T2, T13, T21). Neither type of article differs with regard to specific characteristics and argumentation, even if the ones directly dealing with the past use them more extensively.

Constructive elements

- Showing the amount of destruction caused by the war and the German occupation of France

A few articles depict in detail the harm suffered by France due to the war and the German occupation. This harm is portrayed in terms of economic destruction (T15), but as well in terms of human victims and the emotional effects of the war (e.g. T13, T11, T1). Repeatedly, there is a hint that the war has left the French with deep-seated feelings of distrust towards Germans.

Amazingly, even twenty years after the war one article emphasizes in two paragraphs the socio-demographic damage the war has caused to the German population (T21). The author regrets that almost an entire German generation was lost in the war and is now unavailable to aid the developing economy.

In some articles the damage to the German-French relationship is also emphasized, as well as the global distrust of Germany due to National Socialist crimes and the war, the international loss of face and the problem of how to regain international trust (e.g. T7, T14).

- Expression of will to make amends

Especially the above-described articles dealing with the rebuilding of a new relationship focus on starting over again and emphasize the need to "make friends, not war" (e.g. T14, T2). There are expressions by the articles' authors of support for this logic, as well as examples of Germans who already have the right attitude.

But also the need to stay politically and economically in touch, the international integration of Germany in political, military and economic unions, as well as to engage in dialogue with each other are comprehended and promoted by the journalists as means to overcome the German past (e.g. T5, T14, T10).

- Overcoming the past in a more specific sense

Both articles about war crimes trials contain at least some acknowledgement of the French right to try German war crimes committed in France. Their respective forms, though, are very different. While one expresses a relatively detached attitude (within limits, as follows below) and makes serious attempts to demonstrate the fairness of the French and the French justice system (T1), the other condemns the crime itself but trivializes the perpetrators' guilt and questions the correctness of the judgment (T12).

Also, more than one of the investigated articles acknowledges at least implicitly the French right of resistance against the German occupation during the war. The resistance fighters are portrayed as courageous, sacrificing their lives for the liberation of France (e.g. T4, T6). Their actions are described as closely related to the occupation situation and framed as a kind of self-defense. Now that the war and the Nazi regime are over, they have no desire for revenge (e.g. T1), so the articles indicate, and the resistance fighters have returned to civilian life. Nevertheless, in one other article a specific action by the resistance is framed as an illegal attack on a "legally operating" German military unit (T11).)

Destructive or at least dubious elements

- Trivialization of the war and German occupation: 3 examples

"... after all that has happened in France ..." (T1)

There are many formulations like this, implicitly admitting that the French too had suffered from the German occupation and the war, but the formulation is rather vague. Something "happened", even World War II "happened", which is more the way one would refer to a natural disaster that could have befallen anyone and that no one could have prevented – and the responsibility of those who took the fatal decisions, as well as of those who carried out their orders is obscured.

"... they are not in the mood to hurt each other ..." (T2)

The article is about young French and German people, now visiting the others' country, making new friends there and wanting peace. This sounds good, but the expression "to hurt" is a rather euphemistic way of talking about war, invasion, plundering homes and possessions, murder, massacre, and the like. The phrase also suggests it is a simple matter of a personal "hostile mood" that decides for war or peace, and this denies the role of German nationalism and its ideology of superiority and territorial expansion, i.e. the political dimension of war.

"With the Wehrmacht invasion, street musicians disappeared from the Parisian cityscape. On one hand, the Parisians felt like anything but music and singing, on the other hand, the occupation authorities had banned any street music". (SK, 8.2.1946) (T16)

According to the author, German occupation authorities had banned street musicians because they "feared" satirical songs about them. This seems to be an imaginative but rather trivializing and euphemistic way of portraying the situation during the German occupation of Paris. Street musicians simply "disap-

peared", the Parisians were in a bad mood, and the occupation forces just had no sense of humor and self-irony ...

- Showing the "good" sides of the war
As a special kind of trivialization, some articles seem to be insisting on the war's good sides. On reading these texts, that also contain the above-mentioned vague expressions and trivializing elements, one gets an impression of the Second World War as a kind of international migration movement or organized trans-national tourism. Everybody had for once in his life an opportunity to travel abroad, get to know other countries, even make new international friends (T11). Also, German soldiers were seemingly enabled to overcome old stereotypes of "the superficial, frivolous Frenchwoman" by getting to know real life Frenchwomen (who, moreover, were of the "less worthy kind" [O-tone], as they were street walkers) (T4). Also, the soldiers' stay in the other country or captivity as a POW seemingly offered them a chance to learn foreign languages (T3)!
- Self-upgrading by showing one's own side's "heroes of peace" and own side's good will

An article covering the French trial of the former German ambassador to occupied Paris is written in a relatively detached style (T1). The arrangement of testimonies and their content, the presentation of protagonists, as well as repeated statements by the author give the impression of a very fair trial. The overall tone is generally neutral. The only point where the author shows more enthusiasm is when writing about the testimony of a German general:

"Not least of all, and particularly worth mentioning, is the testimony of General von Choltitz, the former military commander of Greater Paris, who in August 1944 received the order to blow up Paris (which had already been undermined at many places). Due to his disregard of the order Paris is nowadays not a sea of ruins, but one of the most beautiful and best-preserved cities of Europe. He declared that Abetz had helped him then by not objecting that he didn't execute the order". (FR, 23.7.1949)

Ironically enough, Germany lies in ruins and the French owe the rescue of their capital, Paris, "one of the most beautiful and best-preserved cities of Europe", to a German general who simply disobeyed orders. The glamour and halo of this, of course, honorable action also spreads to the defendant, Otto Abetz, who is accused, among other things, of contributing to the deportation of Jews, to the plundering of French works of art, to the murder of French politicians and resistance fighters. This is not the only example of articles becoming enthusiastic about German good deeds in France during the war and about signs of German resistance from within the military. These need not automatically be counterproductive for supporting the reconciliation process, if they aim at showing that free space had existed and been used even under the conditions of war for individual courageous humanitarian behavior and refute those who claim there was no alternative but compliance. In some articles (e.g. T11), though, the presentation of Germans as resisters follows a well-worn defense

strategy in Germany – that of reasoning that "we weren't all that bad, it was just Hitler", which strongly reduces personal moral responsibility.

- Downplaying German war crimes

The following quotation was found in an article covering the French trial for the Oradour massacre, in which nearly the entire population of a French village, including many women and children locked in a church, was slaughtered by a SS unit consisting of both Alsatian and German soldiers (T12):

"... even if on that 10th of June 1944 they fired on human beings only because they didn't want to be shot themselves. And countless soldiers here and there have experienced similar situations, because in every war the same horrible alternative is repeated day after day. A crime requires a criminal intention. ... Or are they already guilty solely because they carried out a criminal order under duress?" (*SK*, 13.2.1953, commentary part)

In the end, the perpetrators become the true victims – of circumstances, and of others who obviously do not really (want to) understand the "rules of war". This is phrased as universal wisdom. While some texts tend to explain the war in terms of an individual hostile impulse, here the author puts the blame on some anonymous authority and strongly trivializes the share of individual responsibility for the massacre, which also seems naïve. Moreover, he questions the true guilt of ordinary soldiers for war crimes, because it was "their job" to obey to orders and to protect themselves.

Of course, these examples of dubious elements in the constructive articles received so much space that the reader might ask what if anything the constructive parts of the articles are. Nevertheless, they were depicted not least of all in order to demonstrate the problem of finding "the" reconciliation-oriented article. The variety of dubious argumentations even in the, at first glance, not really negative texts is broad, and they are not isolated cases, but occur frequently, mostly in the rejected material, and, as far as war is concerned, more often in the earlier years of investigation.

There seem to be two major ways in which the past is dealt with, and both hamper a realistic and honest examination of it: One, as has been demonstrated, is trivialization, downplaying war and German responsibility, as well as lack of self-criticism. The other, sometimes in combination with the first, is to completely reverse the positions. It expresses such an enormous distance from the National Socialists that one could almost believe the Nazis had not only occupied France, but also Germany (e.g. T16). This goes along with the rationale that Hitler was the only real perpetrator, and Germans too were victims of Nazism and war.

As the selected material is limited to the coverage of France and the French, this may not be the appropriate context in which to get a broader picture of the newspapers' different expressions of German post-war self-reflection. On the other hand, the results are in complete accord with current research on "memory regimes". For example, Langenbacher (2003) depicts the investigated period as one where "German-centered" memory dominated. The characteristics of this phase

are a concentration on self, inner-directed working through of German suffering, downplaying Germans-as-perpetrators, etc., whereas only in the late 50s was there a gradual process of working through the past which also extended to the National Socialists' victims. This was enforced by "generational interventions", though the process still had only a limited diffusion throughout German society. The coverage of the investigated period, comprehended as part and mirror of the collective narrative at that time, reflects these results.

From today's point of view, it seems important to reflect on Germany's violent past in order to understand what went wrong and to plan a better future. Nevertheless, from the 1950s point of view, it may have seemed more "reasonable" to keep quiet, let time pass and heal one's own wounds, instead of focusing on the actual problems that the French and the Germans had to face. What is striking, though, is that in the articles of the later period (1960s), the opportunity to review these war experiences again, now from a more distanced stance, was missed. Instead, they seem to be almost entirely left out of coverage, and war and the "Third Reich" are portrayed as sufficiently worked through. Some expressions indicate that the author is slightly annoyed by some French people still holding onto their memory and mistrust (e.g. T13, T6), or the author even emphasizes German suffering caused by the French occupation of Southern Germany.¹⁷

5.4 Conclusions of the qualitative content analysis

These preliminary results offer some initial insights into the possibilities of post-war coverage to contribute to peace and reconciliation. Instead of focusing on the detailed analysis guided by the checklist, here the perspective was to give an overview of the analyzed articles' contexts, their constructive power in the different contexts and their limitations and deficiencies.

The results of the analysis show that conciliatory characteristics can be found periodically in German post-war coverage of France. They are easier to find in articles dealing with the reconciliation process itself or with the socio-cultural situation of ordinary French people. Unfortunately, these articles often express an attitude of: "We've never had any big problem with the French people and try our best, so they also can overcome their problems with us soon", which is also rather condescending, as if the French were mentally-disturbed and in need of therapy. The news value of domestic relevance can be found in most of the articles. Sometimes it seems to be used as a peg on which to hang a story about French-related issues and get the audience interested in the topic. It also provides a chance for raising issues otherwise ignored.

As far as political and economic subjects are concerned, a competitive framing of events increases over time. On one hand, this is a clear expression of growing self-confidence in German policy, growing German self-esteem and identification with

17 These kinds of articles were a priori rejected for the analysis.

the German system. On the other hand, the increasing emphasis on competitive processes may simply reflect the structure of political and economic processes in the capitalistic world.

Last but not least, it has to be taken into account that the historical process of reconciliation between Germany and France cannot be simply transferred to other post-war reconciliation processes like a recipe, without keeping in mind the context of this process and the framing conditions. Here, we're dealing with a relationship between two more or less equally strong partners that have had the burden, but also the chance of growing under the pressure of the need for reconstruction and of the increasing antagonism between East and West. Nevertheless, carefully considering the specific context of the coverage, the preliminary results indicate that most of the identified constructive elements in the articles can probably be generalized and applied, not only to the case of German coverage of France, but also to the coverage of other post-conflict situations, as could be demonstrated by Bläsi (cf. Annabring, Bläsi & Möckel, 2004).

6. Concluding overall remarks

The quantitative content analysis of German press coverage of French-related issues from 1946 to 1970 indicates that the German press actively contributed to the reconciliation process by, e.g. overcoming media selection routines and the depiction of French actors in a mostly positive or at least neutral way. The qualitative study of exemplary articles, though, discloses steppingstones within texts that give a distorted review of the German past. Nevertheless, this qualitative sample contains decidedly conciliatory articles and articles providing a view of France and the French that may be helpful for overcoming past distrust. In this coverage, we can find various constructive elements and expressions of an honest desire on the author's part to contribute to the reconciliation process, as well as to a sympathetic attitude towards the French.

Acceptance and impact of de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage¹

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

War coverage has a strong bias towards the promotion of conflict escalation and – though less pronounced – this bias often persists in post-war coverage as well. Even after a war ends, only a small share of journalists frames the conflict in a strongly de-escalation-oriented way.

The concepts of peace journalism developed by Galtung and others are intended to counteract this bias at each stage of conflict: pre-war, war and post-war. Whether or not these concepts are realistic depends on – besides other factors – audience responses to peace journalism. Does peace journalism have a chance to reach the public? Will its audience respect it as more balanced and less biased? Will it have an impact on the mental models according to which the audience interprets a conflict? Or will the audience cling to its prejudices and reject news articles inconsistent with the enemy images promulgated by mainstream media?

There are several constraints that may have an effect on audience responses to peace journalism (cf. Table 1).

1	The level of conflict escalation
2	The cognitive framework
3	The audience's entanglement in the conflict
4	Societal beliefs
5	Journalists' assumptions about audience preferences
6	The text genre
7	The format of the media
8	The audience itself

Table 1: Possible constraints on the acceptance and impact of peace journalism

1 Editor's note: For a more detailed account of this research see: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (ed.) (2005). *Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Berlin: regener.

The first of these constraints is *the level of conflict escalation*, which progresses from a self-centered divergence of perspectives via competition to struggle and climaxes in open warfare. Inter-group conflict reinforces in-group solidarity. Group members who gain a reputation for vigorously opposing the enemy can thereby increase their social status. Group members identify more strongly with their own group and its positions, and the more escalated the conflict, the more likely they are to do this (Deutsch, 1973).

The second constraint is *the cognitive framework* which corresponds to these levels of conflict escalation and which interprets conflict by means of increasingly radicalized mental models that can be described along the dimensions of (a) the conceptualization of the conflict as a win-win, win-lose or lose-lose process, (b) the uneven assessment of the parties' rights and aims, (c) the double standard used in the evaluation of their actions and behavior and (d) the emotional consequences of these interpretations, which ultimately transform outrage at war into outrage at the enemy (Kempf, 2002a) and disengage group members from moral control of violence (Bandura, 1999).

According to Kempf, this cognitive framework also produces the bias of traditional war reporting and therefore ought to be counteracted by peace journalism. In order to achieve this aim, Kempf (2003b) has suggested a two-step strategy (cf. Table 2).

The first step is called *de-escalation-oriented coverage* and broadly coincides with what is usually called quality journalism. It is characterized by neutrality and critical distance from all parties to a conflict and goes beyond the professional norms of journalism only to the extent that journalists' competence in conflict theory bears fruit and conflict remains open to peaceful settlement (win-win orientation as an option, questioning violence as an appropriate means of resolving conflict, questioning military values, and examination of conflict formation processes).

Although de-escalation-oriented coverage clearly goes beyond conventional war reporting, it is still a long way from peace journalism in Galtung's sense, which is fully unfolded only in a second step that Kempf calls *solution-oriented coverage*. Guided by the intention of peace-making and reconciliation, this second step of peace journalism can only become capable of winning a majority when an armistice or a peace treaty is already in place.

A third constraint is the *audience's entanglement in the conflict*, which will be greater the more reprehensible the atrocities and the closer a society feels itself tied to one of the parties in historical, political and cultural terms. The more it is entangled, the more an audience will tend to identify with one of the parties, and the more it will tend to interpret the conflict according to the same mental model adopted by the party it favors. According to Taylor (2000), however, media cannot deviate too much from the perspective of their audience if they want their reports to continue to be read, listened to or watched.

It is particularly in long-lasting, intractable conflicts that such mental models solidify into *societal beliefs*. Intractable conflicts are demanding, stressful, painful,

exhausting and costly, both in human and in material terms. This requires that societal members develop psychological conditions that will enable them to cope successfully. Societal beliefs fulfill an important role in the creation of these psychological conditions. Since they are both part of society's ethos and a crucial factor for enduring the burdens of war, they will tend to persist even after the war is over (Bar-Tal, 1998b).

	De-escalation-oriented coverage	Solution-oriented coverage
Conceptualization of conflict	Exploration of conflict formation with a win-win orientation; questioning violence as a means of resolving conflict and questioning military values	Peace orientation (peace = nonviolence + creativity); proactive (prevention before violence occurs); people-oriented (focus on civil society)
Evaluation of rights and aims	Respect for the rights of the opponent and undistorted representation of his aims; realistic and self-critical evaluation of one's own rights and aims; fair coverage of peace initiatives and attempts at mediation	Focus on common rights, aims, and interests and on the benefits all sides can get from ending war/violence; gives the anti-war opposition a say; focuses on peace initiatives, signals of readiness for peace and mediation attempts
Evaluation of actions	Realistic and self-critical evaluation of one's own actions and undistorted evaluation of opponent's actions; critical distance from the bellicose on all sides	Focuses on the suffering of all sides, focuses on the invisible effects of war: trauma and loss of reputation, structural and cultural damage; humanizes all sides and identifies all those who act unjustly; focuses on reconciliation perspectives
Emotional involvement	Recognition of the threat to the opponent and reduction of one's own feelings of threat	Recognition of the price of war, even in the case of victory, and transformation of outrage at the enemy into outrage at war
Identification offers	Neutral and distanced	Universal

Table 2: De-escalation-oriented and solution-oriented conflict coverage

A fifth constraint results from *journalists' assumptions about audience preferences*. Journalists' assumptions about audience preferences and traditional news factors like simplification, negativism, personalization and elite orientation suggest that traditional escalation-oriented conflict coverage has a higher news value than de-

escalation-oriented peace journalism: Simplification supports the division of the world into "us" and "them" and produces a bias towards interpreting conflict as a win-lose process (ASPR, 2003), and the preference for negativism, personalization, elite nations and elite persons produces a structural frame which divides the world into "rich" and "poor" and at the same time into "good" and "evil" (Galtung & Vincent, 1992).

A sixth constraint is the *text genre*. Features or reportages offer more space for the assessment of the conflict context, both in escalation- and in de-escalation-oriented terms, than do short commentaries or news articles with a stronger focus on day-to-day events. The 90-second rhythm of TV news items promotes simplification and offers almost no space for background information, etc.

A seventh constraint is the *media format*. National quality papers have a stronger focus on international affairs and more possibilities for journalistic investigation than regional papers that base their articles mainly on the reports of news agencies. Because articles can be re-read, print media are more open to critical assessment than TV, etc.

An eighth constraint is *the audience* itself. The typical readership of provincial papers is less interested in and feels less involved in international affairs than the readership of the quality press. Taking the format of the provincial press into account, they can also be expected to be less well-informed about international affairs, etc.

2. Experimental design

In order to investigate audience responses to escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage, we designed a series of experimental studies which measured (1) the acceptance and (2) the impact of news, editorial and background articles, both in a post-war and in a war scenario.

Experimenting with German and Austrian audiences and with conflicts that did not directly affect either German or Austrian society, the experimental conditions were quite favorable to the acceptance of de-escalation-oriented coverage with respect to two of the constraints discussed above: It can be assumed that both the audiences' entanglement in the conflicts (constraint No. 3) and the solidification of the dominant mental models into societal beliefs (constraint No. 4) were rather moderate.

In the first experiment, designed by Annabring & Spohrs (2004), news articles on three events in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević were presented to a total of $n = 128$ subjects, representative of the readership of the German quality press (cf. Table 3): violent conflicts in Southern Serbia (December 2000), the extradition of Milošević to The Hague (June, 2001) and the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (March 2003).

For each of the events, four different types of articles were used: moderately escalation-oriented articles from prestigious German newspapers (*Die Welt*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) and three variants of these articles, (a) with increased escalation-oriented framing, (b) with moderate de-escalation-oriented framing and (c) with more strongly de-escalation-oriented framing of the events.

Each participant was instructed to read one article on each of the three events in chronological order and after each article fill out a text-assessment questionnaire and narrate the reported events in their own words.

	1 st Experiment	2 nd Experiment
Sample	Readership of the German quality press (n=128)	Readership of an Austrian provincial paper (n=126)
Issues	Violent conflicts in Southern Serbia (December 2000)	
	The extradition of Milošević to The Hague (June, 2001)	
	The treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (March 2003)	Kostunica's reaction to Rugova's victory in the Kosovo elections (November, 2000)
Text genre	News articles from the quality press	News articles from the regional press
Original articles from	<i>Die Welt</i> , <i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i> , <i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	<i>Vorarlberger Nachrichten</i>
Text versions	Original articles with moderate escalation-oriented framing	
	Increased escalation-oriented framing	
	Moderate de-escalation-oriented framing	
	More strongly de-escalation-oriented framing	Escalation-oriented framing with reversed partiality
Average text length	Approx. 453 words	Approx. 230 words

Table 3: The post-war scenario experimental designs

The second experiment (Sparr, 2004) used a similar design and the same instruments, but with some modifications (cf. Table 3): The original articles stemmed from an Austrian regional paper (*Vorarlberger Nachrichten*), and the sample of subjects (n = 126) was recruited from its readership.

The reports about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro were replaced by reports about Kostunica's reaction to Rugova's victory in the Kosovo elections (November, 2000), and the more strongly de-escalation-oriented text versions were replaced by escalation-oriented ones with reversed partiality (pro-Serbia).

The Ss responded to the questionnaires, but did not have to re-narrate the reported events.

The other two experiments changed the text genre from daily-newspaper-style news articles to weekly-newspaper-style editorial and background articles.

	3 rd Experiment	4 th Experiment
Sample	University students (n=96)	University students (n=132)
Issues	Appropriate reaction to terrorist attacks by – Al-Qaida in New York and Madrid – Indonesian army in East Timor – Aum sect in Tokyo	History of the conflict between Russia and Chechnya
Text genre	Editorial from a weekly quality paper	Background article from a weekly quality paper.
Sources	Text elements from <i>Die Zeit</i> , <i>Die Welt</i> , <i>Der Spiegel</i> , <i>Neue Züricher Zeitung</i> , a speech to Congress by G.W. Bush and various books on the War on Terror	Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
Text versions	Extremely escalation-oriented framing and explicit arguments in favor of military measures	Mainly neutral but sometimes including elements of moral disengagement
	Massive de-escalation-oriented-framing and explicit arguments against military measures	Neutral without escalation- or de-escalation-oriented framing
		Mainly neutral, but sometimes warning against moral disengagement
Average text length	Approx. 1155 words	Approx. 781 (neutral text: 522) words

Table 4: The war scenario experimental designs

In the third experiment (Schaefer, 2006), editorials on the appropriate reaction to three cases of terrorist attacks were presented to a total of $n = 96$ students from the University of Konstanz (cf. Table 4). The attacks by Al-Qaida in New York and Madrid, a massacre committed by the Indonesian army in East Timor, and the poison gas attack by the Aum sect on the Tokyo subway.

Using text elements from *Die Zeit*, *Die Welt*, *Der Spiegel* and *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, from a Congressional speech given by G.W. Bush and from various books on the War on Terror, two different types of editorial were constructed on each of these issues: One with extremely escalation-oriented framing and explicit arguments *in favor* of military measures, and one with extremely de-escalation-oriented framing and explicit arguments *against* employing military measures.

Each participant was instructed to read one article on one of the three issues and then fill out three questionnaires.

The fourth experiment (Eckstein Jackson, 2006) presented background articles on the history of the Russian-Chechen conflict to a total of $n = 132$ students from a university of applied science in Berlin (cf. Table 4). Based on a publication by the *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (National Center for Political Education)*, three different types of article were constructed: a neutral, detached and balanced article with no escalation-oriented framing. The same neutral article, but enriched with elements of moral disengagement, legitimizing the use of violence, and the neutral article once again, but enriched with some warnings against legitimizing the use of violence by means of moral disengagement.

Each participant was instructed to read one of these articles and then fill out a questionnaire.

3. Measurement instruments

While the acceptance of the texts was measured in all four experiments, the impact of the texts was measured only in three of them (cf. Table 5).

	Acceptance of the texts	Impact of the texts
1 st experiment	Typical evaluation patterns based on 16 Items	Reconstruction of Ss' mental models
2 nd experiment	Typical evaluation patterns based on 16 + 1 Items	No measurement
3 rd experiment	Score based on three items	Moral disengagement scale + evaluation of concrete military measures
4 th experiment	Four separate items	Moral disengagement scale

Table 5: Measurement instruments

3.1 Measurement of the articles' acceptance

In the first two experiments, the acceptance of the articles was assessed by means of a text assessment questionnaire, to which Latent Class Analysis was applied in order to identify typical evaluation patterns (Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Spohrs, 2005; Kempf, 2005).

Four of the items dealt with the entertainment value of the articles, asking the participants to assess how boring (I1), how interesting (I2), how sensational (I3) and how informative (I4) the articles appeared to them. Next the participants were asked to indicate how familiar they had previously been with the reported events (I5) and to evaluate whether the events were accurately depicted (I6), whether

the text included impartial information about all the parties involved (I7) or whether it favored one of the parties (I8), whether the text was understandable (I9) and whether it brought up new aspects (I10), whether they could agree with the article's content (I11), whether it stimulated their interest in further information (I12), whether it was hard to read the text to the end (I13) and whether the reported facts were depicted truthfully or in a distorted way (I14). Finally, the participants were asked to estimate the journalist's expertise (I15) and his stylistic competence (I16).

In the second experiment an additional question was added, asking the participants whether they would choose to read the article if its title appeared as a headline on the front page of their paper (I17).

In the third experiment, the participants' agreement with the texts was measured using a test score (Cronbach-Alpha = 0.87) based on three items which asked them to rate their personal agreement with the argumentation (similar to I11), the extent to which the facts were described accurately or were distorted (similar to I14), and the overall text quality (I18).

In the fourth experiment, finally, four items were used which asked the participants to rate whether the text was comprehensible (similar to I9), whether it was convincing (I19), whether it was partial (similar to I8) and, if so, which side the text favored (I20).

3.2 Measurement of the articles' impacts

While the first of the experiments measured the texts' impact by reconstructing the mental models according to which the participants interpreted the depicted events after reading the articles, experiments No. 3 and 4 measured the impact of the articles on the participants' moral disengagement from the War on Terror. In addition to this, the 3rd experiment also asked them to rate their approval of employing concrete military measures in the respective conflicts.

3.2.1 Mental models

The participants' mental models of the reported events were inferred from their narratives by means of quantitative content analysis, and a two-step procedure was used which first coded the narratives according to a number of content analytical variables and then applied Latent Class Analysis in order to identify the mental models upon which the narratives were based (Annabring, Dittmann & Kempf, 2005; Kempf, 2005).

In order to do so, the depiction of the parties involved in the reported conflicts was coded with a total of 20 variables, the first set of which described whether the following features were attributed to the parties: confrontational (V1) and/or cooperative behavior (V2), insight into the price to be paid for a confrontational (V3) and/or for a cooperative conflict strategy (V4), insight into the gains to be

had from a confrontational (V5) and/or from a cooperative conflict strategy (V6), confrontational logic and readiness for confrontation (V7) and/or cooperative logic and readiness for cooperation (V8), questioning (V9) and/or approval of common goals and needs (V10), pursuit of egoistical goals (V11), demands for flexibility and/or (V12) unyieldingness (V13), questioning or violation (V14) and/or readiness for or support for democracy and human rights (V15). The second set of variables described whether the parties' behavior was approved of or (at least) evaluated in an unbiased way (V16) and/or whether it was condemned or criticized (V17), whether the narrative referred to victims on the side of the respective party (V18) and whether it dissociated from the party's political elites or society members (V19), and/or whether it identified with them (V20).

3.2.2 Approval of concrete military measures

Approval of concrete military measures was assessed using traditional scoring procedures (Cronbach-Alpha = 0.78) based on four items, asking the participants to rate their approval of air strikes on terrorist training camps, their approval of risking civilian deaths during "police action" against terrorist organizations, their approval of deadly air strikes on enemies and their approval of trying to destroy terrorist organizations (Al-Qaida, Aum sect) or to end human rights abuses (East Timor) using military measures.

3.2.3 Moral disengagement

Moral disengagement from the War on Terror was measured using the participants' score (Cronbach-Alpha = 0.83) on the eight items of the so-called *Terrorism Scale* (Eckstein Jackson & Sparr, 2005). Each of the items represents one of the eight moral disengagement mechanisms described by Bandura (1999), translated into the context of counter-terrorism: Euphemistic labeling of violence, moral justification of violence, dehumanization of the opponent, diffusion of responsibility, minimizing, ignoring, or misconstruing the consequences of violence, displacement of responsibility, extenuating comparisons and attribution of blame to the opponent.

4. Results

The results of the experiments are quite favorable to peace journalism, but show some limitations as well.

4.1 Acceptance of escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented coverage

1. De-escalation-oriented coverage is accepted by the audience *no less* than traditional reporting.

De-escalation-oriented articles were *never*, and with respect to all 16 items on the text assessment questionnaire, accepted to a lesser degree than the other text versions, neither in the first nor in the second experiment.

In the third experiment, where the escalation-/de-escalation-oriented framing was quite pronounced, the de-escalation-oriented texts were even clearly preferred ($F_{(1,84)} = 15.5$, $p < 0.001$; cf. Figure 1).




Figure 1: Third experiment: Effects of the various text versions and conflict scenarios on the acceptance of the texts

2. With respect to the perceived partiality/impartiality of the texts, explicit arguments rejecting the escalation-oriented bias of mainstream coverage may produce a boomerang effect, however.

The participants in the fourth experiment perceived the text version that warned against moral disengagement to be even more partial than the moral disengagement text that followed the mainstream ($\chi^2 = 22.31$, $df = 2$, $p < 0.001$; cf. Figure 2).




Figure 2: Fourth experiment:: Perceived partiality of the various texts versions

3. The regional press generally arouses less interest in further information and less specific responsiveness to escalation- or de-escalation-oriented coverage.

K1.3	Strong interest in further information, but some uncertainty regarding truthfulness and accuracy
K1.1	Relatively strong interest in further information
K1.2	Relatively strong interest in further information, but doubts regarding impartiality and truthfulness
K1.4	Lack of interest in further information
K1.6	Lack of interest in further information and rather negative evaluation

Table 6: First experiment: Evaluation patterns

In the first experiment, Latent Class Analysis of the text assessment questionnaire identified six typical evaluation patterns, five of which expressed different degrees of interest in further information and different degrees of confidence concerning whether the reported facts were depicted truthfully (cf. Table 6) The remaining pattern was characterized by missing data.




Figure 3: Frequency of the evaluation patterns in the first experiment as a function of the reported events. $\chi^2 = 5.74$, $df = 10$, $p < 0.001$.
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro




Figure 4: Frequency of the evaluation patterns in the first experiment as a function of the various text-versions. $\chi^2 = 26.87$, $df = 15$, $p < 0.05$.
e = escalation-oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation-oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation-oriented

In the second experiment, only five evaluation patterns could be identified, *two* of which were characterized by missing data. While the remaining three patterns once again expressed different degrees of interest in further information, they were characterized by a generally lower degree of aroused interest and a generally less positive evaluation of the articles than in the first experiment (cf. Table 7).

K6.1	Some interest in further information
K6.2	Little interest in further information
K6.3	No interest in further information

Table 7: Second experiment: Evaluation

While the evaluation patterns found in the first experiment indicated differentiated responses to reports about different events (cf. Figure 3), as well as differentiated responses to different text versions (cf. Figure 4), this was not the case in the second experiment, where the evaluation patterns were not correlated with the text versions (cf. Figure 6).




Figure 5: Frequency of the evaluation patterns in the second experiment as a function of the various text versions. $\chi^2 = 56.46$, $df = 8$, $p < 0.001$
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E4 = Kostunica's offer of dialogue




Figure 6: Frequency of the evaluation patterns in the second experiment as a function of the reported events. $\chi^2 = 16.18$, $df = 12$, n.s.
e = escalation-oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation-oriented;
r = escalation-oriented with reversed partiality

4. The audience of the provincial press is less interested in international politics and less responsive to its nuances.
Interest in further information was generally lower in the audience of the provincial paper, and the various text versions did not make a difference with respect to the acceptance of the articles. Even the escalation-oriented text versions with reversed partiality (r) were not accepted to a lesser degree than the other ones (cf. Figure 6).
5. Escalation-oriented coverage is *not* more suitable for arousing audience interest.
In the first experiment, which was based on the quality press and its audience, more strongly de-escalation-oriented versions of texts evoked the same amount of strong interest in further information (K1.3) as the escalation-oriented ones (cf. Figure 4).

6. At least in the quality press, de-escalation-oriented coverage has the same potential to arouse interest as escalation-oriented framing.

In the first experiment, lack of interest in further information (K1.4 + K 1.6) was found most frequently in reaction to the original articles and could be reduced to the same extent by the other text versions, regardless of their escalation- or de-escalation-oriented framing (cf. Figure 4).

Lack of interest in combination with a negative evaluation of the articles (K1.6) decreased linearly, the less escalation-oriented and the more de-escalation-oriented the articles were (cf. Figure 4).

7. De-escalation-oriented coverage has a better chance of achieving positive responses, however, if it does not interpret the situation within a too radically reversed framework.

In the first experiment, the most doubt about the impartiality and truthfulness of the articles (K1.3 + K1.2 + K1.6) was aroused by reports about violent conflicts in Southern Serbia which did not merge seamlessly with the old enemy images of the "poor Albanians" and the "evil Serbs", and the moderately de-escalation-oriented text versions aroused less doubt than the more strongly de-escalation-oriented ones (cf. Figure 4).²

8. Traditional news factors like "negative vs. positive" and "personal vs. structural" *do* have an impact on the responsiveness that a news article elicits in its audience.

In the first experiment, a *lack of interest* in further information (K1.4 + K1.6) was most frequently aroused by articles about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (positive/structural) and least frequently by articles about the conflict in Southern Serbia (negative/personal) (cf. Figure 3).

In the second experiment, the *lack of interest* in further information (K6.3) was strongest with regard to Kostunica's offer of dialogue (positive/personal) and weakest with regard to Milošević's extradition (negative/personal) (cf. Figure 5).

9. The impact of these news factors is not consistent, however.

In the first experiment, the articles about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (positive/structural) not only aroused the greatest *lack of interest* (K1.4 + K1.6), but also aroused the *strongest interest* (K1.3) in further information (cf. Figure 3).

10. In particular, the news factor of "simplification" does not have news value of its own, but on the contrary: more complex reporting can attract audience interest even for (structural) issues that are not so interesting per se.

In the first experiment, strong interest in further information (K1.3) was particularly aroused by the more strongly de-escalation-oriented text versions, which gave a more complex depiction of the reported conflicts (cf. Figure 4).

2 Nonetheless, the de-escalation-oriented framing of the latter ones was still moderate enough to not arouse more doubt than the original articles or the escalation-oriented ones.

4.2 Impact of escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented coverage

4.2.1 Mental models

In the first experiment, we also measured whether the framing of the reported events had an effect on the Ss' mental models of the conflict. The experimental Ss were asked to narrate the reported events in their own words. Then a content analysis of these narratives was made, and the mental models with which the Ss interpreted the events were inferred from their narratives.

We found that the framing of the events had a clear effect on Ss' mental models. The more de-escalation-oriented the article framing was, the more constructive were the mental models with which the participants interpreted the events.

Serbia/Yugoslavia

With respect to the perception of Serbia / Yugoslavia, six classes of narratives were identified which show that the escalation- vs. de-escalation-oriented framing of the news articles had a definite influence on the mental models with which the participants interpreted events (cf. Table 8).

K2.6	Unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions
K2.2	Continuation of old enemy images
K2.3	Appreciation of the new start in Serbia
K2.4	Criticism of the Serbian past
K2.1	Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia
K2.5	Refusal to acknowledge democratic change in Serbia

Table 8: First experiment, patterns of interpretation: Serbia/Yugoslavia

Two of these classes are typical of the narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1): Continuation of the old enemy image (K2.2), which informed 57.6% of these narratives, and an unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions (K2.6, 32.5%) (cf. Figure 7).

A continuation of the old enemy image (K2.2) was found most frequently among participants who read an escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was de-escalation-oriented, and its frequency decreased steadily the less escalation-oriented the article was.

An unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions (K2.6) was found most frequently among participants who read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation-oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation-oriented the article was (cf. Figure 8).




Figure 7: Class size as a function of the reported events. $\chi^2 = 571.200$, $df = 10$, $p < 0.001$

E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;

E2 = Extradition of Milošević;

E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro




Figure 8: Class size as a function of the various text versions. $\chi^2 = 73.800$, $df = 15$, $p < 0.001$

e = escalation-oriented; o = original article;

d1 = moderately de-escalation-oriented;

d2 = more strongly de-escalation-oriented

Two other classes are typical of the narratives about Milošević's extradition (E2): Appreciation of the new start in Serbia (K2.3), which informed 45.2% of the narratives, and Criticism of the Serbian past (K2.4, 40.2%) (cf. Figure 7).

Appreciation of the new start in Serbia (K2.3) was found most frequently among participants who read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation-oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation-oriented the article was.

Criticism of the Serbian past (K2.4) was found most frequently among participants who read an escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was de-escalation-oriented, and its frequency decreased steadily the less escalation-oriented the article was (cf. Figure 8).

The remaining two classes are typical of the narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3): Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia (K2.1), which informed 67.9% of these narratives, and refusal to acknowledge democratic change (K2.5, 26.1%) (cf. Figure 7).

Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia (K2.1) was found most frequently among participants who read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation-oriented, and its frequency increased the more de-escalation-oriented the article was.

Refusal to acknowledge democratic change (K2.5) was found most frequently among participants who read an escalation-oriented article (cf. Figure 8).

The international community

With respect to the perception of the international community, three classes of narratives could be identified (cf. Table 9)

K3.1	Cooperative behavior
K3.2	Confrontational behavior (including some criticism)
K3.3	Identification (including some justification of their behavior)

Table 9: First experiment, patterns of interpretation: The international community

The behavior of the international community was most frequently interpreted as cooperative (K3.1) in narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3) (82.4%) and least frequently interpreted as cooperative in narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) (58%) (cf. Figure 9).

This pattern was found most frequently among participants who read a strongly de-escalation-oriented article (d2: 80.6%); it was found least frequently when the article was escalation-oriented (cf. Figure 10).




Figure 9: Class size as a function of the reported events. $\chi^2 = 89.964$, $df = 4$, $p < 0.001$
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro




Figure 10: Class size as a function of the various text versions. $\chi^2 = 28.622$, $df = 6$, $p < 0.001$
e = escalation-oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation-oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation-oriented

The behavior of the international community was most frequently interpreted as confrontational (K3.2) in narratives about Milošević’s extradition (E2) (27.8%) and least frequently interpreted as confrontational in narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) (cf. Figure 9). This pattern was found most frequently among participants who read an escalation-oriented article (29.8%) (cf. Figure 10).

Identification with the international community (K3.3) was almost exclusively found in narratives about the conflict in southern Serbia (E1), where it was characteristic of 33.7% of the narratives (cf. Figure 9).

The conflict in Southern Serbia was the only violent conflict in our sample of events, and violence encourages an audience to identify with its own leadership. Consistent with this, the identification pattern was also found most frequently among participants who read the moderately de-escalation-oriented text version (d1) (cf. Figure 10), which – more than the other texts – discussed the possible risks of sending KFOR troops to Southern Serbia.

4.2.2 Approval of concrete military measures

In the third experiment, the impact of escalation vs. de-escalation-oriented framing and argumentation was measured via the degree to which participants approved of concrete military measures for fighting terrorism.

Irrespective of the conflict context, the different text versions had a significant effect on the participants' approval of military measures ($F_{(1,84)} = 3.94, p = 0.05$): Participants who read an escalation-oriented editorial approved of the use of military measures to a higher degree than those who read a de-escalation-oriented article (cf. Figure 11).




Figure 11: Third experiment: Approval of concrete military measures

4.2.3 Moral disengagement

An evaluation of the impact of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented editorials via the participants' moral disengagement from the War on Terror showed that the effect of the different texts used in the third experiment was even stronger ($F_{(1,84)} = 6.87, p = 0.01$). Reading escalation-oriented texts resulted in a higher

degree of moral disengagement than reading de-escalation-oriented ones (cf. Figure 12).




Figure 12: Third experiment: Degree of moral disengagement

Although the *Terrorism Scale* thus proved to be a sensitive instrument for the measurement of moral disengagement in the context of the War on Terror, a similar effect could not be found in the fourth experiment. Measuring the impact of the texts via differences between pre-test and post-test scores, the fourth experiment demonstrated a significant decrease in moral disengagement, regardless of which of the text versions the participants read (cf. Figure 13).




Figure 13: Fourth experiment: Degree of moral disengagement
Moral disengagement text: $t = 2.8$, $df = 40$, $p = 0.01$. Neutral text: $t = 4.2$, $df = 45$, $p < 0.001$.
Contra-moral-disengagement text: $t = 4.7$, $df = 44$, $p < 0.001$

Although the decrease in moral disengagement was smallest in the group of participants who read the moral disengagement text (cf. Figure 14), the group differences were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 0.22$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.90$).




Figure 14: Fourth experiment: Decrease in moral disengagement

It is clear that the balanced, comprehensive background information on the Russian-Chechen conflict included in all three text versions had the impact of reducing the participants' degree of moral disengagement. Including elements of moral disengagement in the presentation of information may reduce this impact, but in our case the effect was not strong enough to reduce it to a significant degree.

Insofar, the results of the fourth experiment also resemble those found in a study by Kempf (2008) in which neutral texts about the approval of the Road Map by the Israeli Knesset influenced German students to interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as less religious in essence, an independent Palestinian state as less threatening to Israel, and accordingly the conflict as less intractable overall.

5. Discussion

Summarizing our results, we may conclude that they are consistent with findings by Wolling (2002), according to which the quality of information is a crucial factor in the evaluation of news reports.

De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage is *no less* acceptable to audiences than traditional reporting. *Nor* is escalation-oriented coverage more suitable for the purpose of arousing interest, and (at least in the quality press) de-escalation-oriented coverage has the same potential to do so.

The capability of the media to attract attention with quality seems to be restricted

by the text genre and the media format, however, and the political knowledge of the audience may have an impact as well. Particularly, the format of the regional press seems to be too narrow and its audience too little interested in and informed about international politics to make it an effective forum for constructive conflict coverage.

As Eilders (1997) has found, the more political knowledge readers have, the less they will be influenced by traditional news factors. The better informed they are, the more they will have their own ideas about which aspects of an issue are relevant to them.

In accordance with audience surveys which found that the readership of daily newspapers would like to read the sort of political news coverage which gives more background information, is more critical and less influenced by established institutions (Weber, 2003), it is particularly the escalation-prone news factors of simplification, negativism and personalization that seem to lose their impact when the text genre and the media format offer enough space for more complexity, more balanced reporting and the coverage of structural issues.

Although news factors *do* have an impact on the responsiveness that a news article elicits in its audience, the impact of news factors is not uniform. In particular, the news factor of simplification does not have news value of its own, but to the contrary: more complex reporting can attract the interest of an audience even to (structural) issues that are not very exciting per se.

Nonetheless, constructive conflict coverage has some limitations: Explicit arguments rejecting the escalation-oriented bias of mainstream coverage may produce a boomerang effect, making articles seem partial, and de-escalation-oriented coverage has a better chance of evoking a positive response if it does not interpret the situation within a too radically reversed framework. Caution is essential, and it can be assumed that it is even more essential the more extensive the mainstream coverage has been and the more the respective (escalation-oriented) mental models are set in audience members' minds.

While the experiments demonstrated a significant impact of escalation-oriented news frames which biased the participants' mental models towards antagonism (first experiment), strengthened their approval of the use of military measures (third experiment) and encouraged moral disengagement (third experiment), it can be assumed that the opposite effect of constructive conflict coverage which was observed in the experiments was not due solely to de-escalation-oriented framing and/or to arguments in favor of peaceful conflict resolution.

As the results of the fourth experiment seem to indicate, the avoidance of simplification in favor of presenting sufficiently detailed and balanced information about a conflict context is a powerful method to counteract mental models which divide the world into "good" and "evil" and to immunize audiences against moral disengagement – even when the presentation of information is not completely unbiased.

Peace journalism and the news production process¹

Burkhard Bläsi

1. Introduction

In recent years various models of "peace journalism" or "constructive conflict coverage" have been proposed (Bilke, 2002; Galtung, 2002; Kempf, 1996, 2003). These models suggest alternative ways of conflict reporting that can contribute to processes of de-escalation, peace building and reconciliation instead of escalating, exaggerating or ignoring conflicts. They are rooted in the theoretical assumptions of different disciplines: conflict and communication research, sociology and social psychology. At the same time, some practitioners of journalism have been developing guidelines or even detailed manuals for "peace journalists" (e.g. Cornelius, 2001; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000).

However, neither theoretical models nor practical manuals can fulfill their potential to bring about change if they do not take into account the reality of today's media, on the one hand, and if they focus only on the skills of the individual journalist, on the other hand. Therefore, it is very important to also pay attention to the news production process, to the conditions under which journalists actually work in times of conflict and war and to factors that impact on the process of producing conflict coverage. Studying the factors that influence news coverage means nothing less than learning about the actual preconditions for any attempt at constructive conflict coverage.

While there is a considerable amount of research available on factors that influence coverage in general (e.g. Staab, 1990; Ronneberger, 1988; Weischenberg et al., 1994), things are quite different when it comes to how conflict coverage is actually produced. Moreover, it is mostly the particular factors of the news production process that are studied in detail (e.g. the news selection process and the concept of news value), while there is a lack of more comprehensive theory building.

This paper tries to fill this gap by presenting an empirically-based model of factors that influence conflict coverage production. In addition, it will show how this model

1 Editor's note: For further results and a more detailed account of this study see: Burkhard Bläsi (2006). *Keine Zeit, kein Geld, kein Interesse ...? Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Anspruch und medialer Wirklichkeit*. Berlin: regener.

could improve efforts to implement peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage.

2. Method

This study was carried out within the methodological framework of grounded theory, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Briefly, grounded theory is "an inductive theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data" (Martin & Turner, 1986, 141). In contrast to much other research, grounded theory is not about testing previously formulated hypotheses, but about discovering the theory implicit in the data. The main characteristic of grounded theory is the constant comparison of data with other data and of data with the emerging theory. The process of constant comparison involves the construction of codes, categories and subcategories and the exploration of their dimensions and of the relations among categories. Step by step it leads to the development of a theory that illuminates the subject of research. For the analysis of data, specific techniques are recommended (cf. Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that were also applied in this study.

The study is based on an analysis of thirty qualitative expert interviews with German journalists who were actively engaged in producing conflict coverage. The subjects worked as foreign editors at home (i.e. in Germany), as regular correspondents on site, or as freelance journalists. The journalists interviewed worked with both print and electronic media. Their expertise in the subject under study originated in the coverage of conflicts and wars in different parts of the world, including the Gulf war (1991), the Balkans, Chechnya, Rwanda, Liberia, Indonesia, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq (2003).

Working with grounded theory implies a continuing interplay between data collection and analysis. Thus, also in this study the analysis of previously collected data guided the choice of the interviewees, in an effort to obtain the information still needed to "saturate" the theory.

3. Conflict coverage: A model of influencing factors

The following section presents a model of factors that influence conflict coverage production. The model is grounded in the interview data, but also meshes with previous research on individual aspects of the news production process.

With this model we suggest that there are six main factors that influence conflict coverage production: structural aspects of the media, the situation on site, the personal characteristics of individual journalists, the political climate, lobbies, and the media audience.

3.1 Structure

The first factor combines a variety of structural aspects. These include legal parameters; type of media (print media or electronic media, daily paper or weekly magazine, etc.); existing formats and spaces within the specific medium; editorial strategies and procedures; publishers' strategies and expectations and their impact on editors; the criteria of news selection in general; and the overall issue of the media economy. The latter is in turn associated with current developments in the media, such as the merger of media companies and the tendency of media to become faster, more commercial, more entertaining, more dramatized and more internationally interconnected (Löffelholz, 1995). All these aspects exert an obvious influence on conflict coverage production. A journalist employed by a TV station must submit pictures, and if he has no pictures, there will be no coverage (or old and often meaningless pictures will have to be used instead); if space is limited, it will be impossible to include much background in a story; if the editorial strategy is "always be the first to get the story – anything else comes second", then there probably won't be much stress on thorough investigation; if publishers – to use a contrasting example – have a special interest in "ethical journalism", then probably more attention will be paid to the fair treatment of the subjects reported on and to the possible side-effects of coverage. The fact that media products have to hold their own in markets means that they must at least attract a reasonable number of readers or viewers and that in the end every story must sell.

Finally, the process of news selection is very much determined by the news value that journalists attach to certain events, and research has shown that there are some general news factors that guide journalists' selection of events, e.g. proximity, surprise value, personalization, reference to elite-nations and elite-persons, negativity, etc. (Allan, 1999). While one might still disagree on the extent to which these news factors are natural and invariable, many journalists regard them as practically the "ground rules" of journalism, inherent in the structure of their profession. Thus, they also have great relevance for conflict coverage production.

3.2 Situation on-site

This factor encompasses all the conditions that correspondents or reporters are exposed to in a specific conflict area. It begins with the geography of the conflict area, which sometimes determines whether there will be any coverage at all. At the beginning of the Afghanistan war, for instance, many journalists waited for days just to get a helicopter to fly over the mountains to the locations that interested them. As one can see from this example, whether geography is a problem or not often depends on a country's infrastructure, e.g. the availability of air links, suitable roads, etc. Also of importance is the question of logistics and equipment. TV correspondents in particular strongly need the technical possibility to transmit their material, but print journalists must also be able to communicate with their editors at home at any given time (something that has become much easier through the invention of sat-phones).

A major issue on site is the security situation. Armed conflicts are by their very nature unsafe for journalists. At the latest the recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that journalists are no longer always treated as "neutral observers" (as they occasionally have the misfortune of coming under direct fire), but can also become strategic targets for conflict parties. Hence it may be that there will be no coverage of an event or of a certain conflict party simply because it is too dangerous for a reporter to be present.

This leads to the next aspect, the accessibility of places and sources. Accessibility may be impossible for security reasons, but conflict parties may also explicitly refuse to allow access. Informants may not be available for the same reasons, but also because local people may fear personal disadvantages if they talk to journalists, because they don't trust foreign reporters, for cultural reasons (e.g. in cultures where women are not allowed to speak in public), etc. Even if there are sources, journalists still face the question of whether they are credible and whether it is possible to check statements against other sources. Again, the consequences for conflict coverage are obvious: no access to conflict locations and credible sources means coverage without direct observation and own investigation, thus "second-hand journalism" and not uncommonly coverage based on uncertain and dubious information.

As mentioned above, the restrictions imposed by conflict parties can consist in denied or limited access to information sources, but can also include more or less rigid censorship, the threat of expulsion, or other harsh consequences in the case of "uncooperativeness".

Sometimes it is the conflict constellation itself that has effects on coverage: the more complex a conflict is (in terms of history, culture, number of conflict parties, issues at stake, etc.), the more difficult it can be for journalists to understand the real causes of the conflict, the real interests of the conflict parties, and to distinguish promising from unpromising approaches to conflict resolution.

3.3 Person

Almost self-evident is the journalist's influence. The way he or she reports is affected by personal and professional values, beliefs and motives, socialization as a journalist, professional self-image (e.g. the journalist as pure observer vs. the journalist as actively involved party), as well as knowledge and personal experience in the field.

More specifically, for conflict coverage we can identify three kinds of necessary competencies:

1. *Journalistic competence* is what any good journalist should have: the knowledge and skills needed to investigate an issue thoroughly, the ability to structure a report, to write an interesting text, to fit personal coverage into the given formats and spaces, to produce suitable reports despite the unavoidable time pres-

sure, and so on.

2. *General conflict competence* means, on the one hand, the theoretical knowledge a journalist has about conflicts: types of conflicts, conflict dynamics, typical conflict processes and their outcomes (escalation vs. de-escalation), methods and techniques of conflict resolution. On the other hand, it denotes practical knowledge of how to behave as a journalist in a conflict area. This includes knowledge of necessary security precautions, the ability to weigh the risks and opportunities of a situation, to investigate under difficult conditions and to respond to concerted attempts at influencing coverage by the conflict parties.
3. *Specific conflict competence* is the knowledge a journalist has about the concrete conflict and the conflict parties. This includes knowledge of a region's history, culture, religion, language, society, political system, economic system, actors and their interests and motives.

The quality of coverage depends to a great extent on the markedness of these competencies. Typically, the markedness of each competence differs depending on the type of journalist. Specific conflict competence is usually high among long-term correspondents who know "their" country very well, whilst general conflict competence can still be low. The typical war reporter, however, normally has a high level of general conflict competence (at least in terms of practical, if not necessarily of theoretical knowledge). For instance, he is usually experienced in coping with dangerous situations and in moving around in a war zone without being wounded, killed or kidnapped. On the other hand, his specific conflict competence can be rather low, because he often "jumps into" a conflict in periods of high violence without much background information and leaves the area when the violence subsides.

Needless to say that the best coverage could be expected from a journalist who combines a high level of journalistic competence, general conflict competence and specific conflict competence.

3.4 Political climate

Each country has a certain political and societal climate regarding a conflict in another country. The political climate is characterized by the kind of public attention the conflict receives, by the amount of political activity elicited, the amount of coverage given, the diversity of opinions, the degree of polarization and also the potential sanctions imposed on dissenters.

The political climate depends strongly on the degree of involvement of the country in terms of current policies, current interests, economic, historic and cultural relationships, etc.

For editors and particularly for the individual journalist, the political climate can exert great influence on the prospects of coverage. If, for instance, there is a strong mainstream view shared by both the political elite and the media (as in the

USA during the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq), a journalist who takes a different stance may face a quite difficult challenge. If he persists in expressing unpopular views, he runs the risk of being denounced by his colleagues or even of losing his job (Kondopoulou, 2002; Neuber, 2002; see section 4 below). On the other hand, if the political climate is characterized by only modest political and media interest, it normally has no special influence on the content of journalistic reporting. The major problem then consists rather in managing to get the conflict into the news at all.

In section four of this paper this factor will be elaborated in more detail.

3.5 Lobbies

Conflict coverage is mainly not about abstract issues, but rather usually deals with the concrete actions of people, statesmen, parties, organizations, etc. Therefore those who are the subjects of coverage normally have a vital interest in being covered in a positive way. At least this applies to conflict parties that want the support or approval of the public or at least of segments of the public. This is usually the case in democracies, but also dictators and even terrorist networks like Al Qaeda try to convince at least a small segment of the public that their cause is just, as can be seen from the frequency with which new Bin Laden videos keep turning up.

The desire to be covered positively motivates attempts to influence conflict coverage and to use the media for own purposes, hence to publicize one's own opinions and own interpretations of a situation.

In international conflicts, the main lobbying groups are typically policy makers and the military, but other groups, like business associations, NGOs (especially peace and aid organizations), churches, trade unions, etc., also try to influence public opinion.

Lobbying comes in quite varied forms: it may consist merely in the provision of new or alternative information, but it can also mean a sophisticated system of information management which leaves no doubt as to who will receive what information at what time, who will be given access to relevant locations and persons, what information will be withheld, which pictures will be shown and which not, how one's own actions and those of the enemy are to be interpreted, and also when deliberately misleading or inaccurate reports will be promulgated (cf. Luostarinen & Ottosen, 2002).

Examples of professional information management are the press conferences held by NATO spokesman Jamie Shea during the Kosovo war or the briefings given by the US central command in Qatar during the war against Iraq. In contrast, misinformation attempts by Iraqi information minister Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf were utterly amateurish and transparent to any journalist – and thus became notorious only due to their absurdity.

3.6 Audiences

Media products must be successful in the marketplace, for otherwise they will disappear sooner or later. As with any other products, their success depends on the laws of supply and demand. Demand is dependent on the interests, knowledge, habits and expectations of the audience. If we consider how much money the media spend on consumer research just to identify their readers or viewers and what they are or are not interested in, it is clear that audience interests have a considerable impact on media coverage.

The audience probably has no direct effect on the opinions of journalists regarding a given political issue. It rather affects their choice of topics, decisions about which issues are to be covered to what extent and which are to be covered at all, and choices in regard to the layout and presentation of reports.

In Figure 1 the six main factors influencing conflict coverage production are depicted in a single scheme.




Figure 1: Factors influencing the production of conflict coverage

3.7 Some explanatory remarks

The model of influencing factors outlined above is of course simplified. The relations among influencing factors are much more complex than indicated here. In fact, many factors interact and mutually influence each other to different degrees, e.g. one factor's influence can depend on the markedness of another factor.

For example, it is obvious from the perspective of supply and demand that the relation between audience expectations and interests and editorial strategy is not a one-way street. On the one hand, audience interest does influence media coverage, as noted above. On the other hand, audience interests and expectations are also influenced and shaped by the media through previous coverage, by both the content and style of coverage. So, for example, if there is never any coverage of the situation in Guinea-Bissau, then it should hardly be a surprise that the public will not be very interested in this country, since they know absolutely nothing about it. If by chance an article about the country should appear, readers will have no basis for relating to this topic, and thus it is likely that the article will receive little attention. So if consumer research then reveals that readers are not interested in Guinea-Bissau, but prefer to read about President Bush's next election campaign or some other current topic, then this clearly is (not only, but) also a result of previous media coverage.

In order to clarify the way factors interact, we can examine the factors "situation on site" and "person". An experienced journalist with high general conflict competence might still find ways to obtain the information he wants in spite of restrictions imposed by conflict parties. A correspondent with high specific conflict competence should be more likely to comprehend the complexity of a conflict and should not be as vulnerable to the information management tactics of the conflict parties. An inexperienced journalist working for the first time in a conflict area, to the contrary, might find it much harder to cope with difficulties on site, or might not even be aware of the potential hazards.

Some aspects of the news production process may not be clearly attributable to only one influencing factor. For instance, in our model "lobbies" are classified as an additional influencing factor, though certainly lobbying strategies like information management are part of the situation on site as well, and as lobbies also try to exert influence on editors and publishers, the process is also related to the factor of "structure".

3.8 Advantages of the model

Despite these simplifications and shortcomings, the model can help us to understand the complex factors that influence the conflict coverage process. An understanding of the complexity and intermeshing of different factors is crucial when one tries to change the end-product of the news production process: the actual conflict coverage.

So far there have been different proposals for achieving more peace-oriented, more constructive conflict coverage. Using our model, these proposals can be systematized in terms of the factors focused on.

A growing number of researchers and also practitioners have started to offer training for journalists who cover conflict and war. In one type of training program, journalists are taught how to report in a more constructive and peace-oriented way (e.g. online courses in peace journalism offered by the Transcend Peace University). There are also other kinds of training where journalists explicitly learn how to deal with the security situation and how to protect themselves in dangerous war zones. Training programs that do not usually aim at more constructive coverage are mostly offered by the military (e.g. by the German Armed Forces, which conduct one-week training programs on a regular basis) or, especially in the USA, by private companies, often run by former military personnel. Nevertheless, they may also be able to provide essential skills to "peace journalists", who have the same security problems as other journalists covering war zones. Accordingly, there are also an increasing number of handbooks available on both constructive conflict reporting (e.g. McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000) and the security issue (e.g. CPJ, 2003). All these different kinds of training programs and handbooks can be seen as efforts to enhance journalists' competencies in conflict coverage; thus, they attempt to change the "person" factor.

Others suggest that we should primarily concentrate on the structural aspects of media production. This manifests itself in calls for more independent media corporations and preventing the growth of large media conglomerates. One can also focus on the structure of the news itself, e.g. on the fact that peace events normally seem to have no news value and thus are seldom given extensive coverage. Thus, the strategy proposed here is to find ways of adding news value to peace events (Shinar, 2004, in this volume).

Krotz (2001) maintains that the media should achieve the same standards of communication technology as the military. He recommends that media corporations from different countries should join forces in operating their own communications satellite so that the media will have an independent source of information and not have to rely so heavily on information provided by conflict parties. Hence, this would mean a change in media structure (improved technology and international cooperation) to change the power balance on site.

Ottosen (2003) holds that the prerequisite for changing conflict coverage is a social movement within audiences. Only when the public demands alternative conflict coverage, only when there is a real market for something like peace journalism, will it be possible to achieve constructive conflict coverage. The assumption is that if the market were there, everything else – such as journalistic guidelines and strategies, interest in specific competencies, changes in media structures – would follow.

This brief survey shows that to date almost all proposals concentrate on the change of only one influencing factor. There is no comprehensive strategy that addresses

all or at least most of the factors involved in the process of producing conflict coverage.

This is unfortunate, because it can be assumed that no one factor is the key to a more peace-oriented journalism, but that real and lasting change can only come about if all factors are tackled. This is not to say that current attempts are futile. It is certainly a sign of progress when increasing numbers of journalists begin to supplement their knowledge of conflict dynamics and learn strategies of constructive conflict coverage. However, one should not be surprised if the overall effects on conflict coverage remain limited due to the influence of other factors.

4. Political climate

4.1 Climatic zones and climatic conditions

In this section the factor of "political climate" is further elaborated.

For a given country, the political climate surrounding a conflict in another country depends strongly on its type of involvement. On a scale of possible kinds of involvement, six types of conflict can be identified that constitute six different "climatic zones". Possible types of involvement range from the direct involvement of one's country (climatic zone I) to no direct involvement of one's country or allies and no other reasons for interest (climatic zone VI). From the German perspective, examples for "climatic zone I" are the Kosovo and Afghanistan conflicts, for "climatic zone VI" most conflicts in African countries can be used.

Climatic Zone	Defined by	Examples (German perspective)
I	Direct involvement of own country	Kosovo, Afghanistan
II	Direct involvement of allies and support of own political leaders	Gulf War
III	Direct involvement of allies but disapproval of own political leaders	Iraq
IV	Direct involvement of allies, no clear-cut support or disapproval of own political leaders	Israel/Palestine
V	No direct involvement of own country or allies, but other reasons for interest	India/Pakistan, Rwanda, East Timor
VI	No direct involvement of own country or allies, no other reasons for interest	Sierra Leone, most African countries

Table 1: Climatic zones: Defining features and examples

The six climatic zones are distinguished by different "climatic conditions". Among other things, these climatic conditions can be characterized by the amount of political activity, the amount of coverage, the kind of political discourse and the po-

tential negative consequences for dissenters. Comparing climatic zones I and VI, for instance, the amount of political activity is enormous vs. modest; the amount of coverage is enormous vs. practically non-existent; political discourse is highly emotional and highly polarized and often escalation-oriented vs. no real discourse at all; potential negative consequences for dissenters are severe vs. non-existent. In Table 2 the characteristic features of all six climatic zones are summarized.

Climatic Conditions				
Climatic Zone	Amount of political activity	Amount of coverage	Political discourse	Potential negative consequences for dissenters
I	Enormous	Enormous	Highly emotional highly polarized tendency for strong mainstream tendency for escalation-orientation	Severe
II	Enormous	Enormous	Highly emotional highly polarized tendency for escalation-orientation	Marked
III	Large	Enormous	Emotional, polarized	Modest
IV	Large	Large to enormous	Emotional, polarized, but higher chances to find balanced views	Modest
V	Modest	Can be large for a short time span, but normally modest	Matter-of-fact/rational or emotional, but usually not polarized	—
VI	Modest	Practically non-existent	No real discourse at all	—

Table 2: Climatic zones: Climatic conditions

It must be emphasized that the attributes listed in the table should be seen as general tendencies rather than as exact definitions. Furthermore, other variables that impact on climatic conditions are not mentioned in the table. For instance, the duration of a conflict and the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain political events, often connected to political success or failure, can change the climatic conditions of coverage to a considerable extent. (A prominent example of change in climatic conditions over time is the war in Vietnam). Last but not least, this model of climatic zones and climatic conditions is primarily based on the experiences and opinions of the journalists interviewed in the course of this study and on own theoretical consideration. Hence, it is a model that will have to be tested in the future. However, it is also based on and supported by other research findings.

The assumption of a strong mainstream within the media that supports the actions of the political and military elites in the case of the direct conflict involvement of one's own country is consistent with Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model (1988). Their approach in a general sense suggests that the media inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agendas of the privileged groups that dominate their domestic society and state. Furthermore, the existence of such a mainstream is consistent with the finding that even among newspapers with distinctly different political orientations there is a considerable degree of consonance when it comes to issues of external relations (Eilders, 2001). According to Kempf (cf. chapter 2), mainstream reporting and escalation-orientation are at least partly influenced by the fact that journalists are themselves members of their society and thus vulnerable to the same psychological processes that occur whenever a conflict is conceptualized as a competitive rather than a cooperative process. These psychological processes include social commitment to antagonism, to portraying conflict as a zero-sum game pitting good against evil, or to denouncing attempts at third-party mediation or the search for compromises (Kempf, 1996; Deutsch, 1973). Comparative studies of how the Gulf War and Bosnian conflict were covered in the American and European media support the hypothesis of a connection between a country's degree of involvement and the degree of polarization and escalation-orientation of media coverage: "the more a society is involved in a conflict itself and the closer it is to the conflict region (in historical, political, economic or ideological terms) ..., the more escalation-oriented will be its media coverage of the conflict" (Kempf, 1998a, 7).

Even if we accept that there are very diverse "climatic zones" of coverage depending on a country's degree of involvement, we can still ask about the extent to which political climate exerts an influence on the individual journalist's activities. In climatic zones VI and V there is usually either no polarized discourse or no discourse at all. Thus, journalists who report on a conflict under such "climatic conditions" are to the greatest possible extent free in the choice of the issues they cover, in their assessment of the situation and in the stance they take with regard to the conflict parties. They are usually in the agreeable situation of being among the few experts on the given conflict and thus normally need not fear any challenge from their colleagues. And even if they make controversial reports and their coverage provokes disagreement, it mostly remains limited to expert discourse and goes unnoticed by the general public – because the public and also mainstream journalists know too little about the conflict or are simply not very interested. Accordingly, journalists who cover neglected conflicts do not have to worry about any negative consequences, no matter what they actually report (as long as they meet normal journalistic standards).

Things are already different for climatic zones IV, III and II, and even more so for zone I.

The higher the degree of conflict involvement of their own country, the more severe will be the potential negative consequences for dissenters. This again is due to the climatic conditions of the conflict. The greater the mainstream coverage and

the more polarized the discourse, the more likely it is that dissenters from the mainstream view will be sanctioned in one way or another.

This may seem like a description of a totalitarian society. Actually it is also the case in democratic societies. Certainly there are important differences. Dissenters in totalitarian societies often risk their lives and welfare, no matter whether they succeed in reaching a public audience. In democratic societies, to the contrary, dissenting opinions normally are not completely suppressed from the start. Usually non-mainstream opinions are also published or broadcast in some form, even if the country is at war. However, they are often framed in a way that makes them appear irrelevant, absurd, incompetent, idealistic, or naïve (something that continually happens to the positions of the peace movement). Even if it is impossible to dismiss dissenting opinions in this way, it is still possible to sanction the individual journalist. Such sanctions are effective in two ways. Dissenters will think twice before they publicize their dissent again, and other potential dissenters will be deterred.

Democratic societies do not automatically impose sanctions in every case of dissent. Whether or not a journalist is sanctioned depends not only on the climatic conditions of the conflict, but also on his employer and on the degree and persistence of his dissent. For example, Ulrich Wickert, one of the most prominent journalists on German TV, quickly retracted his comparison of the mindsets of George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden after he was harshly criticized and after a leading politician even called for his dismissal. It was only due to his public apology that there were no further consequences.

Moreover, we can assume that there are also a considerable number of undetected cases of sanctioned dissent that never become known to the public. This supposition seems reasonable, because even the victims of sanctions are not necessarily interested in drawing public attention to their cases. After all, they want to continue to work as journalists and are usually dependent on their present employer.

The motives behind sanctioning mechanisms can be diverse. One can again argue like Herman and Chomsky that the mainstream media serve dominant societal groups by furthering their agendas and therefore will attack anyone who questions this agenda or even their dominance itself. (We can assume that the vast majority of journalists would indignantly reject this thesis – though this does not by any means disprove it). In some cases journalists may even welcome an opportunity to vent their ill feelings toward a highly unpopular colleague. Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly in most cases, the social psychological processes referred to above can also account for the sanctioning of dissenters when war is on the domestic agenda. A process of creating social commitment to victory over the enemy is typical when group conflicts are constructed as competitive processes; this in turn encourages the condemnation of actors on one's side who question their country's position and propose alternative forms of conflict resolution. Often they are denounced as disloyal. Journalists, as they are also members of the domestic society that is at war, can easily become part of these processes if they are not

aware of them. Thus, journalists do not have to consciously decide to join in punishing dissenters, they may simply be swept along by group processes within the journalistic community and also by general societal processes.

4.2 Examples of negative consequences for dissenters

To illustrate the different kinds of negative consequences that dissenters may face, in the following section some typical examples are presented from the interviews conducted in this study.

The following quotations refer to the aftermath of 9/11. The mainstream German media supported the war against Afghanistan and backed the position of the German government. Moreover, in the weeks immediately after 9/11 practically any criticism of US policy was dismissed as "anti-American" in Germany. As the examples will show, in such a climate negative consequences for dissenters are highly probable, but they will differ in their severity.

Quotations 1 to 3 stem from a prominent German journalist who made himself vulnerable through his outspoken disapproval of the 2001 war against Afghanistan.

One consequence can be personal downgrading by other members of the journalistic community. In this case colleagues stop responding to the dissenter's arguments and instead attack him personally, e.g. by making him into an object of ridicule:

"For example, R.M. wrote that given my commitment to Afghanistan I would howl if so much as a fire-cracker exploded at my feet."

Yet, this still seems fairly harmless, and no doubt anyone who takes a controversial stance in such a debate must be able to tolerate such remarks. Particularly if one takes into account that denouncing antiwar activists as weak, cowardly or disloyal is one of the traditional tactics of war enthusiasts.

However, if the media mainstream is aroused, it may even start outright campaigns against dissenters:

"The next thing was that the Springer Group,² with all its possibilities for mobilization, classified me as anti-American. The interesting thing was that for this purpose they had to falsify quotations, they had to take quotations out of context; they first had to make hateful what they claimed to hate. If they had printed what I had really said, then everybody would have thought, okay, actually that seems to make sense. But my experience was that in this situation no one is interested in letting the other side say what it really thinks."

Especially if – as in our case – the dissenter is well known, and if his arguments usually reach a large audience, he seems to face a higher risk of becoming the victim of a defamatory campaign. There are at least two good reasons for this: firstly, in such cases it is more advantageous for other media to attack a prominent

2 The conservative Springer Publishing Group is one of the biggest German media enterprises.

colleague, both in terms of general public attention, thus of circulation and viewing figures, and in terms of discrediting the whole anti-war movement by deconstructing a prominent supporter. Secondly, it is often the only real sanction that can be imposed on prominent journalists, because their reputation normally protects them from other (probably more common) sanctions like disciplinary measures or dismissal.

Another possibility is the sheer suppression of dissenters' opinions. For the dissenter himself this may not be as unpleasant as a defamatory campaign against him, but with regard to basic democratic principles like freedom of press and freedom of speech, it can be even worse:

"The Biolek Show³ was interesting, at first, because initially I was supposed to answer entirely different questions. Before appearing on this program, they normally tell you in advance what you will be asked about. This time I was very surprised that on the show I was asked only one of the many questions I had received in advance. All the other questions were new ground. And then suddenly I was obviously the intellectual being exploited by the anti-American intellectual culture. The next thing was that typically enough I was the last one to speak, and moreover that my speaking time was cut short. ... And the next consequence was that when the show was rebroadcast, four minutes of my statement were deleted. Which had never happened before."

If a dissenter is not prominent, suppressing his opinions can endanger his very livelihood. The quotation below comes from a freelancer who filmed a documentary about a German teacher who was transferred for disciplinary reasons because he had harshly denounced American foreign policy at a student rally after 9/11. In the end, the journalist also had a similar experience with the channel he formerly worked for:

"There were several attempts to submit the film, and on every occasion new objections were raised. Objections in general are nothing unusual; you can't just assume that the editor will immediately accept everything as it is. What was unusual was that any changes I made at the editor's request always led to new demands for changes. And at a certain point it finally became clear that what it was no longer a question of changes, but about making the whole production impossible. In the end it went so far that some parts of the script – that we had initially agreed on – were completely eliminated."

As this journalist was unwilling to cut his film in a way that would have altered its overall message, the film was never shown on TV. Moreover, the affair had a considerable negative long-term effect:

"I was already preparing the next production, and before the contract was concluded, the editor in charge told me that it wouldn't come to anything. Later I learned that there was an order that productions with this writer – no matter what they were about – should not be broadcast on this channel anymore ... That was the bitter consequence of this film. And since then I have never worked for this channel again."

3 This was a popular talk show on German TV hosted by well-known TV personality Alfred Biolek.

4.3 Consequences for the implementation of peace journalism

Considering these experiences and our model of "climatic zones" with specific "climatic conditions", what can be learned with regard to the practice of peace journalism?

First, we can assume that the realization of peace journalism should be easier in conflicts where neither one's own country nor its closest allies are involved. In this case, the chances look better for balanced, all-sided, truth-oriented, win-win oriented coverage.

In contrast, if one's own country is involved, and possibly also if close allies are involved, then peace journalism will be more difficult. This is due to the generally more polarized and emotionalized political climate and to the severe negative consequences (personally and/or professionally) that dissenters can face.

These difficulties should not be underestimated. However, in spite of, or rather exactly because of these obstacles, we should give thought to strategies that support peace journalism. Some possible strategies for tackling the problems that go with bad climatic conditions are the following:

- Encourage journalists to be dissenters (something that can also be learned in training courses, e.g. in the form of realistic role playing)
- Enhance journalists' sensitivity to processes of group dynamics and the resulting cognitive distortions – between correspondents, within the media, within a society (e.g. a basic understanding of social psychology)
- Support independent media structures instead of the conglomeration of media corporations
- Publicize cases of sanctioned dissent; discuss the real state of freedom of the press

These are only a few suggestions, and some of them may even be controversial. For instance, journalists may not be interested in becoming publicly known as "dissenters", precisely because of the potentially negative personal consequences. Hence, attempts to publicize cases of sanctioned dissent may be necessary in order to start a public debate about this issue, but at the same time this can be disadvantageous for the affected journalists.

Thus, further consideration and research are needed in order to develop a comprehensive strategy to handle different climatic conditions in a constructive way.

5. Conclusions

Anyone interested in furthering peace journalism should be well aware of the factors that influence the news production process. The six main factors identified in this study are structural aspects of the media, the situation on site, the individual journalist, the political climate, lobbies, and the audience. Only if these factors are

taken into consideration can effective strategies be developed for furthering peace journalism.

Any factor that influences conflict coverage also has aspects that can impede the realization of peace journalism. What follows from the diversity of influencing (and impeding) factors is that researchers and practitioners also have to think of more specific strategies to overcome these obstacles. Developing guidelines for constructive conflict coverage, enhancing reporters' conflict competencies, and teaching young journalists how to report in a peace-oriented way are certainly a good start. However, now we are at a point where general models and strategies need to be specified in more concrete terms. Theoretical models of peace journalism should be operationalized and adapted to the complexities of media reality. Otherwise they are likely to inspire at most a few idealistic reporters, but not the critical number of journalists needed to bring about major changes in the production of conflict coverage.

Thus, there is a need for more specific suggestions for the implementation of peace journalism. How can peace journalism be realized under a variety of political, historical, cultural, and geographical conditions? How can it be implemented within the different structures, procedures and "cultures" of media corporations? How can we overcome the obstacles that arise in journalists' daily activities and vary from conflict to conflict?

These questions are still to be answered. The model of influencing factors affecting conflict coverage presented here could be a starting point for exploring the respective aspects in more detail, as was indicated with regard to political climate.

Part III

Perspectives

Compatibility of peace and news media

Susanne Jaeger

Media coverage of conflict and war rarely depicts the entire complexity of the on-going events. Instead of focusing on achieving peace by peaceful means, it tends to adopt military thinking and the polarities that are omnipresent in the conflict arena. What would a journalism be like that devoted itself to constructive conflict transformation and de-escalation rather than to heating up conflicts even more? Which social psychological theories and basic research would be of use for such a journalism? Some social psychological concepts are presented below that may increase the possibility that the mass media can contribute to peace and the de-escalation of conflicts. At present, there are fewer answers than there are questions. But, nonetheless, there is some evidence that may encourage us to believe in the compatibility of peace and the news media.

I would like to start with three empirical facts about journalism that covers conflicts and peace processes:

1. The empirical evidence tells us that there is rarely any difference between propaganda and ordinary conflict coverage (cf. Kempf, Reimann, Luostarinen, 1996, 1998; Kempf, 1999b; Jaeger, 1998, 2000, 2001). Both provide a cognitive representation of conflict that tends to lead to further escalation rather than to de-escalation, and to war as a means of conflict resolution rather than to constructive conflict transformation. The difference is that we suspect that behind propaganda there is an actor trying to influence us. As for the media coverage of conflicts, we are talking about a social phenomenon: Instead of a single person or institution pulling the strings, most of the time a multitude of social segments, actors and factors, including mass media, are inter-acting without even being aware of any "bad intentions".
2. The empirical evidence also shows there is a great lack of so called "peace discourses". Dov Shinar, for example, explained the mass media's preference for war as its working material and symbolic inspiration with reference to professional and historical reasons: "War is more compatible than peace with media norms, usual discourse, and economic structures" (Shinar, 1998). War provides good visuals and images of action, is associated with heroism and conflict and focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational side of social interaction. It thereby satisfies news-value demands like the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results. Even if peace is on the

political and public agenda and the news media actually should be interested in it, we find an absence of adequate coverage of peace processes (e.g., peace coverage is framed in a war discourse by the use of a terminology of violence, or peace is depicted as something made or prescribed by a few élite persons shaking hands, or the logic of the text in the end leads to despair about the prospects of achieving a peace treaty) (Shinar, 1999; Hamdorf, 2000).

3. A third group of empirical facts explored by Daniel Bar-Tal (1998a, 1998b, 2000b) consists of the so-called societal beliefs which can be found in any society engaged in intractable conflict (e.g., in their mass media or their school textbooks). Societal beliefs are part of a society's ethos. Bar-Tal describes them as strategies that help people to cope with the experiences of suffering, loss of security, goods and lives. Any nation at war tries to produce and support these beliefs by means of propaganda in order to maintain a high level of motivation to act on behalf of society and to harm the enemy, even at the cost of personal sacrifices. For example, Bar-Tal identifies societal beliefs concerning topics like own victimization, delegitimizing the enemy or patriotism. Finally, these beliefs become part of the psychological infrastructure of the individual in order to help him or her survive the exhausting, stressful and painful experiences of war. Societal beliefs seem to be a central aspect of the problem of how a more constructive journalism could be made possible.

As we know, the mass media are a relevant part of the political environment and of opinion- and decision-making processes (see for example Naveh, 1998), and they tend to maintain or even sharpen the antagonism between opponents (e.g., Galtung, 1998). Therefore, mass media should at least refrain from heating up conflict even more and, on a long-term basis, should contribute to the process of reconciliation.

But how are they to achieve these aims? Two problems conflict with these demands:

1. If the media coverage of the opposing party suddenly sounded more conciliatory or forgiving, it would simply be rejected by the public (e.g., Kempf, 1998a). It would hardly be accepted, or would even be suspected of being counter-propaganda promulgated by the opponent. This rejection is due to deeply internalized societal beliefs. Yet, the end of a war or a cease-fire in itself creates an atmosphere of insecurity. The traditional and reliable coping strategies are still functioning. How can the media suddenly claim that the enemy is in fact a friend, a human being like you and me?
2. If media coverage simply tends to concentrate on the facts and keeps aloof from framing and interpretation, if it is too detached, there is a risk that each side will interpret the facts in the sense of its own societal beliefs - and nothing will ever change.

So, what should we do? We have a cease-fire, and now?

As we have seen, one of the keys lies in societal beliefs. Perhaps the mass media can contribute to gradually reducing negative societal beliefs and transforming them into constructive ones. In order to do so, we must study the mechanisms responsible for building them up.

In his studies of propaganda, Heikki Luostarinen worked out three typical distinctive features of propaganda texts (e.g., Luostarinen & Kempf, 2000): the harmonization of the referential levels of the texts, the motivational logic of the texts and the polarisation of identification suggestions - the latter are the most predominant.

Propaganda tries to exploit the feelings of community and solidarity created by a crisis situation. It attempts to affect identity structures so that people prioritize the identity of the unit at war (state, ethnic group and the like) over others (gender, culture, social group, ...). Propaganda does so by offering concepts of the sacred and the profane, extensive use of unifying symbols, distinctions between communally functional and dysfunctional actions, by creating enemy images, and by offering positive objects of identification. Everything sacred is linked to one's own side, everything profane and evil to the enemy. The other side is gradually alienated. Idealization of one's own side, which represents the good, the holy and the honorable per se, culminates in the representation of victims on one's own side as martyrs. These are the heroes and objects of identification who suffered and died for the just cause. Their memory has to be maintained and honored. The worth of the individual is linked to a social significance which transcends death. The presentation of polarized incentives for social commitment is part of the above mentioned building-up of societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1998b). In times of war they serve to provide an underlying meaning for all the suffering in order to support the struggle and to make sure that people believe that their own side is on the right track. They also become a big part of the social identity of the individual. But maintaining societal beliefs leads to a kind of "cognitive freezing", which means: biased selection of information, biased interpretation of information and biased elaboration of information in such a way that conflict and identity support each other. Even after a cease-fire, this construction of each group's respective social identity is still alive in the heads of the former enemies. The end of a conflict would mean the loss of a big part of a person's identity. Let's take a look at the concept of social identity.

The development of social identity is due to natural processes of social comparison which aim at achieving a reliable self-concept. From early childhood on we all strive to know who we are, who we are not, where we belong and where we don't, what and where the differences are between us and the others, what and where the similarities are. As soon as we are confronted with others (even imaginary ones), we tend to put ourselves and the others into social categories in order to structure the information given by our social environment (Tajfel, 1969). These social categories tend to be chosen spontaneously, voluntarily and automatically. As soon as the process of social categorization has taken place, these categories affect the process of perception. They make us respond to social information in a very selective way: information in accord with our expectations is more easily accepted

than other information. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986), the self-perception and self-concept of an individual depends mainly on group-ties and the attribution of a certain group membership, with a general tendency to judge the members of the other group as inferior to those of one's own group or to oneself. In other words, social identity, like personal identity, is linked to the individual's self-esteem, and the individual therefore attempts to protect the sense of the positive distinctiveness of his or her in-group in contrast to the respective out-groups.

Propaganda can profit from these processes, not simply by telling people what to think or to do, but also by providing a framework of social categories, like nationality, religion, appearance, race, and by delivering proof of the adequacy of judging the social environment in terms of these given categories. National identity, as an example of social identity, not only manifests itself in the coverage of the national mass media, but the media also serve to uphold and protect national identity as well (e.g., Rivenburgh, 1997). They do so by putting national issues on the agenda, providing information about facts and by offering the cognitive framework for their interpretation (e.g., a conceptualization of the situation as a win-lose game). In that way, they risk reducing the variability of social identity to a large extent. But they may also have the potential to emphasize shared identities and similarities between former opponents. Mass media could use this knowledge in favor of the peaceful transformation of a society. The reconstruction of multiple identities and of a pluralistic society requires an alternative framework of coverage, different from choosing and using categories like the unit at war (ethnicity, nationality, religion and the like), "good and evil", "winner and loser". In times of war it seemed to be urgent to distinguish friends from enemies by means of concepts like nationality, political attitude and so on. But in times of peace it seems necessary to emphasize the aspects the conflict parties have in common (and always had in common, but have forgotten) in order to help the public regain a fluid set of social identities that they have continued to share with the former enemy: e.g., professions, sports, gender, food, families, school, the education of children, culture, art, etc. The civilian life of both societies has to become a media concern.

Since in societies at war minorities opposed to the fighting (even journalists) tend to be marginalized or even suspected of being internal enemies, in times of reconstruction the media could profit by another social psychological concept that Moscovici has developed. Unlike Asch (1956), who concentrated on changes in public opinion caused by the influence of a majority, Moscovici states that under certain conditions minorities can also bring about changes in public opinion (1979). His genetic (dynamic) model assumes that social systems are in no way statically fixed structures, but are instead open dynamic entities where there is a steady process of definition and re-definition of roles, norms, values and behavioral rules. To exercise a certain social influence, minorities have to consistently maintain their common point of view against the majority. After having attracted attention in order to make the majority examine the minority's positions, there are five characteristics of an effective style of behavior: consistency in arguing, rigidity in arguing, auton-

omy, investment and fairness. Consistency thereby assumes the key role. The conversion theory developed by Moscovici (1980) says that the social influence exercised by minorities leads to an internalized opinion change, to an inner conviction of the correctness of the changed opinion. The opinion change caused by the pressure of a majority is more likely to be a kind of superficial adjustment. Scientific evidence supports this tendency (e. g., Levine, 1989). Thus, social change to reconciliation requires the presence of courageous journalists and committed mass media that are not afraid of challenging the habitual media rules and routines. For example, they can do so by providing a platform for peaceful minorities as a living part of social reality.

Besides that, in a more preventive way, it would seem more reasonable to give a voice to voiceless minorities in order to make public their interests and needs in a peaceful way, than to wait until they radicalize and cannot imagine attracting public attention other than by violence and aggression (Wolfsfeld, 1997a).

Media effects during violent conflict

Vladimir Bratić

1. Introduction

The history of the 20th century will prominently chronicle the relationship between war and the mass media. One obvious outcome of the relationship is the exploitation of media for war promotion and war propaganda (e.g. the effective use of early mass communication channels by the Allies in World War I and the pernicious exploitation of mass media by NS-Germany). It is not surprising to find a close association between media and violence in each conflict of the last decade. Several analyses even attribute an instigative role to the media in inciting violence (Thompson, 1999; Des Forges, 1999; Kirschke, 1996).

If the media have played an important role in breeding violence, it seems logical to examine the prospects for the reverse perspective – positive media contributions to ending violence and building peace. In other words, if media are often found to support forces that lead to violent conflict, they should also have the power to support the forces of peace. The fundamental issue to be addressed in this study is the contemporary understanding of the impact that mass communication channels have in modern societies experiencing conflict. Any application that engages media in promoting a specific type of behavior would have no scientific basis without a thorough analysis of how media affect audiences. While media have been prominent contributors to every post-Cold War conflict (Price and Thompson, 2002; Allen and Seaton, 1999), their role in post-conflict peace development has not been as apparent. However, in the past few years sufficient evidence has been accumulated to justify at least mild optimism regarding the role of media in peace development, thanks to devoted practitioners in international governmental agencies and non-profit organizations (Heiber, 2001; Spurr, 2002; Howard et al., 2003). These have made a major contribution by using mass communication channels to aid the recovery of post-conflict societies, and their initial accomplishments have been documented in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Israel/Palestine, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, etc. These projects all had remarkably positive results and provide illustrations of positive, innovative uses of media in peace processes. The following three projects are the best illustrations of such practices:

Good Friday of 1998 will remain a special day in the histories of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. On that day, one of the longest running conflicts in modern history seemed to be finally over as representatives of the conflict parties of Northern Ireland agreed to a political settlement known as the *Good Friday Agreement*. Northern Ireland's most recent three decades of "troubles" were at last going to be consigned to the past thanks to the unstinting efforts of Catholic and Protestant peacemakers. The final step towards the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement was to be a referendum. There was significant animosity toward the agreement on both sides, and for some time it seemed as if the agreement would not win sufficient public support. The British government decided to seek help from an unlikely source – McCann Erickson, one of the world's leading advertising agencies. McCann Erickson's solution was to develop a media campaign emphasizing the benefits of the Good Friday Agreement. A month later, the agreement received the support of 71 percent of the people on both sides of the conflict (Ark Survey, 1998). It is impossible to gauge the campaign's direct influence on the public's decision to support the agreement. However, it was documented that the advertising campaign played a role in the acceptance of the political agreement, leading to a peaceful resolution of the conflict (O'Neill, 1998).

At about the same time, the long-running Middle East conflict between Israelis and Palestinians was escalating. There was, however, one piece of good news. Research found that the younger generation was becoming more tolerant, especially those children who watched the Israeli-Palestinian version of "Sesame Street", called "Rechov SumSum/Shara'a SimSim" (Cohen, 2002). The program was a project of Sesame Workshop, the creators of "Sesame Street", which has provided many hours of educational programming to children around the world. This time Sesame Workshop produced a program for a society where violent ethnic conflict was deeply ingrained. It developed a show with the goal of increasing tolerance between the two communities. The results were very encouraging; children who viewed the show generally displayed improved levels of tolerance and acceptance of the other group in the conflict (Cohen, 2002).

During the 1994 conflict in Rwanda, Hutus committed large-scale atrocities against the Tutsi community. One of the main influences that provoked this violence is thought to have been a broadcaster, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Free Radio-Television of the Thousand Hills). While messages inciting violence were being broadcast on the radio, people were being massacred in the streets. After the violence, building on the prominence and assumed power of the radio in Rwanda, a group of peacemakers decided to use the medium to influence the population, just as Radio Mille Collines had, but with a diametrically opposite goal – peace and reconciliation. In 1995, Studio Ijambo (Wise Words) was established in neighboring Burundi by the international NGO, Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The main objective of the studio was to produce a variety of messages that could contribute to peace development. With the slogan, "Dialogue is the future", the studio has produced media offerings on social affairs, news programs, dramas, documen-

taries, children's programs, etc. Most of their programs directly address the roots of the regional conflict (SFCG, 2004).

All three projects have been viewed as successful media implementations in a conflict environment. However, practitioners implementing projects in conflict situations rarely attempt to examine the degree of impact that these projects may have on a particular conflict. A common assumption shared by most practitioners is that media have the power to influence the development of peace in a conflict environment. This view is based on the conclusions of practitioners and authors who assume that if media can move people to engage in conflict, by the same token they must have the power to work in the opposite direction, thus promoting peace. Many articles and reports begin with such assumptions, but never attempt to find supportive evidence in the literature (Price and Thompson, 2002; Howard et al., 2003). Had such an analysis been made, it would have shown that not only are there few studies that attempt to establish a direct causal link between media and violence, but that this relationship is complex and cannot be simply taken for granted. What is significantly more problematic is that the weak correlation is now taken out the context of violent conflict and assumed to have the same intensity in facilitating peaceful outcomes.

To address this problem, this study proposes a rigorous evaluation of the possibility that media can contribute to conflict resolution and transformation. The most basic theories of media effects are considered. This study takes into consideration the development of media effects theories throughout the 20th century. As pointed out by McQuail (1994), *media effects* theories start with the phase of the 1920s, when the media seemed all-powerful, continue with the first empirical tests that showed only limited and moderate effects, and evolve into studies that have discovered powerful effects. To fully understand the potential for media to contribute to the peaceful resolution of hostilities in a conflict society, an historical examination of media effects is necessary. Media effects theory can help us to understand how an audience best learns from the media. It further explains a variety of conditions under which media are more effective, and vice versa. Finally, some research conducted in response to international wars and conflicts reveals how the impacts of media may be different during armed conflict. All of these issues should help to guide the contemporary implementation of peace-promoting media projects in societies undergoing conflict.

2. Media impact and conflict audiences, environments and messages

The issue of media effects theory has been at the center of mass communication studies ever since its development in the 1920s. Defined as a "relationship between the media content and its audiences" (Newbold, 1995, p. 119), media effects have been both confirmed and disputed throughout the history of mass communication studies. Even today, after many years and many studies, there is little agreement

among scholars with regard to the magnitude of effects, or even about the best approach to the problem (McQuail, 1994). Contending theories of mass communication effects have been one of the hallmarks of mass communication studies.

Resistant as the field is to complete integration, all attempts to provide a comprehensive overview become chronological descriptions of developments in the field (McQuail, 1994; Baran and Davis 1995; Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). In this kind of environment, a synthesis of media effects theories into a single theory is still needed. These conditions, even though not necessarily detrimental to mass communication studies, have prevented the integration of media effects with other academic disciplines, e.g. conflict resolution. The best answer to the question posed by peace studies experts of "What can media do to help us resolve conflict?" could be suggested by their mass communication colleagues in the following terms: some media messages may influence some people under some conditions.

Working within these parameters, we should look at the types of media messages, people (audience) and conditions in the environment where media have the most powerful impact. Schramm and Roberts (1977) identified three factors – the *audience* factor, *message* factor (mass media), and *situation* (environment) – for their analysis of mass communication effects. For the purposes of this study, these factors are examined through the prism of a conflict situation.

2.1 Audiences in violent conflicts

After World War I, the first analyses and interpretations of mass communication assumed a very powerful influence of early media during the war (Lippmann, 1922; Lasswell, 1928; Bernays 1928). Persuaded by the power of government-controlled propaganda, the authors envisioned mass communication as a means to influence societies in the directions desired by elites (Lippmann, 1922). Stimulus-response psychology convinced those social scientists that mass media stimuli could control and induce entire audiences to behave in uniform ways. The dominant view at that time, which was, however, supported by very little empirical research, painted the picture of a monolithic, vulnerable audience passively absorbing media messages. Soon after the initial studies of propaganda, Lasswell, Lippman and Bernays hypothesized that if media are powerful in persuading people to support war, then they may also be used to bring about desired social improvements. Although social scientists have proposed hypotheses about the positive role of propaganda, the literature rarely addresses the positive influence of mass communication. This idealistic belief in the ability of social scientists to understand and use "propaganda" for positive rather than negative purposes is often neglected. Both Lasswell and Lippmann thought that propaganda had a place and purpose in the hands of a "specialized class". Lippmann's cynicism about the public as a "bewildered herd" and Lasswell's disillusionment with "democratic romanticism" share a common solution – the management of public interests by a responsible elite (Lasswell, 1927; Lippmann 1922, 1925). Bernays (1928) goes a step further to suggest that the intellectual minority should utilize such management in promoting international

peace. Even John Dewey (1939) argued for persuasion when he claimed that democracy was "persuasion through public discussion carried on not only in legislative halls but in the press, private conversations and public assemblies" (p. 139). Even if this is where the idea of peace media may have originated, the modern understanding of the effort hardly coincides with the ideas of the forefathers of communication research.

With the beginning of empirical research came doubts about both the direct effects of media and the passivity of the audience. Countering the dominant view, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944) initially suggested that "opinion leaders" often pass on mediated messages to their audiences. In the early 1950s, Berelson et al. (1954) and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) explained that in informal social relationships leaders gain information from the mass media that they filter down to other, less active persons. They also described the audience's use of media as a selective process (Katz 1980; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). Consequently, its perception becomes rather selective, thus contributing to selective exposure, selective perception and selective retention.

Building on this research, Katz and Lazarsfeld concluded that people actively pay attention to and select messages that agree with their preconceptions. This was later restated as the *reinforcement role* of media – the theory that media do not so much change as reinforce preexisting audience beliefs (Klapper, 1960).

In the 1950s, researchers decided that audience activity depends on the existence of specific needs. Herzog (1944) and Berelson (1949) concluded that media are often used in response to needs. This "*uses and gratification*" model helped explain why audiences are much more active than was assumed in the early stages of theory development (Katz, 1959; Blumler & Katz, 1974). The next few decades were devoted to a debate over whether audiences are more passive or more active. McQuail (1994) finds that the balance of expert opinion sides with the "active audience" perspective, despite opposing theories by Gerbner (Gerbner et al., 1986) and Noelle-Neumann (1984) that ascribe a powerful impact to media, thus reviving the concept of the "helpless audience".

In a conflict situation, it is very important to understand the direct impact of conflict on an audience in order to predict its behavior. The question that should be posed concerns the impact of conflict on the audience and the audience's reaction to the media in the conflict. What we know about people in conflict agrees with common sense: they are afraid, feel uncertain and vulnerable. Another common feature is that the need for information increases rapidly. Information acquired from media can play a decisive role in achieving a certain level of security. Information about the possible threats, direction and level of violence, even basic information about supplies are often shared through the media. A good illustration of the increased need for information is provided by the terror attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. At that time, several major Internet news services were overwhelmed (e.g. the CNN website experienced ten times the traffic of the pre-

vious day), phone calls flooded the major phone companies, and TV ratings skyrocketed (CNN, 2001).

In a model that describes the power of media as the main agenda setter, McCombs (1996) identifies this situation as arising from a "*need for orientation*" and proposes that the greater the need for orientation becomes, the greater will be the power of media to influence audiences. In other words, in times of conflict, the multiplicity of uncertainties in the environment increases audience need for information, which consequently makes audiences more vulnerable to media influence. Gerbner et al. (1986) reach the same conclusion in a study of "heavy viewers". They argue that the viewers more prone to share the imagery of television are the ones who tend to watch more TV. In such a situation, this need for information creates a disproportionate number of heavy viewers. These are people dependent on TV for their information. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) claim that the more people rely on media information suppliers, the more influence media will have on their environment.

On the other side of the argument, Krugman (1965) suggests that with high audience involvement in a given subject matter, media tend to be less influential. McCombs agrees, as he rephrases the issue, when he claims that agenda-setting has little effect on "obtrusive" issues – ones that can be experienced personally without relying on media contributions. However, populations engaged in wars are rarely able to understand the war beyond what is happening in their immediate surroundings. Within society, war – although it is an *obtrusive issue* – is still to a large extent puzzling to the majority of people. Very few events of great importance unfold before their eyes. The need for orientation is actually maximal, because media accounts of larger contexts (political negotiations, battles on other parts of the territory, humanitarian aid, etc.) are essential to satisfy the need for orientation. Major, overarching occurrences determine the development of the war more than do particular local events. In other words, the need for orientation during war prevails over its obtrusive nature.

The *uses and gratification* model explains how and why audiences use media. It shifts the focus from the study of media to the study of audiences. It looks at the social and psychological origins of needs and how they determine the use of and expectations regarding media.

In terms of audiences, we have learned that what they bring to media interacts with what media bring to them (Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1974; Herzog 1944). No longer can we perceive the audience to be atomized and vulnerable to the influence of media, but rather we must understand it as consisting of active individuals and groups with specific needs, values, intellectual capabilities and personal characteristics. Therefore, these personal attributes of the audience largely determine the way it responds to media messages (Cantril, 1940; Hovland et al., 1949). For example, research on the World War II *Why We Fight* films, has shown that a better-educated and more intelligent audience can learn more from media content. This series of films was part of a propaganda campaign initiated by the U.S.

government, which wanted to persuade draftees of the necessity to participate in the war. Soldiers were also more likely to engage in a more thorough analysis (Hovland et al., 1949). If it is likely that the audience will be exposed to arguments for other alternatives, both sides of the issue should be presented. Discussions of both sides of an issue also seem to have been more appealing to this demographic group, while less educated audiences seem to have been more easily persuaded by one-sided messages. Those kinds of messages are also better received in cases where the audience already agrees with the message. However, two-sided arguments were more convincing than ones that opposed the initial argument (Hovland et al., 1949). This means that in a post-conflict environment where conflicting group beliefs and opinions are expected and media presentations are uncensored and multi-faceted, "peace media" should present two-sided arguments. This also holds for the intellectual and better-educated population groups, such as journalists, community leaders and local politicians – in other words, opinion leaders.

Research conducted by Hovland and his colleagues shows that people can acquire both *information* and *attitudes* from media; but this does not necessarily happen simultaneously. Even though these are closely intertwined, information gain does not necessarily lead to attitudinal change. This information is invaluable to practitioners evaluating peace media projects, who may be too quick to conclude that media have failed if they do not produce attitudinal or behavioral changes. In some cases, contributing to *cognitive* knowledge is the only achievement of a media project. It was also found that people pay attention to information that fits their pre-conceptions (Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). In regard to conflict, people may reject or may not even take cognizance of information that is not in accordance with their beliefs. This agrees with the findings of Bandura's *social learning theory* (1986), which states that people learn best from behavior they understand to be beneficial. It is very easy to present peace as beneficial and to arouse pre-conceptions that favor peace over war and conflict.

2.2 Conflict environment

When Albert Bandura introduced his *social cognitive* theory, he stated that the human personality is influenced by interactions among the environment, behavior and the person's cognitions and emotions (Bandura, 1986). These factors have a bi-directional interactive relationship, where no one factor is solely predominant, but instead all the factors influence each other. In a conflict situation, one of these factors – environment – can be isolated in an attempt to examine its influence on audiences. An important question that arises here concerns what we know about the conditions in the conflict environment and how the environment impacts on media and audiences.

Mass communication research was institutionalized immediately after World War I, and a great deal of research was conducted on the propaganda used in both World War I and World War II (Bernays, 1928; Creel, 1920; Doob, 1935; Lasswell, 1927). Scholars also continue to examine the use of media in World War II (Ellul,

1963; Zemen, 1964; Thum and Thum, 1972) and the Cold War (Hallin, 1986; Jowett and O'Donnell, 1998; Chomsky and Herman, 1988). Thus, we should be able to describe the conflict-media environment condition with a great deal of accuracy.

One of the first studies of media effects was Hadley Cantril's analysis of reactions to the famous *War of the Worlds* radio play (Cantril, 1940). Audience responses to this radio broadcast of the dramatized H.G. Wells tale about a Martian invasion of the Earth helped provide insights into the importance of the environment and its relation to effects. In his monumental analysis, Cantril quotes listeners' explanations of the reasons why they panicked and started fleeing from their homes. One chapter of Cantril's book, *Being in a Troublesome World*, proposes that one reason for the panic had to do with recent war fears and the possibility of a foreign attack or invasion. Historical conditions at the time of the broadcast, namely Nazi politics in 1938, produced uncertainty, which consequently greatly influenced the way people behaved while listening to the broadcast. This tells us that a conflict environment, full of uncertainty and insecurity, is an environment that facilitates media effects to a greater degree. It is also safe to assume that if the conflict environment facilitates uncertainty, then the need for orientation will be rather high and media effects will be more powerful (McCombs, 1994). From a developmental perspective, Cambridge (2002) argues that in a time of stress the consumption of media increases, thus increasing the impact of media.

We know that in conflict situations media systems in general will usually be underdeveloped and rarely diverse. It is not uncommon to find that only a few news sources dominate the media environment (e.g. at the time of the conflict in Rwanda there were only a single national radio station and two weekly newspapers, *Imvaho* and *La Relève*). In his study on media cultivation, Gerbner (Gerbner et al., 1986) explains that in countries with consistent and redundant television content, the opportunity for media to cultivate a particular set of beliefs is more predictable and consistent. Noelle-Neumann (1984) came to a similar conclusion when she explained how one-sided media content generates a dominant opinion that silences the opinions of the minority, which is afraid of becoming isolated. A war environment reinforces a monolithic, unified response to reality and contributes to a crowd mentality. The *spiral of silence* best characterizes media in a war situation – an environment in which the prevalence of the majority opinion leads to the suppression of alternative views (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). This explanation outlines two different directions for media development during conflict. Firstly, if one-sided, consistent media content highlights conflict, then the proliferation of new and different voices is a way to counter homogeneity. Preferably, if there is an opportunity to build a new media system, such a system ought to be saturated with images and messages that emphasize the benefits of a peaceful society.

One of the main criticisms of Lazarsfeld's research on the 1940 election campaigns (Chaffee and Hochheimer, 1985) focuses on his method of measuring media effects in an environment where two political campaigns were competing with information that was often contradictory. What Lazarsfeld failed to take into account

was that the media net effect is a zero-sum effect: "all those effects favoring the winning candidate, minus those favoring the loser" (Chaffee and Hochheimer, 1985, p. 273). These environments are characterized by competing, contradictory information that negates and denies the opposing message. A conflict environment is hardly the same as an election environment. Audiences in conflicts are often exposed to highly one-sided messages, with little exposure to opposing information. This is why it is invaluable to understand that the minimal effects of a bipartisan (election) environment may not translate into a more complex conflict environment.

In contrast, Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) account for the increase in dependency on the media by proposing that such dependency is most obvious in two situations: a) where these media supply information central to the needs of the audience and b) where some sort of instability increases uncertainty and ambiguity. There can hardly be any doubt that a war environment is characterized by both of these conditions. Thus, the authors conclude, increased dependency on the media further increases media effects on audiences.

Marshal McLuhan (1964) identified the importance of media in *form* rather than *content*. McLuhan's idea that the "medium is the message" implies that the important effect of a medium results from its form, not its content. Transferred to a conflict environment, the form of the medium in a time of peace-building can be more influential than the actual message. Therefore, it may be in media institutions that the reconciliation or transformation of conflict should begin. More important than any specific story or message may be simply that there *is* a medium that can be listened to, watched or read by all parties to a conflict. Moreover, if this media project employs journalists representing all conflict parties, such a change in form, according to McLuhan, is more important than the message conveyed to the audience.

To sum up the presentation so far, a conflict environment brings about conditions of uncertainty, insecurity and "silence" that enhance the effects of media. This realization can offer a great potential for the advocates of peace as opposed to conflict to use such conditions to promote peace through the media.

2.3 Media messages during violent conflict

In general, media can influence any process of social change in two directions. As suggested by Kurt Lewin (1958), it is possible to pursue social change either by supporting the forces working in the desired direction or by opposing the forces oriented in the opposite direction. Transferred to a conflict environment, peace and reconciliation in society can be achieved either by countering the actors and processes that fuel conflict, or by supporting their opponents in the peace-movement.

One possible direction in media development for peace would be to eliminate the media practices, messages and resources that may have contributed to sustaining

the conflict. In most of the conflicts that occurred over the past fifteen years, there has been a very close linkage of media and violence (Price and Thompson, 2002). It would be logical to assume that media can further the peace process through the suppression of the opposing force – war propaganda. This has happened in many cases of conflict, such as when radio broadcasts were banned in Rwanda (Metzl, 1997a; 1997b), or when the broadcasts of Bosnian nationalist stations were discontinued (Thompson, 1999). Because the suppression of information may be controversial due to the ethical implications, the role of media institutions in transitions to peace should focus on the latter. Therefore, this study is mainly concerned with discovering effective methods to aid the forces of peace. It is noteworthy that a large amount of literature already exists on how media promote conflict, but only very little is available on the role of media in contributing to peace-building. Thus, until we show that media can have a positive social influence in promoting peace, all we can do is to suppress what we identify as negative media forces.

There is no single way that media affect audiences. Unfortunately, almost a century after the first mass communication analyses, we know more about the limitations of media than about their potential. On one hand, media do not have the power to directly inject a certain behavior or attitude into people's minds, as was formerly believed (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Klapper, 1960). On the other hand, the effects of media are neither minimal nor negligible. Even though media are almost never the sole agents of change, they are a prominent factor in complex social systems that give rise to change (Severin and Tankard, 1992).

Over the last 80 years, and especially between 1930 and 1980, a number of studies have yielded a variety of explanations of how media affect audiences (De Fleur and Dennis, 1998; Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). The clearest way to describe media effects research is to present the chronological development of the studies and theories. After the early mass communication analyses of the use of media in World War I, the concept of all-powerful media was clearly the dominant paradigm (Lasswell, 1927; Lippmann 1922, 1925; Bernays 1923, 1928). What the authors of the post-war period described as the direct, powerful effects of propaganda were then perceived as dangerous in peacetime. The potentially manipulative nature of propaganda caused many social scientists to have second thoughts about its utilization. This produced a dominant effect paradigm that is best suggested by the *hypodermic needle* metaphor, which implies that media have the power to "inject ideas, attitudes, and dispositions toward behavior into a passive, atomized and extremely vulnerable audience" (Gitlin, 1995). In the 1920s, the Payne studies helped explain the influence of movies in constructing audience reality (Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). Movies can provide models of behavior, influence attitudes and shape interpretations of reality.

Along the same lines was research on the effects of movies on soldiers in World War II done by Hovland in his study of Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* films. However, the results were slightly different (Hovland et al., 1949). Hovland concluded that movies could successfully transmit a large volume of information content to

a large number of people in a short time with strong effects. Although the films succeeded in increasing soldiers' cognitive knowledge of the war, there was no evidence that films exercised a decisive influence on their attitudes and motivations. Furthermore, he speculated that source credibility is important in producing immediate change, but has less impact over the long term. Over time, audience members remembered parts of the message even though they could not judge the credibility of its source. Therefore, the implications of these findings for a conflict environment are the following: a) negative propaganda fueling hatred may be remembered even if it comes from a questionable source and b) peace media presentations may not immediately result in behavioral change, because informational gain does not automatically translate into changes in behavior.

A similar conclusion was underlined in a landmark study by Klapper (1960), who found that media play a role in the interplay among social, behavioral, environmental and other factors, with change resulting only from an overall set of complex variables. Klapper's (1960) paradigm-changing study states that:

"Mass media ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effect, but rather functions through a nexus of mediating factors and influences. These mediating factors render mass communication as a contributory agent in a process of reinforcing the existing conditions." (p. 8)

Klapper's study appeared after a series of studies that were intended to provide empirical evidence but failed to show direct and powerful effects. However, Gitlin (1995) explains that these studies relied on short-term experiments and surveys, neglected the measurement of cumulative effects and focused on *behavioral* rather than *cognitive* effects. He states that the effects were so narrowly defined that the studies were likely to show at most only slight changes in effects. Many subsequent studies focused on cumulative effects over a longer period and explored conditions under which changed effects were more likely to be found.

Lippmann (1977) originally focused on how people respond not just to the real environment, but also to an environment they do not directly experience. He called this a *pseudo-environment* and claimed that it existed in the form of "pictures in our head". Gerbner et al. (1986) agreed and suggested that in modern society, TV is the most significant contributor to this pseudo-environment or, as he phrased it, *symbolic environment*. It is through this environment that media are able to cultivate thoughts and attitudes in audiences. People have been found to acquire knowledge and behavior through modeling and imitation (Bandura, 1986). The question that arises here is: If this symbolic environment were saturated with images of peace instead of conflict, would such a media source cultivate peace in society? The answer would probably be in the affirmative. However, Gerbner suggests that the results of such an effort should arise through cumulative (repetitive, long-range, consistent exposure) influences on cognition rather than short-term influences on behavior. Drawing on this analysis, it may be more important that peace messages be present across the media environment in all genres and characteristics, rather than in an isolated persuasive effort. In a theory called *mainstreaming*, Gerbner predicts that heavy viewing will override differences in per-

spective due to other variables (e.g. political preference, nationality, etc.). This gives us reason to hope that an audience that is highly involved in a shared media experience that promotes positive messages of peace will be more likely to overcome traditional differences that may have caused the conflict.

Another way to produce a positive effect through media could be in the form of *social learning* (Bandura, 1986). Social learning theory argues that people acquire behavior by observation and then store their observations to use as guides for future behavior. Similarly, media messages are capable of evoking semantically related concepts. This media effect, known as *priming*, implies that an idea expressed in the media can activate an idea in the audience that is similar in meaning. Many examples in meta-analyses by Anderson and Chachere show that witnessing violence increases the likelihood of aggressive behavior (Jo and Berkowitz, 1994). However, there are conditions under which priming is more likely to happen: the meaning of the message must be interpreted as was intended, the interpretation must be worthwhile and justified, and there needs to be a positive identification with the character of the message. Providing that these conditions are met, there is no reason why pro-social behavior cannot be primed in the quest for peace.

The *agenda-setting* model of Shaw and McCombs (McCombs, 1994) represents another approach to the study of media effects. It does not argue that media have the power to directly inject attitudes and behavior into peoples' minds. On the contrary, it argues that media have effects on the scope of their thinking. Media do not tell audiences what to think, but rather what to think about (Cohen, 1963). In other words, the public often comes to share an agenda similar to the one that media present to them on a daily basis. McCombs admits that real-life events determine the media agenda more than any other factor. However, he also acknowledges the influence of politicians, journalists and journalistic practices. This would imply that when events in the environment are violent, then conflict-oriented media will probably mirror this as their own agenda. This is where the importance of a gatekeeper or news editor becomes apparent. Gadi Wolfsfeld's analysis (1997b) of newspaper editorials published in Northern Ireland shows how editorial practices pursued an agenda of peace while maintaining journalistic integrity and professionalism. He examined Catholic and Protestant newspaper editorials during the peace negotiations in 1998. Of 152 editorials, only two opposed a peace agreement. Editors in Northern Ireland apparently felt little need to provide a balance between the proponents and opponents of peace. This finding is especially surprising, given that these editorials were written during periods of violence, when the peace process seemed to be in danger. It is possible that these practices adopted the *social responsibility* role of the press, as explained in 1963 by Seibert et al. The social responsibility of journalists is the professional sense of an obligation to present the full range of opinions. In addition, journalists are accountable not only to their audiences, but also to governments that reserve the right to criticize the media. There is no doubt that the agenda of social responsibility could facilitate the agenda of peace development.

3. Conclusion

Even though we are still unsure about the impact of media on behavioral change, we are confident in the power of media to influence beliefs, opinions and attitudes that eventually translate into action. We know that media influence people in both the short and the long terms. This impact depends on a wide range of variables. Media have powerful effects under the right circumstances, if appropriate communication techniques are employed. The environment of violent conflict and war enhances audience dependence and susceptibility to media, thus enhancing media impact. We have seen that a conflict environment is a specific situation that gives media more prominence and that certain techniques are more likely to influence an audience (see Table 1). Media effects must therefore not be ignored in the effort to transform a society of conflict into a society of peace.

	Audience	Environment	Messages
Media effects in conflict	Media used in war as propaganda – could be used for good causes	A conflict environment increases the impact of media	Messages in support of peace and suppression of messages inciting violence
	Through opinion leaders	Uncertainty, insecurity, time of stress – media consumption increases	Considerable message effects – not as direct as in the "hypodermic needle" model
	Selective exposure, perception, retention	Environment with homogenous media content cultivates beliefs more consistently	Messages influence attitudes, shape perceptions of reality, provide models for behavior
	Consume information in response to a need	A one-sided media environment ignores minority opinions	Guide for future behavior
	Increased need for information, need for orientation – more vulnerable to media impact	Dependency on media increases during conflict	Increase cognitive knowledge
	Education and demographics influence the effects	Transformation of media institutions as a venue and a model for the peaceful transformation of society	Cumulative impact over time
	Inclined to listen to information consistent with own beliefs		Over time differences are "mainstreamed" into more coherent views
	Reception of information does not automatically lead to attitude change		Media set agendas – peace-oriented messages – more positive agenda

Table 1: Media effects in conflicts: Audience, environment and messages

What we know about media influence in conflict and peace is best summarized in the research literature on media effects. The literature suggests that media are capable of influencing audiences, and its impact can be both positive and negative. The role of media in building peace is simultaneously both substantial and limited. As is found in the literature, but also in the practical examples from the field, media have the power to contribute to the formation of attitudes and opinions and to increase knowledge and awareness by supplying information. What is limited about its ability to facilitate peace development is the uncertainty that this positive impact will be translated into behavior or result in action. For this to happen, a number of other variables need to align with the media effort. Mostly because an action or behavior depends on many variables other than media impact, and because a variety of variables contribute to the end result as much as any form of communication initiative, only the true integration of media and the results of peace-building strategies can guarantee a significant move toward a peaceful society.

There is no doubt that the relationships among media and influences on behavior, actions and opinions are very complex. However, the effects of media on the formation of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions are much more apparent than the effects on behavior. What determines this impact depends upon the media type, form, source, environment and timing, but more importantly upon a number of other factors in the environment that have little to do with the media. It is important to note that in each of the examples given above, media appear as a single component of a comprehensive political process of peace development. Therefore, it would be a mistake to claim that the media could contribute to peace single-handedly. Media are a necessary but not sufficient element of peace development; they can only aid in solving problems of communication, but not in changing the deep-rooted causes of conflict. The role of media, as Lippmann suggested in the 1920s, is not to replace social organizations and institutions, but rather media can only be as strong as a society's institutions and processes. Just as pro-war propaganda does not single-handedly cause war, peace media cannot single-handedly end conflict. In order to be productive, media need to assist institutions in their pursuit of peace-building. Thus, media influences on peace development can be strengthened by thorough and rigorous interdisciplinary research.

Implementing peace journalism: The role of conflict stages

Burkhard Bläsi

1. Introduction

In recent articles and publications on peace journalism, scholars and practitioners have addressed a broad range of important issues concerning the implementation of peace journalism. These issues include:

- First of all, the question of *whether* or not peace journalism even should be implemented. This controversy has been fueled by the argument that contributing to peace is not the journalist's task (Loyn, 2007) and the criticism that peace journalism is nothing but old wine in new bottles (Hanitzsch, 2007; see the resulting debate in cco 2/2007).
- Secondly, the question of *how* peace journalism could be implemented. On the one hand, this concerns the well-advanced considerations of how the idea of peace journalism can be spread and how the relevant knowledge, skills and competencies can be taught, e.g., in training courses or at universities (ASPR, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Lynch, 2007).

On the other hand, this issue relates to the structural constraints that affect any kind of journalism and therefore the question of who or what has to be and can be changed in order to implement peace journalism for a broader audience: The individual journalist? General journalistic formats, norms and routines? The economic foundation of the media system? The audience itself? (Bläsi, 2006; Hackett, 2006; Hanitzsch, 2007). And even if we conceptualize this change as "a cyclical progression of mutual adjustment between reformed structural conditions and improved journalistic skills" (Peleg, 2007, p. 4) – a depiction with which I agree – we still need to specify how this progression can be realized in concrete journalistic practice.

While these debates are still going on, another issue has so far largely been overlooked, namely the question of *when* peace journalism could and should most reasonably be implemented. Does it make a difference if peace journalism is put into practice *before* the violent escalation of a conflict, *during* wartime, or *after* the cessation of military operations? Intuitively, one might agree that there must be differences due to the diversity of preconditions. However, these differences have not yet been dealt with in detail. Thus, in this article I will explore the ways in which different stages of conflict affect the chances for peace journalism. In a sec-

and step I will discuss the consequences for the future implementation of peace journalism.

In doing so, I will refer to a model of factors influencing the production of conflict coverage (cf. chapter 7; Bläsi, 2006). On the basis of 30 in-depth expert interviews with conflict reporters from radio, television and the print media, and by incorporating previous research on the news production process, six interacting factors were identified that influence the production of conflict coverage:

1. Journalistic system: this comprises at a basic level the dilemmas inherent in the system, such as the lack of space and time; at the meso-level organizational structures, norms and routines that manifest themselves differently in every media branch; at the macro-level the legal parameters, contents and structures of journalistic education and training, economic and technological determinants.
2. Individual characteristics of the journalist: personal attitudes, values, beliefs, motivation, experience, skills, knowledge and competence.
3. Lobbying, information management and propaganda: Attempts to exert influence by political actors, the military, industry, NGOs, religious leaders, etc.
4. Situation on-site: specific conditions that journalists have to face in the conflict area, e.g., language, geography, infrastructure, censorship, restrictions on journalistic activities, security and personal safety, etc.
5. Public climate: characterized by the kind of public attention the conflict receives, by the amount and type of political activity elicited, the amount of coverage given, the diversity of opinions, the degree of polarization and the potential sanctions imposed on dissenters.
6. The audience: their interests, expectations, habits and purchasing behavior.

As will be shown below, these preconditions (and partly also results) of conflict coverage vary depending on the stage of conflict. Thus, the opportunities for implementing peace journalism also vary with different levels of conflict intensity.

Conflict intensity can be classified on five levels of intensity (HIIK, 2008): (1) latent conflict, (2) manifest conflict, (3) crisis, (4) severe crisis and (5) war. While levels 1 and 2 might comprise verbal pressure, threatening with violence or the imposition of economic sanctions, they are still considered to be nonviolent. In contrast, level 3 (at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents), level 4 (violent force is used repeatedly in an organized way) and level 5 (violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way) are defined as violent stages.

Accordingly, in the following I will differentiate between (1) preconditions of news production in a nonviolent conflict and (2) preconditions of news production in a violent conflict / in wartime. Furthermore, as another nonviolent conflict stage I will analyze (3) the preconditions of news production in the aftermath of violent conflicts.

The empirical basis for the following considerations is likewise provided by the in-depth expert interviews mentioned above. The expertise of the interviewed journalists originated in the coverage of conflicts and wars in different parts of the world, including the Gulf War (1991), the Balkans, Chechnya, Rwanda, Liberia, Indonesia, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq (2003). The interviews were analyzed within the methodological framework of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) by applying the specific techniques of coding and categorizing recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1996; cf. Bläsi, 2006 for a detailed description of the research design and methodical approach).

2. Preconditions of news production in nonviolent conflicts

Table 1 shows how the preconditions of news production affect the chances for peace journalism in a nonviolent conflict. The table distinguishes features that seem rather to facilitate constructive conflict coverage from features that seem rather to hinder it.

In this and the following tables the focus is on the differences between conflict stages. Hence, influencing variables that persist largely unchanged over all conflict stages are not included. (This relates, e.g., to the status quo of journalists' education and training).

Preconditions of news production	Features facilitating peace journalism	Features hindering peace journalism
Journalistic system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing conflict means increasing news value for a country, albeit still limited if not accompanied by other news criteria (e.g., elite-nation, personalization, proximity, overt violence) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor allocation of financial and personnel resources Limited amount of space and time in news coverage Editorial departments have a comparatively low interest in reports by foreign correspondents, insofar as non-elite-nations are concerned At best sporadic reporting
Individual characteristics of journalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Correspondents with in-depth knowledge of the country, its people and existing conflict lines, with a sense for nuances and time for investigation Presumably more journalists who want to present developments on-site (and focusing less on themselves), more journalists who are interested in long-term processes and not just in short-term out-breaks 	

Lobbying, propaganda, information management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propaganda efforts are usually less prominent than in violent conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propaganda efforts increase the more obvious and greater the chances of war. But because they are more covert in nonviolent conflicts, journalists may pay less attention to their influence
Situation on-site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By and large, restrictions are less extensive than in wartime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depending on the political system, even in peacetime journalists may face extensive restrictions
Public climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is not involved in conflict: low public attention. This can be <i>favorable</i> for peace journalism inasmuch as normally no clear-cut hostile images of the conflict parties are produced and as there is room for differentiated reporting • If the own country is involved in a conflict, even a not-yet escalated conflict can attract public attention. As long as a conflict is not defined by the majority as a win-lose process, there are chances for solution-oriented coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is not involved in conflict: low public attention. This can be <i>unfavorable</i> for peace journalism if conflict is simply ignored and, due to a lack of public interest, the media decide not to invest significant resources in conflict coverage
Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to an indeterminate public climate, the audience might still be open for solution-oriented coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infrequent coverage of non-elite countries entails that these countries face low general interest in the audience

Table 1: Facilitating and hindering preconditions of news production in nonviolent conflicts

The kind of coverage that seems feasible without extraordinary efforts strongly depends on the degree of involvement of one's own country. When it is involved there are chances for solution-oriented coverage. The preconditions for news production can in the main be characterized as follows: reporters have high specific conflict competence and a facilitating professional ethos, dispose of the required resources, and an adequate amount of space and time. They face an interested, but still largely impartial audience. In such a situation, a type of conflict coverage should be possible that focuses on common rights and interests, humanizes all sides, points to the price of a potential war, reports on peace initiatives and actively searches for nonviolent conflict resolution (i.e., solution-oriented conflict coverage, see ASPR, 2003). However, this type of coverage becomes more difficult the more the public discourse is influenced by antagonistic conceptualizations and the closer the situation comes to violent escalation.

If one's own country is not involved in the conflict, the chances for constructive coverage decrease to a similar degree as the allocated resources are reduced. At

the same time, the prospects worsen that appropriate coverage will be recognized by the individual media consumer and will enter the public discourse.

3. Preconditions of news production in violent conflicts/ in wartime

Table 2 shows how the preconditions of news production affect the chances for peace journalism in a violent conflict.

In violent conflicts some preconditions are reversed. The allocation of personnel and financial resources increases significantly compared to the nonviolent conflict level. In addition, much more space and broadcasting time is made available for coverage of the conflict. On the other hand, the pressures of time and timeliness increase enormously. All in all, the journalistic system does not offer more auspicious preconditions for peace journalism than before wartime.

Preconditions of news production	Features facilitating peace journalism	Features hindering peace journalism
Journalistic system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allocation of substantial financial and personnel resources • Great amount of space and broadcasting time in news coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High time pressure, scarcely any time for a thorough investigation • Stronger orientation to classical news criteria
Individual characteristics of journalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing numbers of journalists who are experienced in reporting from combat zones, know how to cope with the risks of war and are capable of gathering information in highly restricted areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many reporters of the "parachutist type" with poor specific conflict competence • Potentially more journalists who are eager to use war as a stepping-stone in their career, who are more interested in sensationalism than in differentiation and search more for lurid stories from the battlefields than for background information
Lobbying, propaganda, information management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possibly propaganda is easier to identify in wartime than before and after war • At any rate, much more attention is directed to this topic. Coverage of the information management and propaganda attempts of conflict parties has significantly increased during the more recent major wars with Western participation (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Massive amounts of propaganda produced by all sides

Situation on-site		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heavy restrictions on journalists, attempts at intimidation, even blatant threats to use physical force • Tightened censorship • Under such circumstances, peace-oriented coverage of conflict parties, their actual interests and aims, the visible and invisible harm caused by war, but also of peace initiatives might hardly be realized • <i>Groupthink</i> effects (cf. Janis, 1982) between war correspondents could limit and distort their perception and evaluation of conflicts, e.g., with the possible result that certain modes and options of conflict resolution might be labeled as unacceptable from the outset
Public climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is not involved in the conflict: • In the case of violent escalation, the chances of public attention increase even without the involvement of own country • Initial impartiality in public discourse could open up perspectives for a peace discourse, e.g., by focusing on common rights and interests, by humanizing all parties, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is involved in the conflict: • Usually the development of a war discourse (cf. ASPR, 2003), accompanied by an antagonistic conceptualization of the conflict • Majority of journalists assimilate to war discourse or push it further • Explicit or implicit threat of sanctions for journalists who break with war discourse
Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is not involved in the conflict: • Attention and interest of the audience are more pronounced compared to a conflict with a low level of escalation • The audience is relatively impartial regarding the conflict parties and the options for conflict resolution, hence potentially open to solution-oriented coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If own country is involved in the conflict: • Due to the prevailing public climate and the social psychological mechanisms that incline most recipients to war discourse, the chances are low that solution-oriented coverage will gain broad acceptance

Table 2: Facilitating and hindering preconditions of news production in violent conflicts

Compared to the conflict stages before and after a war, in wartime we often find a numerical predominance of war reporters who are so-called "parachutists". This is the type of reporter hurrying from war zone to war zone, thus very experienced

in war reporting, but lacking expert knowledge of the specific conflict. His attention is directed to stories from the battlefield rather than to background information and long-term developments.

With regard to conflict reporters, I have elsewhere introduced the concepts of general conflict competence and specific conflict competence (Bläsi, 2004, 2006). *General conflict competence* means, on the one hand, the theoretical knowledge a journalist has about conflicts: types of conflict, conflict dynamics, methods and techniques of conflict resolution, etc. Furthermore, it encompasses certain social and self-reflexive skills: for example, the ability to empathize with people on-site and the ability to reflect on one's own biases. On the other hand, general conflict competence encompasses more practical know-how, e.g., knowing how to behave as a journalist in a conflict area. This includes, for example, knowing the necessary security precautions, the ability to investigate in a highly restricted environment and to deal successfully with concerted attempts by the conflict parties to influence news coverage. *Specific conflict competence* is the knowledge a journalist has about the concrete conflict and the conflict parties, including knowledge of a region's history, culture, religion, language, society, political and economic system, actors and their interests and motives.

According to this categorization, it can be assumed that in wartime more reporters are engaged who dispose of high practical conflict competencies, but low theoretical conflict competencies, rather low self-reflexive skills, and low specific conflict competencies. Moreover, within the group of *parachutists* we will presumably find more reporters with a basic motivation that is not really conducive for peace journalism. For example, if war reporting is primarily deemed to be a stepping-stone in one's career, or if searching for adventure and a craving for sensationalism are the main driving forces of journalists, then constructive conflict coverage cannot be expected.

Altogether, the characteristics of the predominant reporters in wartime make solution-oriented coverage far less probable than in nonviolent conflict stages. However, some features of de-escalation-oriented coverage, such as critical distance from the militants on all sides and an undistorted evaluation of the rights and aims of all sides, could be realized even by reporters lacking specific conflict competence and without any peace-related self-concept as a journalist. De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage (cf. chapter 6), as described by Wilhelm Kempf (ASPR, 2003), by and large meets the accepted standards of quality journalism. These standards have to be met even by journalists who report on war primarily to promote their own career. Otherwise they will fail to gain the recognition of their colleagues.

Nonetheless, de-escalation-oriented coverage is rarely to be observed in wartime. Besides the massive attempts by all conflict parties to influence media coverage, this is most notably due to the effects of the public climate. At the least this applies to conflicts where one's own country is actively involved.

In wartime, the entanglement of a society in the war typically triggers certain social psychological processes in its members. These processes involve cognitive and

emotional changes that diminish the chances for a realistic and self-critical evaluation of one's own actions and respect for the rights and aims of the opponents (ASPR, 2003). Unless these social psychological processes are not consciously reflected on and deconstructed, journalists – as members of their society – also undergo these changes. As a consequence, their conflict coverage is likely to be correspondingly biased. The change and convergence of the public climate in wartime is typically accompanied by negative sanctions for journalists who deviate from the public and journalistic mainstream (Bläsi, 2004, 2006). Thus, the prospects for balanced and unbiased coverage of the opponent and for criticism of their own side are reduced even more.

In contrast, the public climate and the closely linked behavior of the audience carry a different meaning for conflict coverage when one's own country is not directly involved in a conflict. In this case an increase in public awareness is more likely to go along with an unbiased attitude towards the conflict parties. In sum, the involvement or non-involvement of one's country can reverse the chances for peace journalism if we look at respectively nonviolent and violent conflicts. While in non-violent conflicts the chances for peace journalism increase if one's country is involved and decrease if one's country is not involved, it is exactly the other way around in violent conflicts.

4. Preconditions of news production in the aftermath of violent conflicts

Table 3 (p. 166f.) shows how the preconditions of news production affect the chances for peace journalism in the aftermath of violent conflicts.

After a violent conflict, the preconditions for news production appear comparatively auspicious regarding the implementation of solution-oriented conflict coverage. In this conflict stage, editorial demands more often permit free space for in-depth investigation and the depiction of processes and developments. The time and space available for conflict coverage, as well as the allocated personnel and financial resources, are reduced following the end of a war, but for quite some time they remain above the pre-war level.

The type of correspondent who reports from a postwar area presumably resembles the correspondent in a not-yet escalated conflict, possessing extensive specific conflict competence and interest in long-term developments. The information management of conflict parties and the mainstream of public discourse now aims at de-escalation, trust building and reconciliation with the former enemy. Hence, the chances are good for a kind of conflict coverage that humanizes all sides, focuses on the suffering and harmful effects of the war for all sides, reports on peace initiatives and reconciliation perspectives and points out the benefits of a jointly created future.

In this conflict stage solution-oriented conflict coverage can play an important role by facilitating the peace process in a proactive manner whilst not playing down existing differences or endorsing a naive "peace propaganda" that calls on the conflict parties to reconcile with each other without recognizing the complexity of the conflict.

Due to intensive reporting in wartime, audience interest in the course of the conflict is probably more marked than before the outbreak of war. It seems that changes in the political climate and the reorientation of public discourse will step-by-step increase the acceptance of solution-oriented conflict coverage – even if beforehand one's own country was involved in an antagonistically conceptualized and highly escalated conflict. Putting to rest possible doubts, recent studies have showed that the media are not only capable of producing solution-oriented coverage, but have already done so on a variety of occasions (Annabring, Bläsi & Möckel, 2004; Bläsi & Jaeger, 2004; Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf, Kondopoulou & Paskowski, 2005; Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Spohrs, 2005; Jaeger, 2005, 2009). However, the realization of postwar solution-oriented coverage is limited, inasmuch as the patterns of interpretation prevalent during a war usually cannot be very easily changed. This is especially true for conflicts where the wartime public climate was built upon societal beliefs associated with intractable negative cognitions and emotions towards the opponent (Bar-Tal, 2000a).

Preconditions of news production	Features facilitating peace journalism	Features hindering peace journalism
Journalistic system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More time for thorough investigation and background coverage • Diminished orientation to classical news criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interest of editorial departments decreases • Decreasing allocation of financial and personnel resources
Individual characteristics of journalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly correspondents with extensive knowledge of the country and its people • Presumably more journalists who are interested in long-term processes, specifically in the postwar development of the conflict parties, the society and its individual members 	
Lobbying, propaganda, information management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease in war propaganda • In the case of an ongoing peace process, political information management focuses on overcoming prejudices and the demonization of the other side 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of peace propaganda, of downplaying still existing differences, of ignoring traumas and the long-term damage that war has left behind
Situation on-site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political change and trust building usually lead to considerably improved working conditions for journalists 	

Public climate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness to peaceful conflict resolution • Peace initiatives are now presented in a positive way, serving as examples for others • No sanctions for journalists who report about the peace process, because they are now back in the mainstream of coverage 	
Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to intense coverage during periods of violent conflict, the audience is sensitized to and for some time interested in further developments • If the audience's country has been involved in conflict, a change in politics and public discourse gradually increases openness in the individual recipient for solution-oriented coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If the audience's country has not been involved in the conflict: • How long the audience will stay interested in postwar developments is open • Possibly after a while the audience may become satiated by coverage of this specific conflict and turn its attention to another conflict area^a • Thus, the time-frame for solution-oriented coverage that can reach a broad audience might be limited

- a. At the end of the 1990s, for example, the German media audience apparently experienced satiety with respect to reportage on the Balkan states after years of intensive coverage of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Today, the German public's interest in current developments in the Balkan states seems rather low. However, besides other factors, this might also be a result of the prevailing sort of post-war coverage.

Table 3: Facilitating and hindering preconditions of news production in the aftermath of violent conflicts

Case study of postwar coverage: Greek media after the fall of Milošević in 2000

Accordingly, historical examples show that up to now attempts at constructive postwar coverage remained mostly ambivalent, inasmuch as solution-oriented elements of reporting went together with persisting stereotypes of the other side. An instructive example is the Greek media discourse after the fall of former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in 2000. During the Kosovo war in 1999, Greek media reportage was clear-cut: pro-Serbia, anti-NATO (Kondopoulou, 2002). With respect to the Serbian people and Milošević, the Greek media expressed nearly unconditional solidarity. After the Serbian people overturned their own government, Greek media discourse had to be repositioned. The Greek media managed to develop a constructive stance towards the changing political climate in Serbia, inasmuch as solidarity with the Serbian population was maintained, but solidarity with Milošević and the former government was abandoned. While the Serbian people were followed sympathetically on their path of democratic transformation, Milošević was assigned the role of the despotic ruler who had inflicted great harm on his people. On the other hand, the Greek media could only very hesitantly distance themselves from the previous anti-NATO discourse and the conceptualiza-

tion of the "malevolent Albanians". Especially when conflicts between the different ethnic groups re-emerged, Greek media discourse quickly returned to the old patterns of black-and-white coverage (see Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf, Kondopoulou & Paskoski, 2005).

5. Implications

If the prerequisites of news production vary in the ways described above, depending on the conflict stage and the degree of involvement of one's own country, this clearly has implications for the practice of peace journalism.

5.1 Implications for the individual journalist

First, these implications can be considered from the perspective of the individual journalist. A journalist striving to do peace journalism should take into account that his efforts face different preconditions depending on the stage of a conflict. He should be aware that the chances of realizing a certain story are strongly influenced by these preconditions. The influences are noticeable throughout the entire chain of news production, news publication and news reception: They concern the possibilities of investigation and information gathering, of arousing interest in the editorial staff at home and of influencing public opinion.

The issue of changing prerequisites is nothing fundamentally new for experienced journalists. In principle, the same applies to a journalist trying to report on the machinations of investment bankers, to name a current and topical example. Before the worldwide financial crisis there were very different preconditions for producing news about the "activities of investment bankers" (for example, in terms of allocated resources, available broadcast time or number of lines, public climate, audience interest) compared to the preconditions at the zenith of the crisis or in the aftermath of the crisis.

Thus, we can act on the assumption that journalists are generally used to handling such changing preconditions. Nevertheless, it is certainly advantageous if journalists reporting from conflict areas have extensive knowledge about the specific preconditions of news production in times of escalating conflicts and war. Knowledge of possible constraints and hindrances constitutes the basis for developing creative counter-strategies (for a synopsis of possible counter-strategies see Bläsi, 2006).

5.2 Implications for the implementation of peace journalism in general

Besides the practical implications for individual journalists, the changing preconditions of news production entail more general theoretical considerations concerning the implementation of peace journalism. In the academic discussion of how to put the ideas of peace journalism into practice, so far the significance of differing

preconditions in differing conflict stages has scarcely been addressed. Taking for granted that these preconditions are indeed different depending on the conflict stage and the involvement of one's own country, one can ask if there might be both favorable time frames and rather adverse time-frames for the implementation of peace journalism.

As has been shown above, each conflict stage – nonviolent conflict, violent conflict and the aftermath of violent conflict – is accompanied by both specific facilitating and specific hindering preconditions. Therefore it cannot be expected that there will be any time frame that is clearly the most favorable one to put peace journalism into practice. Apart from that, it is understood that implementing peace journalism is not a matter only of identifying a particular most suitable conflict stage in order to concentrate all efforts on this stage. It is self-evident that the relevant considerations have to concern all conflict phases and possible levels of conflict intensity.

However, it seems that the focus of implementation has been much more on violent conflict phases than on nonviolent ones. When researchers and practitioners argue about the chances of peace journalism and talk about why the idea of peace journalism is so urgently needed and why it will undoubtedly fail, the subject matter at stake is usually war.

In the following, I will argue in favor of changing the main focus of consideration towards nonviolent conflict stages. The empirical work of the Constance Peace Research Group has shown that elements of peace journalism have already been realized in postwar periods (Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, 2005). Although studies in this field are too rare to draw final conclusions, such constructive approaches are probably more likely to be found in times of nonviolent conflict and in the aftermath of violent conflicts. This is at least suggested if we compare the results of the rather small body of research on the media coverage of nonviolent conflict stages with the results of the large body of research on the media coverage of wars (e.g., Carruthers, 2000; Eilders and Lüter, 2000; Small, 1994; Taylor, 1998). An explanation for this phenomenon might be that for several reasons (some of them named above) journalists have to work harder to do peace journalism within a war discourse than within a peace discourse. Comparing the characteristics of war and peace discourses, Wilhelm Kempf has concluded that solution-oriented conflict (cf. chapter 6) coverage can become widely accepted only in the aftermath of violent conflict (ASPR, 2003), thus pointing to the crucial role of public climate and the audience, to use the terminology presented above.

In the light of these findings, it seems rather surprising that efforts to put peace journalism into practice should start with a focus on wartime. To illustrate this point I will refer to the clearly different but still related topic of conflict intervention and violence prevention at the interpersonal level. It is clear that we need concepts, methods and techniques for direct intervention in violent conflicts, but at the same time it is indispensable to take measures in the field of violence prevention, e.g.,

to create arrangements and learning opportunities that reduce the probability of future violence. This is where a focus on nonviolent stages is crucial.

Learning from programs of violence prevention would mean to acknowledge that people can much more easily change their attitudes and behavior in times that are free of acute threats and fear than in times when they experience massive physical or mental threats.

The analogy I see with respect to the implementation of peace journalism is that a society, with all its subsystems, is much more likely to be prepared to accept the ideas and practices of peace journalism in a nonviolent conflict stage than in wartime. Hence it might be reasonable to focus more seriously on the implementation of peace journalism in nonviolent conflict stages than has been the case so far. I conclude that the chance to find exemplars of peace journalism in the next war increases almost proportionally with the occurrence and scope of peace journalism that can be observed in a society in peacetime before that next war. This is not to say that there is any kind of automatic link in the sense that when peace journalism is practiced in nonviolent periods it will also be practiced in wartime. The social psychological processes that take place in a society when it resorts to war cannot simply be switched off, and obviously there are still other hindrances, as described above. However, the assumption is that the chances for peace journalism to be practiced in wartime could be increased if journalists, editors, the public and the individual recipient could get used to it in nonviolent conflict stages, i.e., if the idea of peace journalism can be anchored in a society in peaceful times. In contrast, it is much more difficult to anchor this idea in wartime.

Taking into account that the still small community of practitioners and scholars striving for a broader implementation of peace journalism has only limited resources, it might be desirable to prioritize future efforts. For the reasons mentioned in this article, in my view practitioners and scholars would be well advised to give priority to the implementation of peace journalism in nonviolent conflict stages.

The media and the implementation of a European peace policy

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

The present paper deals with conceptions for EU media policy in the EU area (European integration, overcoming of national particularism), in the international sphere (overcoming of European cultural imperialism) and in conflict regions (EU or respectively OSCE missions) with the aim of employing news media for building lasting peace, breaking the spiral of violence, furthering non-violent conflict processes and reconciling conflict parties.

In order to achieve this, two problem areas are brought to the fore and discussed under the two aspects:

1. the "is" state and historical experiences and
2. the "ought" state and media policy recommendations.

These problem areas are, for one thing, the basic ability of the media to further peace, which will be addressed in terms of media-sociological and social-psychological aspects and analyzed on the basis of case studies. Another problem area is, second, the media policy instruments that can contribute to preventing conflict escalation and/or to building a constructive media landscape in post-war societies, by:

1. building awareness (e.g., training journalists, training NGO workers) and
2. creating suitable structures (e.g., strengthening public media, media monitoring, monitoring NGO media operations).

News media should thereby be understood not only as a communicator of EU peace policy to the European and international publics, but also as a critical regulatory mechanism for EU policy. In contrast to the reduction of security policy to mere military missions, the goals to be aimed at by a European security policy are located in the production and preservation of military and social peace (human security), the implementation of peaceful dispute settlement and the prohibition of violence. This includes not only *interstate*, but also *domestic* or societal conflict fields (need for equal rights and self-determination / co-determination / welfare / survival orientation and social relevance), as they are identified by Arno Truger (2008) as working areas of civil conflict management.

Media policy measures can therefore be related not only to EU media policy toward or respectively in crisis-torn countries and/or post-war societies. They must also include the EU media landscape itself, for the purpose of

- communicating the EU peace policy to EU citizens,
- creating a critical regulatory mechanism for EU policy, the underlying own interests and the resulting "collateral damage" and
- structuring the international media environment so that it has effects on national discourses in crisis countries and can exercise a moderating influence on them.

2. The peace mandate of the media

Media policy considerations for the implementation of EU peace policy necessarily move in a field of tension between the freedom of the press guaranteed by the constitutions of the EU member states and the peace mandate of the media that is anchored in numerous different international treaties and documents.

Thus, already Article 29¹ of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UN, 1948) limits the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19² to the effect that everyone also has duties to the community and is never entitled to exercise his rights and liberties in opposition to the aims and principles of the United Nations. Article 19³ of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (UN, 1966) stipulates that the right of freedom of expression can be limited by certain restrictions intended to protect the rights and reputations of others, national security and/or public order, public health and morals. Article 20⁴ of the same agreement contains a legal prohibition of war propaganda and incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence. Article 3⁵ of the *UNESCO Media Declaration* of 1978 (UNESCO, 1979) not only establishes that the mass media must make an important contribution to strengthening peace and international understanding,

1 Wording: (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

2 Wording: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

3 Wording: (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 1. For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 2. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

4 Wording: (1) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. (2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

it also specifies this peace mandate to the effect that incitement to war, racism and human rights violations are to be opposed, and information must be propagated that sensitizes the citizens of countries to the needs of others. To be furthered are respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals, as well as the reduction of international tensions and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The legal anchoring of the media peace mandate in international law and its practical implementation are, however, two different things. The potential of the media to influence public opinion was recognized already very early on, and the history of (war) propaganda is just as old as the history of the press. Compared with the enormous expenditure that, at the latest since World War I, has been made to optimize propaganda strategies, military media management and psychological warfare, efforts to utilize the media as instruments for constructive conflict management and peace-keeping have taken a back seat. To be sure, there is a vast amount of literature that critically examines the functionalization of the media for war propaganda – not only by dictatorial regimes, but also by democratic states. However, it was only toward the end of the Twentieth Century that peace researchers, media scholars and journalists focused their attention on the question of how the media could be used not just as a catalyst for conflict escalation, but also as a catalyst for the de-escalation of conflicts and for peaceful dispute settlement.

One of the first scholars to investigate the significance of the media as a form of modern diplomacy was Yoel Cohen (1986). In her book *Media Diplomacy*, she distinguished three types of relationship between media and diplomacy: media as information sources, media as communication channels between decision-makers and media as a means to secure public support. According to Wolfsfeld (2004), the media enable the political elites that control them to influence peoples' convictions and the resulting actions. Lumsden (1997) concludes that in peacekeeping the international community must not limit itself to efforts to promote satisfactory social and economic conditions. It must rather also offer citizens ways of interpreting the world that make possible enduring peace. For Roach (1993) this means primarily containing the readiness to go to war by reducing enemy images, a task for which the media are an indispensable instrument. Terzis & Vassiliadou (2004) hold that the media can make an essential contribution to peace-building by supporting stability, as well as conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation.

-
- 5 Wording: (1) The Mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war. (2) In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are *inter alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspiration, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of the policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes.

3. Models of peace journalism

People base their actions not on the objective nature of things in their environment, but rather on the meaning they ascribe to them (Blumer, 1973). The manner in which media construe social reality is therefore not without consequences for the developmental tendencies that this reality unfolds: For, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 572).

According to the current state of media effects research, the media make a further contribution to the social construction of reality, for one thing, by introducing specific topics into public discourse (agenda-setting) and, for another, by the way they treat these topics (framing). These two processes can also all too easily transform the media into catalysts of conflict escalation, and we must start with them if they are instead to make a contribution to peace-building and reconciliation.

The *agenda-setting* theory goes back to McCombs & Shaw (1972) and attributes the influence of the media to decisions about which stories are newsworthy and what importance and how much space should be assigned to them. Negativism, personalization and elite orientations are regarded as prominent news factors that make events worth reporting. As Galtung (1998) shows, already these news factors form a cognitive frame in which an image of reality arises that divides the world into elite and peripheral countries – and at the same time into good and evil (cf. chapter 2).

No less fateful is the widespread belief among journalists and media producers in the necessity of simplifications that literally make a norm out of the black-and-white stereotyping of a polarizing "we against them" journalism.

Consequently, it is above all the news factors placed by Galtung (2002) at the center of his model of peace journalism that Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) summarize with the following formula: "Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict".

Framing: According to Entman (1993), the concept of framing, going back to Goffman (1974), means "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". It is a matter of how information is presented, which aspects are emphasized, which are not dealt with, and also of under what heading it is represented, which words, conceptions and metaphors are employed, which rhetorical and stylistic means are applied and which narrative form is chosen (cf. Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).

Depending on the type of mental model used to interpret them, the same situations can be placed in a completely different light. The escalation dynamics of conflicts are, according to Deutsch (1973), decisively influenced by whether a conflict is

interpreted as a competitive (win-lose model) or as a cooperative process (win-win model). Competitive conflicts have a tendency to expand and escalate and go together with typical perceptual distortions that according to Kempf (2002a) have effects on media coverage and at the same time represent a motor of conflict escalation.

Correspondingly, it is these misperceptions that Kempf (in ASPR, 2003) places at the center of his model of a constructive conflict coverage that aims at the deconstruction of war discourses and their gradual transformation into peace and ultimately reconciliation discourses and/or works against the escalation of societal discourses into war discourses.

4. War discourse vs. peace discourse

A peace or reconciliation discourse does *not* mean a discourse *about* peace or respectively reconciliation, and especially not a discourse that harmonizes contradictions or suppresses conflicts, etc. It is a matter of *how* to deal with conflict, and correspondingly we can probably best characterize the various discourse forms by the questions they focus on.

- In a *war* discourse, it is a matter of "Who is guilty?" and "How can he be stopped?"
- In contrast, a *peace* discourse asks "What is the problem?" and "How can it be solved?"
- It is first of all a *reconciliation* discourse that centers on the questions "Who is the other?" and "How can we meet each other with mutual respect?"

The choice of a suitable discourse form is of essential importance for the developmental dynamics of peace processes. Mistakes in choosing a discourse form can easily create overly optimistic expectations. Their disappointment provokes ill feeling in the population and ultimately has the consequence that the discourse turns into a renewed war discourse.

Thus, e.g., Mandelzis (2007) shows how an unrealistic media discourse in Israel during the Oslo Peace Process led to its collapse. Pertinent issues and interests that were not clarified in the Oslo Peace Accords disappeared from view behind the euphoric illusion that peace had been achieved and now only had to be secured. The question of *how* peace could be secured (in accord with the above-named news factors) was, however, not posed as a question of the structures that had to be created to make it possible for Israelis and Palestinians to live together in peace ("What is the problem, and how can it be solved?"). Rather, it was personalized and transformed into the question of *who* endangered peace ("Who is the guilty party, and how can we stop him?"). Thereby a discourse *about* the endangered peace regressed into a form of war discourse and set the escalation dynamic in motion again. Consistent with the perceptual distortions typical of escalation, blame was sought in the "others", and the search for the guilty parties

intensified into a search for the "enemy". The enemy was eventually identified as Yassir Arafat (personalization), whereby the Israelis deprived themselves of the counterpart who (still) disposed of sufficient authority in Palestinian society so that together with him a peace process could have been started and organized.

5. Journalistic competencies and production conditions

Only too often, conventional journalism confuses conflicts with zero-sum games in which two parties fight for the same goal, namely to win. The focus of the coverage is placed on the conflict arena. Conflict causes and solutions are sought on the battlefield. What interests the media is the question of war guilt ("Who cast the first stone?") and of who gains the upper hand in a war (Galtung, 1998). The consequence of this is that as a rule conflicts only attract media attention when they have already escalated so much that they can be interpreted in terms of this model.

In contrast to this, quality journalism must make communication channels available that work against inaccurate perceptions and make analyses of conflicts. Therefore many authors, such as, e.g., Howard (2002), Kempf (in ASPR, 2003), Bläsi (2006) or Lynch (2007), see the necessity of basic training for journalists active in crisis regions. If they dispose of the necessary conflict theoretical and social psychological competencies, they can influence public opinion in favor of peace-building.

An improvement in the training of journalists is to be sure necessary for raising the quality of conflict and crisis journalism – but not sufficient. Hanitzsch (2007) rightly points out that it is an illusion to assume that journalists would merely have to change their attitudes and behavior. Besides journalists' qualifications, there are a great number of structural influencing factors in the process of news production that impose constraints on the work of journalists. These factors include, according to Bläsi (2006), among others: lack of space and time pressure, editorial work routines, deficiencies in cooperation between editors and correspondents, the instrumentalization of the media by the conflict parties, the influence exerted on coverage by public relations, propaganda and information management, the hindrances to coverage by censorship, restriction of travel freedom and the personal harassment of journalists by the conflict parties, inadequate access to information, unsatisfactory infrastructure, and problematic security situations in crisis regions, as well as group-think effects within the community of international correspondents, etc. (cf. chapter 7).

Because of these factors, Hanitzsch thinks that in principle the media cannot constructively contribute to peace-building and conflict prevention. In contrast to Hanitzsch, Bläsi develops concrete strategies for change intended to restructure the journalistic action frame by altering structures, routines, competencies or attitudes toward the object, as well as coping strategies that show how it is possible to act constructively even under fixed framing conditions. These strategies, which for

reasons of space cannot be described here in detail,⁶ include a large variety of actors and groupings that must be the bearers of endeavors to promote change. Among them are, besides conflict reporters themselves, also media owners, publishers, managers and (chief-) editors, universities and educational institutions, university teachers and instructors, societal institutions, associations and unions, NGOs and campaigns, as well as politics and the economy.

6. Implementation of constructive conflict coverage

At the same time, Bläsi shows that the chances of implementing constructive conflict coverage vary in the different phases of conflict (pre-war, war and post-war) and depend as well on the extent that one's own country is involved in the conflict (cf. chapter 10). Thereby he draws on Kempf's (in ASPR, 2003; cf. chapter 6) two-step model for the transformation of war discourse into peace discourse.

In the first step, during the 'hot' phase of a conflict, a limitation to de-escalation oriented conflict coverage is appropriate: objective, detached, fair and respectful to all sides. It should not fan the conflict, but rather take a critical distance from the belligerents of every stripe and make the public aware of the high price violent conflict resolution imposes on all participants. Proposals for solutions still do not seem appropriate. At this point, the risk is especially great that the conflict parties will rashly dismiss coverage as implausible or as hostile counter-propaganda. Therefore, in this phase the chief aim can only be to find a way out of the fixation on violence and mutual destruction and to alert the public to an external viewpoint that can deconstruct the conflict parties' antagonistic conceptions of reality and their polarization.

Only in a second step can journalists shift to solution-oriented conflict coverage. Here it is a matter of a constructive process following deconstruction. It must work toward the rapprochement of the opponents and seek paths out of the conflict that the parties can take cooperatively.

According to Kempf, however, this step can only gain majority support if the conflict has emerged from the hot phase and the parties no longer automatically perceive every voice for moderation as hostile. After that, however, it is urgently necessary that the phase of conflict management and rapprochement be initiated and supported – among other things by conflict coverage that actively seeks peaceful alternatives and actors and dedicates itself to the question of how to start peace processes and how to build peace.

Whether solution-oriented coverage is realizable in not yet escalated conflicts strongly depends, according to Bläsi (2006), on own participation. If one's country is involved in a conflict, Bläsi sees initially quite good chances. In such a situation, reporters should have high conflict competence and a supportive self-understand-

6 See on this Bläsi (2006, 259ff.).

ing of their role, have available the necessary financial resources and sufficient time and space and at the same time have an interested, but still relatively unbiased public. Solution-oriented coverage becomes, however, more difficult the more antagonistic conceptualizations become established and the nearer the conflict moves toward violent escalation. If to the contrary one's own country is not involved in the conflict, there are fewer chances for constructive coverage, to the extent that fewer resources are made available for coverage and there is a lack of public interest in the conflict.

According to Bläsi, in the case of war some of the production conditions are reversed. To be sure, the investment of financial and personal resources climbs substantially in comparison to the pre-war phase and thereby improves the conditions, but simultaneously, however, time and the pressure for currentness increases so much that overall the journalistic system offers no favorable frame for constructive coverage. To the extent that one's society is involved in the conflict or sympathizes with one of the conflict parties, the public climate will also be detrimental to solution-oriented coverage. Insofar as it is not consciously reflected on and deconstructed, the cognitive and emotional changes that one's involvement in conflict entails make realistic and self-critical evaluation of one's own actions just as unlikely as respecting the opponent's rights and aims.

In the post-war phase, the conditions are the most favorable for producing solution-oriented coverage. Insofar as peace is really on the political agenda, editorial requirements also leave more free space for doing background research and portraying processes and developments. The available space, as well as the personnel and financial resources are of course reduced after a war, but for some time they will remain above the level of a not yet escalated conflict. As well, the influence exerted by the conflict partners is now oriented to de-escalation, reducing enemy images and building confidence in the former opponent. Thereby the signs are good for coverage that humanizes all sides, addresses the suffering and war damage on all sides and allocates space to reconciliation initiatives. The interest of the news audience in the conflict could even be higher than in the pre-war phase, and it can be assumed that the change of the political situation and the reorientation of public discourse will gradually cause an increase in public acceptance of solution-oriented coverage – as Bläsi emphasizes: even in cases where one's country was entangled in a previously antagonistically conceptualized and violently escalated conflict.

7. Economic pressures

Critics sometimes also claim that economic pressures render peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage impossible. The necessity of ensuring large editions and high audience ratings speaks against departing from the traditional news factors, independently of how counter-productive they prove to be for non-violent processes of conflict and peace-building. Thus, e.g., Hanitzsch (2007) points out

that the news factors correspond with the expectations of the media public and that awakening awareness is a central characteristic of the news factors. In order to be able to survive in the marketplace of public awareness, the media would therefore have to stick to the news factors and could hardly afford to deviate from them, since they would otherwise undermine the economic basis upon which they are compelled to operate.

Newer empirical studies – among others of German press coverage on France after the Second World War (Jaeger, 2003, 2005, 2009; cf. chapter 5)), as well as on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Annabring, 2000) – indicate, however, that news factors are by no means unvarying constants, but rather are quite flexibly handled by the media.

The media public also orients itself much less to news factors than is commonly assumed. Thus Wolling (2002) was able to show that not only for the overall evaluation, but also for the frequency of use of a news broadcast, information quality is of decisive significance, while presentation quality plays only a small role and sensationalism none at all. Eilders (1997) showed that previous political knowledge limits the significance of news factors. The better informed the recipients, the more they will dispose of their own conceptions of what aspects of events are relevant for them. Bläsi (2006) infers from this that it is inaccurate to assume that by focusing on news factors the media only satisfy the expectations and interests of the public, at least in the case of the well-informed segment of the public.

The judgment can thus no longer be maintained that an increase in media complexity would be contrary to the wishes and needs of the public. A reader survey conducted by Weber (2003) showed that the readers of daily newspapers want among other things more background information, critique, contextualization, orientation and political coverage less oriented to established institutions. In a range of experimental studies (Bläsi et al., 2005; Möckel, 2009; Schäfer, 2006; Sparr, 2004; Spohrs, 2006), it has been shown that a less simplifying de-escalation oriented coverage is at least as well accepted by readers as conventional conflict coverage and in part even arouses greater interest in additional information (cf. chapter 6).

The economic pressures that oppose peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage thus result less from the dependency of the media on their public, and much more from their dependency on advertising revenues and the resulting adjustment pressure on media concerns to bring their coverage into conformity with the interests and the ideologies of economic, political and military elites (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Insofar, Hanitzsch (2007) is not entirely wrong when he fears that "a peaceful culture is the precondition of peace journalism rather than its outcome". It will probably only be possible to comprehensively realize peace journalism and constructive conflict coverage when peace is actually on the political agenda, or expressed differently: Whether the media can function as supporters of an EU peace policy will depend essentially on how serious the EU actually is about a peace policy.

As long as media concerns and journalists continue to believe in the news value of polarizing and escalation-oriented coverage, it is, however, to be feared that in the future their negative impact on the quality of coverage will continue to intensify in the course of increasing media privatization and market competition. As Haußecker (2007) has shown based on a comparison of the news broadcasts of public and private television stations in Germany, it is precisely the private stations that tend to a destructive emotionalization of their coverage. Privatization is no guarantee for the independence of the media, but rather in some cases distorts coverage still more. Strengthening the public media thus appears just as indispensable to supporting EU peace policy as establishing an early-warning system for the escalation of media discourse.

8. Structuring a constructive media environment

According to Howard (2002), the media sector must display three characteristics in order to make quality journalism possible and contribute to peace building: competence, freedom and diversity.

Competence means that journalists are familiar with the quality norms of journalism and have a high level of expert knowledge. Competence thereby also means neutrality and accuracy and therefore requires qualifications that go beyond journalistic abilities in a more narrow sense.

Journalists are not outside of society, and in escalating conflicts they are prone to the same misperceptions as other people. To correct these misperceptions, to counteract the distortions of news selection, to avoid conventional black-and-white media depictions, to not just reduce conflicts to the opposition between good and evil, but rather to do justice to their complexity and contradictoriness, to not be satisfied with mere plausibility, but rather to question precisely the plausible explanations – all this requires conflict-theoretical competence that is not taught in conventional journalistic training and must therefore be learned in further educational programs.

Of course, as a corrective for what is true or false and which reality constructions are appropriate or not, journalism has available only the existing knowledge for its everyday work routine. However, the existing knowledge also includes insights gained by peace and conflict research about alternatives to violence, as well as knowledge of the internal logic and dynamics of conflicts, etc. If the realization of journalistic quality standards is not to be left to chance, and balanced coverage that contributes to peace-building is to be achieved, it is urgently necessary to teach journalists and editors conflict-theoretical skills.

The media autonomy addressed by Howard is an important pre-condition for securing the functioning of civil society, and also for giving a forum to critical voices. Through press diversity it should be guaranteed that a variety of opinions are fa-

miliar to the public, so that it becomes possible for citizens to make their own decisions on the basis of a full range of information.

Not only the freedom but also the diversity of the media is strongly limited by social pressures for conformity, which in some cases means that in the national media of the EU member states not even the diversity of views and perspectives held within the EU are transparent. Thus, e.g., the opposition of the Greek public to the Kosovo War (cf. Kondopoulou, 2002), as well as the abstaining of the Greek government from participation in offensive military operations, could quite well have served as a corrective for the one-sided enemy-image constructions that dominated the media landscape of the NATO countries participating in the war.

The heterogeneity of the EU with regard to the interest situation of its member states and their historical, cultural and political affinity to the conflict parties could be seen as a comparative advantage of the EU in situations like this that could lend it a great gain in credibility if it is used appropriately, and should not be regarded only as a "weakness" of the EU in regard to its military operational capabilities.

Further preconditions that can prove problematic above all for the reconstruction of the media landscape in post-war societies and the success chances of peacekeeping missions are credibility, utilization and upholding democratic standards.

Credibility and utilization are, according to Lehmann (1999), basic preconditions to obtain the support of and acceptance by the local population, and experiences with peacekeeping missions have shown the importance of support from the civilian population. Without it, the success chances of a mission fall, and the peacekeeping mission exposes itself to the danger of attacks coming from the local population. As well, excessive expectations and the disappointment resulting from them often cause ill will in the local population, which can endanger the success of a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, it is indispensable for success that the population be informed about events, enlightened as to the background and at the same time provided with interpretation possibilities that further the acceptance of a peacekeeping mission. Only when a relevant share of the population utilize the media entrusted with this task can they actually perform their function and serve as an orientation point for public opinion.

However, the credibility of the media depends quite decisively on whether or not they are perceived by the population as externally controlled. As Gutscher (2006) has shown in a comparative study of the US media strategy in Germany (1945-1948) and the UN media strategy in Kosovo (1999-2002), the media supported by the USA and respectively the UN initially had credibility problems that could only be reduced through increased employment of local media staff.

The necessity of upholding democratic standards results directly from the task of peace building in the sense of building an enduring peace. This is, e.g., spelled out by Handrick (2005) as the effort of the international community of states to break the spiral of violence in conflict- and post-war regions, to shift the conduct

of conflict to a non-violent level and to guide conflicts to an enduring solution by constructing democratic institutions and norms.

The media can maintain their credibility and develop an exemplary role for the development of democratic structures only to the extent that they themselves meet democratic standards. This means, particularly, including members of the affected society in the conceptualization of the media, which was, e.g., in Kosovo not sufficiently the case.

9. Media strategies to rebuild the media landscape in post-war societies – A comparative study

The war left behind a media landscape that was brought into line not only in Germany, but also in Kosovo. The USA's media policy in post-war Germany was, in the view of Gutscher (2006), however, not only more comprehensive, but also more restrictive than that of the UN or the OSCE in Kosovo. It proved on this basis to also be more effective in regard to the quality of coverage.

In post-war Germany, the arrangements were far better for the competence of journalists and the quality of coverage than in Kosovo. Since the monitoring and discretionary powers of the occupation power were much more extensive, the freedom of coverage (to the advantage of democratic re-education, but also to the advantage of American interests) was, however, strongly limited.

In Kosovo, media freedom (in the absence of censorship) was, to the contrary, more extensive. This opened the floodgates, however, to destructive coverage and thereby detracted from the function of the media as an instrument of peace. This was still further exacerbated by deficiencies in competence that were caused by the inadequate training of the journalists and the inadequate diversity of coverage due to the neglect of minorities.

A decisive difference between the rebuilding of the media landscape in Germany and in Kosovo consists, according to Gutscher (2006), in the extent of the restrictions imposed by the USA and respectively the United Nations. In Kosovo, numerous media organizations started their activities completely independently of the UN media policy, and the majority of these media only very inadequately complied with the basic principles of independence and professionalism. In the American zone of post-war Germany, to the contrary, all media had to be licensed by the occupation authority and were subject to strict regulation, as well as continuous monitoring. Thereby there was of course a delay in the development of the German media system; however, the uncontrolled proliferation of unprofessional and dependent media as in Kosovo was successfully prevented.

Beyond this, the control organs whose duty was to introduce regulations for the organization of the media sector and norms of coverage and to guarantee their implementation had much broader operational possibilities in post-war Germany. While the Americans soon set requirements for the establishment of print media

and could set accents, the control organs in Kosovo could only exercise an observer role and retroactively attempt to effectively correct the situation.

While in Germany, the USA rigorously used the control instruments of censorship, licensing and personnel selection, in Kosovo the control instruments were limited to issuing licenses to radio stations, as well as the introduction of a behavior code for journalists and the prohibition of hate speech, which unlike in Germany were not enforced through censorship, however. Instead, officials hoped for voluntary compliance with norms. There were of course various sanctioning possibilities for violations by broadcasters that extended as far as rescinding licenses, but they were used inadequately, and a large number of broadcasters that operated without a license, as well as the print media, that needed no license, were practically out of reach for sanctioning measures.

10. Summary

To summarize, the following recommendations are offered for an EU media policy:

1. For rebuilding the media landscape in post-war societies:
Rigor with regard to licensing and selecting personnel; privileging public media organizations as opposed to privatization; including members of the conflict society in the conception of the media and media legislation; increased employment of local media staff, as well as conflict-theoretical training of journalists and their sensitization to escalation-oriented misperceptions.
2. For structuring the media landscape of the EU:
Journalistic training (see above); strengthening the public media; media monitoring to identify tendencies such as that of the European media to begin to take sides in developing or re-igniting conflicts and/or to reduce the conflict to a moral antagonism of good and evil; as well as the establishment of an early-warning system for the escalation of discourses and conflicts.

Of course *not* to be seen as the aim perspective of these measures is the creation of a European consensus on how the world is to be divided into good and evil. It is rather suggested to use the heterogeneity of the EU to identify the complexity of the problem situation and to create an international media environment that does not sharpen destructive tendencies by coalition building, but rather alerts the conflict parties (and also the EU itself) to the necessity of constructive conflict management.

References

- Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and submission to group pressure. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs*, 70, No. 9.
- Allan, S. (1999). *News culture*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Allen, T. & Seaton, J. (eds.) (1999). *The media of conflict: War reporting and representations of ethnic violence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- ami-info (1999). Kosovo – NATO-Krieg in Europa. 29. Jg., 7/99.
- Annabring, U. (2000). *Protagonisten und Konfliktkonstellationen im israelisch-palästinensischen Friedensprozeß*. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Annabring, U., Bläsi, B., Möckel, J. (2004). The German press coverage of former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milosevic. *Conflict & communication online*, 3(1+2).
- Annabring, U., Dittmann, R., Kempf, W. (2005). Die kognitive Repräsentation von Nachkriegskonflikten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Mainstream-Diskurs und abweichender Berichterstattung. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (ed.). *Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Berlin: regener, 235-254.
- Annabring, U., Spohrs, M. (2004). Reception and acceptance of constructive conflict coverage – Design of an experimental study. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr. 56. Berlin: regener.
- Ark Surveys, (1998). The 1998 referendums. Downloaded on April 16, 2005 from <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm>
- ASPR (Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution) (ed.) (2003). *Constructive conflict coverage. A social psychological approach*. Berlin: regener.
- Ball-Rokeach, S. J., & DeFleur, M. L. (1976). A dependency model of mass-media effects. *Communication Research* 3, 3-21.
- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3, 193-209.
- Baran, S. & Davis, D. (1995). *Mass communication theory*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Bar Tal, D. (1998a). The rocky road toward peace: Beliefs on conflict in Israeli textbooks. In: *Journal of Peace Research*, 35, 6, 723-742.
- Bar-Tal, D. (1998b). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, 9/1, 22-50.

- Bar-Tal, Daniel (2000a). *Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2000b). Die Kultur der Gewalt. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Konflikt und Gewalt: Ursachen – Entwicklungstendenzen – Perspektiven*. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik, Band 5. Münster: Agenda, 66-81.
- Bateson, G., Jackson, D. D., Haley, J., Weakland, J. (1956). Toward a theory of schiziphrenia. *Behavioral Science*, 1, 251-264.
- Beham, M. (1996). *Kriegstromein. Medien, Krieg und Politik*. München: dtv.
- Bell, M. (1997). TV news: how far should we go? *British Journalism Review*, 8/1.
- Berelson, B. (1949). What missing the newspaper means. In: P. F. Lazarsfeld, & F. N. Stanton (eds.). *Communication research*. New York: Harper, 111-129.
- Berelson, B. R., Lazarsfeld, P.F. & McPhee. W. N. (1954). *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berger, P. & Luckmann, Th. (1969). *Die soziale Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Bernays, E. (1923). *Crystallizing public opinion*. New York: Boni and Liveright.
- Bernays, E. (1928). *Propaganda*. New York: H. Liveright.
- Bilke, N. (2002). *Friedensjournalismus. Wie Medien deeskalierend berichten können*. Münster: agenda.
- Bläsi, B. (2006). Keine Zeit, kein Geld, kein Interesse ...? Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Anspruch und medialer Wirklichkeit. Berlin: regener.
- Bläsi, B. & Jaeger, S. (2004). Katalog konstruktiver Aspekte in der Nachkriegsberichterstattung. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 54. Berlin: regener.
- Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W., Kondopoulou, M. & Paskoski, D. (2005). Konstruktive Aspekte des serbischen, deutschen und griechischen Nachrichtendiskurses – qualitative Vergleichsstudien. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.). *Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Berlin: regener, 149-200.
- Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W. & Möckel, J. (2004). A catalogue of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented aspects of conflict coverage. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 53. Berlin: regener.
- Bläsi, B., Jaeger, S., Kempf, W. & Spohrs, Monika (2005). Glaubwürdigkeit und Attraktivität von eskalations- und deeskalationsorientierten Nachrichtentexten. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.). *Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Berlin: regener, 203-234.
- Blumer, H. (1973). Der methodologische Standort des symbolischen Interaktionismus. In: Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen (ed.). *Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit*. 1. Symbolischer Interaktionismus und Ethnomethodologie. Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 80-146.
- Blumler, J. & Katz, E. (1974). *The uses of mass communications*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Bußler, I. (1998). *Deeskalierende Friedens- und Konfliktberichterstattung. Eine kommentierte Bibliographie*. Arbeitspapiere der LAG Friedenswissenschaft in Nordrhein-Westphalen. Fern-Universität Hagen.

- Cantril, H. (1940). *The invasion from Mars: A study in the psychology of panic*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Carruthers, S. (2000). *The media at war. Communication and conflict in the twentieth century*.
- Chaffee, S. H. & Hochheimer, J. L. (1985). The beginnings of political communication research in the United States. In: E. Rogers & F. Balle (eds.). *The media revolution in America and in Western Europe*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 267-296.
- Cambridge, V. (2002). Milestones in communication and developments. In: Kamilipour, Y. (ed.). *Transnational media and global communication in the age of information revolution*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 141-160.
- Capella, J. N., Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *The spiral of cynism. The press and the public good*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- CNN (2001). Internet proves vital communications tool. Retrieved on September, 13, 2001 from <http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/09/12/attacks.internet/>
- Chomsky, N. & Herman, E. (1988). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Cohen, B. (1963). *The press and foreign policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 20, 37-46.
- Cohen, M. (2002) Rechov sumsum/shara'a simsim a viewership study. Unpublished research paper.
- Cohen, Y. (1986). *Media diplomacy. The foreign office in the mass communication age*. London: Frank Cass.
- Conflict & Peace (1998). *The peace journalism option*. Taplow Court: Conflict & Peace Courses.
- Cornelius, S. (2001). Conflict Resolution Network Australia: Innovative Approaches to Working with the Media. *Interaction*, 14/ 3/4, 16-17 and 40-41.
- CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) (2003). On assignment: a guide to reporting in dangerous situations. http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/safety/journo_safe_guide.pdf
- Creel, G. (1920). *How we advertised America*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Creighton, J. L. (1992). Schlag nicht die Türe zu! Konflikte aushalten lernen. Reinbek: RoRo.
- Deichmann, Th. (1997). Mehr Schock. *Der Standard*, 10.1.1997.
- Des Forges, A. (1999). *Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved March 3, 2004 from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/>
- Deutsch, M. (1973). *The resolution of conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dewey, J. (1939). *Freedom and culture*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Dix, S. (1995). *Südkurier: 1945 – 1952; bewegte Anfangsjahre einer Regionalzeitung*. Konstanz: UVK
- Doob, L. (1935). *Propaganda: Its psychology and technique*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Eckstein Jackson, L. (2006). *Moral disengagement: Media use and the support of war*. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller
- Eckstein Jackson, L. & Sparr, J. L. (2005) Introducing a new scale for the measurement of moral disengagement in peace and conflict research. *Conflict & communication online*, 4(2).

- Eilders, C. (1997). Nachrichtenfaktoren und Rezeption. Eine empirische Analyse zur Auswahl und Verarbeitung politischer Information. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Eilders, C. (2001). Conflict and consonance in Media opinion: Political positions of five German quality newspapers. Discussion Paper P 01-702. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- Eilders, C. & Lüter, A. (2000). Research note: Germany at war. *European Journal of Communication*, 15(3), 415-428.
- Ellul, J. (1964). *Propaganda: The formation of men's attitudes*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43/4, 51-58.
- Fahrer, B. (2000). Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung? Inhaltsanalyse ausgewählter Medien/Presseberichte zum israelisch-palästinensischen Friedensprozeß. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson.
- Früh, W. & Schönbach, K. (1982). Der dynamisch-transaktionale Ansatz. Ein neues Paradigma der Medienwirkungen. In: *Publizistik* 1-2/1982, 74-88.
- Galtung, J. (1998). Friedensjournalismus: Warum, was, wer, wo, wann? In: Kempf, W., Schmidt-Regener, I. (eds.). *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Münster: Lit., 3-20.
- Galtung, J. (2002). Peace journalism – A challenge. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*, Vol. II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 259-272.
- Galtung, J., Vincent, R. C. (1992). *Global Glasnost. Toward a New World Information and Communication Order?* Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Gerbner, G., Gross L., Morgan M., & Signorielli, N. (1986). Living with television: The dynamics of the cultivation process, In: Bryant, J. & Zillmann, D. (eds.). *Perspectives on Media Effects*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 17-40.
- Gilboa, E. (1998). Secret diplomacy in the television age. In: *Gazette*, Vol. 60(3), 211-225.
- Gitlin, T. (1995). The political economy approach. In: Boyd-Barrett, O. & Newbold, C. (eds.). *Approaches To Media: A Reader*. London: Arnold, 186-192.
- Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory – strategies for qualitative research*. New York: de Gruyter.
- Glasl, F., (1992). *Konfliktmanagement*. Bern: Haupt.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis. An essay on the organization of experience*. London: Harper & Row.
- Gredelj, S. (1998). Serbische Medien und Kriegstreiberei im ehemaligen Jugoslawien. In: Kempf, W., Schmidt-Regener, I. (Hrsg.). *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Münster: Lit., 57-66.
- Gutscher, S. (2006). Potential und Grenzen der Medien als Friedensinstrument in Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften. Ein Vergleich zwischen Deutschland (1945-1948) und dem Kosovo (1999–2002). Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Hackett, Robert A. (2006). Is peace journalism possible? Three frameworks for assessing structure and agency in news media. *Conflict & communication online*, 5(2).

- Hallin, D. (1986). *The uncensored war: The media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hamdorf, D. (2000). Reduced view of a multidimensional reality. The Northern Ireland peace treaty in *Berliner Zeitung* – an example of peace journalism?. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr. 51. Konstanz: KOPS.
- Hamdorf, D. (2001). Zweidimensionales Bild der Wirklichkeit. Das Nordirland Friedensabkommen in der *Berliner Zeitung* als ein Beispiel für Friedensjournalismus? In: Richter, J. (Hrsg.). *Deutschland: (un)bewältigte Vergangenheiten*. Tübingen: DGVt, 141-150.
- Handrick, S. (2005). Das Kosovo und die internationale Gemeinschaft: Nation-building versus peace-building? In: *Studien zur internationalen Politik*, Heft 2/2005.
- Hanitzsch, Th. (2007). Situating peace journalism in journalism studies: A critical appraisal. *Conflict & communication online*, 6(2).
- Hauß Becker, N. (2007). Terrorismus in Fernsehnachrichten. Eine Analyse der Berichterstattung über Terroranschläge am Beispiel der Ereignisse in Kenia. *Conflict & communication online*, 6(1).
- HIK (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research) (2008). *Conflict barometer 2008. 17th annual conflict analysis*. Heidelberg University.
http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2008.pdf
- Herman, E.S. & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Herzog, H. (1944). What do we really know about daytime serial listeners? In: Lazarsfeld, P. F. & Stanton, F. N. (eds.). *Radio research 1942-43*. New York: Duell, Pearce and Sloan, 3-33.
- Hieber, L. (2001). *Lifeline media: Reaching populations in crisis: A Guide to developing media projects in conflict situations*. Geneva: Media Action International (MAI).
- Hovland, C. I., Lumsdaine, A. & Sheffield, F. (1949). *Experiments on mass communication*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Howard, R. (2002). *An operational framework for media and peacebuilding*. Vancouver: IM-PACS.
- Howard, R., Rolt, F., van de Veen, H. & Verhoeven, J. (eds.) (2003). *The Power of the media: A handbook for peacebuilders*. Retrieved from the SFCG Website January 20, 2004 from http://www.xs4all.nl/%7Econflic1/Media_book_nieuw/a_b_contents.htm
- Hug, D. M., 1997. *Konflikte und Öffentlichkeit. Zur Rolle des Journalismus in öffentlichen Konflikten*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hume, M. (1997). *Whose war is it anyway? The dangers of Journalism of Attachment*. London: BM Informinc.
- Jakobsen, P.V. (2000). Focus on the CNN effect misses the point: The real media impact on conflict management is invisible and indirect. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2000, 131-143.
- Jaeger, S. (1998). Propaganda mit Frauenschicksalen? Die deutsche Presseberichterstattung über Vergewaltigung im Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina. In: Kempf, W. & Schmidt-Regener, I. (Hrsg.). *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Münster: Lit., 75-88.
- Jaeger, S. (2000). Tatsachenbehauptungen und Meinungen – Kognitive Repräsentationen des Bosnien-Konfliktes in der westlichen Kriegsberichterstattung. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr.50. Konstanz: KOPS.

- Jaeger, S. (2001). Rollenkonstruktion im Bosnien-Konflikt. Westliche Kriegsberichterstattung zwischen Ambivalenz und Anteilnahme. In: Richter, J. (Hrsg.). Deutschland: (un)bewältigte Vergangenheiten. Tübingen: DGVT, 151-160
- Jaeger, S. (2003). Massenmedien und Versöhnung: Die Berichterstattung über den deutsch-französischen Friedensprozeß nach dem 2. Weltkrieg. *Conflict & communication online*, 2(2).
- Jaeger, S. (2005). Themenauswahl in der Nachkriegsberichterstattung – eine quantitative Langzeitstudie. In: Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.). Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. Berlin: regener, 51-80.
- Jaeger, S. (2009). Nachrichtenmedien als Ressource für Frieden und Versöhnung. Inhaltsanalytische Pressestudien zur westdeutschen Berichterstattung über Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin: regener.
- Janis, I. (1982). *Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes*, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Jo, E. & Berkowitz, L. (1994). A priming effect analysis of media influences: An update. In: Bryant, J. & Zillmann, D. (eds.). *Media effects: Advances in theory and research*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 43-60.
- Jowett, G. S., & O'Donnell, V. (1999). *Propaganda and persuasion*. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kahnemann, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica*, 47, 263-291.
- Katz, E., Blumler, J. & Gurevitch, M. (1974) Utilisation of mass communication by the individual. In: Blumler, J. G. & Katz, E. (eds.) *The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on gratifications research*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Katz, E. & Lazarsfeld, P. (1955). *Personal influence*. New York: The Free Press.
- Keiffer, M. G., (1968). *The effect of availability and precision of threat on bargaining behavior*. Columbia University: Ph.D. Dissertation.
- Kempf, W. (1986). Emotionalität und Antiintellektualismus der Friedensbewegung? In: Evers, T., Kempf, W. & Valtink, E. (Hrsg.). *Sozialpsychologie des Friedens*. Protokoll 229/1986. Hofgeismar: Evangelische Akademie.
- Kempf, W. (Hrsg.) (1994). *Manipulierte Wirklichkeiten. Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung im Golfkrieg*. Münster: Lit.
- Kempf, W. (1995). Aggression, Gewalt und Gewaltfreiheit. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 30. Konstanz: KOPS.
- Kempf, W. (1996). Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Eskalation und Deeskalation. Ein sozialpsychologisches Modell. *Wissenschaft und Frieden*, 14, 51-54.
- Kempf, W. (1998a). Media contribution to peace building in war torn societies. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz Nr. 43. Konstanz: KOPS.
- Kempf, W. (1998b). Menschenrechte im Kriege. In: Mahdavi, R. & Vandr , J. (Hrsg.). *Wie man Menschen von Menschen unterscheidet. Praktiken der Diskrimination, Kriminalisierung, Illegalisierung*. M nster: Lit., 59-69.
- Kempf, W. (1999a). Deescalation-oriented conflict coverage? The Northern Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian peace processes in the German press. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 45. Konstanz: KOPS.

- Kempf, W. (1999b). Escalation and deescalation-oriented aspects in the media construction of the Bosnia conflict. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr.46. Konstanz: KOPS.
- Kempf, W. (2000). Gewaltursachen und Gewaltdynamiken. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Konflikt und Gewalt: Ursachen – Entwicklungstendenzen – Perspektiven*. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik, Band 5. Münster: Agenda. 44-65.
- Kempf, W. (2001). News media and conflict escalation – a comparative study of the Gulf War coverage in American and European media. In: Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Vol. I. Gulf War, national news discourses and globalization. Göteborg: Nordicom, 149-174.
- Kempf, W. (2002a). Conflict coverage and conflict escalation. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 59-72.
- Kempf, W. (2002b). Escalating and deescalating aspects in the coverage of the Bosnia conflict - a comparative study. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Vol. II. Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 227-255.
- Kempf, W. (2003a). Theoretical and empirical foundations. In: ASPR (ed.). *Constructive conflict coverage. A social psychological approach*. Berlin: regener, 11-123.
- Kempf, W. (2003b). Constructive conflict coverage – A social-psychological research and development program. *Conflict & communication online*, 2(2).
- Kempf, W. (2005). Two experiments focusing on de-escalation-oriented coverage of post-war conflicts. *Conflict & communication online*, 4(2).
- Kempf, W. (2008). The impact of political news on German students' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Conflict & communication online*, 7(2).
- Kempf, W. & Reimann, M. (2002). The presentation of alternative ways to settle the Gulf conflict in German, Norwegian und Finnish media. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Vol. II. Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 203-226.
- Kempf, W., Reimann, M. & Luostarinen, H. (1996). *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse von Kriegspropaganda und Kritischem Friedensjournalismus*. *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz*, Nr. 32. Konstanz: KOPS.
- Kempf, W., Reimann, M. & Luostarinen, H. (2001). New World Order rhetorics in American and European media. In: Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Vol. I. Gulf War, national news discourses and globalization. Göteborg: Nordicom, 125-148.
- Kempf, W. & Schmidt-Regener, I. (Hrsg.). (1998). *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Münster: Lit.
- Kirschke, L. (1996). *Broadcasting genocide; censorship, propaganda, & state-sponsored violence in Rwanda 1990-1994*. London: ARTICLE 19.
- Klapper, T. (1960). *The effects of mass communication*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Knightley, P. (1976). *The first casualty. From the Crimea to Vietnam: The war correspondent as hero, propagandist, and myth maker*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Kondopoulou, M. (2002). The Greek media and the Kosovo crisis. *Conflict & communication online*, 1(2).

- Krugman, H. (1965). The impact of television in advertising: Learning without involvement. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 29, 349-356.
- Krotz, F. (2001). Dämonisierung des Gegners. *Grimme*, 4, 24-25.
- Kunczik, M. (1990). Die manipulierte Meinung: Nationale Image-Politik und internationale Public Relations. Köln: Böhlau.
- Langenbacher, E. (2003). Memory regimes in contemporary Germany. Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop 16: Politics and Memory, Edinburgh 2003
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/w16/Langenbacher.pdf>
- Lasswell, H.D., (1927). Propaganda technique in the World War. London: Kegan Paul.
- Lasswell, H. (1948). The structure and function of communication in society. In: Bryson, L. (ed.). *The Communication of Ideas*. New York: Harper and Row, 37-51.
- Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1944). *The people's choice*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Lehmann, I. (1999). *Peacekeeping and public information*. London: Frank Cass.
- Levine, J. M. (1989). Reactions to opinion deviance in small groups. In: Paulus, P. B. (ed.). *Psychology of group influence*. Hillsdale, New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 187-231.
- Lewin, K. (1958). Group decision and social change. In: Maccoby, E., Newcombe, T. & Harley, E. (eds.). *Readings in Social Psychology*. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 459-473.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Lippmann, W. (1925). *The phantom public*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Löffelholz, M. (1995). Beobachtung ohne Reflexion? Strukturen und Konzepte der Selbstbeobachtung des modernen Krisenjournalismus. In: Imhof, K. & Schulz, P. (eds.). *Medien und Krieg – Krieg in den Medien*. Zürich: Seismo, 171-191.
- Lowery, S. A. & DeFleur, M. L. (1995). *Milestones in mass communication research: Media effects*. (3rd ed.). White Plains, NY: Longman.
- Loyn, D. (2007). Good journalism or peace journalism? *Conflict & communication online*, 6(2).
- Lumsdaine, A.A. & Janis, I.L., (1953). Resistance to "counter propaganda" produced by one-sided and two-sided "propaganda" presentations. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17, 311-318.
- Lumsden, M. (1997). Breaking the cycles of violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 34/4, 377-383.
- Luostarinen, H. (1986). *Perivihollinen (The ancient foe)*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Luostarinen, H. (2002a). Journalism and cultural preconditions of war. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II. Studying war and the media*. Göteborg: Nordicom, 273-283.
- Luostarinen, H. (2002b). Propaganda analysis. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II. Studying war and the media*. Göteborg: Nordicom, 17-38.
- Luostarinen, H. & Kempf, W. (2000). Krieg und Medien. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Konflikt und Gewalt: Ursachen – Entwicklungstendenzen – Perspektiven. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik, Band 5*. Münster: agenda, 334-371.

- Luostarinen, H. & Ottosen, R. (2002). The changing role of the media in conflicts. From the Cold War to the Net Age. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*, Vol. II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 39-57.
- Lynch, J. (2007). A course in peace journalism. *Conflict & communication online*, 6(1).
- Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2005). *Peace journalism*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.
- MacArthur, J. R. (1993). *Die Schlacht der Lügen. Wie die USA den Golfkrieg verkauften*. München: dtv.
- Malevic, M. (1998). Propaganda im Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina. In: Kempf, W. & Schmidt-Regener, I. (Hrsg.). *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Münster: Lit, 67-74.
- Mandelzis, L. (2007). Representations of peace in news discourse: Viewpoint and opportunity for peace journalism. *Conflict & communication online*, 6(1).
- Martin, P. & Turner, B. (1986). Grounded theory and organizational research. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 22/2, 141-157.
- Martin-Baró, I. (1991). Die psychischen Wunden der Gewalt. In: Kempf, W. (Hrsg.). *Verdeckte Gewalt. Psychosoziale Folgen der Kriegsführung niedriger Intensität in Zentralamerika*. Hamburg: Argument.
- Mass, A. & Clark, R.D. (1984). Hidden impact of minorities: fifteen years of minority influence research. In: *Psychological Bulletin*, 95, 428-450.
- Mathes, R. (1989). Medienwirkung und Konfliktdynamik in der Auseinandersetzung um die Entlassung von General Kiessling. In: Kaase, M. & Schulz, W. (Hrsg.). *Massenkommunikation. Theorie, Methoden, Befunde. Sonderheft 30 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 441-458.
- McCombs, M. (1994). News influence on our pictures of the world. In: Bryant, J. & Zillmann, D. (eds.). *Media effects. Advances in theory and research*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1-17.
- McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36, 176-187.
- McGoldrick, A. & Lynch, J. (2000). *Peace Journalism – how to do it*. <http://www.transcend.org/>
- McLuhan, M. (1964). *Understanding media: The extensions of man*. New York: Signet.
- McQuail, D. (1994). *Mass communication theory – An introduction*. London: Sage.
- Meder, G. (1994). Die Funktionalisierung der Vereinten Nationen. In: Kempf, W. (ed.). *Manipulierte Wirklichkeiten. Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung im Golfkrieg*. Münster: Lit, 139-157.
- Metz, J. (1997a). Information intervention: When switching channels isn't enough. *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6), 15-20.
- Metz, J. (1997b). Rwandan genocide and the international law of jamming. *American Journal of International Law* 91 (4), 628-651.
- Meyer, B. (2000). Gewalt und "Friedens erzwingung". In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Konflikt und Gewalt: Ursachen – Entwicklungstendenzen – Perspektiven. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik*, Band 5. Münster: Agenda. 264-276.
- Möckel, J. (2009). News from the Holy Land – Akzeptanz von Konfliktberichterstattung im Fernsehen. *Conflict & communication online*, 8(1).

- Moscovici, S., 1979. Sozialer Wandel durch Minoritäten. München: Urban & Schwarzenberg.
- Moscovici, S., 1980. Toward a theory of conversation behaviour. In: Berkowitz (ed.). *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 13, 209-239. New York: Academic Press.
- Naveh, Ch. (1998). The role of the media in the peace processes: The case of the Middle East in the 1990s. Paper presented at the 48th Annual ICA Conference on (Mis)Communicating Across Boundaries in Jerusalem (Israel), July 20-24, 1998.
- Naveh, Ch. (2002). The role of the media in foreign policy decision-making: A theoretical framework. *conflict & communication online*, 1(2).
- Neuber, H. (2002). Journalisten ins Visier genommen. M – Menschen Machen Medien. Berlin: ver.di. <http://www.igmedien.de/publikationen/m/2002/05/main.html>
- Newbold, C. (1995). The media effects tradition. In: Boyd-Barrett, O. & Newbold, C. (eds.). *Approaches to media: A reader*. London: Arnold, 118-124.
- Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2001). *Journalism and the New World Order*. Vol. I. Gulf War, national news discourses and globalization. Göteborg: Nordicom.
- O'Neill, B. (1998). Spinning the peace deal. *LM magazine*, 111, Retrieved July 17, 2003, from <http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/00000002D0ED.htm>
- Ottosen, R. (2003). Discussion contribution at the conference on "News media as mediators of democratization, peace-building and reconciliation in post-war societies", University of Konstanz, Nov. 28-30, 2003.
- Palmbach, U. & Kempf, W. (1994). Die Konstruktion des Feindbildes Saddam. In: Kempf, W. (Hrsg.). *Manipulierte Wirklichkeiten. Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung im Golfkrieg*. Münster: Lit, 58-81.
- Peleg, S. (2007). In defense of peace journalism: A rejoinder. *Conflict & communication online*, 6(2).
- Paffenholz, T. (2001). Ansätze ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik*, Band 8. Münster: agenda, 15-26.
- Price, M. E. & Thompson, M. (eds.) (2002). *Forging peace: Intervention, human rights and the management of media space*. Edinburgh, U.K.: University of Edinburgh Press.
- Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz (Hrsg.) (2005). *Nachrichtenmedien als Mediatoren von Peace-Building, Demokratisierung und Versöhnung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Berlin: regener.
- Reimann, M. (2001). "Surfing for a peaceful future" – Das Internet als Medium für Demokratisierung und Verständigung zwischen den (ehemaligen) Konfliktparteien in Bosnien-Herzegowina. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Reimann, M. (2002). Communication disorders in conflict coverage. In: Kempf, W. & Luostarinen, H. (eds.). *Journalism and the New World Order*, Vol. II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 173-181.
- Rivenburgh, N. K. (1997). The influence of national identity on news presentations of citizens involved in international affairs: A study of Argentina, Denmark, and the United States. Paper presented at the 1997 annual convention of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, July 4-8, Oaxaca, Mexico.
- Roach, C. (1993). *Communication and culture in war and peace*. London: Sage.
- Rogers, E. (1962). *Diffusion of innovation*. New York: The Free Press.
- Rogers, E. (1997). *A history of communication studies*. New York: The Free Press.

- Ronneberger, F. (1988). Sozialisation der Journalisten-Elite. *Publizistik*, 33, 395-405.
- Sabellek, Ch. (2001). Die Entwicklung des Kosovokonflikts und die Wahrnehmung durch die Medien. In: Richter, J. (Hrsg.). *Deutschland: (un)bewältigte Vergangenheiten*. Tübingen: DGVt, 161-172.
- Sadkovich J. (1998). *The U.S. media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Samayoa, J., (1987). *Guerra y deshumanización. Una perspectiva psicosocial*. Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA), No 461, 213-225.
- Schaefer, C. D. (2006). The effects of escalation vs. de-escalation-orientated conflict coverage on the evaluation of military measures. *Conflict & communication online*, 5(1).
- Schallenger, S. (1999). *Moralisierung im Kriegsdiskurs: eine Analyse von Printmedienbeiträgen zum Golfkrieg und zum Vietnamkrieg*. Frankfurt/M: Lang.
- Schramm W. & Roberts D.F. (eds.) (1977). *The process and effects of mass communication*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Schulz von Thun, F. (1981). *Miteinander Reden 1. Störungen und Klärungen. Allgemeine Psychologie der Kommunikation*. Reinbek: rororo.
- Seibert, F., Peterson, T. & Schramm, W. (1963). *Four theories of the press*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Seppmann, W. (1993). Medien-Bewußtsein. *Marxistische Blätter*, 1/93, 21-29.
- Severin, W. & Tankard, J. (1992). *Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses of the mass media*. (3rd ed.). New York: Longman.
- SFCG. (2004). Detail: Studio Ijambo, Burundi. Retrieved on December 6, 2002 from <http://www.sfcg.org/actdetail.cfm?locus=CGP&name=programs&programid=424>
- Shea, J. (2001). "Kampf der Fernsehbilder". *message*, 1/2001, 98-105.
- Shinar, D. (1998). The media in the transformation of cultural conflict: A Middle Eastern case study. Paper presented at the 48th ICA Conference on (Mis)Communicating across Boundaries in Jerusalem (Israel), July 20-24, 1998.
- Shinar, D. (1999). Media diplomacy and "Peace Talk": The Middle East and Northern Ireland. Paper presented to the special panel "Reconciliation and the Media" at the IAMCR Conference in Leipzig, Germany, July 27-31, 1999.
- Shinar, D. (2004). Media peace discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks. *Conflict & communication online*, 3(1).
- Small, M. (1994). *Covering Dissent. The media and the anti-Vietnam war movement*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Sparr, J. (2004). *Konfliktberichterstattung! Wer mag's konstruktiv? Zur Akzeptanz konstruktiver Konfliktberichterstattung durch die Leserschaft*. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Spohrs, M. (2006). Über den Nachrichtenwert von Friedensjournalismus – Ergebnisse einer experimentellen Studie. *Conflict & communication online*, 5(1).
- Spurk, C. (2002). *Media and peacebuilding: Concepts, actors and challenges*. Downloaded on January 23, 2003, from www.swisspeace.org/publications/wp/working%20paper_01_2002.pdf
- Staab, J. F. (1990). *Nachrichtenwerttheorie: Formale Struktur und empirischer Gehalt*. Freiburg/Munich: Alber.
- Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1996). *Grounded Theory: Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung*. Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags Union.

- Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1998). *Basics of qualitative research*, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Strobel, W. (1996). The CNN effect. *American Journalism Review* 5, 32-34.
- Strobel, W. (1997). Late-breaking foreign policy: the news media's influence on peace operations. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 4: 79-97.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In: Austin, W. G. & Worchel, S. (eds.). *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey, California: Books, Cole. 33-47.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: Worchel, S. & Austin, W.G. (eds.). *Psychology of intergroup relation*. Chicago: Nelson Hall Publ. 33-48.
- Taylor, P. M. (1992). *War and the media: Propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Taylor, P. M. (1995) *Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Taylor, P. M. (1998). *War and the media. Propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War*, 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Taylor, P. M. (2000). The military and the media. Past, present and future. In: Badsey, S. (ed.). *The media and international security*. London: Frank Cass, 177-202.
- Terzis, G. & Vassiliadou, M. (2004). Die Rolle der Medien während Krisen. The IPTS Report, 82, März 2004.
- Thomas, W.I. & Tomas, D. (1928). *The child in America. Behavior problems and programs*. New York: Knopf.
- Thompson, M. (1999). *Forging war: the media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Luton, U.K.: University of Luton Press.
- Thum, G. & Thum, M. (1972). *The persuaders: Propaganda in war and peace*. New York: Atheneum.
- Trötschel, R. (2001). Den Verlust vor Augen, die Einigung im Sinn. Zur Realisierung prosozialer Verhandlungsziele durch Vorsätze. Osnabrück: Der Andere Verlag.
- Truger, A. (2001). Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung – Eine internationale Herausforderung. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Studien für europäische Friedenspolitik*, Band 8. Münster: agenda, 9-14.
- Truger, A. (2008). Zivile Sicherheitspolitik. In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). *Europäische Friedenspolitik*: Münster: Lit, 133-162.
- Tuchman, G. (1978). *Making news*. New York: Macmillan.
- UN (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>
- UN (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>
- UNESCO (1979). Records of the General Conference. Twentieth Session. Paris, 24 October to 28 November 1978. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114032Eb.pdf>
- Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. H. & Jackson, D. D. (1967). *Pragmatics of human communication. A study of interactional patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes*. New York: Norton & Com-

pany.

- Weber, B. (2003). Forschung unterstützt den Riecher der Redaktion. In: Rinsdorf, L., Weber, B., Wellmann, F. & Werner, P. (Hrsg.). Journalismus mit Bodenhaftung. Annäherung an das Publikum. Münster: Lit, 115-131.
- Weischenberg, S., Löffelholz, M. & Scholl, A. (1994). Merkmale und Einstellungen von Journalisten. *Media Perspektiven*, 4, 154-167.
- Whitfield, S. J. (1996). *The culture of the Cold War*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Wirtz, M. & Caspar, F. (2002). Beurteilerübereinstimmung und Beurteilerreliabilität: Methoden zur Bestimmung und Verbesserung der Zuverlässigkeit von Einschätzungen mittels Kategoriensystemen und Ratingskalen. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (1997a). *Media and political conflict. News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (199b). Fair weather friends: The varying role of the media in peace processes. *Political Communication* 14, 29-48.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (2001). *The news media and peace processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (2004). *Media and the path to peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolling, J. (2002). Aufmerksamkeit durch Qualität? Empirische Befunde zum Verhältnis von Nachrichtenqualität und Nachrichtennutzung. In: Baum, A. & Schmidt, S. J. (Hrsg.) *Fakten und Fiktionen. Über den Umgang mit Medienwirklichkeiten*. Konstanz: UVK., 202-216.
- Zehnle, R. (1994). *Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen über Legitimität und Unvereinbarkeit einer militärischen Konfliktaustragung in der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung vor Beginn des 2. Golfkrieges*. Universität Konstanz: Diplomarbeit.
- Zemen, Z. (1964). *Nazi Propaganda*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Zint, M. (2000). Friedensjournalismus als Beruf. *Wissenschaft und Frieden*, 4/2000, 18, 23-26.

Sources

Chapter 1

Wilhelm Kempf: Kriegspropaganda versus Friedens-Journalismus (War Propaganda versus Peace Journalism). In: Calließ, J. (Hrsg.). Das erste Opfer eines Krieges ist die Wahrheit. Oder: die Medien zwischen Kriegsberichterstattung und Friedensberichterstattung. Loccumer Protokolle 69/95, 137-149 (1997).

Chapter 2

Wilhelm Kempf: Konfliktprävention und Medien (Conflict prevention and the media). In: ÖSFK (Hrsg.). Friedensbericht 1999. Krisenprävention. Theorie und Praxis ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung. Zürich: Rüegger (1999).

Chapter 3

Wilhelm Kempf.. Informationsstrukturen als Barrieren ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung – eine Bestandsaufnahme (Information structures as barriers to civilian conflict management). In Truger, A. (Koord.). Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung. Münster: agenda, 229-244 (2001).

Chapter 4

Susanne Jaeger & Wilhelm Kempf.. Die Darstellung gewaltförmiger Konflikte in den Nachrichtenmedien und die Folgen für die Bemühungen um Frieden (Media representations of conflicts as catalysts of peace processes). Osnabrücker Jahrbuch Frieden und Wissenschaft VIII/2001. Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 223-238 (2001) (abridged).

Chapter 5

Susanne Jaeger: The German press coverage of France after World War II. Conflict & communication online, 3/1+2 (2004).

Chapter 6

Wilhelm Kempf: Acceptance and impact of de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 60. Berlin: regener (2006).

Chapter 7

Burkhard Bläsi: Peace journalism and the news production process. Conflict & communication online, 3/1+2 (2004).

Chapter 8

Susanne Jaeger: Compatibility of peace and news media. Paper presented at the IAMCR Scientific Conference in Budapest (Hungary), Sept. 7-8, 2001.

Chapter 9

Vladimir Bratić: Media effects during violent conflict. Conflict & communication online, 5/1 (2006).

Chapter 10

Burkhard Bläsi: Implementing peace journalism: The role of conflict stages. Conflict & communication online, 8/2 (2009).

Chapter 11

Wilhelm Kempf: Medien und Umsetzung der Friedenspolitik (The media and the implementation of a European peace policy). In: ÖSFK (ed.). Europäische Friedenspolitik: Münster: Lit, 114-132 (2008).

Training materials

Wilhelm Kempf, James Brice, Carsten A. Schulz & Michael Reimann: Introduction to constructive conflict coverage – An eLearning module. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz. Nr. 61. Berlin: regener (2007).

Burkhard Bläsi, Susanne Jaeger, Wilhelm Kempf & Jutta Möckel: A catalog of escalation- and de-escalation-oriented aspects of conflict coverage. Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, Nr. 53. Berlin: regener (2004).

About the authors

Burkhard Bläsi, b. 1973 in Stuttgart, Germany, Dipl.-Psych., Dr. rer. nat. in Psychology (University of Konstanz, Germany, 2005). 2001–2005 member of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz. Doctoral thesis on peace journalism and the news production process. Currently working as psychological consultant for the regional school administration of Stuttgart, Germany.

Special areas of interest: peace journalism, nonviolent conflict resolution, crisis intervention and violence prevention in schools.

Recent books: *Konflikttransformation durch Gütekraft* (Conflict transformation by truthforce; Münster: Lit, 2001); *Keine Zeit, kein Geld, kein Interesse ...? Konstruktive Konfliktberichterstattung zwischen Anspruch und medialer Wirklichkeit* (No time, no money, no interest ...? Constructive conflict coverage between ambition and reality; Berlin: regener, 2006).

Contact: Regierungspräsidium Stuttgart, Abteilung 7 – Schule und Bildung
Referat 77 – Qualitätssicherung und -entwicklung; Schulpsychologische Dienste
Breitscheidstr. 65

D – 70176 Stuttgart, Germany
eMail: burkhard.blaesi@rps.bwl.de

Vladimir Bratić, b. 1974 in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. PhD in Mass Communication (Ohio University, 2005). Assistant professor of communication at Hollins University in Virginia, USA.

Special areas of interest: the role of media in conflict and peace, international communication, communication and culture.

Recent publications: *Why and when to use the media for conflict prevention and peacebuilding* (with Lisa Schirch, The Hague, Netherlands: European Center for Conflict Prevention, 2007); *Examining peace-oriented media in areas of violent conflict* (International Communication Gazette, 70 (6), 487-503, 2008); *Peace journalism as an extension of the right to communicate in violent conflict: A case study of Bosnia's Open Broadcast Network* (in: The right to communicate: Historical hopes, global debates, and future premises; with Susan Ross and Hyunjin Kang-Graham, Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 2009).

Contact: Hollins University, Department of Communication
P.O. Box 9514, Roanoke, VA 24019
eMail: vbratic@hollins.edu

Susanne Jaeger, b. 1966 in Würzburg, Germany. Dipl.-Psych., Dr.rer.nat. in Psychology (University of Konstanz, 2008). 1997–2005 member of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz. Doctoral thesis on the German press coverage of France after World War II. Currently working as a research assistant in mental health services research, ZfP Südwürttemberg.

Special areas of interest: construction of conflicts and peace processes in the mass media

Recent publications: *Propaganda und Kriegsberichterstattung* (Propaganda and war reporting; in: Gert Sommer & Albert Fuchs (eds.), Krieg und Frieden. Handbuch der Konflikt- und Friedenspsychologie. Stuttgart: Beltz-PVU, 2004); *Konstruktive Nachkriegsberichterstattung – Ein Forschungsbericht* (Constructive post-war coverage; with Wilhelm Kempf, Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz, 58/2005, Berlin: regener); *Nachrichtenmedien als Ressource für Frieden und Versöhnung. Inhaltsanalytische Pressestudien zur west-deutschen Berichterstattung über Frankreich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (News media as a resource of peace and reconciliation; Berlin: regener, 2009).

Contact: ZfP Südwürttemberg
Bereich Versorgungsforschung Weissenau
Weingartshofer Strasse 2
D – 88214 Ravensburg
eMail: susanne.jaeger@zfp-zentrum.de

Wilhelm Kempf, b. 1947 in Klagenfurt, Austria. Dr. phil. habil. in Psychology (University of Erlangen, Germany, 1977). Professor of Psychological Methodology and Head of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Since 2002 editor of *conflict & communication online* (www.cco.regener-online.de).

Special areas of interest: nonviolent conflict resolution; the construction of social reality by the mass media.

Recent books: *Konflikt und Gewalt* (Conflict & violence; ed., Münster: agenda, 2000); *Los Medios y la Cultura de Paz* (The media and the culture of peace; with Sonia Gutiérrez Villalobos, Berlin: regener, 2001); *Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. II. Studying war and the media* (ed., with Heikki Luostarinen, Göteborg: Nordicom, 2002); *Constructive conflict coverage* (edited by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Berlin: regener, 2003); *Peace journalism – The state of the art* (ed. with Dov Shinar, Berlin: regener, 2007); *The peace journalism controversy* (ed., Berlin: regener, 2008).

Contact: University of Konstanz
Department of Psychology
D – 78547 Konstanz, Germany
eMail: wilhelm.kempf@uni-konstanz.de
Website: www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/SozWiss/fg-psy/ag-meth/

Index

- Agenda for Peace 8, 38, 55f.
- agenda setting 149, 155, 174
- antagonism 16, 28, 34f., 42, 49, 58, 60, 63f., 99, 119, 131, 140, 183
- attitudes 18f., 24, 31, 39, 75, 94f., 98f., 142, 150, 153-157, 159, 165, 170, 176
- audience preferences 100, 102
- audience response 100, 103, 151
- autonomous process 16f.

- black-and-white coverage 168

- censorship 41, 123, 159, 163, 176, 182f.
- civilian actors 55, 60
- civil society 36, 72, 102, 180
- closed door diplomacy 58
- cognition 31, 33, 44, 50, 58f., 64, 100f., 135, 139, 150, 154, 166, 178
- commitment 18f., 132
- competence 11, 18, 101, 107, 123f., 127, 159, 161-165, 178, 180, 182
- competition 16-19, 21ff., 30-35, 42, 44ff., 92f., 98f., 101, 103, 131f., 142, 161, 175
- conflict constellation 20, 123
- conflict de-escalation 7, 9, 39, 49, 120, 124, 139, 165, 173, 178
- conflict escalation 8ff., 19, 22, 29-51, 55, 58-61, 65, 84, 89f., 100-119, 124, 130f., 139, 158, 161, 163, 171, 173ff., 178, 180, 183
- conflict intensity 159, 169
- conflict perception 9, 22, 26, 33, 43-46, 49, 59f.
- conflict prevention 27f., 31f., 42, 55, 102, 169f., 176
- conflict management 8, 10, 22, 28, 38ff., 43f., 48, 50, 55f., 60f., 171, 173, 177, 183
- conflict resolution 18f., 22, 26, 29, 34, 37, 39, 42, 46, 84, 119, 123f., 132, 139, 146f., 173, 177, 161, 163f., 167
- conflict transformation 33, 42f., 49, 60, 139, 152, 173
- conformity 179, 181
- constructive conflict coverage 8, 10, 119ff., 128f., 136, 160, 164, 175, 177ff.
- content analysis 8, 85, 98f., 107, 113
- contextualization 13, 15, 50, 179
- cooperation 16-19, 22, 30-36, 43f., 46, 60, 73, 83, 89, 91ff., 101f., 107f., 115, 128, 131, 135, 175ff.
- coping 124, 140, 176
- critical distance 26, 46, 101f., 164, 177

- de-escalation oriented conflict coverage 9f., 34-37, 60f., 65, 84ff., 89f., 100-119, 164, 177ff.
- dehumanization 179, 181
- delegitimization 140
- divergence of perspectives 16-20, 43f., 101
- double bind 23f., 26
- dynamics of conflict escalation 29, 31, 37, 42f., 59, 174f.

- early-warning system 180, 183
- editorial routines 57
- editorial strategies 122
- elite-bias 69, 74, 82
- emotionalization 180

- empathy 16, 32, 36, 39, 59, 92
- enemy image 9, 15, 17, 28, 39, 48f., 61, 100, 112f., 141, 173, 178
- entanglement 18, 61, 100-103, 164
- entertainment industry 48
- ethical journalism 122

- fabrication of news 28
- four-factor news communication model 50, 68
- framing 8, 24, 29, 57f., 64, 68, 83, 86, 89, 93, 98ff., 100-109, 112f., 116, 119
- Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation 65f.
- Franco-German Youth Office 67
- freedom of expression 41, 135, 172

- Good Friday Agreement 145

- harmonization 40, 141
- human security 171

- idealization 24, 35, 39, 141
- identification 8, 13, 15, 23f., 26, 36-40, 48, 51, 61, 69, 91, 98, 102, 115f., 141, 155
- independence of the media 180
- information control 13, 28
- information quality 179
- information warfare 40
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 172
- internationalization of conflict 38

- journalism of attachment 8, 27f., 33, 42, 48
- journalistic training 180, 183

- lobbyism 9, 125, 127, 159, 161f., 166

- market competition 180
- media autonomy 180
- media complexity 179
- media economy 60, 122, 139
- media effects 9, 144, 146f., 151-157, 174
- media format 103, 119, 122f., 158
- media norms 60, 139
- media policy 10, 171f., 182f.
- media privatization 180, 183
- mediation 16, 18, 34, 39, 47, 61, 102, 131
- mental model 44, 100f., 103, 106f., 113, 119, 174
- military logic 19, 22, 25, 39, 47, 61
- military media management 40, 173
- misinterpretation 17f.
- moral dilemma 48, 59
- moral disengagement 105-109, 116-119
- moral pressure 28, 49
- motivational logic 40, 49, 141

- national interest 41, 47, 60
- NATO 38, 48, 125, 167, 181
- need for orientation 149, 151, 156
- negativism 69, 75, 82, 102f., 119, 174
- neutrality 39, 50, 61, 101, 180
- news production process 120f., 127, 135, 159
- news selection 8, 29f., 41f., 50, 120, 122, 180
- news value 41, 28ff., 58, 69, 82, 84, 98, 102, 112, 119f., 122, 128, 139, 160, 174f., 178ff.

- one-sided messages 150ff.
- OSCE 171, 182
- Oslo Peace Accords 175

- partisanship 9, 26, 39, 48, 55, 60f., 152
- patriotism 140
- peace building 8, 38, 55f., 59f., 63, 120, 180f.
- peace discourse 49, 60, 139, 163, 169, 175, 177
- peace enforcement 8, 38, 55, 59ff.
- peaceful dispute settlement 46f., 171, 173
- peace keeping 8, 38, 55
- peace making 8, 38, 55

- perceptual distortion 16, 19, 23ff., 33f., 43f., 58, 60, 175
- personal entanglement 23f., 37
- personalization 41, 69, 74, 82f., 102f., 119, 122, 139, 160, 174, 176
- persuasion 13, 148
- polarisation 141
- political climate 9, 121, 124f., 129-132, 135f., 166f.
- post-conflict societies 9, 56, 144
- preconditions of news production 120, 158-169, 181
- presentation quality 169
- press diversity 124, 136, 159, 181f.
- press freedom 18, 40f., 134f., 172, 181f.
- preventive conflict coverage 8, 37, 46
- preventive diplomacy 38, 56
- priming 155
- privatization of propaganda 8, 28, 41f.
- professionalism 45, 155, 182
- professional norms of journalism 27, 40, 42, 101
- propaganda 7, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22ff., 28, 34, 40ff., 45, 51, 58f., 83, 131, 139ff., 144, 147, 149f., 153f., 156f., 159, 161f., 166, 172f., 176f.
- public climate 159, 161, 163-169, 178
- public media 171, 180, 183
- public opinion 27, 61, 125, 142, 168, 173, 176, 181
- public relations 28, 32, 42, 45, 48, 59, 176
- psychological warfare 24, 40, 173
- reconciliation 8f., 26, 36, 39, 51, 60, 62-65, 69, 71, 82f., 85f., 89ff., 96ff., 101f., 120, 140, 143, 152, 165, 174f., 178
- reconciliation discourse 175
- reconstruction 10, 39, 51, 56, 63, 70f., 83, 86, 92, 99, 106, 142, 181
- reinforcement role of the media 148
- ritualization 49
- security of journalists 41, 123, 128, 176
- sensationalism 162, 164, 179
- simplification 102f., 112, 119, 127, 174
- social change 143, 152
- social commitment 17f., 23, 36, 131f., 141
- social identity 9, 141f.
- social influence 9, 142f., 153
- social learning 150, 155
- social responsibility 155
- societal beliefs 49f., 100-103, 140f., 166
- solution-oriented conflict coverage 101f., 161, 163-167, 177f.
- spiral of silence 151
- stages of conflict 158
- symbolic environment 154
- terrorist attacks 104f.
- text genre 68, 86, 100, 103ff., 119
- trivialization 49, 95ff.
- two-sided messages 24, 26, 150
- types of media 9, 122, 147
- UN 8, 38, 47, 55f., 172, 181f.
- UNESCO Media Declaration 172
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights 172
- uses and gratification model 148f.
- victimization 140
- war discourse 39-42, 140, 163, 169, 175, 177
- zero-sum game 31, 33f., 39, 43, 46, 131, 152, 176

Dov Shinar & Wilhelm Kempf (eds.)**Peace Journalism: The State of the Art**

(Friedens- und Demokratypsychologie, Bd. 5). 2007. 246 S., brosch., 18 Abb. & 3 Tab.,
€ 34,80. ISBN 978-3-936014-12-9.

The book is a critical exploration of peace journalism, a mode of coverage that proposes alternatives to the preference of war in the media professional culture. Originally published electronically, and now offered in print, it features information, ideas and methods on peace journalism to be used by journalists, instructors, students and the general public.

Written by some of the most prominent media researchers and practitioners, active in the Peace Journalism International Group of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, the book tackles some of the most salient and controversial issues in the conceptual, professional and educational areas and includes an uncommon interaction of applied and theoretical work; explorations of the expressions of peace journalism in text, discourse, and image; and analyses of cases such as Northern Ireland, the Basque country, Israel-Palestine, the Oslo peace process, the coverage of the Mohammed cartoons, and events in the Iraq War.

With contributions by Annabel McGoldrick (War journalism and "objectivity"); Samuel Peleg (Peace journalism and conflict theory); Susan Dente Ross: ((De)Constructing conflict); Robert A. Hackett (Is peace journalism possible?); Lea Mandelzis (Representations of peace in news discourse); Rune Ottosen (Emphasizing images in peace journalism); Wilhelm Kempf (De-escalation oriented post-war-coverage); Jake Lynch (A course in peace journalism); Bev Keever (De-escalating the language of killing); Dov Shinar (Peace journalism: The state of the art).

Wilhelm Kempf (ed.)**The Peace Journalism Controversy**

(Friedens- und Demokratiewissenschaft, Bd. 6). 2008. 174 S., brosch., 4 Abb. & 6 Tab.,
€ 29,90. ISBN 978-3-936014-14-3.

While the media's peace mandate is anchored in a great number of international documents, efforts to utilize the media as an instrument of constructive conflict management and for securing peace seem rather modest. Of course there is a vast volume of literature that casts a critical light on the functionalization of the media for the ends of war propaganda – not just by dictatorial regimes, but also in democratic states – yet the question of how the media could instead be used as a catalyst for the de-escalation of conflicts and for peaceful conflict settlement first attracted the notice of peace researchers, media scholars and journalists only toward the end of the Twentieth Century.

The concept of peace journalism, which arose in reaction to the Gulf War and the post-Yugoslavian civil wars, has not, however, gone unchallenged. Just the term 'peace journalism' itself is enough to awaken fantasies that make journalists fear for their integrity and/or make the concept of peace journalism seem like an unrealizable postulate that overtaxes journalism.

Considerations like this deserve to be taken seriously and have triggered intensive discussion, a current highpoint of which is the present book, in which prominent advocates and critics discuss the project of peace journalism.

Contents:

News coverage of conflict: Between escalation and de-escalation (Wilhelm Kempf) / Peace journalism: What, why, who, how, when, where? (Johan Galtung) / Constructive conflict coverage (Wilhelm Kempf) / Good journalism or peace journalism? (David Loyn) / Situating peace journalism in journalism studies (Thomas Hanitzsch) / Peace journalism and its discontents (Jake Lynch) / In defense of peace journalism (Samuel Peleg) / Counterpleas (David Loyn, Thomas Hanitzsch, Samuel Peleg & Jake Lynch) / Peace Journalism: A tightrope walk between advocacy journalism and constructive conflict coverage (Wilhelm Kempf)

verlag irena regener berlin
ostseestr. 109
d – 10409 berlin

fax: #49-30-42 85 67 62
www.regener-online.de
eMail: verlag@regener-online.de